SZHUG v Minister for Immigration
[2007] FMCA 1010
•20 June 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZHUG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2007] FMCA 1010 |
| MIGRATION – RRT decision – Malaysian with Indian ethnicity – police harassment under drug laws – claim of persecution for political and racial reasons – Tribunal failed to address racial claim – matter remitted. |
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.474, 476
Applicant A & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs & Anor (1997) 190 CLR 225
Applicant S v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387
Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
SZDOS v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2005] FMCA 121
| Applicant: | SZHUG |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG3624 of 2005 |
| Judgment of: | Smith FM |
| Hearing date: | 20 June 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 20 June 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Applicant in person |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr S Lloyd |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | DLA Phillips Fox |
ORDERS
A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent, quashing the decision of the second respondent handed down on 17 November 2005 in matter N05/52009.
A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent, requiring the second respondent to determine according to law the application for review of the decision of the delegate of the first respondent dated 19 August 2005.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG3624 of 2005
| SZHUG |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)
This is an application filed on 9 December 2005, which has been set down for a final hearing under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) in respect of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 2 November 2005 and handed down on 17 November 2005. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate made on 19 August 2005, refusing to grant a protection visa to the applicant.
The Court’s jurisdiction under s.476 is “the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution”, but its powers are confined by s.474 so that I do not have power to send the matter back to the Tribunal, unless I am satisfied that its decision was affected by jurisdictional error. I do not have power myself to decide whether the applicant qualifies for a protection visa.
The applicant arrived in Australia in January 2004. In July 2005 he was detained in immigration detention, and then lodged an application for a protection visa assisted by a solicitor from the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales. The application was lodged on 16 August 2005, and the solicitor’s covering letter summarised the applicant’s claims in one paragraph:
[The applicant] has instructed me that he fears persecution in Malaysia. He was a member of the Parti Keadilan, the Justice Party. His statement sets out his involvement and the way in which he was then targeted by the Malaysian police. He has also faced discrimination and mistreatment because he is ethnically Indian.
I enclose country information showing the poor human rights record in Malaysia, including information about human rights abuses under Malaysia’s Internal Security Act and discrimination against ethnic Indians.
The applicant’s handwritten statement covered six pages. At its commencement he said:
I fear returning to Malaysia because that Malaysian authorities will put me under the (ISA) Internal Security Act or other persecution so that they can put me in prison.
It start because I’m involved in politics and also I am Indian accent which my family is considered by the people here as ‘half‑cast’.
The applicant then recounted being a member of the Justice/Equality People’s Party formed after Anwar Ibrahim was arrested. He explained that he had been an “ordinary member which is actively involved in meeting, conferences, assembly, several rally’s and etc”. In particular, he said he was involved in an election campaign for the state assembly in Kedah, in which members of his party attempted to stop “phantom voters” being bussed in to support the government. He referred to police action against demonstrators from his party, and said:
I managed to escape. I heard that some of them been detained under ISA without investigation, trial and not even know how long they going to be held. Malaysian Government gave police full authorities to do what ever they want to people.
Another reason why I have a problem is because I am an Indian Muslim. People can recognise me as an Indian especially with my accent. Although I am a Malaysian citizen I’m still treated like a second class citizen. In Penang there incident happen where Indian and Malay had fight each other. Thing happen at [location] several year ago. This also one of the reason why they don’t like Indian.
The police in Malaysia was aim and victimised me. They framed me for drugs although I was not involved in drugs.
The applicant then referred to four incidents where he claimed abuse of powers by the Malaysian police. The first was when he was arrested without warrant with his father in his father’s house, and was detained for three months before being released, “after my father admit the drugs is his. He do that because if trial going to take place it would take about four to five years, we can not been bailed. My father was sentenced six years in prison”. The applicant said that after his release: “I’ve been released not knowing that the authorities were going to plot another conspiracy to convict me of possessions of marijuana, because it was my first case, I never been convict before I got probation for two years”. He referred to losing his job because of that conviction.
