SZIRS v Minister for Immigration & Anor
[2007] FMCA 214
•16 March 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZIRS & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2007] FMCA 214 |
| MIGRATION – Visa – protection visa – application for review of decision by Refugee Review Tribunal – whether invitation to hearing sent – not sent – jurisdictional error. EVIDENCE – Whether facts provide reasonable basis for positive finding – serious issue – proof required – clear or cogent evidence. COSTS – Delay – deliberate failure to raise alleged jurisdictional error – failure to comply with orders – no order as to costs. |
| Evidence Act, 1995 (Cth) s.140(2) Federal Magistrates Act, 1999 (Cth), ss.3, 42 Federal Magistrates Court Rules, 2001 (Cth), rr.1.03, 44.15(1) Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Part 8 Division 2, ss.36(2), 65(1), 91R, 91S, 425, 441A(4), 441C(4) |
| Bartucciotto v Western Health Care & Ors [2007] FMCA 26 Laster and Taylor, Interpreters and the Legal System (Sydney: Federation Press 1994) |
| Applicants: | SZIRS & SZIRT |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File number: | SYG 1106 of 2006 |
| Judgment of: | Lucev FM |
| Hearing dates: | 23 August & 3 October 2006 |
| Date of last submission: | 3 October 2006 |
| Delivered at: | Perth (by video link to Sydney) |
| Delivered on: | 16 March 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicants: | First Applicant appeared in person |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | G T Johnson |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Phillips Fox |
ORDERS
That the application be upheld;
That a Writ of Certiorari issue directing the Second Respondent to quash the decision made by it in relation to the Applicants and handed down on 16 March 2006;
That a Writ of Mandamus issue directing the Second Respondent to determine the Applicants’ application dated 19 December 2005 to the Second Respondent for review of the Delegate’s decision according to law;
That a Writ of Prohibition issue directed to the First Respondent preventing the First Respondent from acting on the Delegate’s decision of 16 November 2005 to refuse a protection visa to the Applicants;
There be no order as to costs.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG1106 of 2006
| SZIRS & SZIRT |
Applicants
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application pursuant to s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Division 2 of Part 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”) for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 23 February 2006, but handed down on
16 March 2006. The Tribunal decision affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“the Delegate”) dated 16 November 2005. The application for a protection visa was refused on the basis that the Applicant is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations in accordance with the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol (“the Convention”).
The first named Applicant is a 41 year old male who claims to be a citizen of India and of Indian ethnicity and Hindu faith (the Applicant). The second named applicant is the Applicant’s wife. For relevant purposes of these reasons for judgment, reference to the Applicant can be taken to include both applicants.
The Applicant claims that prior to arriving in Australia he was employed as a government employee.
The Applicant arrived in Australia on 1 August 2005, having legally departed India on a passport issued in his own name and a subclass 6 visitor visa issued on 20 June 2005.
On 8 September 2005 the Applicant lodged an application for a protection (Class XA) visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“the Department”) under the Migration Act.
In his protection visa application, the Applicant claimed that he feared persecution by Congress Party supporters, police and government authorities due to his active involvement as a member of Shiv Sena, which is a supporter of the political party BJP. The Applicant did not appear at the hearing before the Tribunal.
On 16 November 2005, the Delegate refused the Applicant’s application for a protection visa on the basis that the Applicant is not a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol (“the Convention”).
On 19 December 2005, the Applicant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the Tribunal. On 23 February 2006, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of t he Delegate not to grant a protection visa.
On 12 April 2006 the Applicant filed an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.
Legislative framework
Section 65(1) of the Migration Act authorises the decision maker to grant a visa if satisfied that the prescribed criteria have been met. However, if the decision maker is not so satisfied then the visa application is to be refused.
Section 36(2) of the Migration Act relevantly provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that an Applicant is a non citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has a protection obligation under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugee Protocol. Section 5(1) of the Migration Act defines “Refugees Convention” and “Refugees Protocol” has meaning the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol relating to Status of Refugees (“Convention” and “Protocol” respectively).
Australia owes protection obligations to a refugee on Australian territory.
Article 1.A(2) of the Convention relevantly defines a refugee as a person who:
“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
Sections 91R and 91S of the Migration Act refers to persecution and membership of a particular social group when considering Article 1.A(2) of the Convention.
