FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZIEW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 522
CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION – migration – review of decisions – Refugee Review Tribunal – conduct of review – evidence – hearsay evidence where maker of original statement unavailable
CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION – migration – review of decisions – judicial review – grounds of review – bias – apprehended bias
Held: Rejection of witness’ hearsay evidence merely on the basis that Tribunal had no opportunity to test the evidence of the maker of the original statement is a jurisdictional error – may also be seen as apprehended bias
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 cited
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FCR 409 cited
NADH of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 214 ALR 264 appliedR v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 227 applied
Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence (7th Australian ed, Butterworths, 2004)
SZIEW v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD 830 OF 2007MADGWICK J
18 APRIL 2008
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 830 OF 2007
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SZIEW
AppellantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second RespondentJUDGE:
MADGWICK J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 APRIL 2008
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave be granted to raise as a ground of appeal that the second respondent erred in rejecting out of hand hearsay evidence given by a witness, though not raised in the court below.
2.The appeal be allowed.
3.The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 16 April 2007 be set aside.
4.In lieu thereof it be ordered that the following writs issue:
(a) a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent of 7 November 2006;
(b) a writ of prohibition directed to the first respondent prohibiting the first respondent from acting upon or giving effect to or proceeding further upon the decision of the second respondent; and
(c) a writ of mandamus to compel the second respondent to reconsider the application according to law.
5.The first respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court.
6.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs in this Court
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 830 OF 2007
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SZIEW
AppellantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MADGWICK J
DATE:
18 APRIL 2008
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court adverse to the appellant.
Procedural history
The appellant…
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- Case
- [2008] FCA 522
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether it was proper and fair to attribute the Tribunal's minimal consideration of the evidence solely to the hearsay nature and the unavailability of the relative. The court found that the Tribunal had no other basis for rejecting the witness's evidence other than the stated reason. The respondent argued that the Tribunal's decision should be read as a whole and that the rejection of the evidence was rational. However, the court disagreed, highlighting the importance of refugee claims and the potential irrationality of outrightly rejecting hearsay evidence when the primary witness is unreachable.
Given that the inquiry into refugee status must accommodate the challenges of obtaining corroborative evidence, the court held that it was irrational to dismiss hearsay evidence merely because it was untestable. The court found that the Tribunal had erred in its approach, leading to a jurisdictional error. As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court was set aside. The orders included quashing the Tribunal's decision, prohibiting the Minister from acting on that decision, and compelling the Tribunal to reconsider the application according to law. The Minister was also ordered to pay the appellant's costs in the Federal Magistrates Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave be granted to raise as a ground of appeal that the second respondent erred in rejecting out of hand hearsay evidence given by a witness, though not raised in the court below.
2. The appeal be allowed.
3. The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 16 April 2007 be set aside.
4. In lieu thereof it be ordered that the following writs issue:
(a) a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent of 7 November 2006;
(b) a writ of prohibition directed to the first respondent prohibiting the first respondent from acting upon or giving effect to or proceeding further upon the decision of the second respondent; and
(c) a writ of mandamus to compel the second respondent to reconsider the application according to law.
5. The first respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court.
6.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MADGWICK J
As to the substance of the matter, the respondent submits that one cannot isolate the Tribunal’s finding regarding the evidence of the witness from the decision as a whole. The finding, including the rejection of the credibility of the appellant, must be read in light of the decision in its entirety: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259. When read in that light the Tribunal’s treatment of the witness’ evidence was based on a rational decision not to give any weight to that evidence. According to the respondent, an erroneous approach to the evidence in question can only be demonstrated if there was no rational basis for that approach.Consideration The first issue in this case is whether it is proper and fair to say that the sole reason for according the evidence of the witness little weight was that the Tribunal had no opportunity to test the evidence of the witness’ relative. I think it is. The rejection of the appellant’s credibility and the reliability of mere documentary corroboration (for reasons given) provide no basis for inferring that, under cover of silence, the Tribunal also concluded that the applicant’s witness, whom the Tribunal saw and heard, was also unreliable. The Tribunal offered no other reason for rejecting her evidence. The Court may infer that there was no reason other than the stated one. The next and less simple question is whether that amounted to a jurisdictional error. The subject of the inquiry by the Tribunal was a claim by the appellant to be accorded protection by Australia as a refugee within the meaning of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Such a claim raises issues of the utmost importance, of “human fate” as Toohey J remarked in Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 407. In many cases it will be a matter of very great difficulty for applicants to produce evidence to corroborate their accounts of why they have fled their own countries. Often enough, applicants may feel it necessary, in an alien culture, to exaggerate or even fabricate aspects of their claims to have the kernel of a just claim recognised. A genuine refugee may be far from a saint. These observations are, by now, trite. Their importance must not, however, be minimised. They affect the nature of the inquiry and must inform the inquisitorial method: see, eg NADH of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; 214 ALR 264 at [18] (considered below at [23]). In the context of an inquiry into refugee status it is simply irrational to reject evidence outright merely because it is of a hearsay character and the primary witness is in a far country and unexaminable. Even in a court of law, bound by the rules of evidence (unlike the Tribunal: cf s 353(2) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act)), first-hand hearsay evidence is admissible under Commonwealth, New South Wales, Australian Capital Territory and Tasmanian law if the maker of the original statement is “unavailable”, as defined: eg Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 63. In other States hearsay evidence is admissible of statements by persons “beyond the seas” whom it is not reasonably practicable to have attend the hearing, and even simply where undue expenses or delay would be involved in having the maker of the statement called: see generally Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence (7th Australian ed, Butterworths, 2004). There would be little difficulty in persuading a court that a Maoist rebel in Nepal could not reasonably be brought to the court room.