SZIXD & Anor v Minister for Immigration
[2007] FMCA 644
•1 May 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZIXD & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2007] FMCA 644 |
| MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a Protection (Class XA) visa – no reviewable error – application dismissed. |
| Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.91R, 91X, 424A, 476 Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.44.11, 44.12 |
| Minister for Immigration v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 Minister for Immigration v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 NAHI v Minister for Immigration [2004] FCAFC 10 Randhawa v Minister for Immigration (1994) 52 FCR 437 SAAP v Minister for Immigration (2005) 215 ALR 162 SZEZI v Minister for Immigration [2005] FCA 1195 WACO v Minister for Immigration [2003 FCAFC 171 |
| Applicants: | SZIXD & SZIXE |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File number: | SYG1585 of 2006 |
| Judgment of: | Lloyd-Jones FM |
| Hearing date: | 22 March 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 1 May 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Advocate for the Applicants: | The applicants appeared in person with the assistance of a Gujarati interpreter |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Mr P Reynolds of Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The name of the first respondent be amended to read ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.
The application filed on 2 June 2006 is dismissed.
The applicants are to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG1585 of 2006
| SZIXD & ANOR |
Applicants
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The proceedings
These proceedings were commenced by an application under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) invoking s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) filed in the Sydney Registry of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia on 2 June 2006 for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The Tribunal decision was made on 19 April 2006 and handed down on 11 May 2006, affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent made on 22 December 2005, refusing to grant the applicants Protection (Class XA) visas. The applicants seek relief in the form of constitutional writs against the decision of the Tribunal.
The applicants in these proceedings are not to be identified pursuant to s.91X of the Act and have been given the pseudonyms “SZIXD” and “SZIXE”.
The applicants sought an order that the respondents show cause why a remedy should not be granted in exercise of the Court's jurisdiction, under s.476 of the Act. Pursuant to r.44.11(c) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“the Rules”), I dispensed with the hearing under r.44.12 and set the matter down for final hearing.
A Court Book ("CB") prepared by the first respondent's solicitors was filed on 18 July 2006. I have marked this Exhibit “A” and the contents were read into evidence.
Background
The Tribunal decision of Mr R Inder, reference N06/53052, provides the following background information:
The Applicants are husband and wife. They claim to be citizens of India. They arrived in Australia on 27 August 2005. On 4 October 2005, they lodged an application for a protection (class XA) visas with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs under the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). On 22 December 2005 a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs refused to grant protection (class XA) visas and on 17 January 2006 the Applicants applied for review of that decision.(CB 85)
The first named Applicant gave oral evidence to the Tribunal by video conference on Thursday, 2 March 2006 but the hearing was then adjourned until 1400 on 15 March 2006 as the Applicant wanted more time to get some documentation from India, stated his wife was about to have a baby, and he wanted her to be present at the hearing. The adjourned hearing then recommenced at 0930 on 15 March 2006 with the Applicant but was again adjourned until 18 April 2006 as the Applicant claimed his wife had only had the baby on 14 March 2006 and so could not be present that day even though he wanted her to appear as a witness.
Only the first named Applicant has made specific claims under the Refugees Convention, his wife relying on her membership of his family.. For convenience, therefore, the Tribunal will refer to the first named Applicant as the Applicant.(CB 87-88)
The applicant husband’s claims
In the protection visa application, the applicant husband claims he was a member of the Bajrangdal Party of India and a “regular activist”. Due to his involvement in that Party, Congress Party activists targeted and attacked him on several occasions. Further that due to differing political opinions, certain businessmen linked to the Congress Party tried to “betray” him. He did not feel safe or secure in India. He feared Congress Party supporters, the police and ex-business partners. He did not trust local or central authorities in Gujarat.(CB 88)
Tribunal’s findings and reasons
A summary of the Tribunal’s reasons is contained in the first respondent’s submissions prepared by Mr Reynolds, and I adopt paragraphs 13 to 15 of those submissions for the purpose of this judgment:
13.The Tribunal outlined the Applicant’s claims from his protection visa application. The Tribunal then outlined, the oral evidence provided by the Applicant and his wife.
