SZQBF v Minister for Immigration

[2011] FMCA 708

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZQBF & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2011] FMCA 708

MIGRATION – Review of decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal – applicant assisted by unnamed migration agent – exploitation by agent – impermissible merits review – whether Tribunal biased – whether Tribunal set up as arbiter of religious knowledge – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.91R, 425, 476
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.11.11

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang[1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 136 ALR 481
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 194 ALR 244
Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184
Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507
SBBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361; (2002) 194 ALR 749
VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872; (2003) 131 FCR 102
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP [2010] FCAFC 108

First Applicant: SZQBF

Second Applicant: SZQBG

Third Applicant: SZQBH

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 518 of 2011

Judgment of: Nicholls FM

Hearing date: 31 August 2011

Date of Last Submission: 31 August 2011

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 31 August 2011

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant: In Person

Second and Third Applicants: By their litigation guardian

Appearing for the Respondents: Ms E Baggett

Solicitors for the Respondents: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

1. That the first named applicant be appointed the litigation guardian for the second and third named applicants.

2. The application made on 22 March 2011 is dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $3,700.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 518 of 2011

SZQBF

Applicant

SZQBG

Second Applicant

SZQBH

Third Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Ex Tempore; Revised from Transcript)

1. I have before me today an application made on 22 March 2011 pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), seeking review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 24 February 2011 which affirmed the decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister to refuse protection visas to the applicants.

Background

1. The applicants are a family unit consisting of a mother (“the applicant”), her daughter and son. All are citizens of the People’s Republic of China (“China”). All of the applicants arrived in Australia with a visitor’s visa. The applicants applied for protection on 13 August 2010.

Claims to Protection

1. The applicant’s claims to protection were set out in a statement annexed to her protection visa application (CB 37 to CB 40). The second and third applicants applied as members of her family unit (CB 25 to CB 36).

2. The applicant’s claims were, variously, that she was married by arrangement and later had two children with her husband. The birth of the applicant’s second child resulted in the Chinese authorities imposing a penalty on the applicant under the Chinese family planning laws (CB 37.4). In 2002 the applicant divorced her husband.

3. She claimed that the breakdown of her marriage, along with the penalty imposed on her, “put major trauma on [her]… [her] heart was deeply hurt and [she] lost faith in life for a few times” (CB 37.5). The applicant claimed then to have moved to the countryside with her children and began to practice Buddhism (CB 37.7).

4. The applicant also claimed that in 2005 the local authorities forcibly resumed land that she occupied, but “… a few villagers were unconvinced by such unfair situation and tried to appeal to higher authority but ended up being suppressed and persecuted by the government” (CB 37.8).

5. The applicant claimed that in 2008 she became seriously ill, causing her to consult doctors and take medication (CB 37.9). The lack of success with this course caused the applicant to have a “witch in the village to perform an exorcism”, but that she still “remained possessed by demon of illness” (CB 37.9).

6. The applicant then claimed that in 2009 a family member brought a priest from Taiwan to her village who taught her about Christianity.

   
   

   It was after this visit that the applicant claimed to have begun to read the Bible and attend a “family church” (CB 38.4).

7. The applicant also claimed that in one weekend in March 2010 the police raided a family gathering being held on her premises where “… everybody was physically searched and brought back to the police station. All copies of the Bible and the video discs were seized” (CB 39.2). She was detained for five days, during which time she was abused and persecuted. She claimed that she was granted bail after her family paid a large bribe (CB 39.5). The applicant also claimed that the police accused her of having a “connection with foreign cults and [she] was accused of being an enemy of the country, destroying the harmony of the society” (CB 39.4).

8. She claimed to have been under pressure from the police because she was required to report on a regular basis, and was also subject to random directions to report to police (CB 39.5). This caused her business to be affected and she ceased trading (CB 39.3 and CB 39.6).

9. The applicant, however, claimed that she continued to secretly gather in various places with other practising Christians. She was told on one occasion by a police informant of a potential raid on one of their gatherings. This prevented the group from being detained, but their materials were confiscated and there was a further search of her house by the police (CB 39.7).

10. The applicant also claimed difficulties endured by her children at school as a result of pressure that they were placed under because of her claimed religious association (CB 39). She then recounted how, with the aid of a people smuggler, she travelled to Singapore, Malaysia and then ultimately arrived in Australia (CB 40).

The Delegate

1. The applicant was invited to attend an interview before the Minister’s delegate in October 2010 (CB 44 to CB 47). The delegate had before her a number of documents referring to the psychiatric condition of the applicant’s daughter (CB 50 to CB 51), documents relating to the daughter’s schooling (CB 53 to CB 55), and a letter from a Minister of the local church which the applicant attended with her children (CB 52), and photographs (CB 49).

