SZFRV v Minister for Immigration - [2005] FMCA 1485

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZFRV v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2005] FMCA 1485

MIGRATION – RRT decision – Bangladeshi fearing political persecution – disbelieved by Tribunal – no failure to give notice under s.424A nor procedural unfairness.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.422B, 424A, 424A(1), 424A(1)(a), 424A(3)(b), 474(1), 483A, Pt.8

Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
M55 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 13
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v NAMW (2004) 140 FCR 572

Moradian v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

(2004) 81 ALD 565
NAQF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 130 FCR 456
NAZY v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 744
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2002) 211 CLR 476
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82
SZDMJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1034
VAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471
VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158
VXDC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1388
Wu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 221

Applicant:

SZFRV

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Second Respondent:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:

SYG 348 of 2005

Judgment of:

Smith FM

Hearing dates:

2 August 2005, 30 September 2005

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

30 September 2005

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr N McNally

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Parish Patience Immigration

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr A McInerney

Solicitors for the Respondents:

Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

The application is dismissed.
The applicant must pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $4,800, noting that this is additional to the costs awarded on 2 August 2005.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 348 of 2005

SZFRV

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(revised from transcript)

This is an application under s.483A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) which challenges a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 21 December 2004 and handed down on 12 January 2005. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate refusing an application for a protection visa.
The Court’s jurisdiction under s.483A gives it powers under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), but subject to limitations under Part 8 of the Migration Act. Those limitations have the effect that I do not have power to set aside the Tribunal decision and send the matter back unless I am satisfied the decision was affected by jurisdictional error (see Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2002) 211 CLR 476). I do not have power myself to decide whether the applicant qualifies for a refugee visa.
The present applicant arrived in Australia in April 2004. He applied for a protection visa on 17 May 2004. In his form of application he did not indicate the name of any person that had assisted him in making his application. It was accompanied by a four page typed document headed “Statutory Declaration” purporting to be signed by the applicant. The application itself contains a declaration as to the truth of the information contained in it, purporting to be sworn before a justice of the peace whose name is illegible.
The first three paragraphs of the statutory declaration were:
1.I was born in (town), Bangladesh and my family is traditionally involved with the politics of Bangladesh Awamilwague. My family is very much influenced by the politics of the Father of Nation, Bangladesh the Great Leader Banga Bundhu Sheik Mujibur Rahman.
2.The ideology of Bangabandu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman influenced me, while I was very young. I started my politics in the Jubo League (the wing of Awami League) worker and started organising the party in my locality in (town), Bangladesh. I started organising and participating different political activities in my locality. Being a promising Jubo Leaguer leader, I had a close association with contemporary Awamileague League leaders especially Rezaul Karim Hira currently the Member of Parliament and Mirza Azam, the central leader of Bangladesh Jubo League. They inspired me in doing positive politics in my locality. I received their all out supports and blessings in my active politics and regularly organised various political meetings and processions against BNP and its alliance since my joining the party. I was also assigned to organise meetings, demonstrations, and processions against anti government movements, especially BNP and Jamat‑E‑Islami.
3.During my staying in (town), I actively organised the party and lead political and cultural rallies against BNP and its alliances. Because of my dedication, I became very close to my senior leaders. However, because of my involvement with the Jubo League, local BNP and its associated force, Jubo Dal, started harassing me in different ways and threatened me in different occasions. During the period, BNP started threatening that they would see me if I continue my League politics. I actively associated in making different activities of the organisation.
The remainder of the statutory declaration claimed that the local BNP leader had directed his followers to punish the applicant, that the applicant had been kidnapped and tortured, that the BNP “already filed various malicious cases against me”, and that the applicant was scared that he would be arrested by police as a result of these false charges.
A delegate refused the application on 13 August 2004, and the applicant lodged an application for review with the Tribunal on 27 August 2004. His form stated that he did not have an advisor authorised to act for him in the application.
On 8 November 2004 the applicant was invited to attend a hearing on 14 December 2004, and was told to bring his passport to the hearing.
On 7 December 2004 the Tribunal received a typed 19‑page document entitled “Submission for the review of the decisions of DIMIA”.