14.The Tribunal:
(a) accepted that the Applicants were nationals of the Republic of India;
(b) accepted that the Applicant had been involved in the Bajrangdal Party or religious organisation since 2001 however noted that when answering questions in relation to his association with that Party, the Applicant was evasive;
(c) found that if the Applicant had been attacked many times as claimed, be would have remembered at least some of the times when this occurred and would have been able to say which month or even which part of the year this occurred;
(d) accepted that both Applicants had travelled to the United Kingdom on 3 February 2004 but did not claim refugee status or protection because they were members of the Bajrangdal Party or for any other reason;
(e) was not satisfied that the Applicant had a well fear of serious harm amounting to persecution for Convention reason from the Congress Party or its supporters;
(f) accepted that the Applicants were at some stage robbed on the way to Ahmedabad. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the essential and significant reason for the attack was Convention-related;
(g) accepted that his business partners wanted to kick him out of the business and were jealous of him and had differences because they were from the Congress Party. However, the Tribunal did not accept the Applicant’s unsupported claims that the essential and significant reason for any difficulties he may have had with his business partners was serious harm amounting to persecution. Nor did it accept that his business partners harassed him and threatened to kill him for a Convention related reason (being his membership of the Bajrangdal Party);
(h) accepted that the Applicant made a complaint to the police regarding his four business partners however in doing so also accepted that the Applicant did not at any stage go the police and claim that his partners had tried to kill him;
(i) was satisfied that if the Applicant had been threatened by his partners or anyone else from the Congress Party and had been attacked by them he would have gone to the police and made a formal report about such incidents as he did in the FIR submitted on 2 May 2005;
(j) found that the chance of his business partners through their connections in the Congress Party being able to quickly track the Applicant down was remote and improbable;
(k) was not satisfied that members or supporters of the Congress Party tracked the Applicant down in Bombay and wanted to kill him for a Convention reason;
(1) accepted that the Applicant was young, well educated, spoke English and Hindi, had been successful businessman and was satisfied that the essential and significant reason for any difficulties he may have if he and his family were returned to India would not be Convention re1ated. The Tribunal was satisfied that if for any subjective reasons the Applicant did not want to return home, he would be able to live in safety in another part of Gujarat.
15.In light of the above, the Tribunal found that:
(a) having considered the claims made by the Applicants both individually and collectively, there is no real chance of the Applicants experiencing serious harm amounting to persecution for a Convention reason if they return to India either now or in the foreseeable future;
(b) the Applicants are not persons to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol and do not satisfy the criterion set out in section 36(2)(a) of the Act.
Application for review of the Tribunal’s decision
On 2 June 2006, the applicants filed an application for review in this Court under s.39B of the Judiciary Act. They were granted leave at the first Court date to file and serve an amended application, giving complete particulars of each ground of review relied upon. On
4 September 2006, the applicants filed an amended application containing the following grounds:
1.The Tribunal breached the rules of natural justice.
Particulars
(a) The Tribunal failed to disclose to the applicant conclusions that would not obviously have been open on the known evidence, those being:
(i) That the Tribunal said in its findings and reasons that, “the claims made by the Applicant in his protection visa application are vague, general and provide few relevant details. For example, he claims that he was an active member of the Bajrangdal Party but does not say when he joined it, what if any role he had in it, or provide any detailed information about the party and its platform” [CB94, Para 4]. This particular information was not disclosed to the applicant either in writing or during the oral hearing. The applicant relies on the application of SAAP, and full federal court decision of WACO.
(ii) The Tribunal failed to ask the applicant the right question. For example, the Tribunal claimed, “…no evidence was provided to support these claims. For example, the Applicants do not provide a copy of FIR or other police report about this attack. Nor does the letter from Kalpesh-dha (General Secretary) dated 12 August 2005 make any reference to it or to any difficulties that the Applicant ever had in India because of his associations with the Bajrangdal Party or religious organization” [CB 96, Para 1]. The Tribunal did not ask the applicant to provide any of those information if it was willing to depend on such conclusion despite the applicant’s repeated request [see CB94, Para 2] that he should asked if the tribunal needs any more information.