2. The delegate was satisfied that the applicant was a practising Christian, but found that she did not hold a profile that would draw her to the adverse attention of the Chinese authorities. The delegate found that this finding was further supported by what the applicant had said at the interview. That is, that she had remained for one month in her village after the second raid on the church gathering, and for two months in a nearby town on her return from Malaysia, without being approached by the police. Additionally, the delegate noted that the applicant and her children had travelled twice out of China on their own passports without interference by the authorities (CB 64).

The Tribunal

1. The applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision on 22 November 2010 (CB 68 to CB 71). The applicants were invited to attend a hearing before it scheduled for 1 February 2011 (CB 76 to CB 77). Before the hearing a Tribunal officer contacted the applicant requesting that her daughter be available to give evidence (CB 81 to CB 82). Both the applicant and her daughter ultimately attended the hearing (CB 83 to CB 85). The Tribunal had before it a letter from a minister of a local church, which stated that the applicant had been a regular worshipper while residing in Australia (CB 87).

2. On 14 February 2011, after the hearing, the Tribunal received a letter from the applicant dated 11 February 2011 complaining about the conduct of the hearing. In particular, that while the applicant was providing answers to the Tribunal’s questions she claimed to have been interrupted by the interpreter, which caused her to lose her “stream of consciousness” before the next question was posed by the Tribunal. The applicant requested a second hearing to enable her, and her daughter, another opportunity to give evidence (CB 115).

3. The Tribunal refused this request (CB 117). In its decision record the Tribunal explained that it did not offer another hearing to the applicant as it had formed the view that the applicant and her daughter had had a sufficient opportunity to present their claims, and there was nothing to suggest that the applicant had any new information to offer. The Tribunal also noted that at no stage during the hearing did the applicant indicate that there were issues with the interpreting service provided ([43] at CB 136).

4. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had experienced some difficulties with the authorities in China in the past, and also that she had experienced what could be described as personal difficulties ([53] at CB 139). In essence, these difficulties related to her divorce and the “one child” policy in China, and to events in 2001 and 2002. The Tribunal found, however, that these difficulties did not have a Refugees Convention nexus. The Tribunal also accepted that the applicant had been harassed by the authorities in relation to her business and the forced relocation in 2005. However, it found that the former did not amount to serious harm. Both the former and the latter elements did not have a Refugees Convention nexus.

5. The applicant’s central and immediate claim before the Tribunal was to fear harm on religious grounds because of her claimed involvement with the Local Church in China. The Tribunal noted in its analysis that it “had serious concerns about the applicant’s credibility”. This arose from the applicant having demonstrated very limited knowledge about Local Church practice and the Bible, the latter factor being found by the Tribunal to be a fundamental element at Local Church gatherings.

6. Further, the Tribunal was unconvinced that the applicant would have difficulty reading, or have a lack of understanding of the Bible’s appearance and content as a result of a lack of education, as it found that a “person with very limited education would know more about the Recovery version of the Bible than the applicant was able to demonstrate, given that she said in evidence she attended Local Church gatherings… two to three times a week for well over a year” ([51] at CB 139 and [56] at CB 140).

7. It further found that the applicant’s knowledge of Local Church practice “was extremely limited and superficial, and not consistent with that of a genuine practising member of the Local Church” ([56] at CB 140), and that this level of knowledge: “… could have been gained… by talking to a Local Church member or by reading a little about the Local Church” ([57] at CB 140). The Tribunal also took into account that the applicant did not attempt to introduce her children to the Local Church in China, nor to have them baptised in Australia ([57] at CB 140 to CB 141).

8. While the Tribunal accepted that the applicant had been harassed by local authorities and the events in 2005 ([54] to [55] at CB 140), it did not accept that the applicant had been arrested and detained because of her attendance at, or holding on her premises, Local Church gatherings. Nor did the Tribunal accept that after her arrest in March 2010 the applicant had to regularly report at a police station, or that she was on any wanted list. As a consequence, it also did not accept that her children (the second and third applicants) had been bullied at school because of the applicant’s alleged arrest or detention ([58] at CB 141).

9. The Tribunal made this finding on the basis that at the hearing the applicant’s account of the alleged arrest and detention was vague, which then became “confused and inconsistent when she was asked to explain what happened to her children during the claimed period of detention” ([59] at CB 141. See also [60] at CB 141). The Tribunal concluded that the applicant’s engagement in religious activities in Australia was done for the purpose of strengthening her claims to seek asylum and, pursuant to s.91R(3) of the Act, therefore disregarded this conduct ([63] at CB 142).

