SZKLA v Minister for Immigration
[2008] FMCA 42
•25 January 2008
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZKLA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2008] FMCA 42 |
| MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – applicant did not attend Tribunal hearing – Tribunal entitled to proceed with review without applicant appearing before it – no failure to consider the evidence – no failure to accord procedural fairness – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
| Migration Act 1958, ss.441G, 425, 425A, 441A(4), 441C(4), 425(2)(b), 36 ,65, 426A Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.4.35D |
| SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 237 ALR 64; [2007] HCA 35 SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609; [2007] HCA 26 SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 215 ALR 162; [2005] HCA 24 SJSB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 225 NAST v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 208 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214; [2006] FCAFC 61 SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62 |
| Applicant: | SZKLA |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1076 of 2007 |
| Judgment of: | Nicholls FM |
| Hearing date: | 1 November 2007 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 1 November 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 25 January 2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Nil |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Nil |
| Appearance for the Respondents: | Ms S Kantaria |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Clayton Utz Lawyers |
ORDERS
The reference to the first respondent be amended to read “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
The application filed on 26 March 2007 is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $3,140.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1076 of 2007
| SZKLA |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application made under the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) on 26 March 2007 seeking review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) signed on 19 February 2007, and handed down on 1 March 2007, which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister to refuse a protection visa to the applicant.
Background
Leave was granted for the Minister to put before the Court a bundle of relevant documents in this matter (Court Book (“CB”)). The following background can be discerned.
The applicant is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (“China”) who arrived in Australia on 27 August 2006. He applied for a protection visa on 19 September 2006. On 20 October 2006, a delegate of the respondent Minister refused to grant the protection visa, and on 20 November 2006 the applicant sought review of that decision.
Applicant’s claims to protection
The applicant’s claims to protection are set out in his application for a protection visa (reproduced at CB 1 to CB 26), and in an attached statement by the applicant (reproduced at CB 27 to CB 28). His application for review is reproduced at CB 50 to CB 53.
The applicant claimed to fear religious persecution on the basis of his Christian beliefs. He claimed that in 2004 he became active through family religious gatherings. He claimed that a member of his local “residential committee” came to his home and informed him to “register” these gatherings. The applicant did not comply, and he just “changed gathering places”. In September 2005, during a gathering in his home, the local police “came suddenly”, said they were “gathered illegal” and took seven members of the gathering to a detention centre, where they were interrogated and beaten, and were only released after the authorities were paid. The applicant further claimed that after he was married the local police, and people from the local residential committee often came to his home to “check” and threatened him.
The Tribunal – Proceedings
In his application for review, the applicant had nominated a migration agent to act for him in relation to his application (CB 51) and nominated this agent/adviser as his “authorised recipient” for the purposes of receiving correspondence on his behalf (CB 52). This migration agent had also assisted the applicant in his application for a protection visa (CB 9 to CB 10).
On receipt of the application for review the Tribunal wrote to the applicant (to the authorised recipient pursuant to s.441G(1) of the Act) by letter dated 23 November 2006, sent to the address for service provided by the applicant (the address of the applicant’s adviser), and set out for the applicant the process by which the review would be conducted. (By virtue of s.441G(2), in the circumstances, the Tribunal is taken to have given the letter to the applicant.) Importantly, the letter told the applicant of the possibility of attending a hearing before the Tribunal and noted that the hearing was the opportunity to give the Tribunal evidence in support of his application. The letter explained what this evidence could include (CB 60 to CB 61).
Further, by letter dated 28 November 2006, and again sent to the applicant’s address for correspondence, the applicant was put on notice that on the material before it, the Tribunal could not make a decision in his favour and invited the applicant to a hearing before the Tribunal on 21 December 2006 for the purpose of his giving evidence and presenting arguments in support of his claims (CB 63 to CB 64).
The Tribunal advised the applicant that if he did not attend the hearing, and a postponement was not granted, the Tribunal might make a decision on his case without further notice. This letter also made reference to a: “Response to Hearing Invitation” form which was enclosed with the letter, and notified the applicant that he was to read and complete the enclosed form and tell the Tribunal by way of this form if he was coming to the hearing.
From what appears at CB 65, the applicant signed (subsequently confirmed in evidence before the Court) and dated the response. He notified the Tribunal that he did not want to come to the hearing and he consented to the Tribunal proceeding to make a decision without taking any further action to enable him to appear before it. This document was dated 11 December 2006 and received by the Tribunal on 15 December 2006.
