SZNIB v Minister for Immigration

Case •

[2009] FMCA 450

•

12 May 2009

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZNIB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2009] FMCA 450
MIGRATION – Review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – Tribunal made findings of fact “par excellence” – Tribunal properly understood test to be applied – findings were open to the Tribunal to make on what was before it – Tribunal “sufficiently indicated” the issue that was dispositive of the review – information fell within exceptions contained in s.424A – information put orally pursuant to s.424AA – s.424A(2A) engaged – no denial of procedural fairness – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 422B, 425, 424A, 424AA
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 74 ALJR 405
Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1126; (1998) 86 FCR 547
W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 185 ALR 703; [2001] FCA 679
Chan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62; (1989) 169 CLR 379
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559
Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 [1999] HCA 14; 162 ALR 1
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v LayLat (2006) 151 FCR 214; [2006] FCAFC 61
SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 237 ALR 64; [2007] HCA 35
SZMJE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1751
SZLOJ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1693
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v NAMW [2004] FCAFC 264; (2004) 140 FCR 572
VHAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 82
QAAC of 2004 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2005] FCAFC 92
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609; [2007] HCA 26
SZMCD v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor [2009] FCAFC 46
Applicant: SZNIB
First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION

& CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 665 of 2009
Judgment of: Nicholls FM
Hearing date: 12 May 2009
Date of Last Submission: 12 May 2009
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 12 May 2009

REPRESENTATION

Appearing for the Applicant: In person
Solicitors for the Applicant: Nil
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr P D Reynolds
Solicitors for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. The application made on 20 March 2009 is dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $3,000.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 665 of 2009

SZNIB

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Ex Tempore; Revised from Transcript)

  1. I have before me an application made on 20 March 2009 under the  Migration Act  1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), seeking review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 23 February 2009, which affirmed the decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister to refuse a protection visa to the applicant.

Background

  1. The first respondent has put before the Court a bundle of relevant documents (the Court Book – “CB”) from which the following background may be ascertained.

  2. The applicant is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (“China”) who arrived in Australia on 5 June 2008 (see CB 52). She applied for a protection visa on 21 July 2008 (CB 39 to CB 62). This was refused by a delegate of the first respondent on 7 October 2008 (CB 72 to CB 83). The applicant applied for review by the Tribunal on 18 November 2008 (CB 88 to CB 92). (Though it appears that an incomplete application had been submitted on 2 November 2008 – see CB 84 to CB 85.)

The applicant’s claims to protection

  1. The applicant’s claims to protection were that she and her family had been persecuted by the local authorities in her home village when they demolished the family home and offered only minimal, or inadequate, compensation. The applicant, members of her family, and neighbours had protested against the local authority’s decision and actions. The applicant’s brother was detained and harmed by the Public Security Bureau (“PSB”). When the applicant sought to complain about what had occurred to her brother, she was also detained.

The Delegate

  1. The Minister’s delegate found that he was not satisfied that the applicant was a “refugee” for the purpose of s.36 of the Act. (The delegate’s decision record is reproduced at CB 78 to CB 83) This was because he did not believe any of her claims (see CB 82.1: “The Delegate positively disbelieves [the applicant] and/or members of her family were persecuted by Chinese authorities due to a land dispute they had with the Chinese authorities”). He also could not reach the requisite level of satisfaction because the applicant had not claimed to “fear being persecuted if she returns to the PRC for any other reason”, concluding on this basis that she did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future should she return to China (CB 83.2).

  2. It is clear that the delegate’s conclusion was informed by inconsistencies that he found in the applicant’s claims and evidence, including documents that had been put before him in support of those claims (CB 82.3 to CB 82.10).

The Tribunal

  1. The applicant appeared at a hearing before the Tribunal on 21 January 2009 at which she gave evidence. The only account before the Court of what occurred at the hearing is the Tribunal’s account which is contained in its decision record (CB 127.5 to CB 129.10).

  2. The Tribunal found the applicant’s evidence to have been provided in a “very frank and open manner” (CB 130.2). It is clear that the Tribunal accepted the applicant’s account of what she said had occurred to her in China. That is, it accepted that she had experienced problems relating to the demolition of her house without adequate compensation, that she had been detained by the PSB, that while in detention she was “not seriously harmed … but was poorly treated”, and that she was released after she had promised that she would not complain any further (CB 130.2 to CB 130.5).

