SZOGI v Minister for Immigration & Anor

Link copied
Case Copied 29 min read

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZOGI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2010] FMCA 390
MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a protection visa – applicant claiming persecution in Lebanon – applicant disbelieved in part – applicant nominating two witnesses to support his claims – witnesses attending Tribunal on the day of the hearing but not called into the hearing room – failure by the Tribunal to consider the applicant’s wishes as set out in his Response to Hearing Invitation – breach of s.426(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – jurisdictional error established.
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s.29
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s.160
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.66, 424, 425A, 426, 430A, 441A, 441C
Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth), s.166DC
Minister for Immigration v Katisat [2005] FCA 1908
Minister for Immigration v Maltsin (2005) 88 ALD 304
Sook Rye Son v Minister for Immigration (1999) 86 FCR 584
SZMBF v Minister for Immigration [2005] FCA 1427
Uddin v Minister for Immigration (1999) 165 ALR 243
Xiang Sheng Li v Refugee Review Tribunal (1996) 45 ALD 193
Applicant: SZOGI
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG605 of 2010
Judgment of: Driver FM
Hearing date: 4 June 2010
Date of last submissions: 18 June 2010
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 30 June 2010

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant appeared in person

Solicitors for the Respondents: Mr G Johnson
DLA Phillips Fox

ORDERS

  1. A writ of certiorari shall issue quashing the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 25 February 2010.

  2. A writ of mandamus shall issue requiring the Refugee Review Tribunal to rehear the review application before it according to law.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG605 of 2010

SZOGI

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and background

  1. This is an application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).  The decision was made on 25 February 2010.  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa. 

  2. The following statement of background facts is derived from the Minister’s submissions filed on 25 May 2010. 

  3. The applicant is a male citizen of Lebanon born on 01 December 1986. He last arrived in Australia on 24 May 2009.  The applicant applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 24 August 2009.[1]  The application was refused on 25 November 2009.[2]

    [1] court book (CB) 1-29.

    [2] CB 73.

  4. The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the original decision on 18 December 2009. The applicant gave oral evidence before the Tribunal on 11 February 2010. The Tribunal handed down its decision on 25 February 2010.[3]

    [3] CB 106.

The applicant's claims

  1. The applicant claimed to fear persecution for being implicated in a murder that took place during the course of a family dispute in April 2008.  He claimed that he was threatened with…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read SZOGI v Minister for Immigration & Anor and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2010] FMCA 390
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZOGI v Minister for Immigration & Anor, the applicant, SZOGI, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The dispute centred around the interpretation of sections 426(2) and (3) of the relevant Act, which pertain to the notification requirements for oral evidence from nominated witnesses at a hearing. The Minister for Immigration argued that the RRT was not required to consider the applicant's request for evidence from witnesses unless there was clear evidence of receipt of the notice by the Tribunal. The applicant, on the other hand, contended that the RRT's failure to consider the request was a procedural error, particularly in light of the absence of a completed checklist in the court records.

The court was tasked with interpreting the legislative requirements for notification under sections 426(2) and (426(3), specifically whether the term "notify" necessitated actual receipt of the document by the RRT. The Minister's argument hinged on the absence of prescribed methods for notifying the RRT and the lack of a deeming provision in the Act that would presume receipt. The applicant's position was that the ordinary meaning of "notify" implied actual communication of the information to the intended recipient, which in this case was the RRT.

The court found that the term "notify" in sections 426(2) and (3) should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning, which implies actual communication of the information to the intended recipient. The absence of prescribed methods for notification and the lack of a deeming provision in the Act suggested that actual receipt was necessary for the RRT to be considered notified. The court rejected the argument that the RRT could be deemed to be aware of the applicant's wishes without formal notification, aligning with the ordinary meaning of the term "notify". The court also noted that the absence of a checklist did not automatically imply non-receipt, but rather that the RRT needed to be formally notified as per the statutory requirements.

As a result, the court quashed the decision of the RRT made on 25 February 2010 and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the RRT to rehear the application according to law. This decision underscored the importance of strict compliance with notification requirements to ensure that the RRT is properly informed of the applicant's wishes regarding the evidence from nominated witnesses.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

A writ of certiorari shall issue quashing the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 25 February 2010.

2.