The s.424A letter
On 20 December 2006, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant inviting him to comment on certain information. These were said to be matters arising from the applicant’s interview with a delegate of the respondent Minister (CB 67.8 to CB 68.1). Specifically, the Tribunal stated:
“This information is relevant to the review as it indicates that you displayed a very superficial and limited knowledge of Christianity and Christian religious practice at the interview. Your responses at interview are not consistent with your claims in your protection visa application and interview to have practised Christianity regularly and actively since 2004.”
On 2 January 2007, the applicant responded by way of facsimile transmission to the Tribunal and commented on the information (CB 69). In this letter the applicant also confirmed that he did not wish to attend the hearing:
“2.As I had that bad feeling while I was interviewed or interrogated, I am not willing to attend your hearing. My migration agent told me that it is a good chance to explain some questions and the chance to show you that I was persecuted in China and my Christian Believes.”
[Errors in original]
The applicant subsequently provided a bundle of supporting documentation which was received by the Tribunal on 30 January 2007 (reproduced at CB 75 to CB 88).
The Tribunal – Decision
The Tribunal’s decision record is reproduced at CB 96 to CB 104. The Tribunal set out that it had advised the applicant that it was unable to make a decision favourable to him, that it had given the applicant the opportunity of attending the hearing, but that on 15 December 2006, it had received written advice from the applicant that he did not wish to come to the scheduled hearing, and that he consented to the Tribunal proceeding to make a decision on the review without taking any further action to allow or enable the applicant to appear before the Tribunal. In these circumstances, the Tribunal decided to make a decision on the review without taking further action to enable him to appear before it.
The Tribunal found:
1)“Important aspects” of the applicant’s claims were “general and lacking in detail” (CB 102.3).
2)His responses at the “Departmental interview” indicated he had only a “superficial and limited knowledge” of Christianity, and Christian religious practice, and issues including his baptism (CB 102.8).
3)It did not have enough evidence to be satisfied that the claimed religious gatherings took place in his home, or that he distributed “flyers” on Christianity in public (CB 102.8).
4)It was not satisfied that nervousness explained the applicant’s limited and superficial responses at the interview before the delegate (CB 102.9).
5)It did not accept that the documents the applicant provided about his religious practice in Australia, “in themselves”, establish such practice given the “limited detail in the applicant’s claims about his religious practice in Australia” (CB 103.5).
6)But even if the applicant had attended church in Australia, the Tribunal disregarded such conduct because of s.91R(3) of the Act (CB 103.6).
7)The Tribunal was concerned that the applicant’s claims were “mere assertions” and that it did not have an opportunity to test them at an interview before it (CB 103.7).
8)In all, the Tribunal was not satisfied on what was before it that the applicant was a Christian or that the events he said had occurred in China had occurred (CB 103.8).
9)The Tribunal found that it was not satisfied that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugees Convention reason and concluded that the applicant was not a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations (CB 104).
The Application to the Court
The applicant’s application to the Court, filed on 26 March 2007 seeks review on the following grounds:
“1.Jurisdictional error has bee made. RRT ignored my evidences
2.Procedural Fairness has been denied. I am Christian. I fear to go back”
[Errors in original].
Despite the opportunity, no amended application was filed.
Hearing before the Court
At the hearing before the Court, the applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter in the Mandarin language. Ms S Kantaria appeared for the respondent Minister.
At the commencement of the hearing, the applicant stated that at the date of the hearing before the RRT, he was outside of Sydney and was sick, and could not “make it” to the hearing, that he authorised his migration agent to explain this to the Tribunal, but did not know whether the agent did so, or not, and that he: “did not receive the letters from RRT”.
Given that this statement appeared to contradict the evidence before the Court that the applicant had advised the Tribunal that he did not wish to attend the hearing, and had consented to the Tribunal proceeding without giving him the opportunity to appear before it (by way of the “Response to Hearing Invitation” form), and given further that the applicant had subsequently advised the Tribunal, by way of his letter received by the Tribunal on 2 January 2007 that he did not wish to attend a hearing before the Tribunal, I was concerned that the applicant was making, by way of submission, assertions contrary to the evidence already before the Court.
I noted that the applicant, between the time of the first court date in this matter when orders were made for the conduct of his application before the Court and the date of the hearing on 1 November 2007, had not filed any evidence on which he wished to rely. At the first court date, amongst other orders, an order was made that the applicant file and serve an affidavit containing additional evidence that he wished to rely upon – Order 3. This was made in the presence of the applicant on 26 April 2007. I also noted that the applicant has had the benefit of some legal advice by way of a lawyer on the panel of the legal advice scheme (18 June 2007).
