SZJRI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZJRI v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 1090

CORRIGENDUM

SZJRI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

NSD 58 OF 2008

GILMOUR J

24 JULY 2008 (CORRIGENDUM 30 JULY 2008)

PERTH (HEARD IN SYDNEY)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 58 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZJRI
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 JULY 2008 (CORRIGENDUM 30 JULY 2008)

WHERE MADE:

PERTH (HEARD IN SYDNEY)

CORRIGENDUM

1.        Order 3 of the Reasons for Judgment be amended as follows:

“3.In lieu thereof there be orders that:

(a)The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 29 September 2006 be quashed.

(b)The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal, differently constituted, to be heard and determined according to law. 

(c)The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs to be taxed if not agreed.

I certify that the preceding one (1) numbered paragraph is a true copy of the Corrigendum to the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Gilmour.

Associate:
Dated:        13 June 2007

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZJRI v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 1090

MIGRATION – Tribunal found that sole or dominant motivation for threatened harm was for revenge and therefore for satisfaction of a personal grudge – finding was unreasonable on the available evidence – whether threatened revenge giving rise to alleged fear of persecution was for the reason of the appellants membership of the Nepalese police force or by reason of his actual or imputed political opinion – Tribunal implicitly found that revenge and political motive were incompatible – Tribunal failed to consider relevant evidence to find whether revenge threatened was for a Convention reason - appeal allowed.

Applicant S v MIMA (2004) 206 ALR 242 cited
Buultjens v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1058 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2002] 209 CLR 533 applied
NAAH of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 354 cited
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263 cited
NATC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 52 cited
Peiris v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 58 ALD 413 cited
S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 203 ALR 112 cited

SZJRI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

NSD 58 OF 2008

GILMOUR J
24 JULY 2008
PERTH (HEARD IN SYDNEY)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 58 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZJRI
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 JULY 2008

WHERE MADE:

PERTH (HEARD IN SYDNEY)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1090
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a Nepalese national, appealed a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, which had affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to refuse to grant a protection visa. The appellant claimed to fear persecution by Maoists and the police force in Nepal should he return there, citing his involvement in armed confrontations with Maoists during his service as a police officer and subsequent death threats against him. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant had been employed as a police officer and that his arrest of several Maoists had resulted in his coming to the adverse attention of the insurgents but found that the sole or dominant motive for the Maoists' targeting of the appellant was the satisfaction of a personal grudge against him and implicitly therefore not by reason of his imputed political opinion.

The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal erred in its consideration of the appellant's claims and whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The court found that the Tribunal had erred in its characterisation of the motive for the Maoists' targeting of the appellant as a personal grudge, rather than a political motive, and that the Tribunal had failed to ask itself the correct questions in determining whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The court found that the Tribunal's failure to ask itself the correct questions constituted a jurisdictional error.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court, and remitted the matter to the Refugee Review Tribunal, differently constituted, to be heard and determined according to law. The court ordered that the first respondent pay the appellant's costs to be taxed if not agreed and that the appellant's costs of the appeal be paid by the first respondent, also to be taxed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 14 December 2007 be set aside.

3. In lieu thereof there be orders that:

(a) The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal, differently constituted, to be heard and determined according to law.