  3. However, in its “Findings and Reasons”, the Tribunal said that it was unable to identify any “Convention reason” arising from the applicant’s account of these events that occurred in China. The Tribunal, nonetheless, properly turned its mind to address the relevant test in matters of this type. That is, if the applicant were to return to China, whether she would have a well-founded fear of Convention-related persecution on return:

    “54. However the Tribunal must consider whether, if she returned to China now, she might have a well founded fear of Convention related persecution …”

  4. The Tribunal found that it was not satisfied that she did have a well-founded fear and it gave reasons for this conclusion, which are enumerated in successive paragraphs in its decision record (see [55] and what follows, CB 130.5 to CB 131.5.)

Application to the Court

  1. In her application to the Court, the applicant puts forward the following grounds:

    “1. RRT did not make fair decision for me. Chinese government did a lot of harm to me.

    2. Procedural Fairness has been denied. RRT did not consider my evidence fairly. I live in fear in China.”

  2. No particulars are provided in support of these grounds and, despite being given the opportunity, the applicant did not file any amended application.

Hearing before the Court

  1. At the hearing before the Court the applicant appeared unrepresented. She was assisted by an interpreter in the Mandarin language. Mr P D Reynolds of Counsel appeared for the first respondent.

  2. When given the opportunity before the Court, the applicant stated that she had nothing to say. She did confirm that she had obtained legal advice, but was unable to assist the Court further beyond the bare assertions made in the application to the Court. 

  3. The Court has written submissions from the Minister which were drafted and prepared by Counsel.

Consideration

Ground One

  1. In ground one of her application the applicant complains that the Tribunal’s decision was not “fair”, and makes an assertion that the Chinese government did, in fact, “harm” her.

  2. I should just note that, in relation to the latter complaint, the Tribunal did, in fact, accept the applicant’s account of what had occurred to her in the past. It noted that this account did not give rise to any Convention connection. Further, on any plain reading of its decision record, the Tribunal clearly found that whatever may have been the situation in the past, there was not a well-founded fear of Convention-related persecution if she were to return to China in the future, given that the interest that the authorities had shown to the applicant in the past no longer existed.

  3. If it is, as Mr Reynolds submits, the case that this ground is, in effect, a general complaint of unfairness on the part of the Tribunal, then I agree with Counsel that this would amount to a request for impermissible merits review by this Court (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259 (“Wu Shan Liang”) at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).

  4. This Court does not have jurisdiction to determine whether the Tribunal’s decision was “fair”. The Tribunal is required to provide fairness in the procedures that it employs and applies (see further below). But as to the outcome, it is the case that procedural fairness requires a “fair hearing not a fair outcome” (see SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152 (“SZBEL”) at [25], with reference also to Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J).

  5. On what is before the Court, the Tribunal’s findings were findings of fact made within jurisdiction. These were findings of fact “par excellence” (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 74 ALJR 405 at [67], per McHugh J). The Tribunal gave cogent reasons for its findings which were open to it on what was before it (Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1126; (1998) 86 FCR 547 at 558-559, W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 185 ALR 703; [2001] FCA 679 at [64]-[69] per Tamberlin and Nicholson JJ).

  6. In reviewing a delegate’s decision to refuse to grant an applicant a protection visa, the Tribunal is required to determine whether it can be satisfied that Australia owes protection obligations to the applicant under the Refugees Convention (s.36(2) of the Act). In essence, this requires the Tribunal to have regard to Article 1A(2) of the UN Refugees Convention, which sets out, in effect, the definition of “refugee”. That is, any person who:

    “....owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country ...”

  7. The Tribunal is required to consider whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for any one, or more, of the Convention reasons. In the current case, the Tribunal properly understood that the applicant claimed to fear harm because she had protested about the particular local government’s decision to demolish her family’s house without providing adequate compensation, and that she had complained to police about the treatment of her brother.