When I explained the need to put such matters before the Court in a proper evidentiary context, the applicant indicated a preparedness to give evidence in the witness box, and to be cross-examined.
The applicant’s evidence was that at the relevant time his migration agent told him that the Tribunal had advised him of a hearing date and had invited him to attend the hearing. He was working out of Sydney at that time. The applicant said that he was aware of the hearing date, and told the agent that he could not make the journey back to Sydney, and that his “migration agent promised” to tell the Tribunal of his difficulty on his behalf. He stated that since that time, he waited for “the second opportunity” for the Tribunal hearing. He also said that he understood (“seem to say”) that the agent had replied to the Tribunal’s letter of invitation and explained his reason for being unable to attend. But that now he did not know whether he actually did this or not. When he received the Tribunal’s refusal, he then appealed to this Court because he is “seeking another opportunity” to explain his claims to the Tribunal.
In cross-examination, the applicant confirmed that:
1)His migration agent had also assisted him with his protection visa application.
2)The signature on the face of the application for review was his signature (CB 53).
3)On or about 28 November 2006 his migration agent had told him that the Tribunal had scheduled a hearing for 21 December 2006, but said that he had forgotten the exact date.
4)The signature at the foot of the “Response to Hearing Invitation” form was his signature (CB 65).
5)His migration agent had shown him this document and had translated it for him.
6)The signature at the foot of the letter sent to the Tribunal on 2 January 2007 was his signature (CB 69). (This letter advised, amongst other things, that he did not wish to attend the Tribunal hearing.)
7)His migration agent had assisted him to prepare this document to give to the Tribunal.
8)The applicant also gave evidence that the letter (reproduced at CB 69) was prepared by his migration agent and, although he cannot read English, he recognised the signature as his.
9)The applicant confirmed that the documents subsequently provided to the Tribunal (CB 72 to CB 88) were documents submitted to the Tribunal by him.
10)But he further insisted that although these documents were provided by him to the Tribunal that “at the time” he instructed his agent to write the letter of 2 January 2007 to the Tribunal, he was outside of Sydney and was sick, and that he made a phone call to the migration agent at that time, and told the agent that he could provide a doctor’s certificate, but was told that it was by that time “too late”.
Consideration
In SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 237 ALR 64; [2007] HCA 35 (“SZFDE”), the High Court found that fraud by a migration agent (even in circumstances where there was no suggestion of any wrongdoing on the part of the Tribunal) was an effective subversion of the operation of s.425 of the Act because its effect was to stultify the operation of the Tribunal’s obligation to accord procedural fairness to the applicant in this context.
I did not find the applicant’s evidence to this Court satisfactory in a number of respects. The applicant’s evidence was that his migration agent (whom he also confirmed assisted him in his application for a protection visa) told him of the scheduled hearing date, translated the “Response to Hearing Invitation” form (CB 65) to him, and that he signed this document, which was dated 11 December 2006. The applicant also gave evidence that on or around 28 November 2006, his agent told him of the Tribunal’s invitation to hearing letter, that the contents of the “Response to Hearing Invitation” form were translated and explained to him, and that that document was signed by him.
Yet at the same time, he claimed that at the relevant times he was outside of Sydney, was sick, and implied that he wanted to attend the hearing, but could not do so because he could not get back to Sydney for the hearing which had been scheduled for 21 December 2006.
If, as the applicant confirmed, the contents of the “Response to Hearing Invitation” form were translated and explained to him, plainly he would have known that he had told the Tribunal that he did not want to come to a hearing, and had consented to the Tribunal proceeding without taking further action to enable him to appear before it. The applicant’s evidence was clearly inconsistent in this regard.
Further, the applicant also gave evidence that the letter of 2 January 2007 (confirming that he did not wish to attend the hearing) (reproduced at CB 69) was also signed by him. The applicant’s evidence was not entirely clear in this regard, but as I understood it, he certainly confirmed that he instructed his agent to write this letter to the Tribunal, but also said that he was told by her that if he was sick, then he should provide a medical certificate. While the applicant claimed to have been outside of Sydney during these relevant periods, and to have communicated by telephone, he did not explain how his signature appeared on these documents (reproduced at CB 65 and CB 69).
Further, the applicant confirmed that he had provided documents to the Tribunal in support of his claims (reproduced at CB 72 to CB 88). His evidence, however, did not explain the inconsistency between his stated desire now that he wanted to attend the hearing and his stated unwillingness in the letter of 2 January 2007 to attend the hearing and his statement in that same letter that he would provide further documents to the Tribunal instead. This he subsequently proceeded to do. He confirmed this in his evidence.
