SZRNN v Minister for Immigration
[2013] FMCA 98
•18 February 2013
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZRNN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2013] FMCA 98 |
| MIGRATION – Review of decision by Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error – whether Refugee Review Tribunal breached the rules of natural justice – whether Refugee Review Tribunal’s adverse credibility findings were open on the evidence and material before it – whether Refugee Review Tribunal acted in bad faith – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
| Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 36, 65, 91R, 474, Pt.7, Pt.8 |
| NAFF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1 Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang and Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG [2010] FCAFC 51 NAKF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 730 SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507 Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425 NADH of 2001 & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 214 ALR 264 |
| Applicant: | SZRNN |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1216 of 2012 |
| Judgment of: | Emmett FM |
| Hearing date: | 18 February 2013 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 18 February 2013 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 18 February 2013 |
REPRESENTATION
| The applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter in the Nepalese language. |
| Appearing for the Respondents: | Ms K Hooper |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | DLA Piper |
ORDERS
The proceeding before this Court, commenced by way of application filed on 4 June 2012, is dismissed.
The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent fixed in the amount of $5,000.
NOTE: The application for costs is in accordance with the relevant schedule in the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1216 of 2012
| SZRNN |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
EX TEMPORE
This is an application pursuant to s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Pt.8, Div.2 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 30 April 2012 and handed down on 1 May 2012.
The applicant claims to be a citizen of Nepal and of Hindu faith and Brahmin ethnicity.
Prior to considering the proceeding before this Court, these Reasons provide the relevant procedural background, a summary of the legislative framework, a summary of the applicant’s protection visa application claims and the decision of the delegate of the first respondent (“the Delegate”) and a summary of the Tribunal’s review and decision.
Background
The applicant arrived in Australia on 19 April 2009 having departed from Nepal on a passport issued in his own name and on a multiple-entry Student visa as a dependant which expired 14 June 2011.
On 14 June 2011, the applicant lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (“the Department”) under the Act.
On 8 August 2011, the Delegate refused the applicant’s application for a protection visa.
On 30 August 2011, the applicant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal.
On 1 May 2012, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate not to grant a protection visa.
On 4 June 2012, the applicant filed an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.
Legislative framework
In their written submissions in SZRLA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor (SYG929/2012), Minter Ellison, the solicitors for the first respondent, attached a useful summary of the relevant legislative scheme. That summary is as follows:
“1. Under section 65(1) of the Act, the first respondent may grant a visa if he is satisfied of a number of matters, including that the prescribed criteria for the particular visa have been satisfied.
2. Section 31(1) of the Act provides that there are to be prescribed classes of visa. One class of visa is a Protection (Class XA) visa (Regulation 2.01 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations) and to the Regulations).
3. Section 36(2)(a) of the Act provides that:
(2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the Applicant for the visa is:
(a) a non-citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.
4. The 'Refugees Convention' is defined in section 5 of the Act as meaning the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951. The 'Refugees Protocol' is defined in that section as meaning the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967.
5. Subject to certain exceptions, provided for in section 36(3) of the Act, Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention to persons who satisfy the definition of 'refugee' in Article 1 of the Refugees Convention. Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention defines a refugee as a person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
6. Section 36(2)(aa) of the Act provides that:
(2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm.
7. Under section 411(1)(c) of the Act, a decision to refuse to grant a protection visa is a decision which may be reviewed by the second respondent.
8. Relevantly, in conducting that review, the second respondent must comply with the natural justice hearing rule, the requirements of which are exhaustively stated in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act (section 422B(1) of the Act). That Division contains sections 424A and 425, which provide that:
424A Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal
(1) Subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must:
(a) give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review.
425 Tribunal must invite applicant to appear
(1) The Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.
9. Under section 474(2) of the Act, a decision of the second respondent is a 'privative clause decision'. Under section 474(1)(a) of the Act, a privative clause decision is final and conclusive.
10. However, a purported decision of the second respondent which is affected by jurisdictional error is not a decision which is made under the Act and therefore is not a privative clause decision: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476.”
The applicant’s application for a protection visa
The applicant provided a statement in support of his protection visa application in which he gave the following reasons for claiming protection:
a)The applicant has been involved in the Nepali Congress Party (NCP) and has received threats from the Maoists that they would kill him if he continued his support for the NCP.
b)From 1998 til 2005, the applicant was employed with the Waling Municipality, Syangja. During his employment with the Municipality, he was threatened with violence and pressured to make donations to the Maoists.
c)In 2002, the applicant was abducted by the Maoists and held in custody by them for three days. Whilst in captivity, the applicant was beaten, money was placed in his mouth and a gun was fired near his ears. Following the abduction, the applicant felt like his ‘mind did not work’. As a result of the incident, he took medication for three months.
d)The Maoists threatened the applicant’s wife that they would kill the Applicant if she informed the police about the abduction.
e)In 2008, the applicant was forced to make two donations of 100,000 rupees to the Maoists.
f)The applicant began protesting the Maoists and publicly called for them to give back land and houses they had seized.
g)The applicant believes that if he returns to Nepal, he will be harmed or mistreated by Maoists, Maoist YCL and others who hold opposing political views to him. He also fears that he will not be protected from such mistreatment by authorities in Nepal.