10. In all, therefore, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision because it found that the applicant had not suffered persecution in a Convention sense in the past. Further, that in considering whether there was a real chance of persecution in China in the foreseeable future, the Tribunal found that, given the applicant had fabricated essential aspects of her claims and her limited religious knowledge, it could not be satisfied that she would suffer persecution in the future. This conclusion was also informed by the applicant’s ability to travel out of, and to return to, China in 2010 without any adverse interest being displayed in her by the Chinese authorities.

Application to the Court

1. The applicant’s grounds, as they are set out in the application to the Court, are as follows:

   “1. I am a Chinese citizen and Christian who has been persecuted by Chinese government. I had been arrested by the corrupted government and police.

   2. I can not go back to China since I am very scared to be sentenced.

   3. The Chinese government still looks for me if I return. My friends told me not to go back since the police are still looking for me.”

2. As they stand, these grounds do not assert any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. They are in fact an affirmation of the claims made by the applicant to the Tribunal. As such, and even at their very highest, they can only be seen as a challenge to the merits of the Tribunal’s decision and to its factual findings. They cannot in any way be said to rise above a request for this Court to engage in impermissible merits review (Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang[1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 136 ALR 481 (“Wu Shan Liang”)). The grounds as stated therefore have no reasonable prospect of success. If that is all that the Court were to look at, the application to the Court can simply be dismissed on that basis.

3. However, when the Court also looks at the orders sought by the applicant, they are in the following terms:

   “1. I disagree with Immigration and RRT’s decision. They did not consider that I will be in danger if I return.

   2. RRT did not consider that I will be persecuted and in big trouble if I return home.

   3. RRT member questioned me at hearing made me feel very up sad. They never trusted me and I do not think they had the right attitude to my application. RRT should grant my application.”

4. To the extent that the applicant seeks an order in relation to the delegate’s decision, which could be implied from the reference to the disagreement to the “Immigration” decision, then the delegate’s decision is simply not reviewable by this Court. It is a “primary decision” within the meaning given to that term by s.476 of the Act. Not only was the decision reviewable by the Tribunal under Pt.7 of the Act, but it was in fact reviewed.

5. What can be said about the orders is that, as the Minister submits, probably two complaints can be shaped out of what is stated in the orders sought. That is, first, that the Tribunal failed to consider that the applicant would be in danger and would be persecuted if she returned to China. Second, the manner in which the Tribunal questioned the applicant at the hearing possibly seeks to encompass the refusal of the request for a further hearing. Implicit in this, the reference to the words “do not think they have the right attitude” may be an assertion of bias on the part of the Tribunal.

Before the Court

1. The applicant appeared in person before the Court. She was appointed as the litigation guardian for her children pursuant to r.11.11 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth). She was assisted by an interpreter in the Mandarin language. Ms E Baggett appeared for the respondent Minister.

2. Written submissions have been filed by the Minister, as indeed was a formal response. The applicant has put nothing further before the Court.

3. I note that the application, as I said earlier, was made on 22 March 2011. The applicant appeared at the first Court date on 6 April 2011.

   
   

   A number of orders were made giving the applicant the opportunity, amongst other things, to file, by way of affidavit, any evidence on which she would seek to rely, and indeed the filing and serving of written submissions. The applicant, upon her request, was also referred to a lawyer on the panel of the “RRT Legal Advice Scheme”. She confirmed to the Court today that she had consulted that lawyer.

4. The applicant also stated that she had received assistance from a migration agent in the drafting of the application to the Court, and in other matters pertaining to proceedings before the Court which were largely unspecified. The applicant refused to provide the Court with the name and business address details of this person, even though she said that she had paid money to this migration agent in relation to the commencement and the continuation of this migration litigation.

5. Ultimately, the applicant explained that she was fearful of this person, whom she understood to have underworld connections, and that she had been threatened by this person and told, if asked, not to reveal her name and details to the Court.

6. I adjourned the proceedings for a short period to enable Ms Baggett to obtain instructions on the question of whether the Court should press the applicant to provide these details.

7. Of particular concern was whether, first, the applicant had been the subject of exploitation and, second, whether the nature of the relief sought truly represented the applicant’s position (the agent may have been able to assist the applicant and the Court in this regard).

8. The instructions that Ms Baggett received, as she advised to the Court, were that the Minister shared the Court’s concerns in relation to yet another situation where a person before the Court in a vulnerable situation appears to have been the subject of exploitation, and in this case exploitation including threats in relation to matters before this Court. The Minister’s department would investigate the situation if the applicant were to provide details. However, the Minister was not asking the Court to direct or compel the applicant to provide these details.