The applicant said that a second harassment by police occurred in June 2003, when police searched his house and took him to the police station. They later alleged that a urine sample taken three days later revealed morphine use. He was charged and released on bail, although he claimed to be innocent.
He referred to further difficulties getting employment, and to a third incident in August 2003, when the police searched his premises:
… and not find anything. They take me again to the police station for a urine sample. I was remanded for two weeks. The result was the same as before. The authorities were conspiring against me so they could make me bridge my condition on my first charge. This was the authorities aim to convict me under the ISA.
The applicant then referred to a fourth visit by police to his house when he was not at home. He said he was informed of it and advised by his family and friends to go somewhere else. He then came to Australia, where he had an uncle. His statement concluded:
I strongly believe that the police did this to me because I was involved in politics and because I was Indian. Even when I was in their custody I heard them saying that they don’t like Indian, try to be smart, talk to much and should go back to their country. I got a few slaps and kicks went I was been detained.
Some of the police I saw when I was arrested were familiar to me from [town] where we had campaigned for the election. It was clear that some of them recognised me and they said that they knew me. I also recognised them from previous occasions like went I attend conferences, meetings and elections when I was with Parti Keadilan. Some of them also who were responsible for arresting me to.
After coming to Australia I still kept in touch with my family. I was told that the police came twice to our home after I left even they have made enquiries at my neighbours to. My family advise me not to coming back for your own sake. I have heard of other people being caught in similar circumstances but I don’t know the full details. Some people are put under ISA and some not even know where there are.
Also forwarded to the Department was a statement by the applicant’s uncle, which confirmed that his mother, of Malay ethnicity, had married an Indian. His father “was an Indian origins (from Southern India regions). Therefore [the applicant’s] family is considered by the people here as ‘half‑cast’, which carries the Indian mixed races ethnical background”. The uncle’s statement recounted on hearsay the account of his brother‑in‑law’s prosecution and sentence on drug offences. The uncle referred to being aware of the fact that the applicant had been arrested several times during 2003, and concluded:
I truly know [the applicant] and the family; the allegations were incorrect and injustice. I really hope that [the applicant’s] status could be well address and protected by the government of Australia.
The country information forwarded by the solicitor included a US Department of State report on Malaysia dated February 2005. In its preamble, this report referred to problems in Malaysia which:
… included police abuse of detainees, use of the Internal Security Act (ISA) and other statutes to arrest and detain persons without charge or trial, persistent questions about the impartiality and independence of the judiciary, and restrictions on freedoms of press, association, and assembly.
The report discussed powers given to police by Malaysian law to arrest and detain without charge, and to findings of a Royal Commission in 2003 that “there were indications of corruption at every level and that excessive force was used against detainees”. The report referred to the use of the ISA against the political opponents of the government. It also referred to police powers under drug legislation:
Provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act (Special Preventive Measures) give the Government specific power to detain suspected drug traffickers without trail for up to 39 days before the Internal Security Minister must issue a detention order. Once an order is issued, the detainee is entitled to a hearing before a court, which may order the detainee’s release. Suspects may be held without charge for successive 2‑year intervals with periodic review by an advisory board, whose opinion is binding on the Minister. However, the review process contains none of the procedural rights that a defendant would have in a court proceeding. The police frequently detained suspected narcotics traffickers under this act after the traffickers were acquitted of formal charges. During the first 9 months of the year, the Government detained over 1,589 persons under the act.
The report also referred to executive control of judicial processes, and concerns about judicial independence:
The Government limited judicial independence significantly through a 1988 constitutional amendment that provided that judicial powers would be conferred by Parliament rather than being vested directly in the courts. The amendment also conferred certain judicial powers on the Attorney General, including the authority to instruct the courts on which cases to hear, the power to choose venues, and the right to discontinue cases. The Attorney General has control and direction of all criminal prosecutions under the Criminal Procedure Code and has assumed responsibility for judicial assignments and transfers. Since 1988, senior judges have been appointed based on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.
