SZOBQ v Minister for Immigration

[2010] FMCA 453

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZOBQ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2010] FMCA 453

MIGRATION – Review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Tribunal properly dealt with claims – whether Tribunal sufficiently dealt with issue of extortion – findings reasonably open to Tribunal – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.91R
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s.99

Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259
NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; 90 FCR 287
Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184
Rajaratnam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 111
Ram v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 57 FCR 565
Chenafa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1432
Perampalam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 84 FCR 274

Applicant: SZOBQ

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 3091 of 2009

Judgment of: Nicholls FM

Hearing date: 21 June 2010

Date of Last Submission: 21 June 2010

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 21 June 2010

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant: In person

Counsel for the Respondents: Ms B K Nolan

Solicitors for the Respondents: DLA Phillips Fox

ORDERS

1. The application made on 18 December 2009 is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $4,800.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 3091 of 2009

SZOBQ

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Ex tempore; Revised from transcript)

1. I have before me today an application made on 18 December 2009 under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), which seeks review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 19 November 2009, which affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse a protection visa to the applicant.

2. The Minister has put before the Court a bundle of relevant documents (the Court Book – “CB”).

Background

1. The applicant before the Court today is a national of Lebanon who arrived in Australia on 12 March 2009 (CB 14). He applied for a protection visa on 23 April 2009. That application with a statement as to his claims to protection is reproduced in the Court Book (at CB 1 to CB 52).

Claims to Protection

1. The applicant’s claims as initially set out in his statement (CB 18 to CB 21) were that he came from what he described as a Christian village in Lebanon that was surrounded by Muslim villages. He supported the Lebanese Forces and he and his family “suffered” during the war. More recently one of his sons was attacked by an unknown attacker with a knife and sustained an injury to his eye. The applicant borrowed money from a person whom he identified as a Mr Semaan Frangieh to fund his son’s medical treatment. He was unable to repay the debt and Mr Frangieh demanded that it be paid. The applicant claimed in the statement that Mr Frangieh was “supported by Syria” for thirty years and had links to a political party, the Marada Party.

2. He feared that he would be “attacked”, “harmed”, “targeted”, would be forced to vote in a particular way, kidnapped, and would “die” if he returned to Lebanon. The applicant also claimed that he feared the tension in Northern Lebanon in the lead up to elections in June 2009 and claimed that the authorities would not protect him.

The Delegate

1. The Minister’s delegate refused the grant of a protection visa to the applicant (CB 70 to CB 74).

2. Having interviewed the applicant (CB 73 to CB 74), the delegate found that there was no UN Refugees Convention connection to the harm that the applicant had claimed to have suffered. The delegate noted that the harm that the applicant claimed to fear arose simply out of a failure to repay a loan.

The Tribunal

1. The applicant applied for a review of the delegate’s decision on 17 August 2009 (CB 75 to CB 78). He nominated an authorised recipient for the purpose of receiving correspondence – Mr Toufic Laba Sarkis (CB 77), who appears to continue to support the applicant today before the Court.

2. The applicant was invited to and attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 14 October 2009 (CB 86 to CB 88, CB 91 to CB 92). He gave oral evidence. At the applicant’s request the Tribunal also heard oral evidence from a witness, namely the applicant’s brother. The Tribunal’s own account of what occurred at the hearing is set out in its decision record (at [35] at CB 111 to [59] at CB 116).

3. At the hearing before the Tribunal the applicant expanded on the claimed attack on his son. Before the Tribunal he said that he believed that the attackers were linked to the Marada Party and were motivated because of his support for the Lebanese Forces ([39], [41] at CB 111 to CB 112). The applicant made reference to having had discussions about political matters with other people, some few days prior to the attack on his son. He claimed that were he to return to Lebanon he would seek that the matter of the attack on his son be investigated with a view to establishing whether there was any responsibility on the part of the Marada Party ([46] at CB 113).

The Tribunal’s Findings

1. The Tribunal made a number of important findings favourable to the applicant ([65] to [75] at CB 117 to CB 118):

   1.It accepted the applicant’s claims that his son had been injured.

