SZQFA v Minister for Immigration
[2011] FMCA 794
•14 October 2011
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZQFA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2011] FMCA 794 |
| MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal Decision – Refusal of a protection (class XA) visa – no reviewable error – application dismissed. The applicant in these proceedings is not to be identified pursuant to s.91X of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and was given the pseudonym SZQFA. |
| Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.91R |
| Abebe v The Commonwealth (1997) 197 CLR 510 Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 457 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV [2009] HCA 40 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJXO [2009] HCA 40 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 NAAH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 354 NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 NARE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 554 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 SZDFO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1192 SZNHS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1254 SZODW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 5 |
| Applicant: | SZQFA |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 874 of 2011 |
| Judgment of: | Lloyd-Jones FM |
| Hearing date: | 2 August 2011 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 14 October 2011 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant: | Appeared in person and was assisted by a Bengali – English interpreter |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Mr I Temby of Minter Ellison Lawyers |
ORDERS
The application filed on 4 May 2011 is dismissed.
The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 874 of 2011
| SZQFA |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
In accordance with the Court orders made on 31 May 2011, the solicitor for the first respondent was required to file a folder which was to be indexed, labelled and paginated, containing all documents which may be relevant to the hearing. This order was complied with and the volume of materials is identified as the Court Book (“CB”). On the day of the hearing the CB was marked as Exhibit “A” and is the only evidence before the Court.
At the first Court date directions hearing the applicant was granted leave to file and serve an amended application giving the complete particulars of each ground of review relied upon together with any supporting affidavit material. The applicant elected to pursue this option and filed an amended application on 15 July 2011. The applicant was also required to file and serve in the registry a short written outline of submissions and a list of authorities relied upon 14 days prior to the hearing. This order was complied with and the applicant’s outline of submissions was filed on 18 July 2011.
The Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) decision record of Tribunal Member Andrew Mullen dated 13 April 2011 RRT Case Reference No. 1100287 is the decision that is the subject of this review.
The Proceedings
The background material contained in the decision on record indicates that the applicant, who claims to be a citizen of Bangladesh, arrived in Australia on 27 June 2010 on a Business (short-stay) (subclass 456) visa and applied to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship for a Protection (class XA) visa on 22 July 2010. The delegate of the Minister decided to refuse to grant the visa on 16 December 2010 and notified the applicant of the decision and his review rights by letter dated the same day. The applicant applied to the Tribunal on
12 January 2011 for review of the delegate’s decision.
The Tribunal member summarised the written claims made by the applicant in his protection visa application indicating that he was born in Dhaka, Bangladesh in 1975 and had lived at an address in that city for the ten years preceding his arrival in Australia. He gives his religion as Islam and claims to read, speak and write Bengali.
He claims to have received a total of 16 years formal education in Dhaka ending in 2001 when he graduated with a bachelor’s degree and master’s degree in commerce. He claims to have been self-employed as the owner of a business from 1996 to 2010. He claims never to have been married and lists his mother and three siblings living in Bangladesh, and one sibling in the United States of America among family members and close relatives.
The applicant substantial claims are as follow:
a)He left Bangladesh because he feared persecution and if he returned he would be killed by his political opponents and enemies;
b)His opponents had already tried to kill him and they’d filed a false case against him. The police and other authorities would not protect him from the false case against him. The police are under pressure from political authorities and cannot protect him.
In his interview with the Department he gave more specific details about the circumstances of his claim. He stated that when he was working for the Awami League and running a successful business he encountered problems from one of its factions, together with opposition groups and some Jamaat Shibir people. Jamaat Shibir combined with two groups to harass him. The main problem arose when he protested against their anti-social activities such as extortion and muggings. They wanted to bring him down, demanding money from him and threatening to kill him. He tried to move out of politics gradually but they would not let this happen. They attacked his business. He tried to persuade them but they told him that he had to pay the money. He protested in 2009 but the group attacked him and bashed him. He was stabbed with a knife in the leg and suffered a fractured arm. He spent ten days in a Dhaka medical college.
He informed the delegate that he worked for the Awami League as a member and that he was also a polling agent. He took part in demonstrations and helped people to vote. He received his orders from Quazi Morshed Kamal. He submitted a certificate signed by this person on a letterhead of the “Dhanmondi Thana Awami League Dhaka City” dated 6 January 2010 attesting to his membership. Asked what he did at times other than elections he said he would distribute relief during natural disasters.
