SZGQN v Minister for Immigration
[2006] FMCA 1344
•13 September 2006
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZGQN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2006] FMCA 1344 |
| MIGRATION – Review of decision by Refugee Review Tribunal – whether failure to invoke s.427(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is a breach of s.420 or s.430 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Refugee Review Tribunal denied applicant procedural fairness by failing to invoke its power under s.427(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Refugee Review Tribunal entitled to reject allegedly corroborative evidence where independent information advises such evidence readily forged and obtainable – whether Refugee Review Tribunal entitled to reject contents of alleged letters of support where Refugee Review Tribunal satisfied as to authenticity of signatories – whether breach of s.424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). |
| Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5(1); 36(2); 65(1); 91R; 91S; 420; 422B; 424A(1); 427; 427(1); 427(1)(d); 430; 474; pt.7 div.4; pt.8 div.2 |
| Applicant M164/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 16 SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24 SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 2 |
| Applicant: | SZGQN |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File number: | SYG1733 of 2005 |
| Judgment of: | Emmett FM |
| Hearing date: | 4 September 2006 |
| Date of last submission: | 4 September 2006 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 13 September 2006 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Dr J. Azzi |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Mr A.Cox, Phillips Fox Lawyers |
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG1733 of 2005
| SZGQN |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application pursuant to s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Part 8 Division 2 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 23 May 2005.
The Tribunal decision affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“the Delegate”) dated 10 November 2004. The application for a protection visa was refused on the basis that the applicant is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations in accordance with the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol (“the Convention”).
The applicant was born on 1 January 1977 and claims to be from Bangladesh and of Bangladeshi ethnicity and Muslim faith (“the Applicant”).
The Applicant has a wife and daughter who remain in Bangladesh.
The Applicant arrived in Australia on 30 July 2004, having legally departed from Zia Airport on a passport issued in his own name and a visa issued on 28 July 2004.
On 2 August 2004, the Applicant lodged an application for a protection (Class XA) visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“the Department”) under the Act.
In his protection visa application, the Applicant claimed that he feared persecution by members of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”) due to his “high profile” political position as a worker of the Bangladesh Awami League. The Applicant claimed that he faced false murder charges if he were to return to Bangladesh and would be detained and tortured upon return and possibly killed.
On 10 November 2004, the Delegate refused the Applicant’s application for a protection visa on the basis that the Applicant is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.
On 7 December 2004, the Applicant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the Tribunal in which he maintained his earlier claims. On 23 May 2005, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate not to grant a protection visa.
On 4 July 2005, the Applicant filed an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.
Legislative framework
Section 65(1) of the Act authorises the decision maker to grant a visa if satisfied that the prescribed criteria have been met. However, if the decision-maker is not so satisfied then the visa application is to be refused.
Section 36(2) of the Act relevantly provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that an applicant is a non-citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied that Australia has a protection obligation under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Section 5(1) of the Act defines “Refugees Convention” and “Refugees Protocol” as meaning the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
Australia owes protection obligations to a refugee on Australian territory.
Article 1A(2) of the Convention relevantly defines a refugee as a person who:
“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
Section 91R and s.91S of the Act refer to persecution and membership of a particular social group when considering Article 1A(2) of the Convention.
The Tribunal proceeding
The Applicant attended a hearing before the Tribunal with the assistance of a migration agent and a Bengali interpreter.
The Tribunal noted that the Applicant had stated in his protection visa application that he had never been convicted of a crime or offence and that he had never been charged with any offence that was currently awaiting legal action.
The Applicant provided the Tribunal with copies of various documents in the nature of Court and police documents in support of his claim of having false charges laid against him. Those documents included a document purporting to be a warrant issued on 5 January 2002 for the arrest of the Applicant. The warrant arose out of a document claiming to be an “Ejahar”, being a petition for filing a case in which it was alleged that the Applicant was a person involved in the killing of the Senior Vice President of the BNP on 5 September 2001.
The Tribunal explored with the Applicant the circumstances alleged by the Applicant to give rise to the charge and his claim that, following the 2001 elections, he was targeted by the BNP because he was known to be a very popular leader in the Dohar area and had always been in the front row of demonstrations talking about the rights of minorities.
The Tribunal noted that it raised with the Applicant why his protection visa application stated that he had not ever been charged with an offence. The Tribunal noted the Applicant’s response that he had not been found guilty and that when he had made his original application he did not have the details of the charges against him. The Applicant stated that the information about the charges had been obtained by him after he had arrived in Australia. The Tribunal observed to the Applicant that he had been living at his home town in Joypara until July 2002, however, the Applicant said he could only ever obtain details of the charges by going to the Court or the police station which would have prompted his arrest.