(iii) the Tribunal failed to explain why it thinks that the attack on thew way to Ahmedabad was an ordinary robbery and not an attack constituting serious harm within the meaning of Refugees Convention.[see CB 96, Para 1]
(iv) the Tribunal misinterpreted the meaning of serious harm within the meaning of Refugees Convention and the s91R of the Migration Act 19548. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant’s business partners wanted to “kick him out of the business…because they were from Congress party,…” [CB 96 Para 2]. But the Tribunal fails to explain why it would not be persecution within the meaning of s91R of the Migration Act.
(v) the Tribunal accepted that the applicant’s business partners were constantly conspiring to snatch away his business and debar him from the business, threatened him, and have conspired and involved him in “a case of excise evasion”. The Tribunal erred in not finding it serious harm within the meaning of s91R of the Migration Act;
(vi) the Tribunal erred in concluding that there was effective state protection in circumstances where the Applicant claimed that the police were not willing to protect the applicant [CB 97, Para 2]. This is completely wrong because the applicant claimed that the police was not willing to protect the applicant from such harm [CB97. Para 1].
(vii)The Tribunal erred in not explaining on what basis it concludes that the applicant would not be denied employment membership of the Bajrangdal Party or religious organization [CB 99, Para 2]. Moreover, the Tribunal failed to put this information to the applicant either in writing or during the hearing and asked the applicant for comment.
(viii) The Tribunal was in a breach of s424A of the Migration Act in not disclosing that it accepts that if necessary he would be able to sell his house in Petland of for any subjective reason he felt he could not return there and would be able to buy a new place else where with the proceeds. [see CB 99, Para 2 & CB 100, Para 1].
(ix) The Tribunal misinterpreted the meaning of serious harm while accepting that the applicant’s wife miscarriage in the past due to the difficulties of the applicant and then concluding that it was not serious enough to constitute persecution [CB 100, Para 1]).
(x) Therefore, the Tribunal erred in not accepting that the applicant is not a refugee with in the meaning the meaning of the Refugees Convention.(copied without alteration or correction)
Submissions and reasons
The applicants are self-represented litigants who appeared with the assistance of a Gujarati interpreter. The applicants filed and relied on both their amended application and written submissions/further amended application. The further amended application appears to raise the issue:
The Tribunal was in breach of procedural fairness in considering internal relocation alternative.
It then proceeds to deal with the question of relocation and I will return to this issue. On the second page of that document the following statement appears:
In addition to this new argument, the applicant wishes to rely on the argument provided before which is attached with this submission. The applicant also wishes to seek assistance from the court as he is not a legal practitioner and does not have any legal skill.
The remaining pages contain particulars (iii) to (x) repeated from the amended application of 4 September 2006. Although there is no reference to particulars (i) and (ii), I will proceed on the basis that they are relied upon.
The further amended application set out the following particulars in respect of the new ground at [9] above:
The Tribunal failed to assess whether reasonable internal relocation is available to the applicant in India. The applicant mentioned in his original application for protection visa that he only speaks Gujarati language [CB 13, form C, Question 10]. The tribunal failed to assess whether the applicant would be able to secure employment and communicate in other parts of India where the medium of communication is not Gujarati.
We submit that the factors of internal relocation alternative must be considered against the criteria prescribed in by the full court of Federal Court in the matter of Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437.
The submissions then refer to Randhawa v Minister for Immigration (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 440 to 443, in particular to the reasons of Black CJ at 443. It continues:
In reaching this conclusion the Chief Justice emphasised that, in the context of refugee law, the practical realities facing a person who claims to be a refugee must be carefully considered and that the question was not simply whether the appellant could possibly relocate to other areas of the country but whether he could reasonably be expected to do so.