In recent years, members of the bar, NGOs, and other observers have expressed serious concern about the general decline of judicial independence, citing a number of high‑profile instances of arbitrary verdicts, selective prosecution, and preferential treatment of some litigants and lawyers. …
Even when the Essential Regulations are not invoked, police sometimes used other tactics to limit the legal protections of defendants. For example, during a trail, police may summon and interrogate witnesses who have previously given testimony that was not helpful to the prosecution. Human rights advocates accused police of using this tactic to intimidate witnesses. Police also have used raids and document seizures to harass defendants.
The report contained an extensive discussion of the difficulties facing opposition parties in Malaysia. It also considered racial discrimination. It said:
In 2001, Parliament unanimously approved a constitutional amendment barring discrimination on the basis of sex; however, discrimination based on some of these factors persisted. For example, government policies gave preferences to ethnic Malays in housing, home ownership, the awarding of government contracts, educational scholarships, and other areas. …
The Government maintained extensive preferential programs designed to boost the economic position of the Malay majority, which remained poorer on average than the Chinese minority. Such preferential programs and policies limited opportunities for non Malays in higher education, government employment, business permits and licenses, and ownership of land. According to the Government, these programs were instrumental in ensuring ethnic harmony and political stability. Ethnic Indian citizens, who did not receive such privileges, remained among the country’s poorest groups.
The applicant’s solicitor also forwarded to the Department an extensive human rights watch report, concerning oppression of political opponents in Malaysia, including extensive descriptions of the abuse of police powers.
The delegate refused the application on 19 August 2005. In view of a reference to the delegate’s decision in the Tribunal’s “Findings and Reasons” which I shall address below, it is relevant to consider how the delegate analysed the applicant’s claims and dealt with them. He did so under two headings: “Political Profile” and “Ethnic Background”.
Under the heading “Political Profile”, the delegate referred to the absence of evidence to substantiate the applicant’s claims of having joined the Parti Keadilan, and did not “accept that the applicant has now or has ever had a political profile that would result in his detention under the ISA”. The delegate did not address in that section of his reasons the applicant’s claims to have been the subject of police harassment, including by the bringing of false drug charges for reasons of political opinion and perceived ethnicity.
Under the heading “Ethnic Background”, the delegate referred to some of the passages in the US State Department report which I have referred to above. The delegate said that, based on information that one of his parents was an ethnic Malay:
The applicant is therefore entitled to the preferential treatment afforded to the Malay population in Malaysia. I accept that the applicant may be identified as having Indian Muslim ancestry as indeed did the former Prime Minister of Malaysia Dr Mahathir Mohamad, but I do not accept that he would be persecuted for reasons of that ancestry.
The delegate did not address the applicant’s claims to have encountered police harassment due to his ethnicity. The delegate’s decision therefore inadequately dealt with the claims that were made to the Department.
As I shall indicate below, the Tribunal similarly failed to address this significant element in the applicant’s claims, being his claim suggesting his perceived ethnic background as one of the reasons for fearing police harassment. In my opinion, that claim was clearly presented in the passages from the applicant’s written statement which I have extracted above. I did not understand counsel for the Minister to contest that this was so.
In the appeal before the Tribunal the applicant presented documents corroborating his involvement in the political party Parti Keadilan, and his having been subject to prosecutions.
The applicant attended a hearing of the Tribunal to which he was invited on 27 September 2005, accompanied by his uncle. It is regrettable in this case that neither the applicant nor the Minister have tendered a transcript of the tapes of that hearing. Some of the grounds raised by the applicant in his amended application are unsupportable in the absence of a transcript, including a complaint about the quality of the interpretation at the hearing. The applicant had been put on notice by me at a directions hearing in May 2006 that he should consider tendering a transcript. However, he has told me today that he was unable to afford to do this. In the result, I am left with the Tribunal’s own description of the hearing as the only evidence of what occurred.