The Tribunal explored with the Applicant its concerns about how he was able to remain in his home in Joypara in 2002 and how he obtained his passport in June 2004 if he was on the run. The Tribunal noted that it asked the Applicant whether he had suffered any other problems as a result of his involvement in politics in Bangladesh and noted his response that he had been attacked by members of the BNP who had blindfolded him and beaten him resulting in injury to his fingers on
15 January 2004.
The Tribunal asked the Applicant why he had not applied for asylum in the Philippines, having fled Bangladesh because he feared persecution. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant responded that he had heard from friends that Australia was a good place for refugee status and he did not know if that was the situation in the Philippines. The Tribunal stated that the Applicant responded that he had not made any enquiries because he had “been bound for Australia”. The Tribunal found that the Applicant had not been “bound for Australia” because he had obtained a tourist visa in the Philippines to visit Papua New Guinea and obtained a transit visa which he had used to travel to Australia. The Applicant said he did not know how his broker had arranged for him to travel to Australia.
The Tribunal noted that it had put to the Applicant that the reason he had not applied for refugee status in the Philippines suggested that he had come to Australia to obtain a migration benefit rather than because he feared persecution in Bangladesh. The Tribunal noted the Applicant’s denial and response that he would not have left Bangladesh if he had not feared for his life.
The Tribunal noted that independent information indicated that the Court and police documents were the types of documents that were readily forged or fraudulently obtained in Bangladesh. The Tribunal observed that police would work in collusion with applicants for refugee status in supplying bogus papers. The Tribunal noted that it put to the Applicant that in 1997 several hundred documents, such as arrest warrants and other Court and police documents which had been submitted by applicants for asylum, had been examined and none of them had proven to be genuine. The Tribunal noted the Applicant’s response that, whilst he did not reject this information, fraudulent documents were obtainable in any country in the world and that there definitely had to be some genuine documents and that he was telling the truth. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant stated that he had included all the telephone numbers and contact numbers so that the High Commission in Bangladesh could check with the people who had written letters. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant stated that not all those people could be corrupt.
The Tribunal noted it put to the Applicant that it was difficult to put weight on documents of the sort he had produced from Bangladesh and that the Tribunal had to make an assessment of whether he was telling the truth. The Tribunal noted the Applicant’s response that he had a wife and child still in Bangladesh and why would he have come to Australia if he did not have problems in Bangladesh.
The Tribunal noted that it put to the Applicant that it was difficult to accept he had been wanted by the police, as a result of the incident in September 2001, given that he had continued to live at his permanent address until July 2002 and continued to live in Bangladesh until 2004, when he left the country. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant’s only response was that everything he had said was true.
Following the hearing the Applicant produced further material to the Tribunal in the nature of the following purported letters of support:
i)“A letter purporting to be from Sheikh Hasina MP, Leader of the Opposition in the Bangladesh Parliament and President of the Bangladesh Awami League, dated 26 April 2005, certifying that the Applicant is an activist of the Jubo League, that he has been implicated in concocted manslaughter cases, that his family is being harassed by workers of the BNP and that his life may be at risk in Bangladesh.”
ii)“A letter purporting to be from Dr Md Abdur Razzaque MP, dated 24 April 2005, stating that the Applicant held the position of Vice-President of the Juba League in Dohar Thana or subdistrict, that he ‘several time fell victim of alliance govt. local political goons’ who physically assaulted him and threatened to kill him if he did not leave his village home, that Dr Razzaque along with other MPs from the Awami League went to Dohar for a rally on 8 September 2004 but they were not allowed to go to the venue of the proposed rally as ‘Government party musclemen’ intercepted them and the law enforcement agencies expressed their inability to protect them although a senior police officer with additional forces had been deployed to provide them with protection and that ‘[a]gainst the backdrop of awful law and order situation in Dohar’ the Applicant had had no alternative but to leave the country.”
iii)“A letter purporting to be from Md Almas Uddin, General Secretary of the Bangladesh Awami Juba League, Dohar Thana Unit, dated 16 April 2005, which so far as relevant is in identical terms to the letter purporting to be from Sheikh Hasina referred to above”
iv)“A letter purporting to be from Moha. Jahangir Alam, Executive Member of the Bangladesh Awami Juba League, Dohar Thana Unit, dated 14 April 2005, which is in identical terms to the first part of the letter purporting to be from Dr Razzaque except that, where the letter purporting to be from Dr Razzaque says that the Applicant was threatened to make him leave his village home, the letter purporting to be from Mr Alam says that the alliance government local political goons threatened to kill the Applicant if he did not leave his village home ‘like me & others’.”