  8. In my view, the Tribunal properly understood the relevant test to be applied in determining the review. (That is, as expressed at para [54] of its decision record.) The Tribunal plainly noted that it was unable to identify a Convention nexus in the applicant’s claims as they related to the past. In relation to the second part of the applicant’s complaint in ground one (the Chinese government did her a lot of harm), I note, in particular, that the Tribunal accepted the applicant’s claims of what she said had occurred to her in China. 

  9. In my view, the Tribunal’s ultimate conclusion, the basis for its decision was arrived at by focussing on, and answering, the question that it was jurisdictionally charged to answer. That is, whether the applicant would, upon return to China, have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.

  10. It is the case that, in matters of this type, past events are certainly a guide to what can occur in the future. As is often said, the circumstances in which an applicant fled the country of claimed persecution will ordinarily be the starting point for the Tribunal’s consideration. (See, in this regard, authorities such as Chan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62; (1989) 169 CLR 379 and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor [1997] HCA 22, (1997) 191 CLR 559.)

  11. Indeed, as was said in Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 [1999] HCA 14; 162 ALR 1, evidence of past persecution would give strong support to the conclusion that the fear is well-founded.

  12. Ultimately, claims of past events must be considered in the context of focussing on, and answering, the relevant question of whether there is a well-founded fear of Convention-related persecution if the applicant were to return to the country of claimed persecution at the time of the Tribunal’s decision or in the reasonably foreseeable future. 

  13. In my view, on a plain reading of the Tribunal’s decision record, it acted in accordance with its obligations and had regard to the appropriate test.

  14. The Tribunal properly considered whether the applicant would experience Convention-related persecution if she were to return to China.  It found that she would not experience persecutory harm based on a number matters (at CB 130.5 to CB 131.5):

    1)The applicant’s evidence that the police had not demonstrated any interest in her since she had been released from detention.

    2)The fact that she had been able to depart China through an airport without difficulty. Presumably, if she were of interest to the authorities, she would have experienced some difficulty.

    3)There was no evidence that the police continued to be interested in her family.

    4)Her brother had not complained any further about his harsh treatment by police.

    5)The applicant did not indicate that she would complain again upon return to China.

    6)While she may experience difficulty in obtaining employment in China, she did not make claims that the PSB would further hinder her employment prospects.

  15. In all, therefore, the Tribunal properly understood the relevant test to be applied, accepted the applicant’s claims of what she said had occurred in the past in China but, based (to a significant extent) on what the applicant herself had told the Tribunal, was unable to be satisfied that the applicant would face persecutory harm for a Convention reason if she were to return to China.

  16. In my view, the Tribunal’s findings were open to it on the material before it, and it gave reasons for those findings.  I cannot see that ground one as asserted by the applicant reveals any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

Ground two – Denial of procedural fairness

  1. The applicant makes a complaint that there was a general denial of procedural fairness, that the Tribunal did not consider her evidence fairly, and that she lives in fear in China

  2. This is a case to which s.422B of the Act applies. This means that the matters that are set out in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act are taken to be the exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule (absent bias) (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v LayLat (2006) 151 FCR 214; [2006] FCAFC 61 at [59] to [67], SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62 at [8], SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 237 ALR 64; [2007] HCA 35 at [48]).

  3. I note the matters that are set out in Division 4 of Part 7. Relevantly, pursuant to s.425 of the Act, the applicant was invited to a hearing, she attended the hearing, and she gave evidence at that hearing.

  4. As referred to by Counsel in the Minister’s submissions, when considering matters of procedural fairness and s.425, the authority of the High Court in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152 is currently central to that consideration. I note submissions made on behalf of the Minister that the delegate did not accept the witness to be credible, and that, as a result, there was “no issue that she was entitled to assume had been decided in her favour” before the Tribunal.

  5. With respect, as I comprehend SZBEL, the procedural fairness obligations pursuant to s.425 of the Act require that an applicant is entitled to know the issue, or issues, that are determinative in the disposition of his or her application for a protection visa. The applicant is entitled to assume before the Tribunal that those issues that were determinative or dispositive before the delegate are the issues that are determinative or dispositive before the Tribunal.

  6. If there are other issues that are determinative before the Tribunal, the Tribunal is obliged, in meeting its procedural fairness obligations, to expose, or to “sufficiently indicate”, the issue to the applicant at the hearing before it.