The Delegate’s decision
On 4 August 2011, the applicant attended an interview with the Delegate.
On 8 August 2011, the Delegate refused the applicant’s application for a protection visa on the basis that the applicant is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention.
The Delegate did not accept the applicant’s claims of past harm and found that his entry into Australia was to seek work and not to flee persecution. The Delegate found that the applicant was not of interest in Nepal because of any political opinion and is not of adverse interest to authorities in Nepal. The Delegate concluded that the applicant’s reasons for wishing to remain in Australia are not Convention related.
The Tribunal’s review and decision
On 30 August 2011, the applicant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the Tribunal.
The applicant provided no further documents in support of his review application.
On 7 October 2012, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant informing him that the Tribunal had considered the material before it but was unable to make a favourable decision on that material alone. The letter invited the applicant to attend a hearing on 10 November 2011 to give oral evidence and present arguments.
On 10 November 2011, the applicant attended the Tribunal hearing and gave evidence. At the conclusion of that hearing, the Tribunal noted that it put to the applicant various inconsistencies in his evidence and concerns about his evidence and told the applicant that it would consider his explanations.
Following the hearing on 10 November 2011, on 19 March 2012, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant inviting him to a further hearing to expand and clarify some issues and give the applicant an opportunity to make any claims under the newly introduced complementary protection criteria under s.36(2)(aa) of the Act.
On 16 April 2012, the applicant attended the further Tribunal hearing and gave further evidence.
At both hearings, the Tribunal explored the applicant’s claims with him extensively and put to the applicant matters of concern it had about his evidence. The Tribunal noted in detail the applicant’s responses. In particular, the Tribunal explored with the applicant the reasons for his delay in lodging his protection visa application as well as his claimed experiences in Nepal.
Ultimately, the Tribunal found the applicant’s explanations not to be credible. The Tribunal also found that there were significant omissions in his evidence which it identified in detail in the decision record, together with its concerns about particular inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence.
The Tribunal noted that the applicant said that there may have been interpreter problems. However, the Tribunal noted that it confirmed with the applicant at the beginning of each hearing that he understood the interpreter and asked the applicant to raise any particular issues with the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that the applicant did not raise any issue about interpreting at either of the hearings. The Tribunal further noted that there was no evidence before it of any specific interpreting problem or that any interpreting problems could explain the significant inconsistencies and omissions in the applicant’s evidence.
The Tribunal found the applicant not to be a witness of truth and comprehensively rejected his claims of past experiences in Nepal, his reasons for leaving Nepal and his fears of returning to Nepal.
Ultimately, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant has a well founded fear of persecution if he was to return to Nepal for any Convention reason. The Tribunal also found that “there are no substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm”.
The Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not satisfy the criterion for being a refugee as set out in s.36(2)(a) of the Act and was not satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa) of the Act.
Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.
The proceeding before this Court
The applicant was unrepresented before this Court, although had the assistance of a Nepalese interpreter.
On 29 June 2012, the applicant attended a directions hearing before me. I explained to the applicant that this Court had no power to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal, unless the Court is satisfied that the Tribunal’s decision is affected by a mistake going to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. I also explained to the applicant that the grounds of the application made bare assertions that were unsupported by particulars. The applicant confirmed that he wished to continue with the application.
The applicant was given leave to file and serve an amended application giving complete particulars of each ground of review relied upon, together with any further evidence by way of affidavit, including any transcript of the Tribunal hearing, as well as submissions in support.
At the directions hearing, the applicant was referred to the Court’s Legal Advice Scheme for free legal advice. The applicant has participated in the Court’s Legal Advice Scheme and received free legal advice. The applicant was also provided with the contact details of legal services providers and interpreting and translation services in documents headed in his own language.
At the commencement of the hearing, the applicant confirmed that he had not filed any amended application, evidence or submissions in support of his application and that he had no further documents to present to the Court this morning in support of his application.
The applicant confirmed that he relied on the grounds contained in an application filed on 4 June 2012 as follows:
“1. I argue that the Tribunal member’s decision in my case has been vitiated by an error of law as the only inference is that the Tribunal member failed to satisfy all its statutory requirements in dealing with my case.
