SZNBX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZNBX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1172

Appeal from: SZNBX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 445
File number: NSD 416 of 2018
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 29 August 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether the primary judge erred in not finding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) failed to consider relevant facts and material in concluding that the appellants had a right to enter and reside in other European Union countries for the purposes of s 36(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the primary judge erred in not finding that the AAT had considered irrelevant material or material which did not exist – whether the primary judge erred finding that the AAT was correct to determine that the appellants had not taken all possible steps to avail themselves of third country protection under s 36(3) – Held: appeal dismissed, with costs
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(3), 417
Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Applicant C [2001] FCA 1332

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; 207 ALR 12

Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship v SZRHU [2013] FCAFC 91; 215 FCR 35

Suntharajah v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1391

V856/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 114 FCR 408

Date of hearing: 17 August 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 52
Counsel for the Appellants: The first appellant appeared on behalf of the appellants, with the assistance of an interpreter and a McKenzie friend
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr C Lenehan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

NSD 416 of 2018
BETWEEN:

SZNBX

First Appellant

SZNBY

Second Appellant

BAZ16

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 AUGUST 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The first appellant be appointed the litigation representative of the third appellant.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed. 

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GRIFFITHS J:

  1. This appeal is from a judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) which were published on 8 March 2018 (see SZNBX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 445). The FCCA dismissed the appellants’ judicial review application concerning a decision dated 7 April 2016 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which dismissed the appellants’ application to review the delegate’s decision made on 18 September 2014 to refuse the appellants a protection visa.  The second and third appellants are the…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1172
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of SZNBX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellants, seeking to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA), contended that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had failed to consider relevant facts and material in concluding that they had a right to enter and reside in other European Union countries under section 36(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). They further argued that the AAT had considered irrelevant material or material which did not exist. Additionally, the appellants disputed the AAT's determination that they had not taken all possible steps to avail themselves of third country protection under section 36(3). The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the primary judge erred in upholding the AAT's decision.

The court carefully examined the appellants' grounds of appeal, including whether the AAT had erred in its consideration of relevant facts and material, and whether it had considered irrelevant or non-existent material. The court noted that the AAT's decision was supported by material before it, and that the appellants had not provided any evidence to substantiate their claims of exclusion from EU countries due to the first appellant's criminal conviction or the second appellant's mental health issues. The court also considered whether the AAT had correctly determined that the appellants had not taken all possible steps to seek protection in third countries. The court concluded that the appellants had not established any appealable error in the primary judge's reasoning or orders.

The court held that the appeal should be dismissed, as the appellants had not challenged the primary judge's reasons for dismissing their claims in respect of the AAT's rejection of their cases under sections 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act. Moreover, the court found that any appealable error in relation to section 36(3) was immaterial, as the appellants had not challenged the primary judge's rejection of their claims for protection either as refugees or under complementary protection. The court rejected the appellants' submission that the issue to be determined was whether they had a "legally enforceable right" to enter and reside in EU countries, holding that section 36(3) encompassed a liberty, permission, or privilege lawfully given.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellants to pay the first respondent's costs, as agreed or assessed. The court emphasised that, even if one or more of the appellants' grounds of appeal was established, the appeal must be dismissed due to the appellants' failure to challenge the primary judge's rejection of their claims under sections 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act. The court also dismissed each of the five grounds of appeal, substantially for the reasons set out in the Minister's submissions, finding that the appellants had established no appealable error in the primary judge's reasoning or orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first appellant be appointed the litigation representative of the third appellant.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Thirdly, the same may be said in respect of the appellants’ contentions concerning the best interests of the third appellant as a minor child. In any event, it is plain on the face of the AAT’s reasons for decision that consideration was given to the position of the third appellant (see, for example, [45], [56] and [68]). Conclusion The appeal should be dismissed and the appellants ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, the Minister drew attention to the fact that, apart from the AAT’s conclusions regarding s 36(3), the AAT also rejected the appellants’ claims under ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act and no appeal has been brought in relation to those findings. Accordingly, it was submitted that the AAT’s findings would stand even if, contrary to the above, there was a jurisdictional error established in respect of the AAT’s conclusions concerning s 36(3). Consideration and determination As the Minister pointed out in his outline of written submissions, even if one or more of the appellants’ grounds of appeal was established, the appellants did not challenge the primary judge’s reasons for dismissing their claims in respect of the AAT’s rejection of their cases under both ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act. The appellants did not seek leave to amend their original notice of appeal and they did not suggest that their amended outline of submissions was intended to go beyond that notice of appeal. The Court went to some lengths to have the appellants identify which particular grounds of their notice of appeal were relevant to the amended outline. In circumstances where none of those grounds of appeal challenges the primary judge’s rejection of their claims that the AAT fell into jurisdictional error in rejecting their claims for protection either as refugees or under complementary protection, any appealable error in relation to s 36(3) is immaterial. For that reason alone, the appeal must be dismissed. For completeness, however, I would dismiss each of the five grounds of appeal, substantially for the reasons set out in the Minister’s submissions. The appellants have established no appealable error in the primary judge’s reasoning or orders. As to grounds 1 and 2, no error has been established in relation to her Honour’s conclusion at [132] that it was open to the AAT to make the findings that it did in respect of its conclusion that the appellants had a right to enter and reside in other EU countries (see [18] above). I accept the Minister’s submission that, even if there was an erroneous finding of fact made by the AAT in respect of the issue whether either the first or second appellants had resided in Germany or that the first appellant’s visit there occurred before Latvia joined the EU, at the time of the AAT’s decision Latvia was a member of EU and there was material before the AAT (as identified by the primary judge at [114] and [115] of her Honour’s reasons for judgment) to ground the AAT’s finding that the appellants had a right to enter and reside in other EU countries. I reject the appellants’ submission that the issue to be determined is whether they had a “legally enforceable right” to enter and reside in EU countries. That submission is inconsistent with SZRHU, which makes plain that s 36(3) is not confined to a legally enforceable right, but also encompasses a liberty, permission or privilege lawfully given. Nor has any appealable error been established in respect of the primary judge’s finding at [122] that there was no evidence before the AAT to support the claim that the first and/or second appellants may be excluded from such countries because of the first appellant’s criminal conviction or the second appellant’s mental health issues. In particular, there was no evidence before the AAT to suggest that any discretion to exclude citizens of EU countries on account of public security or public health grounds would be applied unfavourably to either of them. As the primary judge observed at [123] of her Honour’s reasons for judgment, it could only be at the time of seeking entry and residence in an EU country that any discretion to exclude on public security or public health grounds would be exercised. Notwithstanding that the appellants contended that the discretion would be exercised unfavourably to them, they provided no evidence below to support that contention, even though they were given the opportunity to do so in the FCCA (see [121] of the primary judge’s reasons for judgment). In this Court the appellants sought to put into evidence a document dated 2016 from the European Parliament which contained a table setting out statistics concerning the refusal to grant residence in various EU member countries during the period 2011-2015 (MFI 1). The Minister opposed this course. The Court ruled the material to be inadmissible in circumstances where it was not before either the AAT or the FCCA and no explanation was provided as to why the appellants did not take the opportunity to put the material before the FCCA. Moreover, there was nothing in the material to suggest that it had any relevance to the individual circumstances of the appellants.