(b) The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs to be taxed if not agreed.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal to be taxed if not agreed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant is a citizen of Nepal. His appeal is from a judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to refuse to grant a protection visa to the appellant. BACKGROUND Before the Tribunal, the appellant claimed to fear persecution by Maoists as well as the police force in Nepal should he return there. Prior to departing the country, the appellant was a sub-inspector of police who had joined the police force in 1991. He was sent to the town of Sindhupalchak for three months in 1998 as the officer commanding 17 police officers stationed there. He was involved in a number of armed confrontations with local Maoists, during one of which his men injured and, it seems, killed a number of Maoist insurgents. Four insurgents were captured. Despite a number of death threats from unidentified Maoists, the appellant handed the detainees to the District Police Office for further action before he returned to Kathmandu. They were each imprisoned and were still in prison at the time of the Tribunal hearing. In 2005 the appellant was ordered to return to the posting in Sindhupalchak. During the intervening period, when he had been posted to other locations, he received death threats, in phone calls, from Maoists from Sindhupalchak. These threats were expressly linked to the injuries, deaths and imprisonment of their fellow Maoists during and after the 1998 encounter. They were tied to demands for the release of those imprisoned. The threats began to take an emotional toll on the appellant. The Police Department sent him to join the Dili Police, in East Timor, under United Nations command, as a means of providing him some relief from these threats and their adverse affect upon his mental health. Insurgent activity in the area of Sindhupalchak had increased considerably since his prior posting. The Police Department refused to rescind his posting. Because of his fears of revenge by the Maoists, he decided to absent himself from the police force and seek asylum in Australia. He said that if he were to return to Nepal, he would be arrested for failing to take up his assigned post. He said that the Nepalese police were searching for him and had advised his wife that they would arrest him as soon as they found him. THE TRIBUNAL DECISION The Tribunal accepted that the appellant had been employed as a police officer and that his arrest of several Maoists had resulted in his coming to the adverse attention of the insurgents. It made no express finding concerning the appellant’s claims that during the armed confrontation which led to those arrests, some of the Maoists had been injured and killed. There was however no express rejection of this evidence. The Tribunal accepted that Nepalese police officers could be considered to be members of a class of persons who possess a uniting feature or attribute, and that persons in that class are cognisable as a particular social group: Applicant S v MIMA (2004) 206 ALR 242 at [69]. However, it was not satisfied that there was a real chance that an essential or significant reason for persecution directed towards the appellant was because he was a member of the Nepalese police force or by reason of his imputed political opinion. This was, the Tribunal found, because the sole or dominant motive for the Maoists’ targeting of the appellant was the satisfaction of a personal grudge against him and implicitly therefore not by reason of his imputed political opinion. THE COURT BELOW