The Tribunal accepted that these letters were genuine, in that they were indeed from the signatories and that the signatories had in fact signed them. However the Tribunal noted that four of the letters were expressed to be in almost identical terms.
The Tribunal observed that people like Sheikh Hasina and Dr Razzaque would not often draft their own correspondence but simply sign letters prepared for them by others. The Tribunal noted that it drew no adverse inference from those facts.
However, the Tribunal did not accept that what was said in the letters was true. The Tribunal noted that the letters from Sheikh Hasina and Md Almas Uddin stated that the Applicant had been implicated in concocted manslaughter cases, whereas, the Applicant himself only claimed to have been charged in one case relating to the killing of the Vice President. Again, the letters from Dr Razzaque and Moha Jahangir Alam stated that the Applicant had been a victim to local BNP assaults and threats several times, whereas, the Applicant claimed that he had only been assaulted on one occasion on 15 January 2004. The Tribunal found that, in respect of any inconsistency, it preferred the evidence of the Applicant to what was said in the letters.
The Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant had in fact been charged in relation to the killing of the Vice President in 2001, nor that he was assaulted by members of the BNP on 15 January 2004.
The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant was a worker of the Awami League but did not accept that he was a high profile political figure in Bangladesh.
The Tribunal found the Applicant’s evidence with regard to how he managed to evade arrest “unconvincing”. In particular, the Tribunal observed that the Applicant had continued to live in his home town in Joypara, or at times stayed with relatives or friends until July 2002. The Tribunal also noted that the Applicant stayed in Bangladesh for a further 2 years after July 2002. The Tribunal did not accept that the police would not have been able to arrest the Applicant before July 2002 if they had wanted to.
The Tribunal observed that the Applicant obtained a passport in his own name in June 2004 and made no attempt to seek asylum in the Philippines.
The Tribunal concluded that there was no real chance that the Applicant would be arrested or detained or tortured or that he would be killed for reasons of his political opinion if he were to return to Bangladesh now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. In particular, the Tribunal noted that the Applicant had remained in Bangladesh for over 2½ years after the change in government and was employed by a company which was his party’s leader’s organisation. The Tribunal did not accept the Applicant’s claim that he had been targeted by the BNP government, government agencies and workers of BNP because of his high profile or his popularity as a political leader.
The Tribunal was not satisfied that the Applicant has a well founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason and was therefore not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations.
The proceeding before this Court
The Applicant was represented by Dr Azzi, of counsel, at the hearing before this Court. Leave was granted to Dr Azzi to file in Court a further amended application. Dr Azzi also sought to rely on a document that he handwrote in Court and, when I suggested it did not disclose a reviewable ground, then Dr Azzi amended it in Court. The handwritten document identified a further ground raising, for the first time, an issue of the Tribunal’s compliance with s.424A of the Act. The handwritten document was later provided in typed form. The First Respondent did not object to this conduct by Dr Azzi. Nevertheless, no explanation was offered by Dr Azzi as to why he was so ill prepared, other than that his conduct in this instance was “exceptional”. I would hope so.
All the grounds relied upon by the Applicant are set out as follows:
“Further Amended Application
1. The second respondent committed a jurisdictional error of law by denying the applicant natural justice and procedural fairness in relation to the documents produced to corroborate the applicant’s claims.
Particulars
a. In his “Findings and Reasons” the presiding member accepted that the authors of the corroborating letters provided to the Tribunal signed their respective letter (CB 103.8).
b. One of the letters provided was signed by Sheikh Hasina, Leader of the Opposition Bangladesh Parliament, former Prime Minister and Leader of the Awami League (CB 80 and 102.8).
c. The presiding member did not however, accept the truth of the contents of the letters provided, preferring “the Applicant’s evidence to what was said in the letters to the extent of any inconsistency although… I do not accept that the Applicant has in fact been charged in relation to the killing…” (CB 104.2).
d. The presiding member drew “no adverse inference from the fact that four of the letters are expressed in identical terms: it is obvious that people like Sheikh Hasina… do not draft their correspondence but simply sign letters prepared for them by others…” (CB 103.8)
e. It is implied in the presiding member’s reasoning rejecting the letters that the respective authors of the corroborating letters would make a written statement unconcerned by its veracity.
f. In such circumstance it was inherently unfair for the presiding member to conclude the documents are forgeries without first giving the applicant an opportunity of dealing with it when the documents were central to the applicant’s claim.
g. The Tribunal also denied the applicant the conduct of a fair proceeding where the need for further inquiry pursuant to s 427(1)(d) of the Migration Act 1958 was obvious and no impediment to such inquiry was apparent.
h. It was not enough for the presiding member to put to the applicant generally “that forged or fraudulently obtained documents are readily available in Bangladesh (CB 105.5).