The Tribunal’s Findings and Reasons
On 12 January 2011 the applicant sought review of the delegate’s decision by the Tribunal (CB 83). On 20 January 2011 the Tribunal invited the applicant to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments relating to issues arising in his case (CB 96). The hearing before the Tribunal occurred on 22 March 2011 (CB 105) and was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Bengali and English languages (CB 106). On 13 April 2011 the Tribunal decided to affirm the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a Protection (class XA) visa (CB 109). The tribunal notified the applicant of that decision by letter on the same day (CB 108).
In setting out the following summary of the Tribunal’s decision I have relied upon the material prepared by the first respondent’s solicitors contained in their written submissions filed in these proceedings.
I have not made further direct attribution as this would make the summary unwieldy. The information was provided to assist in the understanding in the nature of the application.
The Tribunal found that:
a)The applicant’s evidence regarding his political activities in Bangladesh was “marked by considerable vagueness” (CB 121 at [60]);
b)Some of the applicant’s responses were inconsistent with his claims to membership of the Awami League (CB 121 at [60]);
c)The applicant’s inability to identify persons who had allegedly harmed him and wished to harm him raised “strong doubts as to the credibility of this area of his claims and of his account in general’ (CB 122 at [62]);
d)The applicant’s claim that traditionally bitter political rivals such as the Awami League and the BNP would collaborate to harm him was “so improbable that I do not accept it is true” and that it “cast further doubt over the credibility of his claims in general” (CB 122 at [63]);
e)The applicant’s delay of nearly 3 months departing from Bangladesh after being issued with an Australian visa to complete some interior design work was inconsistent with the actions of a person who was fearful for his life (CB 122 at [64]);
f)Given that independent country information available to the Tribunal suggests that fraudulent documents are readily available in Bangladesh, the Tribunal could not rely on the letters that the applicant submitted as evidence that he was a member of the Awami League and could not give weight to the applicant’s hospital discharge letter (CB 122 – 123 at [66] – [67]); and
g)In the context of the Tribunal’s findings in relation to the applicant’s credibility, the Tribunal found that his motive for joining the Awami League in Australia was only to strengthen his claim to be a refugee and the Tribunal accordingly disregarded that conduct as required by s.91R(3) of the Act (CB 123 at [71]).
On this basis the Tribunal found that it could not be satisfied that the applicant was “a member of a branch of the Awami League in Dhaka or that he had any affiliation with the party there or elsewhere in Bangladesh. I am not satisfied that he was targeted, attacked or subjected to extortion demands by the BNP, Jamaat Shibir or a faction of the Awami League, either in concert or separately. Nor am I satisfied that he was forced to flee his family home in Barisal to escape harm, or that he narrowly escaped another attack there” (CB 122 at [65]). The Tribunal also found that it was not satisfied that a false case had ever been brought against the applicant, as claimed in his protection visa application (but not otherwise mentioned by the applicant) (CB123 – 124 at [72]).
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that:
a)It was “not satisfied that the applicant has a well founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason should he return to Bangladesh now or in the reasonably foreseeable future” (CB 124 at [74]);
b)It was not satisfied that “the applicant was a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention” (CB 124 at [75]); and
c)Therefore “the applicant does not satisfy the criteria set out in s.36(2)(a) for a protection visa” (CB 124 at [75]).
Grounds of Review
In the original application filed on 4 May 2011 the following grounds were pleaded:
i)The Refugee Review Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction under the Migration Act and acted in excess of its jurisdiction;
ii)The Tribunal made the errors of law being jurisdictional errors that it did not put any weight to the relevant facts; and
iii)The Tribunal failed to give me natural justice according to law.
Leave was granted for the applicant to file an amended application which was complied on 15 July 2011, listing the following grounds:
i)The Refugee Review Tribunal failed to assess my credibility in whole, rather it focused on specific issues those were favourable to it;
ii)The Refugee Review Tribunal did not put any weight to the supporting documents those were favourable to my claims;
iii)The Refugee Review Tribunal failed to consider my fear of persecution under s91R of the Migration Act.
Consideration
The applicant filed written submissions in support of his grounds of review and indicated that he relied upon that document. Similarly, the solicitors for the first respondent filed detailed written submissions in response to the amended application and I will refer to both of those documents in respect of the relevant grounds set out below.