  7. In particular, I note the following paragraphs from the High Court’s judgment in SZBEL:

  8. SZBEL at [33]:

    “The Act defines the nature of the opportunity to be heard that is to be given to an applicant for review by the Tribunal. The applicant is to be invited ‘to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review’. The reference to ‘the issues arising in relation to the decision under review’ is important.”

  9. SZBEL at [35]:

    “The Tribunal is not confined to whatever may have been the issues that the delegate considered. The issues that arise in relation to the decision are to be identified by the Tribunal. But if the Tribunal takes no step to identify some issue other than those that the delegate considered dispositive, and does not tell the applicant what that other issue is, the applicant is entitled to assume that the issues the delegate considered dispositive are ‘the issues arising in relation to the decision under review’. That is why the point at which to begin the identification of issues arising in relation to the decision under review will usually be the reasons given for that decision. And unless some other additional issues are identified by the Tribunal (as they may be), it would ordinarily follow that, on review by the Tribunal, the issues arising in relation to the decision under review would be those which the original decision-maker identified as determinative against the applicant.”

  10. SZBEL at [47]:

    “First, there may well be cases, perhaps many cases, where either the delegate's decision, or the Tribunal's statements or questions during a hearing, sufficiently indicate to an applicant that everything he or she says in support of the application is in issue. That indication may be given in many ways. It is not necessary (and often would be inappropriate) for the Tribunal to put to an applicant, in so many words, that he or she is lying, that he or she may not be accepted as a witness of truth, or that he or she may be thought to be embellishing the account that is given of certain events. The proceedings are not adversarial and the Tribunal is not, and is not to adopt the position of, a contradictor. But where, as here, there are specific aspects of an applicant's account, that the Tribunal considers may be important to the decision and may be open to doubt, the Tribunal must at least ask the applicant to expand upon those aspects of the account and ask the applicant to explain why the account should be accepted.”

  1. As the High Court said, the starting point in identifying the issues arising in relation to the decision under review is the decision of the delegate. I have already referred to those issues before the delegate previously in this judgment. That is, the delegate comprehensively rejected all of the applicant’s claims, having found significant inconsistencies which led him to believe that certain claims had been fabricated. The delegate “positively disbelieved” the applicant’s claims. It was this comprehensive rejection of the applicant’s account of what she said had occurred to her in China that led the delegate to determine that the applicant was not a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations. (See [5] above.)

  2. A plain reading of the Tribunal’s reasons reveals that the truthfulness of the applicant’s claims, and the credibility of the applicant’s account of what she said had occurred in China, were not issues that were dispositive of the review. Contrary to what the delegate had found, the Tribunal found that it accepted the factual account of what had occurred in China: “[The applicant] gave her oral evidence in a very frank and open manner and the Tribunal accepts that she had the problems in China that she described” (CB 130.2). 

  3. Notwithstanding this, and while it also said that it could not find a Convention nexus in her account of what had occurred in China in the past, in my view, the Tribunal’s decision plainly turned on whether these past events, which (as I emphasise) it accepted had occurred, would provide the basis for persecutory harm on return to China in the future.

  4. Despite opportunity, the applicant has not put any other account before the Court of what occurred at the Tribunal’s hearing. For example, there is no transcript of the hearing before the Court. As Mr Reynolds submitted (properly, in my view), the Court can only proceed on what has been put before it.

  5. The Tribunal’s account of the hearing, in my view, reveals that, at the very least, the Tribunal “sufficiently indicated” (using the words used by the High Court in SZBEL) to the applicant the determinative issue in this case. That is, whether the Chinese authorities would take any further interest in the applicant should she return to China. This issue was squarely put to the applicant. (In this regard, see [41 at CB 129. As to the Tribunal’s reliance on factual matters that also informed that conclusion to which I have already referred, see generally what is set out at [33] to [40] at CB 128.)

  6. During the course of the hearing Mr Reynolds also submitted that even if a view were to be taken that the Tribunal also determined that there was no Convention nexus to be identified in the applicant’s claims of past harm, and that this also could be seen as an issue determinative of the review, the Tribunal’s account of what occurred at the hearing, again, reveals that the factual basis underlying that issue (that is, the substratum of facts that the applicant had put before the Tribunal) was discussed at the hearing, such as to “sufficiently indicate” to the applicant that this was an issue dispositive of the review.

