SZHJZ v Minister for Immigration

[2007] FMCA 1184

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZHJZ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2007] FMCA 1184

MIGRATION – Refugee – review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – applicant’s grounds asserted factual matters not amounting to jurisdictional error – no bias or apprehension of bias – no s.424A error – complaint about country information – complaint about incorrect interpreter at Tribunal – no evidence to support claim of incorrect interpreter – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Migration Act 1958, ss.422B, 424A(1), 425, 424A(3)(b).

SZDSB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2005] FMCA 203
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic AffairsvWu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507
VFAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[2003] FCA 872
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SBAN [2002] FCAFC 431
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Lay Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214
SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62
NBKT v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2006) 156 FCR 419
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] HCA 26
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] HCA 63
Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 570
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2005) 216 ALR 1
VBAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 965

Applicant: SZHJZ

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 3032 of 2005

Judgment of: Nicholls FM

Hearing date: 17 July 2007

Date of Last Submission: 17 July 2007

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 08 August 2007

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Nil

Solicitors for the Applicant: Nil

Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T. Reilly

Solicitors for the Respondents: Blake Dawson Waldron

ORDERS

1. The reference to the first respondent be amended to read “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2. The application is dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $5,500.00.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 3032 of 2005

SZHJZ

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. I have before me an application filed in this Court on 19 October 2005 and amended on 15 May 2006, seeking review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), made on 2 September 2005 and handed down on 27 September 2005, which affirmed the decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister to refuse a protection visa to the applicant.

Background

1. The applicant is a citizen of India who arrived in Australia on

   
   

   10 October 2003. On 17 November 2003, he lodged an application for a protection visa with the first respondent’s Department. On

   
   

   9 December 2003, a delegate of the respondent Minister refused to grant a protection visa. On 13 January 2004, the applicant applied for review of that decision. On 11 May 2004, the Tribunal (“the earlier constituted Tribunal”) affirmed the decision to refuse a protection visa to the applicant. That decision was the subject of previous proceedings in this Court before Smith FM (SZDSB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2005] FMCA 203 (“SZDSB”)). On appeal to the Federal Court, Hill J set aside the earlier constituted Tribunal’s decision by consent and a differently constituted Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) reheard the matter on 2 September 2005.

The Applicant’s Claims to Protection

1. The applicant’s claims to protection are contained in his application for a protection visa reproduced in the Court Book (“CB”) at CB 1 to CB 23, particularly in a statement by the applicant at CB 23 and in his application for review to the Tribunal at CB 39 to CB 42. The applicant claimed:

   1)That he faced religious persecution “because of being a Sikh and because of supporting the cause of Sikhism”. The applicant claimed that he was assaulted in 1989 by Hindus when driving to Calcutta from Delhi and his hair was cut. He also claimed he was involved with Sikh activists and he transported Sikh activists in a hidden compartment in his truck.

   2)In 1995 he was stopped at an interstate checkpoint when he had three passengers on board, and that he was arrested, beaten, tortured and fired at when he was running away.

   3)His father stood for elections in 1999 and was arrested as a result of communal violence following the poll. The applicant claimed he escaped but on his return to India in October 2002, he found there were warrants for his arrest which precipitated his ultimately coming to Australia.  

The Tribunal

1. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal and gave evidence on

   
   

   2 September 2005. The Tribunal’s account of what occurred at the hearing is set out in its decision record reproduced at CB 86.6 to CB 87.9. The applicant has not put any evidence before the Court to challenge the Tribunal’s account of what occurred at the hearing.

2. The Tribunal found that:

   1)The claimed incident said to have occurred in 1989 could possibly have occurred, but that it was an incident that had since “never been repeated”, and based on the country information before it which it accepted, there was not a real chance that the incident would be repeated. In any event, on its own, it lacked “the sustained nature to constitute persecution” (CB 101.10 to CB 102.2).

   2)

   The claimed encounter with police in 1995 “was [again] a one off event” and had not been repeated since. The Tribunal found that there was no prospect of any such repetition. The Tribunal also found that the applicant in any event did not leave India until

   
   

   5 years after the event. It found it was unconvinced that the incident took place, but even proceeding on the basis that the event did occur, found that it had not been the applicant that the police had been pursuing (CB 102.3).