Ground One
The applicant submitted that the Tribunal failed to assess his credibility as a whole but rather focussed on specific issues that were not necessarily favourable to his position. He claims that under the assessment process the Tribunal ignored the supporting letters provided by the senior leaders in Bangladesh as well as a letter of support provided by the president of the Australian Awami League. The applicant claims that those supporting letters indicated that he was involved in politics and as a consequence had been ill treated by his opponents. However the Tribunal did not accept his involvement in Awami League politics and only took in to consideration that the applicant could not provide supporting information to satisfy the Tribunal. On this basis the Applicant claims that the Tribunal erred in assessing the applicant’s credibility as a whole.
It is submitted on behalf of the Minister that findings of fact, including findings of credibility, are within the proper exercise of the Tribunal’s function and the Minister relies upon the authority of Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 per McHugh J at [67]. I agree with the Minister’s submissions that it is open for the Tribunal to reject the applicant’s evidence as lacking credibility for the reasons set out in the decision record at [60] – [67] which is effectively summarised at paragraph [11] above.
It is submitted on behalf of the Minister that the Tribunal did not ignore the applicant’s supporting documents as contended in the applicant’s outline of submissions. Rather, it considered the documents and found that it could not give them any weight:
a)Due to a prevalence of fraudulent documents in Bangladesh (CB 122 – 123 at [66] – [67]);
b)Due to the strong concern that the Tribunal had as to the credibility of the applicant’s claims (CB 122 – 123 at [66]); and
c)In a case of the medical evidence submitted by the applicant the Tribunal’s concern that it was not a document which was consistent “as put to him at the hearing, the information provided in this document about his alleged injuries does not appear to be fully consistent with a level of detail which could reasonably be expected from a professionally qualified medical officer” (CB 123 at [67]).
The Tribunal’s adverse credibility finding and consequent rejection of the applicant’s claims is a matter for the Tribunal par excellence, see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham (supra) per McHugh J at [67] where his Honour stated:
… A finding on credibility which is the function of the primary decision-maker par excellence. If the primary decision-maker has stated that he or she does not believe a particular witness, no detailed reasons need to be given as to why that particular witness was not believed. The tribunal must give the reasons for its decision, not the sub-set of reasons why it accepted or rejected individual pieces of evidence. …
I am satisfied that the Tribunal’s findings in this respect were open to it on rational grounds based on the material before it and they disclose no error in its treatment of the applicant’s credibility: Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547. The Tribunal’s reasons for decision, which is the only evidence before the Court in relation to the conduct of the hearing, indicates the concerns it had about pieces of the applicant’s evidence and which it raised with him during the hearing. The applicant was unsuccessful because of the view the Tribunal took of the facts and, in particular, its finding that he was not credible.
In respect of the applicant’s reliance upon various documentation to support his claims the Tribunal made the following observations at [66] – [67]:
I have reached these conclusions having had regard to the two letters said to have been written by a local Member of Parliament and the Secretary General of the Applicant’s branch of the Awami League. As put to him at the hearing the independent country information available to the Tribunal indicates that fraudulent documents are easily obtained in Bangladesh and that, for humanitarian reasons, political parties are willing to issue letters confirming, untruthful, party membership. Given this background I am not satisfied that the letters outweigh my strong concern about the credibility of the Applicant’s claims or that reliance can be placed upon them as demonstrating that he was a member of the Awami League in Bangladesh.
The information about the availability of fraudulent documents in Bangladesh is also relevant for the hospital discharge letter submitted by the applicant. Further, as put to him at the hearing, the information provided in this document about his alleged injuries does not appear fully consistent with the level of details which could reasonably be expected from a professionally-qualified medical officer. Together with his demonstrated preparedness to remain in Bangladesh for a significant period after he was given the means of escape, despite his claim to have suffered one serious physical assault and to have been afraid of further attacks, these factors lead me to conclude that no weight can be placed on the discharge letter as evidence that the applicant was ever subjected to physical assault while he was in Bangladesh.
(CB 122 – 123)
The applicant claims that the Tribunal overlooked his supporting documentation, however, the Tribunal did have regard to the documents in that it actually summarised and dealt with those items in the manner that has been outlined above. It cannot be said that it did not take in to account the documentary elements of the applicant’s claim in the manner constituting jurisdictional error. Consequently, Ground One cannot be sustained.
Ground Two
Again, in the applicant’s written submissions he repeats the ground and then states that on the basis of the comment contained within ground two it is evident that the Tribunal did not put any weight on his documents because “independent country information available to the Tribunal indicates that fraudulent documents are easily obtained in Bangladesh”. The applicant submits that the documents that he submitted before the Tribunal were genuine and authentic. However the Tribunal did not make any investigation about their authenticity although all of the referees’ names and contact details were on the letterhead. The applicant submits that the assumption should not be acceptable in law. For example, Bangladeshi made fraudulent documents, he is a Bangladeshi then all of his documents are also fraudulent. The applicant submits that he feels dishonoured by this comment and that justice has not been provided to him.