The question of whether safe internal relocation is reasonably available is, of course, one of fact for determination by the RRT. However, in reaching a conclusion on this question the RRT must not fall into an error of law by excluding from consideration matters which are central to a determination of that issue. The reasoning in Randhawa makes it clear that the circumstances to be taken into account are wide ranging, with strong emphasis on the practical realities of an applicant’s position such that the culture, economical or any other problems of relocation can be taken into account.
As Mr Reynolds’ written submissions were in response to the amended application which did not contain this new ground, he made oral submissions in response to the new claim. The applicants, in their protection visa application, indicated that they speak, read and write Gujarati.(CB 13) Mr Reynolds referred to the Tribunal decision which contains the following evidence:
…In response to questions put to him by the Tribunal, the Applicant confirmed that everything he claimed was true and correct in every respect; there were no changes to make; and a friend helped him to fill out the protection visa application form. He claims he speaks reads and writes Gujarati and Hindi, and a little English…(CB 90)
And under ‘Findings and Reasons’ is the following:
The Tribunal noted he was young, well educated, speaks English (at the commencement of the hearing on 2 March 2006 the Applicant claimed that he speaks good English, notwithstanding on 18 April 2006 he only claimed he spoke a little English) and Hindi, and has been a successful businessman in the past. Given this, the Tribunal asked the Applicant why it would not be reasonable for him to live elsewhere in India if he was having some problems in his own village.(CB 98)
Also, the Tribunal’s ‘Findings and Reasons’ records:
The Tribunal asked the second named Applicant why they could not live somewhere else in India and she replied that it was the same everywhere and wherever they go they will find them and harass them.(CB 99.5)
The Applicant then claimed there were 24 Stats in India and each had its own language and he cannot for example speak Tamil. The Tribunal put to him that India is 83% Hindu, and he replied that he cannot speak the other languages and while all States have Hindus they all have different dialects. However, in view of all the above including its earlier findings, the Tribunal is satisfied that if for any subjective reason the Applicant does not want to return to his home in Petlad, he and his family would be able to live in safety in another part of Gujarat or indeed elsewhere in India where Hindi and/or English are spoken.(CB 99.6)
Mr Reynolds then referred the Court to a significant finding by the Tribunal:
In short, while accepting that the Applicant was involved in the Bajrangdal Party or religious organisation, from the limited and unsupported claims made by the Applicant the Tribunal has not been able to satisfy itself that the Applicant has a well-founded fear of serious harm amounting to persecution for a Convention reason on this basis from the Congress Party or its supporters.(CB 95.6)
Mr Reynolds submits that the issue of necessity of relocation and the surrounding circumstances have been considered by the Tribunal and those considerations are recorded in its decision.
I agree with the submissions made by Mr Reynolds that the Tribunal did observe the test set out in Randhawa and its decision reflects its considerations. The applicants claim that the Tribunal did not correctly apply the test, but they do not identify any specific error. In the absence of any particulars, the limited avenue available to this Court is to consider the material contained in the decision. After considering the passages identified by Mr Reynolds and re-reading the decision, it is not apparent that the Tribunal made any error.