  7. In my view, as I have said earlier, there was one issue dispositive of the review. But even if the reference to “no Convention nexus” is identified as a separate issue, I agree with Mr Reynolds that this also would not assist the applicant in the current case, nor what is said to have been discussed at the hearing.

  8. In turning to other matters, relevantly, set out in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act, s.424A obliges the Tribunal to put to the applicant in writing information that would be the reason or part of the reason for its decision. As to the information relied on by the Tribunal in the current case, I note that information contained in the applicant’s protection visa application falls within the exception contained in s.424A(3)(ba) of the Act from the obligation that is set out in s.424A(1) (SZMJE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1751 at [22], SZLOJ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1693 at [15]).

  9. Second, the independent country information relied on by the Tribunal comes within the exception contained in s.424A(3)(a) from the obligation in s.424A(1) (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v NAMW [2004] FCAFC 264; (2004) 140 FCR 572 at [71], VHAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 82 at [12] to [14], QAAC of 2004 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2005] FCAFC 92 at [22]).

  10. Finally, the information provided by the applicant herself for the purposes of the review, such as the information that she provided to the Tribunal at the hearing, falls within the exception contained in s.424A(3)(b).

  11. I note that to the extent that the Tribunal made reference to what the applicant orally told the delegate, such information, of course, does not come within the exception contained in s.424A(3)(ba). It is quite clear, however, that the applicant repeated her factual account of events in China at the hearing before the Tribunal, and that the Tribunal relied on this factual account. In any event, the Tribunal accepted the applicant’s account of what she said occurred in China such that it cannot be said that this information was a part of the reason for affirming the decision under review.

  12. I also agree with Mr Reynolds’ submission that the Tribunal’s assessment of the applicant’s evidence is not information for the purposes of s.424A(1) and the reliance on SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609; [2007] HCA 26 in support of that proposition.

  13. Further, in relation to the information about the applicant’s departure from China, s.424AA was engaged in this case. I note what is set out in the Tribunal’s decision record at CB 129 at [46], where the Tribunal specifically invited the applicant to comment on this information, either in writing after the hearing, or orally. In these circumstances, s.424A(2A) was engaged and the Tribunal was not obliged to further put that information in writing to the applicant pursuant to s.424A(1) (SZMCD v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor [2009] FCAFC 46 per Tracey and Foster JJ).

  14. There is no other section in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act which requires any specific consideration by this Court. I cannot see that any other section would assist the applicant in her claim that procedural fairness has been denied.

  15. As to the applicant’s claim that the Tribunal did not consider her evidence fairly, this complaint also does not assist the applicant.  The Tribunal did not reject the applicant’s evidence – it accepted her evidence as to past events. The applicant does not otherwise say how it was unfair of the Tribunal to do so.

  16. As to the Tribunal’s reliance on her evidence to conclude that the authorities would take no interest in her on return, this was plainly open to the Tribunal on what was before it.

  17. In all, I could not see this complaint as being anything other than a manifestation of the applicant simply being aggrieved by the outcome of the review.  I have already dealt with the “fairness” of that issue.

  18. As to the applicant stating that she “lives” in fear in China, such a claim can only be seen as another request for this Court to engage in impermissible merits review (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259).

Conclusion

  1. For the applicant to succeed before this Court, the Court would, at the very least, need to find jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. I cannot discern any such error as it is said to arise from the applicant’s grounds, nor otherwise.  Accordingly, the application made to the Court is dismissed.

Costs

  1. It is appropriate that an order for costs be made in the current case.  There is nothing before the Court to argue against the making of such an order, which should follow in the normal course of events.  As to the amount of $3,000, I note that it is an amount less than the amount set out in the relevant Schedule to the Rules of this Court. Further, I am satisfied that in all the circumstances it is a reasonable amount that the Minister seeks, bearing in mind the work that has been done by the Minister’s legal representatives, including the briefing of Counsel, submissions prepared by Counsel, and an appearance by Counsel at the final hearing.

I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM

Associate:  C Darcy   

Date:  11 June 2009

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