   2.It accepted that he and his wife had borrowed money to pay for the medical treatment.

   3.It accepted that as at the time the applicant appeared before it he had not repaid all of the money that he had borrowed.

   4.It also accepted that Mr Frangieh had: “… pressured [the applicant] to repay the debt”, and that there were political tensions in Lebanon in the lead up to the June 2009 election.

   5.It further accepted that the applicant and his family had been “inconvenienced or disadvantaged” by reason of the influence of the Marada party.

2. However the Tribunal did not accept that the attack on his son was motivated by those who wished to target the applicant for his support of any political group or party. It gave its reasons for this. It considered in the circumstances that the reason given by the applicant for the attack on his son was not plausible (see [67] to [71] at CB 117 to CB 118).

3. The Tribunal also found:

   “…However the chance appears remote that [the applicant] might be seriously harmed in the reasonably foreseeable future by this man [Frangieh] or his associates, as the chance of the debt’s being paid off would be limited if [the applicant] were harmed.” ([72] at CB 118)

4. In the alternative the Tribunal found that, if the applicant were harmed, the motivation for the harm would not be for a Convention reason ([72] at CB 118).

5. The Tribunal had “considerable doubts” that the applicant would seek an investigation into the attack on his son upon return to Lebanon. But even if he were to do so the Tribunal found that it was not satisfied that he would be seriously harmed as a result of any such action. Even further, if he were harmed for taking such action such harm would not be motivated for a Convention reason ([74] at CB 119).

6. With regard to independent country information before it the Tribunal found that since the elections in June 2009: “… local political tensions have subsided” ([75] at CB 118).

7. The Tribunal found ultimately that just because the applicant and his family supported a party other than the Marada Party it did not necessarily mean that he had a well‑founded fear of persecution for reason of political opinion for that reason.

8. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.

Application to the Court

1. The application before the Court contains two grounds:

   “1. The Tribunal misunderstood my fear of persecution.

   2. The Tribunal failed to understand the risk I will face at the hands of the Marada.”

Before the Court

1. At the hearing before the Court today the applicant appeared in person. He was accompanied by a friend (Mr Laba Sarkis). He was assisted by an interpreter in the Lebanese/Arabic language. Ms B.K. Nolan of counsel appeared for the first respondent.

2. In addition to the Court Book I also have before me filed on behalf of the Minister written submissions drafted by Ms Nolan. Apart from the application the applicant has put nothing further before the Court.

3. Before the Court today the applicant made a number of statements which can be categorised in the following way.

4. First, the applicant restated many of the claims that he had made before the Tribunal. I explained to the applicant that the nature of the proceedings today was not to answer the question as to whether or not he is a refugee, but whether in answering that question the Tribunal committed, in effect, a “legal mistake”.

5. The applicant initially appeared to have some difficulty in understanding the relevance of what had been put to him. He reiterated again what admittedly are the very sad circumstances of the attack on his son and his separation from his family for over one and a half years. But, as I sought to explain to the applicant, a mere restatement before the Court of factual matters put before the Tribunal cannot assist him today. Without anything further the applicant’s statements could only properly be seen as a request for this Court to engage in its own fact‑finding about his refugee claims. In other words, to engage in impermissible merits review (Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259 (“Wu Shan Liang”).

6. Second, the applicant raised factual matters said to have occurred since the Tribunal made its decision. These related to concerns about the Marada Party and his son. Whatever claims the applicant may now make about subsequent events cannot, of course, show legal error on the part of the Tribunal decision.

7. Third, the applicant initially stated that he had spoken to a lawyer about five months ago. It was not clear why the applicant made this statement. But ultimately, and in particular after I emphasised with the applicant the need to focus on the relevant legal issues before the Court, he asked for more time to consult a lawyer and to obtain “evidence from a lawyer” so that this could be put before the Court.