According to the Tribunal:
The applicant began by stating that if he returned to Malaysia he would be arrested under the provisions of ISA. He agreed that he had not been arrested under these provisions in the past, but believed it would happen in the future for reason of his politics. He said he was an active member of the Keadilan Party – his activities included giving talks for the party, publicising its platform and participating in its rallies. He said the police are interested in him because he argues with them; there is always something wrong between the applicant and the police. The police to whom he is referring are the police in Penang, who know him. The applicant also claimed that he had information that would interest the police, especially in relation to the election in [town] in Kedah State.
Counsel for the Minister submitted that at this point the Tribunal could properly have understood the applicant as withdrawing his earlier claim that his perceived ethnicity was a factor in the police “interest in him”. However, I would not read anything that he is recorded as saying by the Tribunal as allowing such a conclusion.
Counsel for the Minister also pointed to the absence in any part of the subsequent hearing of any reference by the applicant to a racial explanation, either partial or otherwise, for the police harassment described by the applicant. I accept that there was such an absence. However, it appears that the Tribunal never asked the applicant questions addressing that claimed explanation.
On the Tribunal’s description it “asked the applicant about his political activities”, and the applicant described these. The Tribunal then asked the applicant about his “involvement with the police on the criminal matter”. The applicant then gave more detailed accounts of the four occasions on which he received attention from the police. He described their bringing of charges based, on his account, on false evidence. The Tribunal then recorded asking the applicant why he left Malaysia, and a response in which he referred to being “targeted because of his political opinion”. Counsel for the Minister submitted that it was significant that the applicant did not also refer to his racial explanation. However, I do not consider that the absence of a volunteered reference to his racial claim at this point in the hearing could properly allow a Tribunal to conclude that it was being abandoned.
At the end of the hearing, the Tribunal recorded:
At the end of the hearing, the applicant said that he would like to make a further submission in response to my concerns that I had put to him (that there was no real chance that he would be persecuted for reason of his political opinion). I allowed him time to do so. On the date when the submission was due, the applicant wrote requesting an extension of time, saying that he was waiting for “evidence, information or document to give to the Tribunal”. I allowed the extension. When that date passed without a submission being received, the Tribunal rang the applicant’s adviser. She stated that she had not been preparing a submission and in fact had not been in contact with the applicant since the hearing.
Counsel for the Minister submitted that the applicant at this point, and at earlier points, had been given an opportunity to present further explanations and evidence concerning his claimed police harassment on perceived ethnic grounds, and that the absence of his volunteering such further information indicated to the Tribunal an abandonment of that claim. However, I do not accept that submission.
The procedures followed by the Tribunal at a hearing have been described as “inquisitorial”, and in a situation where the Tribunal is obliged itself to ask questions to explore the claims which had been brought on a review before it, that is an appropriate description. However, this procedure has the consequence that many, if not most, applicants who are not assisted at a hearing by a professional representative may not perceive a need to repeat or embellish claims which they are aware have already been presented to the Department, and which they believe are before the Tribunal. An applicant’s passive responsiveness to questioning by the Tribunal which did not explore all the claims made to the Department cannot, without more, be taken by a Tribunal as amounting to an abandonment of the claims which were not addressed. I do not accept that, on the evidence before me, there was any basis for the Tribunal to have concluded or assumed that the applicant had withdrawn or abandoned his claim that he suffered police harassment which was significantly attributable to racial prejudice as well as his anti‑government political opinions.
Turning to the Tribunal’s reasons, it is most unclear that the Tribunal in fact formed the view that the applicant had abandoned this element of his claims. What is clear, is that the Tribunal never expressly addressed it.