I accept the written submissions made on behalf of the Minister that the weight that should be accorded to a particular piece of evidence is a matter for the Tribunal to decide: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 291. It is submitted on behalf of the Minister that ground two discloses no error on the part of the Tribunal Member and this is supported by the following items:
a)The Tribunal was entitled to have regard to, and give weight to, the independent country information available to it: SZODW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 5 at [25]; NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11];
b)The weight the Tribunal member gave to the applicant’s evidence was a matter for it to determine: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (supra) at 291 and a claim that the Tribunal failed to give any weight to an applicant’s evidence amounts to an impermissible attempt to engage the Court in a merits review of the Tribunal’s decision: SZNHS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1254 at [23]; NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (supra) at [11]; and
c)Once the Tribunal had decided it could not rely on the applicant’s supporting documents the Tribunal had no further duty to enquire in to the genuineness of the documents: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 at [43]. It is for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal as to his claims: Abebe v The Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [187].
The matter that must be considered is that an application for review of a decision of the Tribunal is not a merits review. It is not a hearing de novo. This Court in hearing the review does not make an assessment of the evidence and the applicant’s credibility. Judicial review, unlike merits review, focuses on the lawfulness of the earlier decision, not its appropriateness. The Court is asked whether the primary decision maker was authorised to do what they did under the prevailing law and not whether the actual decision is the best decision which could have been made in the circumstances. It is not appropriate for this Court when hearing a review to substitute its own view on the credibility or plausibility of the evidence to that of the primary decision maker. It is the Tribunal that conducts a full review, i.e. a merits review of an unfavourable decision by a delegate of the Minister.
As has been explained on numerous occasions and in particular by his Honour Allsop J in SZDFO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1192 and NARE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous [2003] FCA 554, and also by the Full Court in NAAH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 354 the Court cannot engage in a merits review and it is not part of its task to do so. Consequently ground two cannot be sustained and should be dismissed.
Ground Three
The applicant in his written submissions contends that the Tribunal failed to deal with his political activities in Australia as an Awami League activist. He states that the Tribunal failed to ask him any material questions as to how he would have been adversely affected by his political activities in Australia if he returned to Bangladesh.
He indicated that Mr Saragul Haque provided him with a reference in his capacity as the Secretary General of the Australian Branch of the Awami League. The applicant indicated that he had attended and participated in all the programs arranged by the Australian Awami League which were available to him as a member. The applicant claims, however, that the Tribunal failed to deal with his political activities in Australia. The applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to consider the fact that there is a strong possibility of his persecution if he returned to Bangladesh on the basis of his political activities in Australia.
It is submitted on behalf of the Minister that this ground cannot succeed because:
a)The Tribunal did properly consider whether the applicant feared persecution under s.91R; and
b)The Tribunal was required to disregard the applicant’s political activities in Australia when assessing whether the applicant had a well founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh as a result of its finding that the applicant had engaged in these activities solely for the purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee.
It is submitted on behalf of the Minister that the Tribunal properly stated the requirements of s.91R at paragraphs [11] – [15] of its decision (CB 111). The Tribunal identified the three conditions present in s.91R(1) and the examples of “serious harm” provided in section s.91R(2) (CB 111). The Tribunal then considered the applicant’s claims against those conditions but rejected all of the applicant’s claims as to his fear of persecution on the basis of adverse credibility findings set out at paragraphs [60] – [64] of its reasons (CB 121 – 122). The Tribunal accordingly found that it could not be satisfied that the applicant “ever suffered harm in Bangladesh because of his political opinion or because he was a target for extortion by criminals with political connections” (CB 124 at [73]) and that it was “not satisfied that there is a real chance he could suffer harm in Bangladesh in future for those reasons” (CB 124 at [73]). The Minister argues that the Tribunal properly considered whether the applicant feared persecution of the type contemplated by Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention, as qualified by s.91R of the Act.
One of the Tribunal’s findings was that it could not be satisfied that the applicant was “a member of a branch of the Awami League in Dhaka or that he had any affiliation with the party there or elsewhere in Bangladesh. I am not satisfied that he was targeted, attacked or subjected to extortion demands by the BNP, Jamaat Shibir or a faction of the Awami League, either in concert or separately. Nor am I satisfied that he was forced to flee his family home in Barisal to escape harm or that he narrowly escaped another attack there” (CB 122 at [65]). Against this finding it is submitted that it is open to the Tribunal to find, as it did, that it was “not satisfied that his motive for joining and participating in the activities of the Awami League in Australia has been other than to strengthen his claim to be a refugee” (CB 123 at [71]).