9. On resumption, the applicant was asked again to provide details but indicated that she was fearful of doing so. In the circumstances, I could not see that it was appropriate or would serve any practical purpose to proceed down any avenue of compulsion requiring the applicant to provide this information.

10. In being as generous as the Court can be to an unrepresented applicant, what the Court is left with is, in essence, two complaints that can be said to be derived by way of the orders sought by the applicant (see [29] above).

11. It is the case that the first complaint, that is that the Tribunal failed to consider that the applicant would be in danger and would be persecuted if she returned to China, does not reveal any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. On what is before the Court, the Tribunal plainly considered each of the applicant’s claims and each aspect of her claims. In the circumstances there is no failure to exercise jurisdiction, as for example is described in such authorities Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 194 ALR 244 and Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184.

1. The applicant’s complaint now, in all the circumstances, can only be seen as a challenge to the Tribunal’s factual findings. In this regard the Tribunal made findings reasonably open to it on what was before it and for which it gave reasons. The applicant’s complaint really seeks impermissible merits review by this Court (Wu Shan Liang).

2. The second complaint takes issue with how the Tribunal is said to have questioned her at the hearing, and that this made her either sad or upset. The complaint asserts that the Tribunal did not have “the right attitude” towards her application.

3. What must immediately be noted, as I said to the applicant during the course of the hearing, is that the applicant has not, despite opportunity, provided any evidence to the Court to support her allegations. For example, no transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal has been put before the Court. All that is relevantly before the Court in this regard is the Tribunal’s own account of what occurred at the hearing. This does not support the thrust of the applicant’s complaint. It is the case, as Ms Baggett in my view correctly submitted, that the Tribunal is entitled, and I must say even further, in the sense of being able to reach the statutory requisite level of satisfaction, is obliged, to properly test the applicant’s evidence.

4. The applicant may indeed have felt sad or upset given that in the course of its questioning the Tribunal put to her its concerns about the inadequacy of her responses and the resultant impact upon its view of her credibility. It must be said that had the Tribunal failed to do so it may have left itself open to a charge that it had not adequately raised the issues in the review with the applicant at the hearing, thus denying her procedural fairness. In simple terms, the applicant was entitled to know the case against her, and the Tribunal cannot be criticised for putting this to her.

5. The reference to being sad or upset may seek to imply some attack on the Tribunal to be derived from the applicant’s letter that it sent to the Tribunal after the hearing (CB 115). In this letter she described some anxiety about the outcome because she was unable to provide more details because she said she had been prevented from doing so by the interpreter. In addition, she claimed to have been nervous and she therefore, in those circumstances, sought a second hearing before the Tribunal.

6. There are a number of aspects to this complaint, if indeed it is to be seen in this broader, and for the applicant, more advantageous way. The first is that the applicant has not, as I said earlier, provided any evidence to support her claims as to what happened at the Tribunal hearing. The factual basis, therefore, for the complaint about what occurred at the hearing does not rise above what she put to the Tribunal in her post-hearing letter. In this regard, the Tribunal did address the applicant’s allegations in its decision record.

7. As Ms Baggett submits, the Tribunal fulfilled its mandatory obligation pursuant to s.425 of the Act in inviting the applicant to a hearing which subsequently took place. In fact, it was at the Tribunal’s initiative that the applicant’s daughter, aged either 15 or 16 years, was also given the opportunity to give her evidence. While it is possible, as the Minister submits, for the Tribunal to have provided a second opportunity to the applicant, it was not obliged to do so. This obligation arises where an issue determinative of the review arises or becomes apparent to the Tribunal after the hearing, or is not properly exposed at the hearing. This did not occur or apply in the current circumstances.

8. The issues determinative and dispositive of the review were, on the evidence before the Court, canvassed at the Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal’s consideration of the applicant’s request, and its refusal to grant it, was not some arbitrary or capricious exercise of its discretion. The Tribunal gave cogent reasons for its decision in this regard. As the Minister submits, there is no breach of the obligation pursuant to s.425 of the Act in circumstances where the applicant merely does not perform well at the hearing.

9. In addition, I note that the Tribunal also considered the question of the standard of interpretation and the adequacy of the interpretation. It was satisfied that the applicant had been given an adequate opportunity to give her evidence and make her submissions. Again, I repeat that the applicant has brought no evidence to this Court to properly challenge the Tribunal’s finding in this regard. In all, therefore, as Ms Baggett submitted today, on the face of the decision record, which is the only evidence before the Court of what occurred, is that the Tribunal did afford the applicant a meaningful opportunity which it is obliged to do under s.425. No error, let alone jurisdictional error, is revealed in this regard.