A writ of mandamus shall issue requiring the Refugee Review Tribunal to rehear the review application before it according to law.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister contends that notification requires actual receipt of the document under ss.426(2) and (3). The Minister contends that there is no evidence of receipt of the document by the Tribunal, given the absence of a completed form in the court book, and that there is evidence it was not received in the form of the no response checklist. The Minister submits:It is submitted that there can be no failure on the part of the RRT to consider the applicant's expressed desire for evidence to be taken from nominated witnesses if the RRT is not made aware of the applicant's wishes.· Section 426(2) requires an applicant to 'give the Tribunal written notice' of his wishes that oral evidence be obtained from nominated persons. Such notice must be given in accordance with subsection (2) (in other words, within 7 days of being notified of the hearing invitation). Subsection 426(2) does not, it is submitted, simply require the applicant to 'give' or 'send' a written notice.· Section 426(3) is unlike other provisions in the Act[11] which impose requirements for the giving of documents. In each such instance, the requirement for the RRT to give a notice, a written statement, or an invitation, is subject to specific methods of 'giving' that are prescribed in the Act, and, in each instance mentioned above, is subject to a prescribed deeming provision for receipt of the notice or invitation. · However, s 426 does not prescribe methods by which an applicant is to give to the RRT notice of a desire to have witnesses be called to give evidence at a hearing for the purposes of ss 426(2) and 426(3). Neither does the Act provide for any deeming provision with respect to a notice sent under s 426(2). If the legislature had intended that s 426(2) be read subject to a deeming provision for the receipt of notices sent, such a provision would have and could have easily been explicitly included in the Act. In the absence of a prescribed deeming provision, the Court should interpret 'notify' as that word appears in s 426(3) of the Act in accordance with the word's ordinary meaning. The Macquarie Dictionary defines 'notified' as: '1. To give notice to, or inform, of something. 2. To make known; give information of...’. It is submitted that the word 'notify', in the context of ss 426(2) and 426(3), implies that the intended recipient of the information is made known of the information.· If the legislation does not 'deem' a notice to have been given under s 426(2), the Court should not interpret s 426(3) by giving the term 'notified' a meaning other than its natural and ordinary meaning.· An analogous approach was taken by Weinberg J in Solomon v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 912, where his Honour found, dealing with the term 'notified' as that term appeared elsewhere in the Act[12], that: 'There is authority for the proposition that an applicant is relevantly "notified" of a decision of the Tribunal rejecting his application when he learns of the decision, albeit without having yet been provided with the reasons.'· In the first respondent's submission, notification for the purposes of s 426(3) requires actual receipt by the RRT of the notice purportedly sent. It would otherwise be incongruous and absurd to require the RRT to consider the exercise of its discretionary power to hear from witnesses nominated by an applicant, where the RRT in fact was not made aware that any such witnesses had been nominated, or made aware of their identities. In these circumstances, for example, the RRT is unable to turn its mind to whether it is appropriate to receive the witness(es) evidence, having regard to various factors like relevance and probative value (see Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indiegnous Affairs v Maltsin (2005) 88 ALD 304).· It is noted that s 29 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) does not apply in this case, as it relates to circumstances where an Act 'authorizes or requires any document to be served by post'. There is no such requirement or authorisation in the terms of s 426(2). A notice under s 426(2) could, in theory, be given to the RRT by means of fax, email or hand delivery.· It is further submitted that s 160 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) does not apply here, as although that Act establishes a rebuttable presumption of receipt with respect to sent postal articles, s 426(3), as discussed above, specifically requires the giving 'of notice' and requires that the RRT is 'notified'. It is not sufficient that the Court form the opinion that the RRT is taken to have been aware of the Response form, or 'should have known' of the existence of the Response form.[11] For instance, see s.66(1), which requires notification of an applicant, by the Department 'in the prescribed way'; s.430A, which requires the RRT to notify the applicant of a decision on a review (other than an oral decision) by giving the applicant a copy of the written statement by one of the methods specified in section 441A; s.424, which requires that an invitation be 'given to a person' by one of the methods specified in s.441A' or 'by a method prescribed' for persons in immigration detention; and s.425A, which requires that the RRT 'must give' the applicant a notice 'by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person'.[12] His Honour was considering the meaning of the word 'notified' as it appeared in a now repealed version of s 478 of the Act.