SZIEW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZIEW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 522

CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION – migration – review of decisions – Refugee Review Tribunal – conduct of review – evidence – hearsay evidence where maker of original statement unavailable

CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION – migration – review of decisions – judicial review – grounds of review – bias – apprehended bias

Held:  Rejection of witness’ hearsay evidence merely on the basis that Tribunal had no opportunity to test the evidence of the maker of the original statement is a jurisdictional error – may also be seen as apprehended bias

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 cited
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FCR 409 cited
NADH of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 214 ALR 264 applied

R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 227 applied

Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence (7th Australian ed, Butterworths, 2004)

SZIEW v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD 830 OF 2007

MADGWICK J
18 APRIL 2008
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 830 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZIEW
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MADGWICK J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 APRIL 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave be granted to raise as a ground of appeal that the second respondent erred in rejecting out of hand hearsay evidence given by a witness, though not raised in the court below.

2.The appeal be allowed.

3.The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 16 April 2007 be set aside.

4.In lieu thereof it be ordered that the following writs issue:

(a)   a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent of 7 November 2006;

(b)   a writ of prohibition directed to the first respondent prohibiting the first respondent from acting upon or giving effect to or proceeding further upon the decision of the second respondent; and

(c)   a writ of mandamus to compel the second respondent to reconsider the application according to law.

5.The first respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court.

6.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs in this Court

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 830 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZIEW
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MADGWICK J

DATE:

18 APRIL 2008

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HIS HONOUR

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court adverse to the appellant.

    Procedural history

  2. The appellant…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 522
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZIEW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved the appellant, a woman who claimed to fear persecution in her home country on the basis of her Christian faith, which she adopted after arriving in Australia. The Tribunal rejected her application for protection, finding her to be a witness of little credit. The central issue on appeal was whether the Tribunal had jurisdictionally erred in its handling of evidence from a witness who testified that the appellant's husband was an active Maoist. The Tribunal had dismissed this evidence because it was hearsay and could not be tested due to the witness's relative being in Nepal.

The court examined whether it was proper and fair to attribute the Tribunal's minimal consideration of the evidence solely to the hearsay nature and the unavailability of the relative. The court found that the Tribunal had no other basis for rejecting the witness's evidence other than the stated reason. The respondent argued that the Tribunal's decision should be read as a whole and that the rejection of the evidence was rational. However, the court disagreed, highlighting the importance of refugee claims and the potential irrationality of outrightly rejecting hearsay evidence when the primary witness is unreachable.

Given that the inquiry into refugee status must accommodate the challenges of obtaining corroborative evidence, the court held that it was irrational to dismiss hearsay evidence merely because it was untestable. The court found that the Tribunal had erred in its approach, leading to a jurisdictional error. As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court was set aside. The orders included quashing the Tribunal's decision, prohibiting the Minister from acting on that decision, and compelling the Tribunal to reconsider the application according to law. The Minister was also ordered to pay the appellant's costs in the Federal Magistrates Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be granted to raise as a ground of appeal that the second respondent erred in rejecting out of hand hearsay evidence given by a witness, though not raised in the court below.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 16 April 2007 be set aside.

4. In lieu thereof it be ordered that the following writs issue:

(a) a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent of 7 November 2006;

(b) a writ of prohibition directed to the first respondent prohibiting the first respondent from acting upon or giving effect to or proceeding further upon the decision of the second respondent; and

(c) a writ of mandamus to compel the second respondent to reconsider the application according to law.