In respect of particular (i) of the amended application, the applicants claim that certain information was not disclosed to them either by invitation or at the hearing. Yet, the Tribunal found that the claims made by the applicant husband were vague, general, and provided few relevant details. Mr Reynolds submits that the applicants’ reference to SAAP v Minister for Immigration (2005) 215 ALR 162 and WACO v Minister for Immigration [2003] FCAFC 171 is misguided. It is submitted that the reason for the Tribunal’s decision was an absence of material and therefore the obligation imposed by s.424A was not engaged. In support of this contention, Mr Reynolds referred SZEZI v Minister for Immigration [2005] FCA 1195 at [29] where Allsop J stated:
On one view, it might be said that since the only information that was before the Tribunal about the appellant’s circumstances was information not withdrawn from the operation of s 424A (1) by s 424A (3)(b), it must be that that information was the reason or part of the reason for the decision. That is too simplistic an analysis. In SZECF I discussed the purpose of s 424A. Its operation is to be understood conformably with that purpose. Whilst in some cases an "unbundling" is necessary in order, sensibly, to apply s 424A to the expressed reasons of the Tribunal, here, the reason for the decision is plain. The Tribunal, having read all the material and having evaluated its content and weight, was unable to reach a specified mental state. It was not satisfied that the appellant had a well-founded fear because of subjectively perceived inadequacies in the information. The reason for the decision was simply (and no more than) the evaluative conclusion founded on the perceived inadequacy of the information, in the sense of an absence of detail and extrinsic explanation which had been invited. It would be an inadequate and misleading statement to say that the information was the reason or part of the reason for the decision. It was the lack of the requested further assistance and explanation that was the reason.
I am satisfied that particular (i) cannot be sustained.
Particular (ii) of the amended application claims that the Tribunal failed to ask the right question and that it did not ask the applicants to provide more information. Mr Reynolds submits that the Tribunal wrote to the applicants on 18 January 2006 confirming that it had received their application and that they should immediately forward any documents, information or other evidence they would like it to consider.(CB 56-57) The Tribunal sent another letter on 31 January 2006 informing the applicants that it had considered the material before it but was unable to make a favourable decision on that information alone.(CB 58-59) Again, the Tribunal requested the applicants send any new documents they wanted it to consider. It is submitted that it was for the applicants to make good their case before the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559. The applicants did not accept the Tribunal’s invitations to provide further material, although they did assert their willingness to provide any material that the Tribunal may request. As indicated by Kirby J in Minister for Immigration v Guo & Anor, the relevant facts pertaining to an application need to be supplied by the applicants themselves in as much detail as necessary to enable them to establish the facts. It is the applicants’ responsibility to persuade the reviewing decision-maker that all the statutory elements are made out. I am not satisfied that this particular identifies any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
In respect of particular (iii) of the amended application, the applicants claim that the Tribunal failed to explain why it found that the attack on them was an ordinary robbery and not one constituting serious harm within the meaning of the Refugees Convention. Mr Reynolds contends that the Tribunal accepted that the applicants were robbed on their way to Ahmedabad.(CB 96.3) However, from their limited and unsupported claim, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the essential and significant reason for the attack was Convention related.(CB 96.4) The Tribunal noted that the applicants did not provide a copy of the FIR or other police report regarding the attack.(CB 97.5) Mr Reynolds submits, and I agree with his submission, that it was open to the Tribunal to make this finding on the basis of the evidence before it and no jurisdictional error arises.
In respect of particular (iv) of the amended application, the applicants claim that the Tribunal misinterpreted the meaning of serious harm within s.91R of the Act and the Refugees Convention. Mr Reynolds submits that it was open to the Tribunal to find that the applicants did not have a well-founded fear of persecution as it was not satisfied that the essential and significant reason for the attack or any difficulties they had in India were Convention related, and that they would be able to safely relocate to another part of Gujarat.(CB 99.6) I accept Mr Reynolds submissions that there was no further obligation on the Tribunal to consider whether the applicants’ claims satisfied s.91R of the Act. No jurisdictional error arises.
Particular (v) of the amended application again relies on s.91R of the Act in relation to the actions of the applicants’ business partners. Mr Reynolds submits that the Tribunal accepted the applicant husband’s claim that he faced difficulties with his partners who were jealous of him and wanted to “kick him out” of the business.(CB 96.9) Similarly, the Tribunal accepted that the applicants had made a complaint to the police in relation to the business partners.(CB 97.2) However, the Tribunal did not accept the applicants’ unsupported claim that the essential and significant reason for any difficulties with the business partners was serious harm amounting to persecution due to differing political opinions.(CB 96.9) I agree with Mr Reynolds’ submission that this finding was open to the Tribunal to make on the evidence before it and this claim should be dismissed.