The Tribunal proceeding
The decision of the Tribunal is accurately summarised by the Respondent’s written submissions as follows:
“The RRT was not satisfied on the “lack of detail in the evidence before [it]” that the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. It considered the applicant’s claims to be vague. It noted the lack of supporting material and considered that it could not, in the absence of conducting a hearing, be satisfied that the applicant was a supporter of Shiv Sena”: Respondent’s Outline of Submissions, para.4.
The application
The Applicant filed an application on 12 April 2006. An amended application was filed on 21 August 2006. That amended application was based on the two grounds set out at paragraph 20 below (“the Amended Grounds”).
Following an initial hearing on 23 August 2006 at which an issue arose as to the sending and receipt of an invitation to attend a hearing before the Tribunal: CB 53-54, copy of letter from District Registrar to Applicant, dated 5 January 2006 (“Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter”), the Applicant was granted leave by the Court to file a further amended application and evidence the Applicant intended to rely on by way of affidavit by 4 September 2006: Transcript, 23 August 2006, p.13. By the time the matter came on for further hearing on 3 October 2006 the Applicant had filed neither a further amended application nor an affidavit: Transcript, 3 October 2006, p.1 (“October Transcript”). Although it is difficult to understand how, the Applicant seemed to be under some misapprehension as to what was ordered on 23 August 2006: October Transcript, pp.4-5.
Thus it was that at the hearing on 3 October 2006 the Court, and the parties, proceeded as if the application had been further amended to include a claim that the Tribunal had not sent, and so far as it might be relevant, the Applicant had not received, the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter (“the Further Ground”). Proceeding in this matter is consistent with the manner in which the Court is intended to operate, namely:
(a) as informally as possible in the exercise of judicial power;
(b)not protracted in its proceedings;
(c) resolving proceedings justly, efficiently and economically;
(d) using streamlined procedures; and
(e) avoiding undue delay, expense and technicality.
See Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) ss.3 & 42 (“FM Act”); Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r.1.03 (“FMC Rules”); Goodall v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2007] FMCA 218 at para.21 per Lucev FM (“Goodall”).
Further it is consistent with the principles established to allow courts to deal with self represented litigants, and to diminish as far as possible, any disadvantage suffered vis a vis represented litigants: Goodall at para.44 per Lucev FM; Bartucciotto v Western Health Care & Ors [2007] FMCA 26 at para 36 per Lucev FM (and the cases and articles there cited).
Amended grounds
The amended grounds are as follows:
GROUND ONE
1. That the Tribunal’s decision dated [no date cited] lacked the required satisfaction in terms of sec. 414 of the Migration Act because it failed to carry out the mandatory function of reviewing the Applicant’s claims t hat were available on file, rather than dismissing his application on the basis that the Applicant failed to attend the hearing it conducted.
GROUND TWO
2. That the Tribunal failed to act under sec. 424 of the Migration Act which allows the Tribunal to call for further information from an applicant at any time in order to afford fairness to a refugee applicant rather than dismissing the application on the basis that there was a lack of details before it to consider the Applicant’s application.
Because of the issues raised by the Further Ground it is not necessary at this stage to consider the Amended Grounds.
Further Ground – Tribunal hearing invitation letter
As indicated above (see para.18) the Further Ground is essentially that the Tribunal had not sent, and so far as might be relevant, the Applicant had not received, the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter.
The evidence in relation to the Further Ground is set out hereunder.
The Applicant gave evidence-in-chief that he lived in a house with three couples during the relevant period, which was January to April 2006 (all months referred to hereafter are in 2006). The Applicant said that he had “gone out to work some days”. He further said that in relation to the post he “told those people” who lived in the house with him “please send it to me”. He says he did not receive the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter. See October Transcript, p.5.
The Applicant was cross-examined on the above evidence.
In relation to the time in which he worked he initially said it was “before the RRT hearing date”. Pressed on the time he said “February or March whenever the hearing date was.” Further pressed, he said “did he not know the dates”, but “they [the people living in the house] did not tell me when they received the post.”. See October Transcript, p.6.
The Applicant then said that he worked for “two months”. Pressed as to when, he said “Maybe February/March”. See October Transcript, pp.6-7.
The Applicant said that he was “expecting a letter” from the Tribunal, but when pressed further said he was “not sure whether … he was going to receive from RRT”, but asked the other people in the house if there was “any post just send it to me”. The Applicant then went on to say that he had told the other people in the house this “when I left the house” and that was in “February and March”. Further questioned, he said it was the beginning of February. See October Transcript, p.7.