Further, I also agree with Ms Kantaria’s subsequent submissions that the applicant’s evidence was, in some respects, confused, particularly about the exact date for the hearing. Nor was the applicant sure exactly as to the time that he was outside of Sydney, during which time he said that he was both working and was sick.
Plainly, the circumstances before the Court now are distinguishable in a number of relevant ways from the circumstances before the Court in SZFDE. In that case, the relevant migration agent did not alert the applicants to the date of the hearing scheduled before the Tribunal. The “agent” in that case claimed falsely to have been a “practising solicitor” and “a registered migration agent”. Further, the evidence accepted by the Court at first instance in that case was that he advised the applicants in that case to decline an invitation issued under s.425(1) on “spurious grounds”. There is no such evidence of any of these elements in the applicant’s evidence before the Court now.
In all the circumstances, I agree with submissions by Ms Kantaria, that at best, on the applicant’s evidence, he appeared confused about the date of the hearing invitation and, in any event, was clear that he was told of the hearing date (but he forgot the exact date). Nor does the applicant say that he was given any advice that was negligent, fraudulent, or otherwise, by the agent, not to attend the hearing. Given the other circumstances of the existing contradictions in the applicant’s evidence that he told the migration agent that he was away from Sydney and sick, is inconsistent with his own evidence that the contents of the “Response to Hearing Invitation” form, and the contents of the letter of 2 January 2007, were explained to him, and he signed those documents. Importantly, both documents contain very clear statements of an express unwillingness to attend the Tribunal hearing.
In all, therefore, I am not satisfied that the evidence before the Court establishes any fraud (or, for that matter, any conduct akin to fraud) or even negligence on the part of the migration agent. The applicant’s complaint in this regard does not succeed.
There is nothing before the Court now to show that the Tribunal failed to comply with the relevant provisions regarding the issuing and notification of the invitation to hearing and the relevant time periods (ss.425, 425A, 441A(4), 441C(4) of the Act and reg.4.35D of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”)).
The Tribunal’s letter of invitation to hearing was sent pursuant to s.441G(1) of the Act to the applicant’s authorised recipient for such purposes. The applicant was taken to have received this letter pursuant to s.441G(2) of the Act and, in any event, confirmed in his evidence that he had been told of the invitation to the hearing, and of the scheduled hearing date, which he had forgotten.
Given what it set out at CB 65 and CB 69, and that both documents were confirmed to have been signed by the applicant, I am satisfied that the Tribunal was empowered to proceed in the way that it did pursuant to s.425(2)(b). In short, on the best view of the evidence available to the Court, the applicant consented to the Tribunal proceeding to decide the review without giving him the opportunity of appearing before it.
The Tribunal had written to the applicant on 28 November 2006 (CB 63), putting him on notice that on the material before it, it was unable to make a decision in his favour. It invited him to a hearing for the express purpose of his providing oral evidence and presenting arguments in support of his claims. In these circumstances, it is not clear why the Tribunal felt compelled to send a subsequent letter (“the s.424A letter”). But nonetheless in the circumstances, notwithstanding the applicant’s advice that he did not want to attend the hearing, the Tribunal provided him with an alternative opportunity to provide further information to it.
Nor can I see that it was wrong of the Tribunal to have done so in the circumstances. While the High Court in SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609; [2007] HCA 26 (at [19]) said there was a “temporal operation” to the application of s.424A (that is, in sequence prior to s.425). I did not understand the statements of the High Court to be directed beyond the circumstances that were presented by the case before it, and to therefore displace what was said by the majority in SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 215 ALR 162; [2005] HCA 24 (“SAAP”) as to the possibility of the Tribunal sending a s.424A letter even after a hearing pursuant to s.425 had been conducted.
At the hearing before the Court, the applicant also made complaints (not put in evidence) about the level of interpretation provided at the hearing with the Minister’s delegate. The applicant complained that the interpreter did not translate: “neighbourhood committee”. The applicant did not explain further.
But in any event, whatever problems that may have arisen in this regard during the hearing conducted with the delegate, and apart from the fact that the applicant provided no evidence whatsoever to support this complaint, what remains is that even had he done so, any such error would not have revealed jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. It conducted a review on the merits, and, further, gave the applicant the opportunity, specifically by way of its s.424A letter, to raise any such complaints, amongst other issues. At best in his response, relevantly, the applicant said:
“On the interviewed by the officer in DIMIA, I was very nervous, so I did not answer the question properly. I did detail three months by local police for my Christian believe.”