8. To the extent that this constituted some late application for an adjournment of the hearing of his matter today, I refused this request. The applicant made his application to the Court on 18 December 2009. He appeared in person before Lloyd-Jones FM on 16 February 2010. He was on that occasion assisted by an interpreter in the Arabic language. His Honour made orders on that day for the conduct of the progress of the matter before the Court. While the applicant has said before the Court that he is a “simple” person, it would have been quite clear at that time even to an unsophisticated person, and I say that with respect to the applicant, of any need to have sought further assistance in his matter.

9. The applicant did consult a lawyer on the panel of the Court’s Legal Advice Scheme. He was provided with advice in March 2010. I also note that the applicant was not without resources in the sense of seeking assistance as to how to go about engaging a lawyer to assist him. From the material in the Court Book, the applicant has a brother in Australia who has been here for many years. Indeed he gave evidence on the applicant’s behalf before the Tribunal. Even if the applicant is, as he has self-characterised himself, a simple person he had available his brother who, having spent many years in Australia, would have been available to have assisted him to at least arrange contact with another lawyer.

10. I also note that Mr Toufic Laba Sarkis has been involved in this matter, at least as an authorised recipient in the making of the application. He accompanied the applicant at the hearing before the Tribunal and was self-described as a “community worker”. It is not clear what is meant by this term. What is clear is that the Court can take judicial note of the fact that Mr Laba Sarkis on a number of occasions has assisted applicants in some capacity before the Court. He would at least have, as a result of that assistance and presence in Court, some familiarity as to how to go about contacting a lawyer.

11. Finally, I reject the applicant’s (if it is to be so characterised) application for an adjournment on the basis that there was nothing in what the applicant has put to the Court today that left the Court with any level of satisfaction that it would be in the interests of the administration of justice that he be given more time to consult a lawyer. Before the Court the applicant was inadequate in making submissions on legal issues. I say that with respect to him. That inadequacy would surely have been obvious to him at a much earlier time, and most certainly on receipt of the Minister’s written submissions which he told the Court that he had previously received.

Consideration of the Grounds of the Application

1. Ground one of the application before the Court asserts that the Tribunal misunderstood the applicant’s fear of persecution. No particulars or detail whatsoever have been provided, despite the opportunity given to the applicant by Lloyd-Jones FM on 16 February 2010. Nor as I said earlier was the applicant able to assist further before the Court.

2. It may be that ground one is just a complaint that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant’s claims revealed a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee’s Convention reason. That is, that the applicant seeks to take issue with the factual findings made by the Tribunal and its ultimate conclusion based on those findings.

3. If that is all that the ground seeks to plead then it must fail. This is because it is really a request for this Court to engage in its own review of the delegate’s decision. This is not permitted. (See such cases as Wu Shan Liang.)

4. In the alternative it may be that the ground complains that the Tribunal did not properly understand, or properly deal with, the applicant’s claims. Here again, the applicant’s ground would not succeed in revealing jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

5. As I have already said the applicant’s claims to fear persecutory harm were initially set out in his protection visa application. As the applicant wrote in that statement his problem started when his son’s eye was injured by a sharp object, which was later said to be a knife, when he was playing with other children in the street in his village in Lebanon. In the statement the applicant also said he did not know who had injured his son. He said he borrowed money from Mr Frangieh to pay for medical treatment for his son. There was an agreement to repay this money with interest each month. The applicant was unable to make these repayments.

6. Although the year is unclear, some time “in February” Mr Frangieh approached the applicant’s home and demanded at least the repayment of interest. In the applicant’s absence his wife signed “a paper” at that time that acknowledged receipt of $3,500, whereas the applicant claimed that the initial amount was $3,000. The applicant claimed that the Frangieh family were politically powerful and that if he fails to repay the loan he would be targeted and would die. The applicant claimed to politically support the views of a rival political group. The applicant claimed that the authorities in Lebanon would not be able to protect him.