5. The first respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court.

6.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MADGWICK J
The appellant also claimed to fear persecution on the basis of her Christianity, a religion to which she has converted since arriving in Australia.The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal rejected the application because it found the appellant to be a witness of little credit, for reasons given. The case on appeal The only substantial point finally agitated before me was the claim, not raised in the court below, that the Tribunal had jurisdictionally erred in its treatment of the evidence from a witness produced by the appellant that the latter’s husband was an active Maoist. The witness gave evidence after the appellant had been fully examined by the second Tribunal member. The Tribunal summarised the evidence as follows: “The witness said that she knows the applicant’s history and one of her (the witness’) relatives was caught as a Maoist in 2004 and she had heard about the applicant’s husband being a Maoist from that relative.” The transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal was tendered before me, and that is, so far as it goes, an accurate summary. However, the witness also indicated that her relative, and the appellant’s husband, were leaders within the Maoist movement. Nevertheless, the Tribunal member did not accept that the appellant’s husband was a Maoist. She based this decision on a general finding that the appellant had not been truthful in her evidence before the Tribunal, and a conclusion that supporting documentation (including letters from family and a police inspector in Nepal) was not reliable evidence of the facts therein. With respect to the evidence of the witness, the Tribunal said:Although the Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s witness may have been told by a Maoist relative of hers that the applicant’s husband is a Maoist the Tribunal does not consider that this is reliable evidence of that fact; the Tribunal had no opportunity to test the evidence of the relative and how he knew or why he said that the applicant’s husband is a Maoist.Respondent’s submissions The respondent firstly says that leave should be refused to raise the new ground on appeal. As to the substance of the matter, the respondent submits that one cannot isolate the Tribunal’s finding regarding the evidence of the witness from the decision as a whole. The finding, including the rejection of the credibility of the appellant, must be read in light of the decision in its entirety: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259. When read in that light the Tribunal’s treatment of the witness’ evidence was based on a rational decision not to give any weight to that evidence. According to the respondent, an erroneous approach to the evidence in question can only be demonstrated if there was no rational basis for that approach.Consideration The first issue in this case is whether it is proper and fair to say that the sole reason for according the evidence of the witness little weight was that the Tribunal had no opportunity to test the evidence of the witness’ relative. I think it is. The rejection of the appellant’s credibility and the reliability of mere documentary corroboration (for reasons given) provide no basis for inferring that, under cover of silence, the Tribunal also concluded that the applicant’s witness, whom the Tribunal saw and heard, was also unreliable. The Tribunal offered no other reason for rejecting her evidence. The Court may infer that there was no reason other than the stated one.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MADGWICK J

As to the substance of the matter, the respondent submits that one cannot isolate the Tribunal’s finding regarding the evidence of the witness from the decision as a whole. The finding, including the rejection of the credibility of the appellant, must be read in light of the decision in its entirety: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259. When read in that light the Tribunal’s treatment of the witness’ evidence was based on a rational decision not to give any weight to that evidence. According to the respondent, an erroneous approach to the evidence in question can only be demonstrated if there was no rational basis for that approach.Consideration The first issue in this case is whether it is proper and fair to say that the sole reason for according the evidence of the witness little weight was that the Tribunal had no opportunity to test the evidence of the witness’ relative. I think it is. The rejection of the appellant’s credibility and the reliability of mere documentary corroboration (for reasons given) provide no basis for inferring that, under cover of silence, the Tribunal also concluded that the applicant’s witness, whom the Tribunal saw and heard, was also unreliable. The Tribunal offered no other reason for rejecting her evidence. The Court may infer that there was no reason other than the stated one. The next and less simple question is whether that amounted to a jurisdictional error. The subject of the inquiry by the Tribunal was a claim by the appellant to be accorded protection by Australia as a refugee within the meaning of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Such a claim raises issues of the utmost importance, of “human fate” as Toohey J remarked in Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 407. In many cases it will be a matter of very great difficulty for applicants to produce evidence to corroborate their accounts of why they have fled their own countries. Often enough, applicants may feel it necessary, in an alien culture, to exaggerate or even fabricate aspects of their claims to have the kernel of a just claim recognised. A genuine refugee may be far from a saint. These observations are, by now, trite. Their importance must not, however, be minimised. They affect the nature of the inquiry and must inform the inquisitorial method: see, eg NADH of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; 214 ALR 264 at [18] (considered below at [23]). In the context of an inquiry into refugee status it is simply irrational to reject evidence outright merely because it is of a hearsay character and the primary witness is in a far country and unexaminable. Even in a court of law, bound by the rules of evidence (unlike the Tribunal: cf s 353(2) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act)), first-hand hearsay evidence is admissible under Commonwealth, New South Wales, Australian Capital Territory and Tasmanian law if the maker of the original statement is “unavailable”, as defined: eg Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 63. In other States hearsay evidence is admissible of statements by persons “beyond the seas” whom it is not reasonably practicable to have attend the hearing, and even simply where undue expenses or delay would be involved in having the maker of the statement called: see generally Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence (7th Australian ed, Butterworths, 2004). There would be little difficulty in persuading a court that a Maoist rebel in Nepal could not reasonably be brought to the court room.