Particular (vi) of the amended application claims that the Tribunal erred in concluding that there was effective state protection for the applicants. Mr Reynolds in his written submissions, contends that the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicants had been willing to approach the police to seek protection in the past, as evidenced by the report submitted by them to the Tribunal on 2 May 2005.(CB 96.7) However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that there was an absence of effective state protection in the past, or that if the applicants returned to India there would be an absence of state protection from the authorities.(CB 97.7) While the Tribunal accepted that the applicants had made a complaint to the police, it found that the complaint did not extend to, amongst other things, their claim that the business partners had tried to kill the husband.(CB 97.9) It is submitted that the Tribunal is entitled to weigh up and make findings of fact based on evidence before it: Minister for Immigration v Guo & Anor at 570. I agree with Mr Reynolds’ submission that the findings of the Tribunal were reasonably open to it and that no jurisdictional error arises.
Particular (vii) of the amended application raises two issues: that the Tribunal failed to explain why it believed the applicants would not be denied membership of the Bajrangdal Party or religious organisation, and that the Tribunal failed to put this information to the applicants in writing or during the hearing and invite the applicants to comment.
Mr Reynolds submits that it was open to the Tribunal to find that the applicants would not be denied employment because of the husband’s membership of the Bajrangdal Party or a religious organisation.(CB 99.4) A fair reading of the Tribunal decision indicates that all these issues were ventilated with the applicants during the hearing. A number of these questions were directly addressed to the applicants and their comments specifically requested. I am satisfied that the claims raised under this particular cannot be sustained.
In respect of particular (viii) of the amended application, Mr Reynolds submits that when summarising the applicants’ evidence given at the reconvened hearing on 18 April 2006, the Tribunal noted that the applicant husband was born in Surat and lived his whole life in Petlad where he owned his own home. It is submitted that on the basis of the evidence given by the applicants at the hearing, it was open to the Tribunal to find that they would be able to sell their house and relocate elsewhere with the proceeds. Mr Reynolds submits that the Tribunal’s findings in this respect does not constitute “information” for the purposes of s.424A of the Act and need not be put to the applicants for comment. A fair reading of the decision indicates that information of the husband’s background was introduced by him during the reconvened hearing of 18 April 2006. In the absence of a transcript, particulars or more detailed submissions, the details are recorded in the Tribunal decision and nothing suggests that they came before it in any other way than as stated in the decision. I am satisfied that s.424A of the Act was not invoked and that no jurisdictional error arises.
Particular (ix) of the amended application claims that the Tribunal misinterpreted the meaning of “serious harm”. Mr Reynolds submits that the applicants failed to particularise how the Tribunal misinterpreted the meaning of “serious harm” when it accepted that the applicant wife would have had a hard time if she was pregnant in India and had had a miscarriage. Mr Reynolds submits that this ground seeks merits review, which is not within the jurisdiction of this Court: NAHI v Minister for Immigration [2004] FCAFC 10 at [10].
Particular (x) of the amended application again invites the Court to consider the merits of the application, which is not within this Court’s jurisdiction. I accept Mr Reynolds’ submissions in respect of particulars (ix) and (x) that this Court cannot enter into merits review: Minister for Immigration v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259.
Conclusion
The applicants in these proceedings are self-represented litigants who appeared with the assistance of a Gujarati interpreter. The applicants participated in the Court’s Panel Advice Scheme and filed an amended application and a subsequent further amended application on the day of the hearing. They did not have written submissions, as the document named as such was in fact the combination of a new ground of review and a repeat of the previously filed amended application. Mr Reynolds for the respondents assisted the Court with detailed written submissions supported by oral submissions in respect of the new ground introduced by the applicants at the commencement of the hearing. I am not satisfied that any of the claims made by the applicants can be sustained and consequently, the application should be dismissed.
I am satisfied that an order for costs should be made in this matter. I order that the applicants pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to this application.
I certify that the preceding twenty-six (26) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Lloyd-Jones FM.
Associate:
Date: 1 May 2007
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