SZRBX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZRBX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 404

Citation: SZRBX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 404
Appeal from: SZRBX and anor v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FMCA 1197
Parties: SZRBX and SZRBY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 41 of 2013
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 8 May 2013
Catchwords: MIGRATION –  appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error –whether Refugee Review Tribunal considered the totality of the appellants’ claims in their context
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 420, 424, 424A, 430
Cases cited: Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2000] FCA 1478
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
MZWPD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2006] FCA 1095
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30, 77 ALJR 1165
Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 90 FCR 287
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164
SZGUW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 91
SZGUW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 108 ALD 108
SZOVB v Minister for Immigration (2011) 125 ALD 38
SZRBX and anor v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FMCA 1197
W352 v Minister for Immigration [2002] FCA 398
Date of hearing: 29 April 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 41
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr L Karp
Solicitor for the Appellants: Kinslor Prince Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Smith
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent did not appear
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 41 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZRBX
First Appellant

SZRBY
Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 MAY 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The first appellant pay the first respondent’s costs in the amount of $5000.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 41 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZRBX
First Appellant

SZRBY
Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE:

8 MAY 2013

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The appeal raises a single issue as to whether Nicholls FM (as his Honour then was as a Member of the Federal Magistrate’s Court) erred in not accepting the appellants’ argument that the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) committed a jurisdictional error in allegedly…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 404
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZRBX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved an appeal by the first appellant against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The appellant sought refugee status, claiming persecution by the Karuna Group, a paramilitary group in Sri Lanka. The central issue was whether the RRT's decision was affected by jurisdictional error, specifically whether the Tribunal had failed to consider the totality of the appellant's claims in their context.

The court was required to determine if the RRT's reasons demonstrated that it had properly considered the appellant's claims, including those related to events before and after the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka. The Minister for Immigration and Citizenship argued that the RRT had adequately addressed the appellant's claims, and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia had correctly rejected the appellant's argument regarding the jurisdictional error. The court needed to assess whether the RRT's acceptance of the appellant's claims about earlier harassment rendered irrelevant his claims of future harassment, particularly when those claims were rejected.

The court found that the RRT had indeed considered the totality of the appellant's claims. It had detailed the appellant's claims in its reasons, particularly focusing on the period leading up to the end of the civil war. The RRT accepted the appellant's claims about his earlier harassment but rejected his claims concerning the subsequent period. The court concluded that the RRT's acceptance of the appellant's earlier problems did not make his claims of future harassment irrelevant, especially since those claims were rejected. Therefore, the court upheld the RRT's decision and dismissed the appeal.