7. Since the applicant’s arrival in Australia Mr Frangieh has visited the applicant’s house and insisted to his wife that he wanted a solution to the outstanding amount of money still owed. The applicant also claimed that his brothers and sisters in Lebanon were pressured to vote for the Frangieh supported political party in the elections in June 2009. At the interview before the delegate, the applicant said that his wife arranged a loan for $3,500 because his son needed several operations on his eye which was injured, as he had previously stated. They were unable to meet the interest repayments and Mr Frangieh pursued the repayment of the debt.

8. The applicant also claimed that Mr Frangieh was associated with the Marada party and the applicant supported another political party. Further, that his family in Lebanon was coerced into voting for the Marada party in the elections in June 2009.

9. I have referred to these claims at some length because it is important to note that on any plain reading of the Tribunal’s decision record, having regard first to where the Tribunal set out the applicant’s claims and, secondly, having regard to its analysis, it is quite clear that the Tribunal well understood the applicant’s claims and ultimately dealt with each of those claims.

10. Further, the Tribunal’s account of what occurred at the hearing with the applicant remains unchallenged by any other evidence before the Court. For example, despite opportunity the applicant has not put any transcript of that hearing before the Court.

11. The Tribunal’s account reveals that in the context of the above claims the Tribunal asked the applicant about the incident when his son was injured. The applicant is reported as having added to the claim that the injury to his son was deliberate, although inflicted by a child. The applicant also told the Tribunal that some days before this incident he had spoken to people about political allegiances, and that his son was targeted because he had been perceived to support a party opposed to the Marada Party. A party that he said he hated because of an earlier matter involving his nephew. In relation to the loan, the applicant stated that he had repaid about half because he had been working in Australia. The applicant anticipated problems if he were to return to Lebanon because he said he would inquire of police about the incident involving his son.

12. The applicant’s brother gave evidence of the fierce competition for votes between the Frangieh supported party and the party that the applicant supported. He gave evidence that the motivation to harm the applicant emanating from Mr Frangieh was because the applicant owed him money and because of what he said was the “political issue”.

13. In this context it is important to again note that the Tribunal accepted the application’s son had been injured, that he had borrowed money to pay for medical treatment, and that Mr Frangieh pressured the applicant to repay the debt. It is also important to again note that the Tribunal accepted that there were political tensions in the lead up to the June 2009 election, and that the applicant’s family had been inconvenienced or disadvantaged in the past because of the influence of the Marada Party.

14. However, despite the applicant’s claim, the Tribunal found that the incident involving his son did not have any political motive attached to it.

15. The Tribunal gave cogent reasons for this finding which was reasonably open to it on what was before it. The Tribunal also considered whether the applicant’s debt to a person with connections to the Marada Party, that is Mr Frangieh, may give rise to serious harm. In context I understood this consideration to arise with s.91R(1) and (2) of the Act in mind. The Tribunal accepted that Mr Frangieh pressured the applicant to repay the loan. But, for reasons which it gave, the Tribunal found the chances of serious harm in the future to be remote. That in any event, even if the applicant were to be harmed, the essential and significant reason for any such harm that might flow from any delay in repaying the loan would not be for any Convention reason.

1. In my view implicit in this finding is that the sole motivation for the claimed persecutor harming the applicant would be the repayment of the loan. This also was open to the Tribunal on what was before it. The Tribunal found the applicant’s claim of harm on return to Lebanon because he would press for an investigation into the attack on his son, and would be abducted or killed by people associated with the Marada Party if he were to do this, to be vague.

2. The Tribunal also found that, at its highest, even if the applicant did seek this investigation, it was no more than speculation that he would be seriously harmed as a result. This again was reasonably open to the Tribunal on what was before it. The Tribunal also considered the applicant’s claims regarding his family, and in particular in the lead up to the June 2009 elections. Having regard to independent country information available to it the Tribunal found that political tensions had since subsided. It was not satisfied that merely supporting a party other than the Marada Party was sufficient, in the circumstances, to give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for the Convention reason of political opinion. This again was reasonably open to the Tribunal on what was before it.