Further handwritten amendment filed in Court (later replaced by typed document)
2. The Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by not providing the applicant, in accordance with s 424A of the Migration Act 19158, particulars of information the Tribunal considered was the reason or part of the reason for affirming the delegate’s decision.
Particulars
a) At the hearing (CB 94.2) the Tribunal referred to Q6 of the applicant’s protection visa application but did not do so in writing.
b) The Tribunal referred to information at a) above to bolster its conclusion (at CB 104.1, 105.8) that the applicant did not face false charges and therefore did not fear persecution.
c) In the preceding circumstances it was incumbent on the Tribunal to give the applicant notice in writing of such information.”
Ground 1 – Denial of procedural fairness
At the heart of this ground is the submission by counsel for the Applicant that the Tribunal denied the Applicant procedural fairness by failing to invoke its power under s.427(1) of the Act to conduct any investigation in respect of the documents furnished by the Applicant and upon which it placed no weight. The documents were in the nature of police and Court documents and letters of support provided to the Tribunal post hearing.
Counsel for the Applicant took the Court comprehensively through the Full Court’s decision in Applicant M164/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCFCA 16 (“Applicant M164”). By majority, the Court found that, where a Tribunal found documents to be part of an elaborate fraud and the genuineness of the documents could have been established comprehensively by prompt investigation and that the need for further inquiry is obvious, and no impediment exists to the conduct of such inquiry, then a failure by the Tribunal to exercise the power under s.427(1)(d) was a denial by the Tribunal to conduct a fair proceeding. Tamberlin J, in the majority, noted that such an issue will arise where the Tribunal is prepared to draw adverse inferences from material before it “on grounds that are slight” (at [76]).
Counsel for the Applicant contended in the case before this Court, that there was an obvious need to make further inquiry; that no impediment existed to such an inquiry; that the concerns of the Tribunal could have been readily resolved; and that to do otherwise was a denial of procedural fairness, in accordance with the principles espoused by the majority in Applicant M164.
Counsel for the Applicant acknowledged, in his written submissions, that the conclusion of the Court in Applicant M164 of jurisdictional error based on s.427(1)(d), was because of the Tribunal’s failure to accord procedural fairness to the applicant in failing to invoke that section and not because there was a duty to exercise the discretion in s.427(1)(d).
Since Applicant M164, the Act has been amended to include s.422B. Section 422B states that Part 7 Division 4 of the Act is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to matters it deals with (SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62). Part 7 Division 4 of the Act also includes s.427 of the Act.
In those circumstances, it is not open to the Applicant to find any jurisdictional error in the case before this Court on a denial of procedural fairness arising out of a breach of s.427(1)(d).
At the heel of the hunt, in reply, Dr Azzi submitted that a failure to exercise discretion under s.427(1)(d), in circumstances where it was unreasonable not to exercise the discretion, was a failure to comply with the Tribunal’s duty pursuant to s.430 of the Act and a failure to act in accordance with substantial justice and the merits of the case, in accordance with s.420 of the Act.
In relation to the Court documents and the police documents, including the warrant for arrest, the Tribunal identified and explored with the Applicant the information before it that indicated that such documents were readily obtained and were regularly fraudulently obtained in Bangladesh. The Tribunal’s concerns about the documents were cogently explored with the Applicant and the Tribunal noted the Applicant’s responses. In the circumstances, the Tribunal’s reasons for rejecting those documents and placing no weight on them were reasonable and were not “slight”. Ultimately, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the documents provided reliable evidence. That was a finding that was open to the Tribunal on the evidence and material before it.
In relation to the letters provided by the Applicant post hearing, the Tribunal made it clear that it accepted that the signatories of the letters were genuine, but that, having regard to the identical nature of the content, and, allowing for the fact that such persons are likely to have letters prepared for them for their signature, where those letters departed from the assertions of the Applicant, the Tribunal preferred the evidence of the Applicant. That is an evaluation by the Tribunal of the evidence before it and a matter entirely within its duty. The Tribunal is obliged to consider, analyse and evaluate the evidence before it and to make findings of fact based on that evidence. It was open to the Tribunal, on the evidence and material before it, to come to the findings and conclusions that it did in respect of those documents. (Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 41 per Mason J).