The Applicant identified the people concerned and said that they were now living in Mildura. He said that he not only told them personally to send the information on, but also over the phone (presumably when he was away working). See October Transcript, p.8.
The Applicant was then asked why he had not contacted the Tribunal. He responded by saying that he was “never sure when will I get a hearing”, and further said that he had given the Tribunal his address and that he did not phone them as he had a problem speaking English. The Applicant was then asked why he could not have used an interpreter, to which he responded that he thought the “hearing will come … quickly.” Pressed further the Applicant said he was not sure the hearing would come on quickly. The Applicant was then asked why he had said that he expected the hearing to come quickly: to which he responded “It is going to come any time. I was never sure … [w]hether two years, one year or six months.”. See October Transcript, p.9.
The Applicant was then cross-examined about when he told the other people in the house to pass the post on to him. He said, again, that he had told them at the beginning of February, that he did a “little bit of work” (emphasis added) in January and then said that prior to February he “presumed” that the persons in the house would “give each other our post” because they were staying together. He then said that prior to February “it was understood” that the occupants of the house would give each other the others post if they collected it. Further questioned about his work in January the Applicant said that he (and others) were moving around to “[w]herever we can get some farming work”. The Applicant then said that he was “frequently going out for work” in January. See October Transcript, pp.10-11.
The Applicant was then cross-examined as to the receipt of the letter advising of handing down of the Tribunal’s decision (“the Decision Advice letter”). Without having seen a copy of the Decision Advice letter the Applicant acknowledged receipt of it, at a “re-directed address”. The Applicant said he went to the post office to re-direct the mail in April. See October Transcript pp.11-12 The Applicant now apparently lives in Griffith.
The Applicant’s attention was then drawn to a copy of the Tribunal’s Decision Advice letter, addressed to the Applicant at an address in Harris Park. CB63. Counsel specifically pointed to the date of the Decision Advice letter – 24 February 2006 – and the expected date of decision – 16 March 2006. The Applicant then said that he did not receive the Decision Advice letter, and that “This came to me in the Green Book” (a reference to the Case Book filed by the Respondent in accordance with the Court’s Orders). Counsel for the Respondents, with mock incredulity, asked “you never received this [Decision Advice] letter either?” The Applicant prevaricated for a considerable period before saying he had not received the Decision Advice letter. See October Transcript, pp12-13.
The Applicant was then asked if he knew the Tribunal was going to be handing down its decision on his case. The Applicant said that “the [Decision Advice] letter says I’ll be given a decision.” Asked the question again the Applicant said that he had “seen the letter where the RRT stated they are going to dismiss my case”. See October Transcript, p.13.
The Applicant admitted that at no stage did he contact the Tribunal to find out what was happening concerning his decision. He said that because of the “problem with his English” he was not confident ringing up the Tribunal. When asked whether he could have asked someone else, including an interpreter, to help in approaching the Tribunal the Applicant said “that is true”, but went on to explain, again, that he had asked for the post to be sent on to him. See October Transcript, p.13.
It was put directly to the Applicant that he had received the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter, and had chosen not to go to the Tribunal hearing. See October Transcript p.13. In response, the Applicant said:
“There is no reason why I could not have attended that hearing too. As I came to these hearings I could have come along and submitted my papers.”. See October Transcript, p.14.
Having regard to the fact that:
a)the Applicant’s native language is Gujarati;
b)the Applicant was speaking through an interpreter;
c)the manner in which the Applicant answers emerged, (i.e. sometimes somewhat indirectly); and
d)having regard to the basis of the Further Ground itself,
the Court has taken the above answer to be a denial of the proposition put by Counsel for the Respondent: see “Ethnicity Language and Disadvantage” in Laster and Taylor, Interpreters and the Legal System (Sydney: Federation Press 1994) pp.162-163.
The Applicant was cross-examined as to why he had said nothing about the non-receipt of the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter in his original Application and the Amended Application. The Applicant’s consistent response was that the lawyer then representing him (a Mr Jayawardena) had told him not to include information concerning the non-receipt of the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter:
a)“he told me that it is of no relevance that you have not received the letter”;
b)“he didn’t tell me to write”;
c)“As the lawyer had told me not to write it, I did not write it”;
d)“Yes, he did tell me if you do not, there is no relevance of not receiving a letter in your case and they will dismiss your case”;
e)“I did ask him to write it down but he said that you can say that in the hearing”;
f)“According to him, he said that once a Court sends you a letter it is understood by the Court that you have received the letter and so there is no argument regarding it”;
g)“As he told me not to write it I just did it in the hearing and he had asked me to say it in the hearing.”