   3)In relation to the applicant’s claims that problems arose from his father’s political campaign and that there were outstanding warrants against him, the Tribunal could not accept that the applicant could have left and re-entered India more than once and “obtained and renewed a passport” if there were outstanding charges against him. Further, the Tribunal found that the applicant’s evidence was “very unconvincing”, and it gave reasons for this (CB 102.6).

   4)

   The applicant’s family were still in his home village, and it was “convinced” that therefore there would be no problems awaiting the applicant there. But even if there were, based on the country information available to it, the applicant would be able to relocate elsewhere in India, even though on the material before it, the Tribunal “did not believe” that relocation was necessary

   
   

   (CB 102.7 to CB 102.8).

   5)In all therefore, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had suffered harm amounting to persecution in the past, and did not accept that there was a real chance of the applicant suffering harm amounting to persecution in the near future, and therefore affirmed the decision under review (CB 107.10 to CB 108.1).

The Applicant’s Grounds of Review

1. I have before me, for the applicant, an application filed on 19 October 2005 (“the original application”) and an amended application filed on 15 May 2006 (“the amended application”).

2. The amended application on its face appears to seek review of the earlier constituted Tribunal decision. Under the heading “Decision details”, in response to the “Date of the decision” the applicant has answered “11-05-2004” (the date for that decision). Further, under the heading “Orders sought by the applicant”, the applicant has stated: “To set aside the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal in N04/48187”, which I note is a reference to the earlier constituted Tribunal’s decision (CB 46). The applicant’s original application does not specify the date of the decision of which he is seeking review, but states notification of the decision was received on “27 of September…2005” (This corresponds to the date of the handing down of the Tribunal decision).

3. The original application seeks review on the following grounds:

   “The Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction or constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction by asking itself the wrong question regarding my persecution and did not take into considering of the oral evidence regarding my persecution.

   The Tribunal denied the natural justice in determine my review application that the Tribunal was biased, or in the alternative, there was an apprehension of bias in the making of the purported decision such that it vitiated the said purported decision.

   The Tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction or constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction or denied my procedural fairness in that the Tribunal failed to investigate my genuine claims with the requirement of Migration Act 1958.

   The tribunal in its decision ‘findings and reason’ has harshly mentioned that I have no problems if I return back to India. In fact the tribunal never checked the authenticity of my oral evidence. If it was then the tribunal should have given the opportunity to me to comment on. The tribunal itself also did not take any initiative to verify the authenticity of my documentary & oral evidences through the DFAT, NEW DELHI, INDIA.

   The tribunal has denied the procedural fairness by ruling out my claim I can relocate without proper investigation. If the reliance was going to be placed to this I was not given an opportunity to contest at any time prior to the RRT decision.

   The tribunal did not use country information as specific however, the general information gathered by the tribunal considered to weigh against my case in the final outcome. The tribunal used all the information for matter of reasoning and evaluation of my case for the protection visa. The tribunal was preoccupied and did not have a fresh look. The tribunal also failed to consider the Amnesty International country information.” [Errors in original].

4. In the amended application filed on 15 May 2006, the applicant seeks the following grounds of review (which the applicant requested be “taken along with the [original] application already lodged”):

   “2. The Refugee Review Tribunal has failed to see that the applicant satisfies the criteria required under Article 1A(2) of the Convention…

   2(a) The Tribunal has committed jurisdictional error and this court has the power to cancel the Tribunal’s decision. Because a reading of the reasons for dismissal of the Tribunal will show that the Tribunal has not applied its mind…

   3. The Tribunal has committed legal and jurisdictinal error. The applicant submits that the Tribunal had violated section 424A(1) of the Migration Act. The applicant was not properly informed by the Tribunal, through the Interpreter, the basis on which the matter was decided against the applicant and no opportunity was granted to the applicant to reply to those facts.

   4. The decision of the Tribunal has to be set aside for the reason stated above. The Federal Court also made a point in relation to this and the matter was remanded.

   5. The Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction and failed to exercise its jurisdiction by asking itself the wrong question regrading (sic: regarding) persecution of the applicant and did not consider the oral evidence regarding persecution.

   6. The Tribunal did not take any initiative to verify the authenticity of the documentary and oral evidence, but has merely dismissed the claim of the applicant.

   7. The Tribunal has not applied its mind in the manner as required. The Tribunal has committed legal error that requires a proper consideration.” [     Errors in original].