Under the heading “Findings and Reasons”, the Tribunal commenced its discussion over two pages of that part of the applicant’s claims which it described as “the applicant claims that he has been, and will continue to be, targeted by the Malaysian authorities for reason of his political opinion and activities”. The Tribunal accepted the applicant’s participation in Keadilan activities. However, it formed a view that, as a result of oppression by the Malaysian government, the party had ceased to be active. The Tribunal concluded:
The independent evidence above suggests that the political opposition, including Keadilan, was substantially weakened by the ISA arrests in April 2001. Hence the period of the applicant’s documented membership of Keadilan coincides with the period in which Keadilan lost its high profile and, by the election of 2004, much of its parliamentary presence. There is nothing before me to indicate that membership of Keadilan, without more, attracts adverse attention from the Malaysian authorities, particularly in the period since April 2001.
I am not satisfied that the applicant has been harmed in the past for reason of his political opinion. I find that the chance that he will be so harmed in the reasonably foreseeable future is remote.
I shall not pause to consider whether this reasoning adequately dealt with the applicant’s claims in relation to political persecution, since I consider that a clearer ground of jurisdictional error arises in this case.
The Tribunal’s “Findings and Reasons” then discussed “the applicant’s dealings with the police on the drugs charges”. It expressed a conclusion at the commencement of its discussion:
While I recognise that it is possible for police to investigate a person for one reason as a cover for their adverse interest on other grounds, I am not satisfied that the police investigations of the applicant were prompted by any adverse interest the authorities may have in the applicant for reason of his political opinion.
Nowhere in the subsequent discussion did the Tribunal consider whether the police might have had interest in the applicant, and have been prompted to harass him, by reason of his ethnicity or perceived ethnicity, whether alone or in combination with his perceived political opinions.
The Tribunal discussed the police charges, and referred to the fact that the applicant had been released on bail in proceedings in a Court. It suggested that it is “mere speculation” and “inherently implausible” that his prosecution on drug offences was related to his political opinions. The Tribunal concluded this part of its discussion:
I am satisfied that the applicant is not regarded adversely for reason of his political opinion, even as a member of Keadilan. The independent evidence indicates that the last government “attack” on Keadilan was in April 2001 and this effectively crippled the opposition. There have been no Keadilan arrests since that time and indeed, no political party arrests under the provisions of ISA since at least the beginning of 2004. The applicant detailed no particular political activities beyond a general reference to meetings and rallies except for one particular occasion which the independent evidence places in November 2000.
I accept that the applicant has had dealings with the police since September 2002 in relation to drugs and I am satisfied that this is a separate issue. The applicant has not been denied any due process in the conduct of his drug cases. He has failed to appear in court (having left Malaysia) and this may have consequences. However, I am of the view that this should rightly be characterised as prosecution rather than persecution.
A Tribunal’s characterisation of the applicant’s criminal prosecutions as “prosecution rather than persecution” may reveal an inadequate appreciation of the definition of “refugee” under the Refugees’ Convention. Where it is feared that criminal laws enforcement processes might be used to oppress political opponents of the government, it is necessary for a Refugee Tribunal to examine the underlying reasons for the feared prosecutions to consider whether they would be “classified as a legitimate object of that country” (see Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473 at [45], citing Applicant A & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs & Anor (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 258, and applied by me in SZDOS v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2005] FMCA 121 at [30]‑[48]).
In the present case, the Tribunal does not cite these authorities anywhere nor discuss them, but I accept the submission of counsel for the Minister that the applicant’s claim that the police were motivated by reasons of his political opinion to harass him has been addressed by the Tribunal without apparent error. However, a fear of the application of criminal enforcement processes may also come under the Refugees’ Convention, where the applicant fears that the processes are initiated or exacerbated for other discriminatory reasons coming within the Refugees’ Convention. Thus a selective exercise of police powers under criminal laws may give rise to a Convention claim, where police are motivated or activated by racial discrimination (compare Applicant S v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387 at [42], [48] and [83]).