See October Transcript pp.15-16.
Finally, it was also put to the Applicant that it was simply untrue that he had not received the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter. In response, the Applicant said:
“I just want to say that I have not received any invitation from the RRT and as I am attending now I would have attended the same.”: October Transcript, p.17.
Again, it can be seen that there is a somewhat indirect response to a direct proposition, which the Court will again consider as a denial of the proposition put to the Applicant by Counsel for the Respondent.
For the Respondent an Affidavit of Jonathon Willoughby-Thomas, the District Registrar of the Sydney Registry of the Tribunal, sworn
18 September 2006 was relied upon.
Relevantly, the District Registrar’s evidence was follows:
“3. As District Registrar, I have the overall responsibility for receiving and managing review applications lodged with the RRT in Sydney.
4. I am familiar with the standard procedure that was in place in January 2005 for the dispatch of letters inviting applicants to attend RRT hearings in purported compliance with section 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“section 425 letters”).
5. Section 425 letters are generated from standard templates using the RRT’s electric Case Management System (“CMS”). The CMS records personal details of applicants and actions taken in relation to their application for review.
6. When a section 425 letter is generated using the CMS, information recorded in the CMS against the relevant file (including the last address for correspondence provided by the applicant in connection with his or her application for review), is automatically inserted into the section 425 letter.
7. Whenever a section 425 letter is generated using the CMS, it is automatically recorded as an ‘event’ in the CMS “Case Log” for the relevant file. The date appearing on the section 425 letter indicates the date on which the letter was prepared.
8. Once created, the section 425 letter would be placed in an ordinary pre-paid envelope bearing in print or handwriting the applicant’s name and address for correspondence (as it appears in the top left hand corner of the section 425 letter).
9. The envelope containing the letter would be placed in a “pigeon hole” to be collected by an officer of the RRT for dispatch to Australia Post.
10. An officer of the RRT would ordinarily collect outgoing mail from the external dispatch “pigeon hole” RRT at approximately 10.30 am and 2.30 pm each day and deliver it to Australia Post.
11. Envelopes placed in the “pigeon hole” after the daily mail had been collected would ordinarily be dispatched the following working day.
12. An officer of the RRT would print a copy of the section 425 letter and place it on the relevant physical RRT file.
13. I have no reason to believe that the procedures described above were not followed in relation to this applicant.
14. The RRT’s CMS records that the section 425 letter in this matter was created on 5 January 2006. Annexed hereto and marked “A” is a true and correct copy of an extract of the RRT’s electronic records.
15. A copy of the section 425 letter inviting the applicant in the present proceedings to attend a hearing before the RRT is dated 5 January 2006 and appears on file N05/52911. Annexed hereto and marked ‘B’ is a true and correct copy of this letter.
16. The last address for correspondence provided by the applicant in this matter was that contained in his application for review. Annexed hereto and marked “C” is a true and correct copy of the application for review in relation to file N05/52911.
17. There is no physical or electronic record of the applicant having provided the Tribunal with a new or different address for correspondence to that which is contained in the application for review.
18. Based on my knowledge of the RRT's systems and processes, the information contained in the RRT’s physical and electronic records, including the material annexed to this affidavit, I say that I have no reason to doubt that the section 425 letter would have been dispatched, according to normal procedure, by pre-paid post on 5 or 6 January 2006 at the last address for correspondence provided by the applicant in connection with the review.”
It is clear on the evidence that the Applicant did not receive the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter. That however does not matter – the Applicant is deemed to have received the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter: Migration Act, s.441C(4); Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73 per Black CJ, Sundberg and Bennett JJ (from which an application to the High Court for special leave to appeal was dismissed: VSAF of 2003 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCATrans 757); VNAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 134 at paras. 9 & 15-16 per Sundberg & Hely JJ. The deemed receipt is premised on the document – in this case the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter – being given to the Applicant “by the method in sub-s.441A(4)”: Migration Act, s.441C(4).
Section 441A(4) provides as follows:
(4) Another method consists of a member, the Registrar or an officer of the Tribunal, dating the document, and then dispatching it:
(a) within 3 working days (in the place of dispatch) of the date of the document; and
(b) by prepaid post or by other prepaid means; and
(c) to:
(i) the last address for service provided to the Tribunal by the recipient in connection with the review; or
(ii) the last residential or business address provided to the Tribunal by the recipient in connection with the review.
Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of s.441A(4) are consecutively cumulative requirements. In this case only paragraph (b) is in issue, and the only question is whether the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter was sent (or despatched).
The Court is asked to infer from the Tribunal’s usual practice that the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter was sent to the Applicant by the method envisaged in s.441A(4): see exchange between the Court and Counsel for the Respondent, October Transcript p.19.
Counsel for the Respondent concedes that if the Court finds that the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter was not sent then there would be a jurisdictional error: October Transcript, p.21. That concession properly made by Counsel for the Respondents, is consistent with authority: SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 215 ALR 162 at 183 per McHugh J; [2005] HCA at para 77 per McHugh J; ALR 203 per Kirby J; HCA at para 173 per Kirby J; ALR 211 per Hayne J; HCA at para 203 per Hayne J.
The District Registrar’s Affidavit establishes that a Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter was created in this case: District Registrar’s Affidavit paras 6, 7 & 14 and Appendices A & B. However, no such certainty exists with respect to the actual sending of the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter. Many events are described as events that “would” or “would ordinarily” happen in the sending of a Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter: District Registrar’s Affidavit, paras.8, 9, 10, 11 & 12. They include, for example, that the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter “would be placed in an ordinary pre-paid envelope bearing in print or handwriting the applicant’s name and address”: District Registrar’s Affidavit para.8. It is not explained why what otherwise appears to be an automatically generated process might require an envelope address in “handwriting”. It raises the risk of human error. Nowhere in the evidence is there any evidence that an actual record is kept of Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letters “sent” by the Tribunal. That is perhaps surprising given the mandatory “must invite” requirement of s.425 of the Migration Act. It certainly makes it difficult, in a case such as this, to make a positive finding that a particular letter was sent or not sent, or that it is more likely than not that it was sent.
The question then becomes whether the facts which have been proved provide a reasonable basis on which the Court can make a positive finding that it is more likely than not that the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter was sent: Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 304-305 per Dixon J; Gurnett v Macquarie Stevedoring Co (1955) 55 SR (NSW) 243 at 248 per Street CJ (“Gurnett”).
The gravity of the issue is a circumstance which the Court must take into account when determining whether or not the burden of proof has been discharged and the more serious the issue of which proof is required the more cogent or clear the evidence needed to establish it: Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517 at 521 per Barwick CJ, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Windeyer JJ; Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361-363 per Dixon J; Re Dellow’s Will Trusts [1964] 1 WLR 451 at 454-455 per Ungoed-Thomas J., Evidence Act, 1995 (Cth) s.140(2).
The gravity of the issue in this instance is evidenced by the mandatory nature of the requirement to invite under s.425 of the Migration Act and the need for strict compliance with that requirement in a context where an Applicant’s failure to attend a Tribunal might result in the Tribunal dismissing the review application, with the possible consequence that an Applicant must return to a country in which that Applicant alleges fear of future persecution.
In this case, the generality of the evidence concerning the sending of the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter to the Applicant is such that the Court is not persuaded to the requisite standard that the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter was sent to the Applicant. To find that the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter was sent would be “to rest in surmise conjecture or guess”: Hawkins v Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co Ltd (1911) 1 KB 988 per Buckley J, cited in Gurnett at 248 per Street CJ; for there are no facts sufficiently related to the possible sending of this Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter to warrant the conclusion that it is likely or more likely than not that this Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter was sent to the Applicant. Accordingly, the Court finds that there was jurisdictional error and appropriate prerogative relief must follow.
Costs
Ordinarily the Applicant would be entitled to his costs. However, in this case:
a)the Tribunal Hearing Invitation Letter issue was not raised until the hearing of the matter on 23 August 2006, and the failure to raise it was seemingly deliberate and based on legal advice, and the issue ought properly been raised earlier to enable the Respondents to give consideration to their position prior to any hearing;
b)the consequence of (a) was the scheduling of a further hearing on 3 October 2006;
c)
the Applicant failed to comply with the Orders made by the Court on 23 August 2006 for filing of a further amended application and relevant affidavits prior to the hearing on
3 October 2006; and
d)the consequence of (c) was that the hearing on 3 October 2006 was longer than it ought to have been.
The above circumstances cause the Court to exercise the discretion express in r.44.15(1) of the FMC Rules (“The Court may”) to make an order that there be no order as to costs .
I certify that the preceding fifty-four (54) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Lucev FM
Associate: M Hewitt
Date: 16 March 2007
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