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Tribunal referred to Singh in its reasons in this way: …the High Court in MIMA v Singh [2002] HCA 7 (7 March 2002), Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby & Callinan JJ, stated inter alia, ‘even if a killing occurs in the course of a political struggle, it will not be regarded as an incident of the struggle if the sole or dominant motive is the satisfaction of a personal grudge against the victim; however revenge is not the antithesis of political struggle, it is one of the most common features’ (per Gleeson CJ para 18; see also Gaudron J para 44) … even if the Tribunal accepts the applicant may be targeted for harm in Sindhupalchok by Maoists for reasons of his having been responsible for the arrest (and possible mistreatment) of a number of their colleagues after the abovementioned 1998 incident; based on the evidence provided, the Tribunal is satisfied the sole or dominant motive for harming the applicant in Sindhupalchok would be for the satisfaction of a personal grudge against him. (Emphasis added) The evidence before it, without more, did not support a conclusion that the Maoists had a ‘personal grudge’ against the appellant. True it was that the Maoists threatened revenge against the appellant as an individual but it was in the context of the longstanding armed struggle between the Maoist insurgents and the State of Nepal. The police force was an agency of the State. The deaths, injuries and subsequent imprisonment of insurgents were the result of a fire fight initiated by a group of Maoists against a group of police officers commanded by the appellant. None of the insurgents was known to the appellant and there is no evidence, apart from his position as the officer in command at the time of the fire fight, that he was known to them. The death threats made against him arose out of that armed clash and its aftermath. Indeed the threats were accompanied by demands that he arrange for the release of the four imprisoned insurgents. Counsel for the first respondent conceded that there was no evidence to warrant a conclusion that the appellant was threatened for reasons of personal animus or private retribution. On its face it is difficult, with respect, to see how these threats could, in the circumstances, be characterised as the result of a personal grudge held against the appellant. Apart from other considerations the threats carried with them a demand for the release of the imprisoned Maoists. Counsel for the first respondent, did not identify any basis in the evidence for such a finding. No rationale exists beyond the fact that the appellant acknowledged in evidence that his fear was related to possible revenge by Maoists. Two things immediately may be said about that. First, the appellant’s view of the motives of the Maoists who made the threats could hardly be determinative. Ultimately, it was no more than a matter of inference on his part. The actual motive may not have been revenge. In any event as is obvious and as was conceded by counsel for the first respondent revenge could be politically motivated. Second the Tribunal, in its reasons, in fact noted that the appellant feared revenge from the Maoists “… because of his involvement with (the Maoists) as a police officer in 1998” and “for reasons of his having been responsible for the arrest (and possible mistreatment) of a number of their colleagues after the abovementioned 1998 incident”. The Tribunal evidently accepted this explanation. Accordingly the Tribunal itself linked the threat back to what had occurred in 1998. The Tribunal, in its reasons was prepared to accept that the appellant may be targeted in Sindhupalchok by Maoists because he had been responsible for the arrest and possible mistreatment of a number of their colleagues after the abovementioned 1998 incident. However it seems, in the absence of any other relevant evidence that the Tribunal concluded, on the basis of the appellant’s evidence, that the motive of revenge against him as an individual must necessarily be characterised as ‘personal’. ‘Revenge’, in this case, apparently, inevitably equated to a ‘personal grudge’.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GILMOUR J
Insurgent activity in the area of Sindhupalchak had increased considerably since his prior posting. The Police Department refused to rescind his posting. Because of his fears of revenge by the Maoists, he decided to absent himself from the police force and seek asylum in Australia. He said that if he were to return to Nepal, he would be arrested for failing to take up his assigned post. He said that the Nepalese police were searching for him and had advised his wife that they would arrest him as soon as they found him. THE TRIBUNAL DECISION The Tribunal accepted that the appellant had been employed as a police officer and that his arrest of several Maoists had resulted in his coming to the adverse attention of the insurgents. It made no express finding concerning the appellant’s claims that during the armed confrontation which led to those arrests, some of the Maoists had been injured and killed. There was however no express rejection of this evidence. The Tribunal accepted that Nepalese police officers could be considered to be members of a class of persons who possess a uniting feature or attribute, and that persons in that class are cognisable as a particular social group: Applicant S v MIMA (2004) 206 ALR 242 at [69]. However, it was not satisfied that there was a real chance that an essential or significant reason for persecution directed towards the appellant was because he was a member of the Nepalese police force or by reason of his imputed political opinion. This was, the Tribunal found, because the sole or dominant motive for the Maoists’ targeting of the appellant was the satisfaction of a personal grudge against him and implicitly therefore not by reason of his imputed political opinion. THE COURT BELOW Before the Federal Magistrate the appellant raised three grounds:1.The second respondent (the Tribunal) committed jurisdictional error by failing to ask itself the correct question, those being: (a)Whether the underlying cause of any revenge sought by the Maoists against the applicant was an opinion held by the appellant or imputed to him by his Maoist foes, that he had an ideological opposition to them.(b)Whether in light of all the facts and evidence that the Tribunal did accept or did not reject, the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.(c)Whether, applying common sense to all the facts of the particular case, the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. 2.The Tribunal committed jurisdictional error in taking an irrelevant consideration into account that being that officers of the state, charged with protecting the state and its people are outside the protection of the Refugees Convention. 3.The Tribunal committed jurisdictional error in its consideration of the issue of state protection in that it failed to consider how effective such protection may be. The Court below held that the first and second grounds were not made out although the third ground was made out. However, the Court refused relief in its discretion based on the finding that the earlier findings regarding the absence of Convention nexus were independent of the findings in respect to state protection and otherwise sustained the decision. THE APPEAL

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GILMOUR J