In my opinion, it was such a claim that the applicant had originally made in his written statement accompanying his visa application, and which the delegate and then the Tribunal were bound to address. As I have indicated, the Tribunal did not address it in the part of its reasoning addressing the “applicant’s dealings with the police on the drug charges”.
I have above rejected counsel for the Minister’s principal submission, which was that the Tribunal was not obliged to address it, due to its abandonment by the applicant in the course of the hearing. I do not consider it was open to the Tribunal to have formed that view, if indeed it did.
Counsel for the Minister’s alternative submission was that the Tribunal did address it, in its subsequent discussion of the applicant’s general risk of facing racial discrimination if he returned to Malaysia. The Tribunal said:
The applicant originally wrote in his PVA that he feared persecution for reason of his race, being half Indian. The applicant made no mention of this claim at the hearing, nor did his witness (his uncle) although he, too, had referred to it in his original letter to the Department. I note that this ground was addressed by the delegate in the primary decision. He set out reliable independent evidence indicating that the Malaysian constitution bans discrimination on the basis of race (and other) grounds, but that some racial discrimination persisted. The delegate also noted that the one incident of inter‑racial violence to which the applicant alluded was, in fact, a religious incident, with the Indians concerned being Hindus. The applicant is a Muslim, like the native Malays. The delegate did not find that the applicant faced persecution on the grounds of his race.
(emphasis in original)
Plainly, in this passage the Tribunal did not expressly address the alternative or cumulative motivation of the police which the applicant pointed to, being their racial prejudice. Nor in my opinion, and giving the Tribunal the latitude required under Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 277 and 291, can the Tribunal’s reasoning be understood as implicitly addressing that element in the applicant’s claims.
Indeed, the Tribunal’s reference to “this ground was addressed by the delegate in the primary decision”, suggests that the Tribunal overlooked that, in fact, the delegate had never addressed the applicant’s claimed racial explanation for police harassment. At least, this reference to the delegate’s decision confirms that in this paragraph the Tribunal was only addressing the matter addressed by the delegate under the heading “Ethnic Background”, being the applicant’s situation in relation to Malaysia’s preferential treatment of Malay people.
In my opinion, this is the correct understanding of this part of the Tribunal’s reasons. I consider that its conclusion that the applicant “does not wish to pursue any claim that he has suffered, or will suffer, persecution for reason of his having a father of Indian ancestry”, was intended by the Tribunal to address only a possible claim of general societal discrimination facing persons of Indian ethnicity in Malaysia.
In view of the clear presentation of the applicant’s claim of a racial basis for fearing police harassment, I would have expected the Tribunal to have addressed this claim expressly rather than obliquely, if the Tribunal had properly considered that claim. It is true, as counsel for the Minister pointed out, that earlier in the Tribunal’s reasons under the heading “Claims and Evidence”, the Tribunal summarised the applicant’s original written statement, including his belief that the police “were targeting him because of his political opinion and because he is Indian”. However, I am led to conclude that the Tribunal failed to address the racial element in this claim. I am entitled to draw that inference, and I would draw it in this case, from the absence of any discussion of that claim in the Tribunal’s expressed reasons for affirming the delegate’s decision (see Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [10], [35], [69], [75]).
I am therefore satisfied in the present case that the Tribunal has made the jurisdictional error which has recently been explained fully by the Full Court in NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [63]:
It follows that if the Tribunal makes an error of fact in misunderstanding or misconstruing a claim advanced by the applicant and bases its conclusion in whole or in part upon the claim so misunderstood or misconstrued its error is tantamount to a failure to consider the claim and on that basis can constitute jurisdictional error.
For whatever reason, the Tribunal has in this case, in my opinion, failed to appreciate an element in the applicant’s claims which it was required to address. The applicant is therefore entitled to the relief he claims in his application. No discretionary reason for refusing relief has been suggested by the Minister.
I certify that the preceding forty‑six (46) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Smith FM
Associate: Lilian Khaw
Date: 4 July 2007
2