The Hearing before the Court

1. At the hearing before the Court, the applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter in the Punjabi language. Mr T. Reilly appeared for the first respondent. The applicant stated:

   1)That in relation to his request in ground 1 of the amended application that the amended application “be taken along with the application”, he left it to the Court to determine which “application he was relying on” as he was not in a position to assist. (In this regard I gave consideration to both the original application and the amended application – noting that there is some considerable overlap between the two).

   2)That there were problems with the interpreter at the Tribunal hearing. The applicant stated he had been provided with an Urdu speaker instead of a Punjabi speaker. He subsequently linked this complaint to ground 3 in the amended application.

2. The Minister’s position was that the application provided no particulars, and the general assertions left nothing to which the Minister could respond.

Consideration

1. Ground 1 in the amended application does not assert any ground of review of the Tribunal’s decision. Ground 2 in the amended application on any plain reading, seeks review of the merits of the Tribunal decision. The applicant asserts that contrary to the Tribunal’s conclusion, he meets the Refugee Convention definition of a refugee. This Court, of course, cannot review the merits of the Tribunal’s decision and this ground cannot succeed. (See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic AffairsvWu Shan Liang (1996) (“Wu Shan Liang”) 185 CLR 259 at 272).

2. What is stated at ground “2(a)” (“the Tribunal has not applied its mind”) and ground 7, may be seen as an assertion of bias on the part of the Tribunal, in that the Tribunal did not bring or apply an open mind to the proceedings in considering the applicant’s claims before it. This was plainly asserted in the original application.

3. As Mr Reilly correctly submits, this is a serious allegation and must be clearly proved (SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749 at 43-47). Nor, taking into account relevant authorities (see for example, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507), is there anything before the Court to show that the Tribunal had a state of mind so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration or being persuaded differently (see also VFAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[2003] FCA 872 and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SBAN [2002] FCAFC 431). For the applicant’s benefit in particular, I should emphasise that bias is not demonstrated simply by the Tribunal stating that on the basis of what the applicant had put to it at the hearing, and on the basis of country information available to it, it did not accept that the applicant’s claims amounted to persecution. In this regard, the Tribunal made findings of fact which were open to it on the material before it, and it gave reasons for these. This ground also does not succeed.

4. The originating application also asserts an apprehension of bias on the part of the Tribunal. Again, with reference to relevant High Court authority (Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425), there is no evidence or circumstance before the Court to show that a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal did not bring an impartial mind to its review of the delegate’s decision. This complaint also does not succeed.

5. The originating application to the Court asserts that the Tribunal denied the applicant natural justice in the making of its decision. No particularity has been put forward by the applicant in this regard, but in any event, I note, as Mr Reilly submits, that this is a case to which s.422B of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) applies, making the matters set out in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act the exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule (absent bias) (see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Lay Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214, SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62 and NBKT v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2006) 156 FCR 419 (“NBKT”) at [85]).

6. At ground 3, read with ground 4 in the amended application however, the applicant asserts a breach of s.424A of the Act. The applicant asserts that he was not properly informed by the Tribunal (it would appear at the hearing) as to the basis on which the Tribunal intended to find against the applicant, and that he was denied an opportunity to reply to those facts. Section 424A(1) of the Act obliges the Tribunal to put to the applicant information on which it would seek to rely, which is a part of its decision. However, the Tribunal is not obliged to put to the applicant its thought processes, adverse though these may be, in discharge of its obligation pursuant to s.424A of the Act (see SZBYR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] HCA 26 at [18]).

7. Further, in the context of the applicant’s complaint concerning s.424A of the Act, I did consider the Tribunal’s finding that the applicant could not have left and re-entered India more than once, and renewed a passport if there were outstanding charges against him. Information relating to the applicant’s travel movements was discussed with the applicant at the hearing (see CB 87.4), such that this information was information provided by the applicant himself for the purposes of review, and falls within the exception set out in s.424A(3)(b) of the Act from the requirements of s.424A(1) of the Act.