The final orders were that the appeal be dismissed and that the first appellant pay the first respondent's costs in the amount of $5000.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The first appellant pay the first respondent’s costs in the amount of $5000.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The first appellant’s claims may be summarised as follows (largely adopting what is set out in the appellants’ written outline of submissions filed in the appeal to the Court): (a)he and his family are from Batticoloa area of eastern Sri Lanka. They owned and cultivated rice and coconuts on several farms in the area, including at Sinna Urani, Valaichenai and Nasivantivu. After his father’s death the first appellant took over management of these farms;(b)he was also interested in drama. He acted at school and later joined a drama company registered in Colombo. The drama group performed in Colombo and in the northern and eastern provinces at religious and cultural festivals and at LTTE “Heroes Day” celebrations; (c)at some time prior to 2001 the LTTE infiltrated the areas where the first appellant’s farms were located. He was abducted by the LTTE and ordered to undertake military training. He escaped this by promising to give the LTTE coconuts on a regular basis; (d)he was suspected of LTTE involvement by the military, and he was subject to “continuous arrest”. He married in 1998, and this helped to allay suspicions of LTTE involvement at that time; (e)he also started a business selling garments, and did well because of the scarcity of the products. In about 2007 the first appellant registered a new business under his name for his wife who was qualified as a beautician; (f)in 2001 he and his labourers were arrested at his farm in Nasivantivu for suspected LTTE involvement. The first appellant was held for two months, interrogated about his involvement with the LTTE and was released with the aid of politicians. He had to register with the police at Batticoloa until a peace accord between the LTTE and the government was signed in February 2002; (g)during the period of the peace accord the first appellant was able to travel freely. Tourists came more frequently to the area (the Nasivantivu property was close to the beach), and Sri Lankan Army troops were stationed nearby to protect the tourists. During this time the LTTE ordered the first appellant to give work to their cadres on his farms. The LTTE cadres controlled the farms, and trained new recruits on the coconut estates. They also used the first appellant’s property and equipment to store and transport arms and ammunition; (h)the Batticoloa commander of the LTTE, a man nicknamed “Karuna”, broke with the LTTE leadership in early 2004. Fighting started between Karuna’s cadres and those loyal to the LTTE. The cadres on the first appellant’s farm at Nasivantivu joined Karuna, who joined with the Sri Lankan Army and another Tamil group, the EPDP, which had already sided with the government. The first appellant stopped travelling to Nasivantivu and concentrated on his garment business and his drama activities; (i)the situation in eastern Sri Lanka was deteriorating even while the peace accord was in existence, and in January 2007 the accord was completely scrapped. The Sri Lankan Army and the paramilitaries started to arrest Tamils who had given money and support to the LTTE. Around December 2009 the Army and the government handed over control of the administration of Batticoloa to the paramilitaries (of which Karuna’s group was one). The first appellant’s attempts to leave Sri Lanka with the drama group failed; (j)around December 2009 Karuna cadres ordered the first appellant to report at their camp, which was close to his home. They sought details of his businesses and told him that they knew that he had served the LTTE and allowed them to use his farm and equipment at Nasivantivu. They also told him that they had seen his drama performances for the LTTE Heroes Day condemning the government. The told him to start farming once more, to give the proceeds to them, and to pay them Rs 10,000 per month or they would have him prosecuted and imprisoned. The first appellant started working his farm at Nasivantivu again; (k)during this time Karuna himself was inspecting the first appellant’s farm and other farms in Nasivantivu. The Army was concentrating on developing the land for tourism, and hotels had been built near an army camp to accommodate the tourists who were “flocking” to the area after the defeat of the LTTE; (l)the first appellant’s farm at Nasivantivu had been devastated by the tsunami in 2004, and he had to plant many trees. Some died and had to be removed, and his workers left because he could not pay them. The vegetables that he planted were taken by the army. He fell behind with his payments to the Karuna Group, and they assaulted him and took him to the Batticoloa army camp where he was further assaulted as an LTTE accomplice. He was ordered to pay Rs 50,000 per month from his other businesses until he could make his farm profitable. He agreed to do so to escape detention. He tried to go abroad but failed; (m)around November 2010 the paramilitaries ordered that the first appellant should attend their office immediately. His statement continued:When I went there they said that I had been found to have paid [the] LTTE more money than we paid them. When I refused to accept that accusation the paramilitaries told me that that they had been training along with the LTTE cadres in my coconut estate at Nasivantivu and had seen me treating the LTTE cadres with respect and had been supporting their policies. They further said that I had been giving my whole produce to them and even worked hard to assist the LTTE and gave food for the cadres at my farm. They further accused me of acting in dramas depicting the Tamil people’s sufferance during LTTE Heroes Day celebration and I could be sentenced to prison on that ground alone.(n)after the first appellant pleaded with them he was taken to see Karuna himself. Karuna had been to Nasivantivu when he was local LTTE commander and had met the first appellant there. Now, Karuna gave the appellant an ultimatum, if he wanted to stay out of prison he should transfer the land at Nasivantivu to him. The first appellant was forced to agree, and Karuna told him that if he were to tell anybody about this he would be shot on sight; (o)Karuna wanted the Nasivantivu land for sale for a tourist development. The first appellant was warned that once he transferred the property he would be sent to prison permanently so that he could not file a case against Karuna; (p)one of the first appellant’s brothers in Australia sponsored him to come here for the brother’s daughter’s coming of age ceremony. After he left, his wife told the paramilitaries that he had left without even telling her; and (q)at his Departmental interview of 26 May 2011 he claimed that three days beforehand, on 23 May, soldiers entered his home and threatened to shoot his wife. They had come searching for him because he had not complied with their demands. At that interview he also claimed that she was asked for money by those who were looking for him, and that she gave money. Summary of RRT’s reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submitted that the approach of the Court below was to consider the RRT’s reasons as a whole in light of a proper understanding of the obligations imposed by s 430(1) of the Act. That approach led his Honour to correctly reject the first appellant’s argument. Consideration The Minister’s submissions should be accepted. Nicholls J did not err in rejecting the appellants’ contention that the RRT had committed jurisdictional error by not considering the totality of the appellants’ claims in their context. As noted above, the RRT described at some length in that part of its reasons headed “Claims and Evidence” all of the first appellant’s claims, including detailed descriptions of various “problems” encountered by the first appellant in the period leading up to the end of the civil war (see, for example, the dual reference to “his problems” in [51]). In that part of the RRT’s reasons under the heading “Findings and Reasons”, the RRT set out in [102] a broad summary of the first appellant’s claims relating to that period. In the next paragraph the RRT broadly summarised the claims relating to the subsequent period. Then in [105] the RRT made clear that it accepted the first appellant’s claims relating to the first period, but rejected the claims concerning the second period. The reference in [105] to the first appellant having “had problems over the years because of the ongoing strife in Sri Lanka” is, as the Minister accepted, rather anodyne. Those “problems” (which the RRT accepted as having occurred) were not particularised by the RRT in [105]. But on a fair reading of the reasons, which should be read as a whole, there is little or no doubt in my mind that the “problems” being referred to are those which were broadly summarised by the RRT in [102] (where the very same term is used) and, in considerably more detail in the earlier part of the RRT’s reasons. As is evident from [105] of the RRT’s reasons, the RRT made favourable findings in respect of the claims relating to events leading up to the end of the civil war, but then proceeded to make unfavourable findings concerning the first appellant’s claims concerning the subsequent period. The appellants failed essentially because the RRT rejected the first appellant’s credibility in relation to the post-war claims. Its reasoning in this regard is set out in the multiple dot-points in [105] which immediately follow its description of the post-war claims which were not accepted. In my view, the primary judge did not err in rejecting the appellants’ argument that the RRT had failed to consider the totality of the appellants’ claims in their context. In particular, I accept the Minister’s submission that in circumstances where the RRT found that, contrary to the first appellant’s evidence, there was no adverse interest in him from December 2009, the reasons why he claimed that he had been harassed (and would, in the future, be harassed) became irrelevant. The RRT accepted in effect that he had suffered harassment in the earlier period but it rejected his claims concerning the latter period. In those circumstances, the RRT’s acceptance of the fact that he had experienced “problems” during the earlier period became irrelevant. Having said that, however, it seems to me clear that the primary judge was correct in holding that the RRT did in fact consider and determine the totality of the appellants’ claims in their context.