In the circumstances, the reasons provided by the Tribunal for its decision to place no weight on that material were open to it, were reasonable and were not “slight”.
Accordingly, there was no need for the Tribunal to consider whether to exercise its power under s.427(1)(d) of the Act. There was no failure by the Tribunal to act in accordance with the substantial justice and merits of the case in the terms alleged by the Applicant, namely, because it did not invoke its power under s.427(1)(d) of the Act. Nor, is there any other breach of s.420 or s.430 of the Act disclosed in the Tribunal’s decision or the conduct of its review.
Moreover, given that s.427(1)(d) is a discretionary power, I am far from persuaded that a breach of s.427(1)(d), in the circumstances alleged by the Applicant, is capable to amounting to jurisdictional error. That is because, if the breach is founded in a denial of procedural fairness, then, after the introduction of s.422B of the Act, a denial of procedural fairness, by itself, is not sufficient to ground a finding of jurisdictional error
Accordingly, ground 1 is not made out.
Ground 2 – Alleged breach of s.424A(1) of the Act
Counsel for the Applicant submitted that the Tribunal breached its obligations, pursuant to s.424A(1) of the Act, in that it had regard to matters stated by the Applicant in his protection visa application without giving written notice to the Applicant of that information inviting his comment. Counsel for the Applicant relied on various references in the Tribunal decision as being information of that nature.
It is not every piece of information that is a part of the decision that is captured by s.424A(1). It is only that information that is part of the reason for affirming the decision under review that enlivens the obligations of s.424A(1).
In the words of Allsop J in SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 2 (“SZEEU”) at [216]:
“One always needs to analyse and interpret the reasons of the Tribunal in order to understand the reason for the ultimate reason or conclusion of the lack of satisfaction of the existence of protection obligations. Merely because something is contained in the text of the reasons of the Tribunal which involves “information” does not conclude the question whether it was (and, in the relevant sense, would be) a part of the reason for affirming the decision. The whole of the written reasons must be analysed and interpreted in their context to assess why it was that the Tribunal acted as it did (and so, in the relevant sense, to assess what would be, prior to making the decision, the reason or a part of the reason). Having thus ascertained the reason or reasons (if there be more than one) why the Tribunal was not relevantly satisfied, any information that was (and thus, in the relevant sense, would be) a part of the reasoning process to explain such reason engages the operation of s 424A, without any additional requirement (for which Paul and VAF appear to call) that the relevant importance of the information to the reasoning process be assessed to form a judgment as to whether fairness requires the engagement of s 424A. The above tasks of assessment or interpretation of the Tribunal’s reasons, of ascertaining what was any reasoning process and of assessing the relevance of any information thereto may not be straightforward and may lead to conclusions about which minds may differ.”
It is clear, from the Tribunal’s reasons, that any inconsistency in the claims in the protection visa application, with the Applicant’s claims before the Tribunal, played no part in the reasons why the Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant was falsely charged with the killing of the Vice President or that he was assaulted by the BNP. The Tribunal predicated its findings of rejection of those assertions by the Applicant with the words, “for reasons given below”. The Tribunal then went on to identify the evidence upon which it relied and concluded “for reasons given above I do not accept he has been charged with the killing of” the Vice President. Nowhere, in any of those reasons, is the remotest reference by the Tribunal to reliance on any inconsistency in the claims made by the Applicant, with claims made in his protection visa application, as part of the reason for affirming the decision under review.
Moreover, the only information, to which the Tribunal had regard, was evidence and material given by the Applicant to the Tribunal for the purposes of the review. Such information is specifically excluded from the obligations of s.424A of the Act by operation of s.424A(3)(b) of the Act.
For those reasons, the obligations under s.424A(1) of the Act were not enlivened and there was no information before the Tribunal that formed a part of the reason for affirming the decision under review that was not otherwise excluded by s.424A(3) of the Act.
Accordingly ground 2 is rejected.
Conclusion
The Tribunal’s decision is not affected by jurisdictional error and is therefore a privative clause decision. Accordingly, pursuant to s.474 of the Act, this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere.
The proceeding before this Court is dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding sixty (60) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Emmett FM
Associate: S. Kwong
Date: 12 September 2006
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