3. On any plain reading of the Tribunal’s decision record I cannot see that the Tribunal misunderstood the applicant’s claims as they were put and as they were said to arise from the circumstances presented. It dealt with all of the applicant’s claims and each aspect of them.

4. As Ms Nolan said in written submissions the Tribunal is only required to consider claims raised explicitly by an applicant, unless additional claims arise squarely on the material before the Tribunal. This is clearly said bearing in mind such cases as NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1 and cases of similar nature (Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; 90 FCR 287, Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184). I cannot see any failure to deal with the applicant’s claims as explicitly put or as they can be said to arise from the circumstances put before it. Just on that basis alone ground one does not succeed.

5. In written submissions, the Minister submits that it was open to construe the threatening conduct of Mr Frangieh as being extortion and, with reference to the matter of Rajaratnam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 111 (“Rajaratnam”), having accepted the construction of extortion, it remained to consider whether the Tribunal sufficiently dealt with the principles set out in that case.

6. Before the Court Ms Nolan explained that it was not the Minister’s position, necessarily, that this was a case of extortion but that if the Court were minded to perceive the circumstances of this case as falling within that ambit, then there was no error in what the Tribunal had done in line with what was said in Rajaratnam.

7. It is the case as set out in the Minister’s (if I can call them) precautionary submissions, that just because certain conduct can be characterised as extortion does not mean that such conduct cannot come within the Convention definition of persecution. Of course as the concept of persecution is further explained by s.91R of the Act. Here, as is generally (though not exclusively) the case, the motivation of the claimed persecutor must be considered in assessing the essential and significant reason for the persecution.

8. I note in particular, as set out in the Minister’s submissions, paragraph 48 of Rajaratnam. The Court said:

   “In a particular setting, then, extortion can be a multi-faceted phenomenon exhibiting elements both of personal interest and of convention-related persecutory conduct. For this reason the correct character to be attributed to extorsive conduct practised upon an applicant for refugee status is not to be determined as a course by the application of the simple dichotomy: ‘Was the perpetrator’s interest in the extorted personal or was it convention related?’ In a given instance the formation of the extorsive relationship and actions taken within it can quite properly be said to be motivated by personal interest on the perpetrator’s part. But they may also be convention-related. Accordingly any inquiry concerning causation arising in an extortion case must allow for the possibility that the extorsive activity has this dual character.”

9. It must be said that I have some difficulty in accepting that Mr Frangieh’s conduct can be characterised as extortion. I refer first to the everyday definition of “extortion” or “to extort” found in the Macquarie Dictionary. I note, in particular, the act of extorting said to be defined in law as:

   “… the crime of obtaining money or other things of value…  where none is due or not so much is due…”

   Also an:

   “… oppressive of illegal exaction.”

   What is clear is that this presupposes some illegal exaction of money or other benefit.

10. I note further that in the Judicial Commission of New South Wales’s Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book (last updated 18 May 2010, at with reference in particular to sections commencing with s.99 and following of the Crimes Act1900 (NSW), the suggested direction for dealing with the offence of demanding property with intent to steal is generally referred to as, amongst other things, the offence of “extortion”.

11. Here, again, I note the following:

    “The third element that the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt, is that [the accused], at the time when [he/she] made the demand on [the victim], did so with the intention to steal the property mentioned in the indictment. To prove this, the Crown must satisfy you beyond reasonable doubt that [the accused], when [he/she] made the demand, intended permanently to deprive [the victim] of this property, knowing or believing that [the accused] was not legally entitled to the property and that [the accused] acted with a dishonest state of mind.”

12. There is no dispute that in the current case the applicant borrowed money and owed a debt to Mr Frangieh. While the applicant initially thought the amount to be $3,000 plus interest, his wife signed some document some time later agreeing that it was $3,500. In context, this was clearly, with the passage of time, the addition of interest. All of this arises from the applicant’s own evidence. It is difficult to see that, in these circumstances, the claimed persecutor’s conduct, that is Mr Frangieh’s conduct, could be characterised as extortion.

