FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZHUJ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION (No.2) | [2010] FMCA 913 |
| MIGRATION – Removal of unlawful non‑citizen from Australia – duty of officer to remove as soon as reasonably practicable – mental health considerations – non‑citizen self‑harming before removal – obligation to consider new medical evidence before removal – removals availability assessment procedures of Department of Immigration – no evidence of past failure to consider relevant material – no evidence of prospective jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
| Constitution, s.75(v) Federal Court Rules (Cth), O.62 Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.21.02(2)(c) Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5(1), 46A, 48B, 198(6), 417, 474, 474(2), 474(3), 474(7), 476(1), 476(2)(d) |
| Applicant: | SZHUJ |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| File Number: | SYG 2362 of 2010 |
| Judgment of: | Smith FM |
| Hearing date: | 19 November 2010 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 19 November 2010 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr T Ower |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr N Williams SC and Mr J Kay Hoyle |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The applicant must pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed in accordance with Federal Court Rules O.62. Pursuant to r.21.02(2)(c), refer those costs for taxation under O.62.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2362 of 2010
| SZHUJ |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)
This is a matter which came before me on an interlocutory basis on 2 November 2010. The background to the matter, the circumstances in which that hearing occurred, and my reasons for considering that there were serious issues to be tried are found in SZHUJ v Minister for Immigration [2010] FMCA 860, and I shall not repeat them.
The issues I identified concerned the relevant officers’ duty and power to remove the applicant from Australia under s.198(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), in so far as the power is conditioned by the words “as soon as reasonably practicable”. It appeared reasonably arguable that these words require the officers to take into account all the evidence available to them as to the applicant’s medical fitness to travel, and that it might be arguable that they might ignore such evidence presented in the past or which might be presented in the future before the applicant’s removal is effected.
As my judgment pointed out, the evidence on that occasion showed that a report from a psychiatrist obtained on behalf of the applicant as…
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- Case
- [2010] FMCA 913
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court held that the definition of a'migration decision' must be interpreted to encompass actions that are preparatory to the act of removal, as mandated by s.198(6) of the Act. It was held that the decisions assessing the reasonable practicality of removal, which occur prior to the actual removal, are integral to the process and therefore constitute a 'migration decision'. However, the Court concluded that the applicant's application was not the appropriate means to review these decisions before the removal has been carried out. The Court reasoned that such decisions are not final or conclusive until the act of removal is actually performed. The Court emphasised that the officer responsible for removal retains a continuing obligation to assess the reasonable practicality of removal in light of circumstances as they arise, right up until the moment of removal.
The Court dismissed the application, holding that the applicant's challenge to the administrative decisions was premature and that the proper avenue for review was after the removal had occurred. The Court further ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs, as agreed or taxed in accordance with Federal Court Rules O.62. This ruling underscores the Court's limited jurisdiction in relation to migration matters and the need for applicants to follow the prescribed processes for review.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The application is dismissed.
2.
The applicant must pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed in accordance with Federal Court Rules O.62. Pursuant to r.21.02(2)(c), refer those costs for taxation under O.62.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
This Court’s jurisdiction in relation to migration matters is conferred and confined by s.476(1) of the Migration Act, which requires identification of a ‘migration decision’. The Court is given “the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution” (emphasis added). A ‘migration decision’ is defined in s.5(1) as including ‘a privative clause decision’, ‘a purported privative clause decision’ and ‘a non‑privative clause decision’. The definitions of these terms lead back to an extended concept of a ‘decision’ provided in s.474(2) and (3):(2)In this section: privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5). (3)A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following: (a) granting, making, varying, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to make an order or determination; (b) granting, giving, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission (including a visa); (c) granting, issuing, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to issue an authority or other instrument; (d) imposing, or refusing to remove, a condition or restriction; (e) making or revoking, or refusing to make or revoke, a declaration, demand or requirement; (f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article; (g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing; (h) conduct preparatory to the making of a decision, including the taking of evidence or the holding of an inquiry or investigation; (i) a decision on review of a decision, irrespective of whether the decision on review is taken under this Act or a regulation or other instrument under this Act, or under another Act; (j) a failure or refusal to make a decision. Counsel for the applicant accepted that when administrative action which has been taken referable to s.198(6), or is proposed to be taken by reference to that section, is analysed in terms of s.474(2) and (3), a reviewable ‘migration decision’ is best regarded as being constituted by a course of administrative action which is ‘conduct preparatory’ to the ‘doing’ of ‘any other act or thing’, being the act of removal of a person from Australia. The action mandated and authorised by s.198(6) may require a series of administrative ‘decisions’ in the sense of formulated opinions and intentions, but the making of those decisions is not the ultimate manifestation of the s.198(6) power. They are necessary administrative steps towards effecting an act or outcome, being the removal of a person from Australia. This becomes an important point where, in a case such as the present, such decisions are identified and their legality is examined before a person has been removed from Australia. Necessarily in my opinion, decisions assessing whether a future removal is considered to be ‘reasonably practicable’ will never be final or conclusive prior to the effecting of that removal. The Migration Act raises a continuing obligation on an officer with a duty to exercise a s.198 removal power, to consider reasonable practicality in relation to whatever actions by way of removal are contemplated from time to time. It must be intended by the Act that such an officer, or a team or hierarchy of officers if more than one are involved in the removal process, will consider questions of reasonable practicality in the light of relevant circumstance which present themselves to the officers from time to time, up until the time when they have effected the removal.