10. As to any inference of bias on the part of the Tribunal, any such allegation has not been distinctly made, let alone is there any evidence before the Court, and indeed having regard to the evidence that is before the Court, can it be said that such a claim can be clearly proven. As the authorities make clear, such serious allegations would need to be clearly made and distinctly proven (Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507 per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J at [69] and per Kirby J at [127], SBBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361; (2002) 194 ALR 749 per Tamberlin, Mansfield and Jacobson JJ at [43], VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872; (2003) 131 FCR 102 and Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425).

11. What must also be noted is that no error is revealed in the Tribunal’s questioning of the applicant in relation to her knowledge of her religion, being the factor on which her claim to fear persecutory harm largely depended.

12. It is the case that, at [56] of its decision record, the Tribunal did find that the applicant’s knowledge and practice of the Local Church religion in China was extremely limited and superficial, and not consistent with that of a genuine practising member of the Local Church. Had the Tribunal set itself up as the arbiter of religious knowledge (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP [2010] FCAFC 108, particularly per Kenny J), that is, as setting a standard of religious knowledge and what that religious knowledge should be, and further that the applicant’s failure to meet that standard being seen and be used as the reason to refuse protection to the applicant, then legal error may be revealed.

13. However, on a fair reading of the whole of the Tribunal’s analysis, and indeed taking into account what was said in [56], I am, on balance, of the view that the Tribunal did not set up some arbitrary standard of religious knowledge which the applicant was required to meet. When regard is had to the Tribunal’s questions these were, in my view, plainly designed to elicit the applicant’s actual knowledge. That is, the focus was on what the applicant knew, not on what she was supposed to know. In this manner the Tribunal’s questioning was permissible in light of relevant authorities.

14. It was the applicant’s inability to give answers above what was found to be a limited or superficial level, and her vague evidence, and in some instances her inconsistent evidence, that led to the Tribunal’s rejection of her claim in this regard. On that basis no error is revealed.

15. The applicant before the Court today unfortunately was unable to assist in her own cause. What she put to the Court was to emphasise the unfair manner in which she says the Tribunal conducted the hearing, which led to her being upset and nervous. These are matters with which I have already dealt.

16. She raised an additional complaint that the Tribunal member said to her that she was lying and looked at her in what she described as a “despised” way, that the member sat “swinging” in her chair, and that she felt that another member with better manners may have resulted in a different outcome for her.

17. At the very least, without evidence, the assertions fail at a factual level. To the extent that again this is part of a claim of some bias on the part of the Tribunal, I have already dealt with that matter. To the extent that it is some explanation as to why she was nervous and upset, then again that fails because of the lack of evidence.

18. I should just emphasise a number of matters. The first is that the applicant at the conclusion of the hearing seemed to, it may be inferred from comments that she made, seek an adjournment of this hearing so that she could seek assistance from a lawyer. I refused that adjournment. The applicant has had over five months to pursue the conduct of her case before the Court. On her own submission she has sought the assistance of a registered migration agent, albeit one who appears to have been of little use to the applicant. But importantly she did access advice from a lawyer on the panel of the “RRT Legal Advice Scheme”. If she had wanted to seek assistance from another lawyer she had ample time to do so.

19. The applicant also claimed that, due to injury to one of her children and subsequent surgery, she did not have funds to pursue other legal advice. But she did not give the Court any basis to be able to be satisfied that, even if any reasonable further time were provided to her, she would be able to gather sufficient funds to access further legal advice in the foreseeable future.

20. As I said earlier, the Court has become concerned in unfortunately a large number of cases, where unqualified people in the community often, and as said by the applicant in this case for money, purport to give legal assistance to applicants in circumstances where they have no legal qualification or authority to do so. Where patently, as in this case, the assistance provided is grossly inadequate. I ask the Minister that he or his department give some attention to the quite unacceptable exploitation of vulnerable people in the Australian community.

21. While the applicant before the Court today has been found by the Tribunal not to be a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations pursuant to the Refugees Convention, that does not mean that she is a person to whom protection should not be given from exploitation by unscrupulous people in the Australian community who prey upon vulnerable people such as the applicant. Such people who come to this country, whether their claims to refugee protection are unmeritorious or not, are entitled in any civilised society to be protected from the mercenary and exploitative behaviour of people such as this unnamed migration agent.

Conclusion

1. For the current case, for the applicants to succeed before the Court, the Court would need to discern jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. No such error is evident. I will therefore make an order dismissing the application that has been made to the Court.

I certify that the preceding sixty-two (62) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM

Date:  21 November 2011