13. In Ram v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 57 FCR 565, the Court considered a situation where the applicant claimed he was the subject of extortion on the basis that he was a member of a particular social group, that is villagers who had gone abroad and returned with money, or indeed other wealthy Sikhs. I note, in particular, what was said by Burchett J at 569:

    “In the present case, quite apart from the difficulty of seeing wealthy Punjabis living in circumstances which make them vulnerable to extortion as a sufficient group, it is the greater difficulty of saying that the attacks feared by the appellant would be for reasons of his membership of that group... Plainly, extortionists are not implementing a policy; they are simply extracting money from a suitable victim…”

14. It cannot be said, in that way, that for current purposes the relevant issue can be characterised as one of extracting money from a victim. The applicant agreed and indeed claimed that he did owe the money.

15. Similarly I note what Tamberlin J said in Chenafa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1432 at [12]. While his Honour acknowledged that there were a “considerable number of authorities” relating to the matter of extorting funds from victims, this:

    “… is not necessarily evidence of persecution for a Convention reason … there may be many other grounds on which money is sought to be extracted in a criminal way from citizens of a country.”

16. In the current case there was certainly no criminality that could be said to emanate from the demand for money, given that the debt was acknowledged as being owed. But the important thing to note is that, again, the Court emphasises the element or aspect of criminality as being a feature of the concept of extortion.

17. I note also what a majority of the Full Court said in Perampalam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 84 FCR 274 at 283 per Burchett and Lee JJ:

    “Extortion directed at those members of a particular race from whom something might be extorted cannot be excluded from the concept of persecution within the Convention, and Ram does not suggest it can… The words ‘persecuted for reasons of’ look to the motives and attitudes of the persecutors… and if the LTTE practices extortion, with violence and threats of violence, against Tamils, the government being unable to provide protection, because the LTTE holds that Tamils must be coerced into supporting it, the terms of the Convention are satisfied”.

18. Even on this basis a distinction can be made with the current circumstances. While the Tribunal accepted that Mr Frangieh was pressing for the repayment of the loan it did not accept that he engaged in any criminal or coercive behaviour.

19. In any event the Tribunal in the current case did look to the motivation for Mr Frangieh’s conduct.

20. It found a debt was owed and it found that Mr Frangieh was motivated to recover the money that was owed to him. However, and importantly, the Tribunal also considered whether there was any other motivation in harming the applicant. In this regard the Tribunal specifically considered the claimed political link to the wounding of the applicant’s son. For reasons which were open to it, it found no political motive. It specifically considered the link between the debt owed to Mr Frangieh and his association with the Marada Party. Its relevant finding in this regard, as I have already stated, was also open to it.

21. The Tribunal also specifically considered the claimed link between the seeking of an investigation of the son’s injury and the claimed political link with the attack on him. It also said it looked at the claim to fear harm because of political tensions leading up to the June 2009 elections.

22. So even if Mr Frangieh’s conduct can be termed extortionary (which I do not consider to be the case), I can only agree with Ms Nolan that the Tribunal satisfied the Full Court’s requirements as set out in Rajaratnam. That is, that in any event it approached the issue in the way required by that case. Specifically, the Tribunal’s consideration did not just stop at its finding in relation to the debt owed. But plainly, bearing in mind the duality of purpose referred to in Rajaratnam, the Tribunal considered all the claims which the applicant advanced which sought to make a link to a political motivation for the perpetrator’s conduct. It rejected any such links.

23. In light of the above ground two is also not made out. The Tribunal, on any plain reading of its decision record, understood the applicant’s claims to fear harm on return as it related to the Marada Party. It could not be satisfied that this was such as to give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. In all these circumstances, as Ms Nolan correctly in my view submitted, the applicant’s ground does not rise above a disagreement with the Tribunal’s consideration. In reality it seeks no more than impermissible merits review.

Conclusions

1. For the applicant to succeed before the Court today the Court would, at the very least, need to find some jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. I cannot discern such error. I will therefore make an order dismissing the application to the Court.

I certify that the preceding sixty-nine (69) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM

Associate: 

Date: