SZNTL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZNTL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 1040

Citation: SZNTL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 1040
Appeal from: SZNTL v Minister for Immigration [2009] FMCA 1153
Parties: SZNTL v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1389 of 2009
Judge: NICHOLAS J
Date of judgment: 24 September 2010
Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review – Refugee Review Tribunal gave no weight to documents relied upon by appellant in support of her claims – whether it was open to Tribunal to do so – alleged failure by Tribunal to “fairly, properly and thoroughly” consider appellant’s claims – duty of Tribunal to review the whole of applicant’s claims – arguable failure of Tribunal to do so not raised by appellant below or on appeal – appeal dismissed  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 66, 91R(1), 412, 430(1)
Cases cited: Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2000) 101 FCR 501 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2009) 210 CLR 1 cited
SDAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (200) 199 ALR 43 cited
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 75 ALJR 982 cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant  S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai (2001) 106 FCR 426 considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Tedella (2001) 195 ALR 84 cited
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 cited
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZPNG (2010) 115 ALD 303 cited
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 194 ALR 244 cited
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 cited
Date of hearing: 16 February 2010
Date of last submissions: 3 March 2010
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 42
Counsel for the Appellant The Appellant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1389 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZNTL
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

NICHOLAS J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 SEPTEMBER 2010

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1389 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES…
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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 1040
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZNTL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the appellant, SZNTL, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Tribunal which had rejected her application for a protection visa. The appellant argued that the Tribunal's decision was flawed due to bias and a failure to properly consider her evidence, including documentary evidence of her treatment by police and her escape to Australia. The central legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal's decision was vitiated by actual or apprehended bias and whether the Tribunal had failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the appellant's claim.

The court first addressed the issue of bias, finding that the appellant's evidence in support of this claim was insufficient. The Tribunal's reasons for decision, while perfunctory, did not establish actual or apprehended bias. The court then examined the Tribunal's handling of documentary evidence, concluding that the Tribunal had not erred in rejecting the appellant's account of events and the documentary evidence related to it. The court found that the Tribunal had fairly considered the documentary evidence, even if it was ultimately given little weight due to the implausible nature of the appellant's narrative. The court also noted that the requirement for fair, proper and thorough consideration of an applicant's claims is not a ground of review available under the Migration Act, referencing relevant case law.

In summary, the court found that the Tribunal's decision was not tainted by bias and that the Tribunal had properly considered the documentary evidence. The court upheld the Tribunal's decision, rejecting the appellant's claims of jurisdictional error and bias.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

There is no doubt that the learned Federal Magistrate was right to reject the appellant’s complaint that the Tribunal’s decision was vitiated by actual or apprehended bias. The material relied upon by her for the purpose of making that argument good was slender at best. That is not to say that the Tribunal’s reasons for decision are satisfactory. They are perfunctory in their rejection of the appellant’s evidence of her treatment by police and the circumstances of her escape to Australia. But that does not establish actual or apprehended bias. Documentary Evidence I also agree with the learned Federal Magistrate that there was no jurisdictional error stemming from the Tribunal’s treatment of the documentary evidence relied upon by the appellant. The Tribunal made express findings rejecting the appellant’s account of events which she described in her application as occurring in February 2008 and subsequently. These findings expressly encompass the period and the events to which the documentary evidence relied on by the appellant related. There is no suggestion that the Tribunal overlooked the existence of the documents in question – it clearly had regard to them but declined to give them weight in light of what it considered to be a wholly implausible story. For present purposes, I take the Tribunal’s rejection of the appellant’s “entire account” as encompassing at least so much of her narrative which begins with her description of the events of 7 February 2008 through to the account of her escape to Australia. It was open to the Tribunal to approach the documentary evidence in the way it did: see Applicant S20/2002 at [12]. Fair, proper and thorough consideration The appellant submitted in her written submissions that the Tribunal erred in that it failed to “fairly, properly and thoroughly” consider her claim. A similar formulation (“proper, genuine and realistic consideration”) was considered in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai (2001) 106 FCR 426. The Full Court, which was concerned with an application for judicial review made under Part 8 of the Act as it then stood, held that it was not an available ground of review that the Tribunal had failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the case of an applicant for a protection visa. That decision was followed by the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Tedella (2001) 195 ALR 84. Both of those decisions were referred to by the Full Court in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [50]-[51]. The Full Court cautioned against treating language used in judgments as if it was the equivalent of words in a statute and stated that the “touchstone” for determining whether there was reviewable error “must always be the words of the empowering Act and the nature of the function which it confers upon the decision-maker”. At the same time it noted that what was said in Anthonypillai must now be read in light of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The narrative included in the appellant’s visa application concludes with her statement that she has been “regarded as a ‘criminal’ at large by the PSB”, that the police have looked for her “everywhere” and that they have questioned her parents, brother and sister. She states that she cannot return to China because she will be subjected to persecution on her return. THE DECISION OF THE DELEGATE On 7 April 2009 the appellant was notified in accordance with s 66 of the Act that her application for a protection visa had been refused. Enclosed with the letter was a statement of the reasons for the decision signed by the delegate. The delegate’s reasons, under the hearing “Is the harm feared for a Convention reason?”, include the following statement:ClaimsThe applicant claimed she will suffer harm at the hands of her abusive husband if she returns to China.I find that the Convention ground of membership of a particular social group, namely Chinese women who are subjected to domestic violence, is the essential and significant reason for the harm feared as outlined in subdivision AL of the Migration Act. Later, under the heading “Consideration of the Applicant’s Claims”, the delegate again noted that “[t]he applicant’s fear of return to China is based on the claim that she has been subjected to domestic violence by her abusive husband.” After referring to the High Court decision in Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387 and the United Nations’ Guidelines on International Protection concerning the definition of a “particular social group”, the delegate stated that Australian courts have a social perception approach in determining the existence of a particular social group which examines whether a group shares a common characteristic which makes them a cognisable group or sets them apart from society at large. He accepted that women who are the subject of domestic violence in China may constitute a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention. In this context the delegate also referred to the decision of the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2000) 101 FCR 501 (which decision was affirmed by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1). The delegate then stated:I accept that women who are victims of domestic violence in China may be a cognisable group within society, and constitute a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention. While I accept that women who are victims of domestic violence in China constitute a particular social group, it is not sufficient that a person be a member of a particular social group to meet the definition of a refugee. She must also have a well-founded fear of persecution for reason(s) of their membership or perceived membership of the particular social group. However, the mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is well-founded.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I also agree with the learned Federal Magistrate that there was no jurisdictional error stemming from the Tribunal’s treatment of the documentary evidence relied upon by the appellant. The Tribunal made express findings rejecting the appellant’s account of events which she described in her application as occurring in February 2008 and subsequently. These findings expressly encompass the period and the events to which the documentary evidence relied on by the appellant related. There is no suggestion that the Tribunal overlooked the existence of the documents in question – it clearly had regard to them but declined to give them weight in light of what it considered to be a wholly implausible story. For present purposes, I take the Tribunal’s rejection of the appellant’s “entire account” as encompassing at least so much of her narrative which begins with her description of the events of 7 February 2008 through to the account of her escape to Australia. It was open to the Tribunal to approach the documentary evidence in the way it did: see Applicant S20/2002 at [12]. Fair, proper and thorough consideration The appellant submitted in her written submissions that the Tribunal erred in that it failed to “fairly, properly and thoroughly” consider her claim. A similar formulation (“proper, genuine and realistic consideration”) was considered in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai (2001) 106 FCR 426. The Full Court, which was concerned with an application for judicial review made under Part 8 of the Act as it then stood, held that it was not an available ground of review that the Tribunal had failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the case of an applicant for a protection visa. That decision was followed by the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Tedella (2001) 195 ALR 84. Both of those decisions were referred to by the Full Court in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [50]-[51]. The Full Court cautioned against treating language used in judgments as if it was the equivalent of words in a statute and stated that the “touchstone” for determining whether there was reviewable error “must always be the words of the empowering Act and the nature of the function which it confers upon the decision-maker”. At the same time it noted that what was said in Anthonypillai must now be read in light of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597. Before the Federal Magistrate the appellant adopted a slightly different formulation to that adopted by her in her submissions on appeal; the formulation employed by her below was, according to the reasons of the Federal Magistrate, that there was no evidence that the Tribunal made any attempt to consider her evidence fairly, properly and independently. As summarised by the Federal Magistrate, the appellant’s submission to his Honour was: She claims there is no evidence the Tribunal made any genuine attempt to consider that evidence fairly, properly and independently. Again, she reiterates her claim the Tribunal made its finding based on unwarranted assumption or an apprehension of bias, rather than look at the documentary evidence. It is apparent that this submission, as put to his Honour, drew upon other submissions made by the appellant concerning the Tribunal’s alleged bias and its treatment of the documentary evidence relied upon by the appellant. Thus, the first and second arguments put to his Honour by the appellant were closely intertwined. In substance, it was the appellant’s contention that the Tribunal did not give her evidence fair, proper and independent consideration because it had already made up its mind before the Tribunal hearing occurred. However, there is no evidence to support that contention.