2. I argue that the Tribunal member’s decision in relation to my case was taken in breach of the rules of natural justice.
3. I argue that the Tribunal Member failed to consider my evidence fairly and the Member established that in initial disbelief of my credibility on one matter and failed to consider my entire evidence in a new light whereas I truthfully gave the Tribunal Member my evidence in relation to claims. Thus the substantial conclusion reached by the Tribunal member was poorly justified in my case.
4. I believe the Tribunal Member failed to act in a good faith in my case as my truthful evidence was undermined by the Tribunal Member’s arbitrary view.”
Each of the grounds was interpreted for the assistance of the applicant and the applicant was invited to make submissions in support of each of the grounds and in support of the application generally.
Ground 1
Ground 1 was not supported by particulars, evidence or submissions.
In support of ground 1, the applicant repeated on several occasions that the Tribunal had not looked after his case properly and had not decided in his favour. The applicant said that he had told the truth to the Tribunal and that his history had not been considered.
A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record does not identify any failure by the Tribunal to satisfy the statutory requirements in considering whether the applicant met the criteria under the Refugees Convention. The documents relevant to the applicant’s review by the Tribunal were tendered to the Court in a “Court Book”, filed 28 June 2012, and marked Exhibit 1R. Exhibit 1R makes clear that the Tribunal complied with its statutory obligations under Pt.7, Div.4 of the Act in the conduct of its review.
The applicant did not identify any particular manner in which the Tribunal failed to look after his case properly, as alleged, or provide any particulars as to the way in which his story had not been considered by the Tribunal.
There was no transcript of the Tribunal hearing provided to this Court, nor did the applicant provide any evidence to this Court to suggest that the Tribunal’s decision record is not accurate. At the directions hearing on 29 June 2012 the Applicant was given an opportunity to file a transcript of the Tribunal hearing. The applicant was also directed to give notice if he wished to rely on recordings of the hearing. However, no step was taken by the applicant to rely on any such evidence. In the circumstances, the Court accepts as accurate the Tribunal’s summary of the oral evidence given by the applicant and exchanges it had with the applicant at the Tribunal hearing. The Court is entitled to accept the Tribunal’s decision record as accurately reflecting the matters to which it refers as taking place at the hearing in the absence of any evidence to the contrary (NAFF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1).
Further, it is well established that the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any and all claims made by an applicant (Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 per Beaumont J; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596 Kirby J; Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70 per Wilcox J). Nor does the Tribunal have to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out (Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348 per Heerey J).
As summarised above in these reasons, the Tribunal’s decision record discloses a detailed exchange with the applicant by the Tribunal at two hearings at which the applicant’s claims were explored with him and the Tribunal’s concerns about his evidence put to him for comment.
The Tribunal’s findings were open to it on the materials and evidence before it, and for the reasons it gave, including its adverse credibility findings. Credibility findings are a matter par excellence for the Tribunal (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67] per McHugh J).
In the circumstances, ground 1 does not identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal and appears more to be a disagreement with the findings and conclusions of the Tribunal. Such complaints invite merits review which this Court cannot undertake (Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 53-54; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang and Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
The following was stated in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG [2010] FCAFC 51 at [20] by the Court:
“It was not for the Federal Magistrate’s Court, nor for this Court, to review the merits of the RRT’s decision: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611. A wrong finding of fact is not an error of law: Waterford v The Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 at 77. Unsound reasoning is not an error of law: Reg v The District Court; Ex parte White (1966) 116 CLR 644 at 654; Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 356.”
Accordingly, ground 1 is not made out.
Ground 2
Ground 2 was not supported by particulars, evidence or submissions.
In support of ground 2, the applicant said no more than that he was not satisfied with the Tribunal’s decision.
I asked the applicant in what way did the Tribunal breach the rules of natural justice. The applicant responded that he had told his story to the Tribunal but that perhaps the Tribunal had misunderstood his claims. The applicant then again repeated his complaint that the Tribunal had not looked after his case properly.
To the extent that in ground 2 the applicant complained that the Tribunal may have misunderstood his claims a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record does not support such a complaint. The Tribunal accurately summarised the applicant’s written complaints. In the absence of any identified error by the applicant in the Tribunal’s summary of his interview with the Delegate, the Tribunal also summarised the applicant’s interview with the Delegate.
Otherwise, the Tribunal’s decision record does not disclose any misunderstanding by the Tribunal on the face of the decision record. As stated above, the Tribunal’s decision record discloses detailed accounts of the evidence given by the applicant. In particular, the Tribunal noted that it invited the applicant to comment or respond to information that it considered to be the reason for affirming the decision under review. Such information included the evidence that the Tribunal found the applicant had omitted to give to the Delegate, evidence that the applicant had given to the Tribunal that was inconsistent with other evidence and information in his student visa application. The Tribunal noted that it explained to the applicant that he could ask for additional time to comment or respond and noted that the applicant said he did not want more time.
To the extent that the applicant said there may have been interpreting problems as part of his explanations in addressing the Tribunal’s concerns, the Tribunal noted that it had confirmed with the applicant at the beginning of each hearing that he understood the interpreter and asked the applicant to raise any particular issues with the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that the applicant did not raise any issue about interpreting at either of the hearings. The Tribunal found that there was no evidence before it of any specific interpreting problem or that any interpreting problems could explain the significant inconsistencies and omissions in the applicant’s evidence. Those findings were open to the Tribunal on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave.
Again, ground 2 otherwise invites merits review which this Court cannot undertake.
Accordingly, ground 2 is not made out.
Ground 3
Ground 3 was not supported by particulars, evidence or submissions.
The applicant made no relevant submission in support of ground 3 and did no more than ask the Court to send his case back to the Tribunal.
The changing and expanding nature of the applicant’s claims was a matter that the Tribunal was entitled to take into account in considering the applicant’s claims and assessing his credibility. As stated above, the Tribunal’s adverse credibility findings were open to it on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave.
To the extent that ground 3 asserts that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s evidence fairly, such an assertion is not made out on the face of the Tribunal’s decision record and otherwise remains wholly unparticularised by the applicant. In the circumstances, such a bare complaint does not identify an error capable of review by this Court.
Otherwise, the complaints in ground 3 are addressed in grounds 1 and 2 above, and again do no more than cavil with the merits of the Tribunal’s decision.
Accordingly, ground 3 is not made out.
Ground 4
Ground 4 was not supported by particulars, evidence or submissions.
In support of ground 4, the applicant repeated his complaint that the Tribunal did not look at his case properly.
To the extent that ground 4 asserts that the Tribunal failed to act in good faith, the applicant failed to particularise any dishonesty, fraud, malevolence, spite or other personal motivation for bad faith on the part of the Tribunal and none is apparent on the face of the Tribunal’s decision record. In the circumstances, the applicant’s complaint that the Tribunal did not act in good faith is no more than a bare assertion that is wholly unsubstantiated and does not by itself demonstrate jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal (see NAKF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 730 at [16] per Gyles J)
To the extent that ground 4 suggests a complaint of bias on the part of the Tribunal, such a claim of bias is serious and requires evidence, such as a transcript of the Tribunal hearing. Further, it is a rare and exceptional case where bias can be demonstrated solely from the published reasons of a decision. Similarly, the mere fact that the Tribunal makes adverse findings in respect of the Applicant does not give rise to an inference of bias or, by itself, suggest that the decision-maker approached its task other than with a mind open to persuasion (SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 at [38]).
A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record does not disclose any prejudgment on the part of the Tribunal in the sense that the Tribunal was “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, or of being persuaded differently, whatever evidence or argument may be presented.” (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [69], [71]-[72], [127]).
A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record does not suggest that the Tribunal approached its task other than with a mind open to persuasion. There is no evidence upon which a fair minded lay observer, properly informed as to the nature of the proceedings, the matters in issue and the conduct of the Tribunal, might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal may not have brought an impartial mind in determining the application for review (Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425 at [27]-[32]; NADH of 2001 & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 214 ALR 264 at [115]).
Otherwise, again, ground 4 also cavils with the Tribunal’s findings and conclusions, thereby inviting merits review which this Court cannot undertake.
Accordingly, ground 4 is not made out.
Conclusion
A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal understood the claims being made by the applicant; explored those claims with the applicant at a hearing; and, had regard to all material provided in support. The Tribunal put to the applicant matters of concern it had about his evidence and noted the applicant’s responses. The Tribunal also put to the applicant independent country information before it and invited the applicant to comment upon it. The Tribunal also identified independent country information to which it had regard. The Tribunal then made findings based on the evidence and material before it. Those findings of fact were open to the Tribunal on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave. A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal reached conclusions based on the findings made by it and to which it applied the correct law.
In the circumstances, the Tribunal complied with its obligations under the statutory regime in the making of its decision, including the conduct of its review.
The Tribunal’s decision is not affected by jurisdictional error and is therefore a privative clause decision. Accordingly, pursuant to s.474 of the Act, this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere.
The proceeding before this Court should be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding seventy-one (71) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Emmett FM
Deputy Associate:
Date: 18 February 2013
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