[Errors in original]
On any reading, this hardly amounts to a claim of failure of any interpretation before the delegate.
Grounds in the application
The stated grounds in the application are that the Tribunal ignored the applicant’s evidence, and that there was a denial of procedural fairness. The applicant put nothing further before the Court in support of these grounds.
Ground One – Tribunal Ignored Evidence
In ground one of the application the applicant asserts that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error as it “ignored my evidences”. On a plain reading of the Tribunal’s decision record, this complaint is not made out. The Tribunal clearly referred to and noted the claims and evidence of the applicant in his protection visa application, his interview with the Minister’s Department and in the response he provided to the Tribunal’s “s.424A letter” (see CB 99.2 to CB 102.2). The Tribunal considered the claims and evidence of the applicant (see its “Findings and Reasons” at CB 101.8 to CB 104.3). But, simply, it found that, due generally to the vagueness, generality and lack of detail, as well as a lack of supporting evidence, it could not accept the applicant’s claims as being sufficient to satisfy it that the applicant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations. I cannot see that the Tribunal “ignored” the applicant’s evidence.
If what the applicant really means by saying that the Tribunal “ignored” his evidence is that it could not be satisfied that the applicant was owed protection then this on its own does not reveal jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The evaluation of the claims before it is of course for the Tribunal to make in the proper exercise of its function.
The relevant statutory regime applicable to applications for protection visas is that the Tribunal must grant a visa (s.65) where it is satisfied that, in effect, the applicant meets the definition of “refugee” as set out in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention (s.36(2)). If such a level of satisfaction is not reached, then a refusal decision is mandated (SJSB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 225 at [15]-[16], NAST v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 208 at [4]-[5], Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73).
The Tribunal’s reason, in the circumstances, for not being able to reach the requisite level of satisfaction that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the Refugees Convention, was plainly open to it on what was before it. Where the relevant statutory regime mandates that the application be refused if the stated satisfaction is not reached, then no error in this regard is revealed in the Tribunal’s decision (SJSB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 225 at [15]-[16], as supported by NAST v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 208 at [4]-[5] and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73).
While this Tribunal went beyond what is often seen in Tribunal decisions of this type in writing to the applicant after receiving the notification declining the opportunity for a hearing, and taking into account the applicant’s response, I cannot see that its reason for affirming the delegate’s decision was anything other than not being able to reach the requisite level of satisfaction on what was ultimately put before it, and on the applicant’s claims, as put, that the applicant was not a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations.
Ground Two – Denial of Procedural Fairness
In relation to the applicant’s claim that the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness, I note that this is a case to which s.422B of the Act applies, such that the matters set out in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act are the exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule (absent bias) (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214; [2006] FCAFC 61 at [59]-[67], SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62 at [8], SZFDE at [48]). In that regard, I note what I have already said in relation to ss.424A, 425, 425A of the Act.
The Tribunal was entitled to proceed to a decision following the applicant’s response to its hearing invitation (CB 67) (s.425(2)(b) of the Act). In any event, when the date for the scheduled hearing passed without the applicant attending at the time, date and place as notified to the applicant, the Tribunal had the power to proceed as it did pursuant to s.426A. (The date of the decision was 17 February 2007 and the date of the scheduled hearing was 21 December 2006.)
But even if procedural fairness principles as understood at general law were to apply, I cannot see that the applicant was denied procedural fairness. The Tribunal put him on notice that on what he had initially put before it it could not make a decision favourable to him. It invited him to a hearing to give evidence and present arguments in support of his claims. On his own evidence, he knew of this invitation. The Tribunal understood that he did not want to attend.
Although not compelled to do so, the Tribunal gave him a further opportunity to provide further information. In particular, it gave him the opportunity to address the very deficiency that was identified in his claims as put:
1)A “very superficial and limited knowledge of Christianity and Christian religious practice at the interview” before the delegate (CB 67.10).
2)His evidence was “vague and lacking in detail” (CB 68.3), was “generalised” (CB 68.4) and “limited” (CB 68.4).
The Tribunal took into account the applicant’s written response (CB 102.9). Ultimately, despite the opportunity given to the applicant, what remained before the Tribunal did not convince it that the applicant was owed protection obligations. I cannot discern a failure to provide procedural fairness in these circumstances.
Conclusion
In all, I cannot discern jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision as it is said to arise in the stated grounds in the application, from what the applicant said at the hearing before the Court, or his evidence, nor otherwise. The application, therefore, is accordingly dismissed.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM
Associate: C Darcy
Date: 25 January 2008
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