8. The Tribunal made use of the information that the applicant had obtained and reviewed his passport at the time when he claimed to be the subject of outstanding warrants for his arrest (see CB 102.6). On its face, this information does not appear in the Tribunal’s account of the hearing. Mr Reilly submitted that the Court could infer that the applicant’s passport was before the Tribunal because the Tribunal’s letter of invitation to the hearing (CB 73.7) directed the applicant to bring his passport to the hearing. Further, he tendered (although not in any appropriate evidentiary format) a transcript of the Tribunal’s hearing which shows that the applicant produced his passport at the hearing, and the Tribunal examined it (see pages 9.10 and 10.2 of Respondent’s Exhibit 1). Ultimately, the applicant submitted to the Court that he had produced his passport to the Tribunal at the hearing before it. In all therefore, the information relating to the applicant’s passport was provided by the applicant to the Tribunal for the purposes of the review such that this information fell within the exception contained in s.424A(3)(b) of the Act from the requirements of s.424A(1) of the Act.

9. In spite of the applicant putting his complaint in the context of s.424A of the Act, I did also consider (in the context of the general complaint of a denial of procedural fairness) the applicant’s complaint that he was not put on notice by the Tribunal of adverse, and determinative, issues relied on by the Tribunal to affirm the decision under review, and whether, in this context, the Tribunal failed in its procedural fairness obligations pursuant to s.425 of the Act in the manner as set out by the High Court in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] HCA 63 (“SZBEL”).

10. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision because it found in relation to the claimed instances of harm in the past that these did not amount to persecution, and that based on the applicant’s circumstances there was not a real chance of the applicant suffering harm amounting to persecution in the future.

1. The claimed instances of past harm were the relevant incidents in 1989, in 1995, and the consequences (communal violence) of his father’s involvement in elections in 1999, and subsequent warrants for the applicant’s arrest in 2001. I should just note that in its decision record (at CB 102.9), the Tribunal made reference to “local elections of 2001”, and at CB 87.6 to “the election of 2001”. It is not clear whether local elections also took place in 2001 as well as in 1999. If this was not the case, then the Tribunal’s reference should have been “1999” rather than “2001”. However, I agree with Mr Reilly that such an error in a factual finding does not amount to jurisdictional error (Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 570 at [137]). In any event, what the Tribunal properly focused on was the claim of violence and harm resulting from the father’s political involvement and the warrants for the applicants arrest allegedly issued in 2001.

2. The incident in 1989 was not pursued at the hearing (CB 86.8). However, the Tribunal subsequently proceeded on the basis that this incident had occurred as claimed, but simply, that it was some time ago and that it had never been repeated (this was put at the hearing – see CB 87.6) and that country information available to it showed that there was no real chance it would be repeated in the future. This mirrored what was found originally by the delegate (see CB 37.7).

3. The encounter with police in 1995 was dismissed at the hearing and the Tribunal noted its concerns with the applicant’s account (see CB 86.8 to CB 87.1). Further, the Tribunal noted that it had occurred some time ago and that nothing of the kind had re-occurred (CB 87.6).

4. The father’s political involvement and its consequences for the applicant were discussed at the hearing, as were the Tribunal’s concerns about the claim as put by the applicant (see CB 87.2 and CB 87.8).

5. The other issue relevant to the Tribunal’s consideration, and a factor in its affirming the delegate’s decision, was the applicant’s travel movements since 1999. These were also discussed at the hearing (CB 87.4). In all therefore, I could not see that issues relevant to the Tribunal’s reasons for affirming the delegate’s decision were not known to the applicant particularly as a result of the issues discussed at the hearing.

6. The applicant also complains (ground 5 in the amended application which echoes what is set out in the originating application), that the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction by asking itself the wrong question regarding persecution of the applicant. I saw this, in the absence of any particularity whatsoever, as an assertion that the Tribunal did not believe the applicant. This is confirmed when the applicant goes on to complain, in the same sentence, that the Tribunal did not consider his “oral evidence regarding persecution”. The Tribunal plainly did consider the applicant’s oral evidence. It either did not believe the applicant’s evidence, or where it did, found that the matters that the applicant asserted, did not amount to persecution under the Refugees Convention. On what is before the Court now, these were findings which were open to the Tribunal and for which it gave reasons. To the extent therefore that the applicant complains in this regard, I cannot see that this complaint rises above a request for impermissible merits review (Wu Shan Liang).