Section 91R(3) of the Act provides that when determining whether the person has a well founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, a decision maker must “disregard any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia” unless “the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee”. As the applicant has failed to satisfy the Tribunal in this regard it is submitted that the Tribunal was required by s.91R(3) of the Act to disregard the applicant’s participation in the Awami League in Australia as it stated that it did at [71] of the decision on record (CB 123).
The meaning of s.91R(3) was considered by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV [2009] HCA 40 where the Court held that the section requires:
“that conduct [engaged in within Australia] which has as its sole purpose the creation of a claim to a well founded fear of persecution, should not be taken in to account.”
The High Court further stated that the Tribunal is to disregard conduct in Australia unless satisfied that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee if it is determined that evidence of the conduct will strengthen the claim.
The Tribunal accepted that the applicant “joined the Australian branch of the Awami League and that he has involved himself in some of its activities and made donations to it (CB 123 at [71]). This answers the applicant’s bare complaint in the grounds as pleaded that the Tribunal failed to consider his political activities in Australia as an Awami League activist. The complaint that the Tribunal disregarded this conduct for the purposes of s.91R(3) amounted to a failure to understand the correct operation of s.91R. As was explained by the High Court by French CJ and Bell J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (supra) at [7] and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJXO [2009] HCA 40 s.91R(3) operates as a command to the Minister and, ultimately and relevantly to the current proceedings, the Tribunal. This command is to consider whether “an applicant seeking to rely upon conduct engaged in in Australia” has shown “that the conduct was not engaged in solely to strengthen his or her claim” (SZJGV at [13] and per Crennan and Keifel JJ at [53] - [65]).
In the current case the Tribunal complied with this command.
It ascertained that there had been certain conduct in Australia. It was not persuaded, however, that that conduct was engaged in other than for the purposes of the applicant strengthening his refugee claim. The Tribunal is the arbitrator of fact as to the purpose of the conduct. The applicant may claim that he had a different purpose for joining the Australian operations of the Awami League, but it is for the Tribunal to decide based on what is before it. In the current case it was open to the Tribunal to find it was not satisfied that the applicant participated in the activities of the Australian branch of the Awami League other than for the purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee. Given the applicant’s oral evidence and the contents of the letter from Mr Sirajul Haque, the President of the local branch of the Awami League, it was open to the Tribunal to make its findings. Once having found this the Tribunal was bound to disregard this conduct pursuant to s.91R (3).
In this sense the Tribunal did not fail to consider the conduct as submitted by the applicant but properly disregarded it in deciding whether the applicant had a well founded fear of Convention related persecution if he were to return to Bangladesh.
It is noted that the applicant arrived in Australia on 27 June 2010 and lodged his protection visa application on 27 July 2010. There is a complete absence of any evidence as to when the applicant joined the Australian branch of the Awami League and whether that occurred prior to the filing of his protection visa application. No argument has been advanced by the applicant that his membership was undertaken prior to lodging the protection visa application and if that had been advanced the time frame would be less than one month for any prior registration of the League membership. The language of s.91R(3) is directed to conduct undertaken to strengthen an applicant’s claim t be a refugee, not necessarily for a protection visa. This distinction means that the timing of the making of any such application for a protection visa and the membership is not relevant. There is no limitation on the Tribunal considering only conduct engaged in after a protection visa application has been lodged. This section is clearly directed at any conduct engaged in in Australia. There is no time limitation.
Consequently Ground Three cannot be sustained and should be dismissed.
Conclusion
Although the applicant is a self-represented litigant, he has received assistance from a legally qualified panel advisor in reviewing his case and although the panel advisor did not prepare an amended application for the applicant he has taken the opportunity to take the step of filing an amendment. It was apparent at the Court hearing that the applicant did not fully comprehend the issues ventilated and the only written submissions which were made by him and upon which he relied were in effect a restatement of the contents of the grounds of review in the amended application.
I am satisfied that the written submissions tendered by the Minister adequately address all of the issues raised in the grounds of review and that none of those grounds can be sustained and should be dismissed. On a fair reading of the Court Book and the Tribunal decision it is not apparent from the face of those documents that any jurisdictional error is apparent. Consequently the application should be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-eight (38) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Lloyd-Jones FM
Date: 14 October 2011
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