7. The applicant also complains that the Tribunal should have further investigated his claims by verifying the authenticity of his documentary and oral evidence. It is not clear what documentary evidence the applicant refers to as the Tribunal’s decision was based on information provided by the applicant himself at the hearing before it. I cannot see what further enquiries the Tribunal should have made in ascertaining the veracity of the applicant’s claims. The applicant was given the opportunity to present his claims and was specifically on notice by way of the letter inviting him to the hearing (CB 73) that if he wanted to submit any “new documents” that he could do so. I also note Mr Reilly’s reference to Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 at [43] and cannot see that the Tribunal was under any obligation to make any further enquiries on what the applicant had put before it.

8. I also accept Mr Reilly’s submission in relation to the applicant’s complaint relating to the Tribunal’s use of country information. It is, as Mr Reilly submitted, well established that the choice and use of country information is a factual issue for the Tribunal (NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11-13], Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2005) 216 ALR 1 at [8] and NBKT at [81], [84]).

9. In the original application (not repeated in the amended application), the applicant also complains that he was not given the opportunity to comment on the Tribunal’s finding that he could relocate to another part of India. The applicant complains this was a denial of procedural fairness. I note generally, as referred to above, that this is a case to which s.422B of the Act applies.

10. But even in the context of what the High Court said in SZBEL, I cannot see that the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on the basis that the applicant could relocate to another part of India. The Tribunal was “convinced” that there were no problems for the applicant if he were to return to his home village (CB 102.8). A plain reading of its decision record reveals that it noted that Sikhs live all over India and that there would be no difficulty in his obtaining employment elsewhere. The Tribunal plainly states: “I do not believe that relocation is necessary” (CB 102.8).

11. Even if it could be said that there was a relocation finding which was one basis for the decision, as such, it would stand as a separate basis for the Tribunal decision, independent of the basis on which the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review, namely that the claimed incidents of past harm either did not amount to persecution, or were remote and did not and would not re-occur, or did not occur as claimed, such that as a Sikh returning to India the applicant would not be subject to persecution for a Convention reason even if he were to return to his home location. This basis for the Tribunal’s decision is unaffected by jurisdictional error (see VBAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 965).

12. At the hearing before the Court, the applicant complained that at the Tribunal hearing he had been provided with an Urdu, rather than a Punjabi speaking interpreter. He linked this to ground 3 in the amended application. On its face, I did not see ground 3 as making such an assertion and have already dealt with what this ground on its face, appears to assert. Nonetheless I subsequently understood the applicant to complain that difficulties because of the interpreter resulted in his not being “properly informed by the Tribunal”.

13. The applicant has provided no evidence whatsoever to support his claim that the Tribunal provided an Urdu speaking, rather than Punjabi speaking interpreter at the hearing before it, or that there were any difficulties with the level of interpretation provided. I note that at the first Court date before FM Smith on 23 November 2005, orders were made (Orders 4 and 5) requiring all evidence, including a transcript of the Tribunal hearing, to be presented as a transcript verified by an affidavit.

14. As against the unsupported (by any evidence) mere assertion, Mr Reilly tendered a document from the Tribunal’s file (which I marked as “Supplementary Court Book 1”). This document is the Tribunal’s relevant “Hearing Record”. It reveals that the language used by the interpreter at the hearing was “Punjabi”. He further submitted there was nothing in the Tribunal’s account of what occurred at the hearing (in its decision record) to show that there were any problems with the level of interpretation.

15. The application to the Court was made on 19 October 2005. The applicant attended a directions hearing where orders were made for the provision of evidence in support of his complaints. While the involvement of Counsel may have been limited (to the one occasion of the second directions hearing on 18 August 2006 when Mr Gormley of Counsel assisted the applicant on that occasion) the applicant has certainly had some assistance in the drafting of his two applications to the Court. I draw this clear inference from the applicant’s inability to assist with any explanation of his grounds or to give any particularity whatsoever. He was not even able to tell the Court which of the grounds he sought to press. He submitted that other than what was in those documents, he could assist the Court no further. But whatever the situation, the applicant has had more than a reasonable period of time (and was on notice of the need to do so) to put evidence before the Court to support the complaint that he was not provided with a Punjabi speaking interpreter. He has not done so.

16. The state of the relevant evidence before the Court therefore is that the applicant was provided with an interpreter in the Punjabi language, as he had requested. This complaint does not succeed.

Conclusion

1. In all therefore, I cannot see on what the applicant has put before the Court, nor otherwise, any jurisdictional error in Tribunal’s decision. This application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding thirty-five (38) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM

Associate: 

Date:  08 August 2007