Its opening paragraph said:
Dear Sir/Madam:
I have substantial grounds to be persecuted by Bangladesh Nationalist Party because of my political involvement with Bangladesh Awali League. I applied for a Protection Visa to remain in Australia permanently but unfortunately DIMIA could not realize my situation and refused my application. I strongly believe that I have substantial grounds to be persecuted by terrorist groups of Bangladesh Nationalist Party because of my previous political conflicts with them. In this regard, I meet the prescribed criterion under Sub‑class 866. Following the definition of Refugee I consider myself as a genuine refugee. I am providing the submissions based on the statements provided to DIMIA along with some recent documents which demonstrates my direct involvement with the party and the activities of my opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
On the third page of this document was a heading “Background and Claims”, below which was a repetition of the applicant’s claims which, at least for the first three paragraphs, was a “cut and paste” verbatim repetition of the first three paragraphs of the statutory declaration which accompanied the visa application. I have not made a comparison of the remainder of the recited “Background and Claims”. The remainder of the document contained submissions by way of argument from country information and a discussion of legal cases, including references to decisions of the High Court of Australia concerning the application of the Refugees Convention.
The applicant attended the Tribunal’s hearing, and a transcript of what transpired is before me. I shall refer to parts of it below. The Tribunal summarised what happened at the hearing, and no submission has been made that its summary is inaccurate. It is apparent that various matters of concern in the mind of the Tribunal were squarely put to the applicant, although complaints are made about two matters which I shall deal with below.
Under the heading “Findings and Reasons” the Tribunal said:
The Applicant’s evidence raises some doubts as to his identity. He claims that his name is (birth name) and that he was born in (town), Bangladesh on (date) 1966. He also claims to have entered Australia on a purchased and falsified Bangladesh passport under the name of (passport name). However, the latter claim is in conflict with the evidence of the Department’s movements database, which the Tribunal accepts, indicating that the Applicant entered Australia on 28 April 2004 in the name of (birth name). Despite its concerns on this issue, the Tribunal is prepared to give the Applicant the benefit of the doubt to the extent of accepting that his real name is (birth name), as he claims. The Tribunal is also prepared to accept that the Applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh who was born in (town) on (date) 1966.
The Applicant claims that if he returns to Bangladesh he will be persecuted, and may be killed, because of his political activism as a member of the Jubo League, the youth wing of the Awami League.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant has provided a truthful or accurate account of his experiences in Bangladesh, or that his evidence about his fear of persecution can be relied on, for several reasons.
… [The Tribunal gave reasons in four numbered paragraphs]
Summary
The Tribunal is not satisfied, on the evidence before it, that the Applicant has ever been an activist or a member of the Jubo League or the Awami League to which it is affiliated. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant has ever suffered harm in Bangladesh for this or any other reason, at the hands of the BNP, other political parties, terrorists or anybody else. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant is wanted by the police or that charges, whether false or otherwise, have ever been laid against him. Nor is the Tribunal satisfied that there is a real chance that the Applicant will suffer any other harm if he returns to Bangladesh. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant has a well‑founded fear of persecution should he return to Bangladesh because of his political opinion or for any other Convention reason, either now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, and is not satisfied that he is a refugee.
The Tribunal’s discussion of four areas of the applicant’s claims points to rational reasons for dissatisfaction as to the truth of the applicant’s claims. Although the amended application filed in this Court contended that three of its conclusions were made in the absence of probative evidence, this contention was not pressed.
The first two grounds of review argued by the applicant’s solicitor were as follows:
Ground 1
1.The Tribunal was in breach of section 424A of the Act in that despite identifying information that the Tribunal considered to be the reason, or a part of the reason, for its affirming the Departmental decision, no notice was issued under section 424A of the Act. The information that ought to have been the subject of a section 424A notice was:
1.1CB80.2 – movement records of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous affairs that allegedly conflicted with the applicant’s evidence about his entry in Australia and the identity he used to travel to Australia. The information in the movement records should have been the subject of the section 424A notice, and the fact that they conflict with his evidence should have been outlined as why it is relevant to the review.
1.2CB80.6 – the contents of the applicant’s application to DIMIA (and the application itself) allegedly conflicted with the applicant’s evidence that he prepared his application without the assistance of a migration agent, but that he had help to other Bangladesh refugees. This is specifically cited as adverse to the Tribunal’s assessment of the applicant’s credibility.
Ground 1.1 relied upon the Tribunal’s opening paragraph under the heading “Findings and Reasons” which I have set out above.

It contended that information from “the Department’s movements database” to which the Tribunal referred was required by s.424A(1) to be put to the applicant by way of a written invitation for comments.
Section 424A(1)(a) provides that the Tribunal must:
give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review …
The reference to “information that … would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision” has been discussed in authority binding upon me. This raises a test of whether, in the opinion of the Court, the information was used by the Tribunal when ultimately arriving at its decision in a manner which was “integral to” or “an important aspect of the Tribunal’s reasoning process” (see VAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471 at [33] and VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158 at [51‑54]).
In my opinion, reading the Tribunal’s reasons in the present case it is apparent that the Tribunal’s reference to the Department’s movements database did not result in it using that information as an integral part of its reasons for affirming the delegate’s decision. I have no reason not to accept the structuring of its reasons by the Tribunal as properly revealing its process of reasoning. In my opinion, it is clear from this that the Tribunal affirmed the decision by reason of dissatisfaction as to the applicant’s account “of his experiences in Bangladesh” which he had claimed gave rise to a fear of persecution. It did not do so by reason of findings as to the circumstances in which the applicant entered Australia. Indeed, I accept the submissions by counsel for the Minister that the Tribunal gave the applicant the benefit of the doubt of its uncertainty about which passport the applicant entered Australia upon and in what name he made his entry. I therefore do not accept that an obligation under s.424A(1)(a) arose in relation to the Tribunal’s reference to that information.
Ground 1.2 argued that an obligation under s.424A(1) also arose in relation to the Tribunal’s use of information taken from the applicant’s primary visa application documents, which it regarded as inconsistent with some responses of the applicant to its questions at the hearing.

Its reasoning about this occurred in a paragraph which gave the Tribunal’s first reason for not accepting the credibility of the applicant’s account of his experiences in Bangladesh:
First, the Tribunal is not satisfied as to the truth of the Applicant’s claims concerning the circumstances in which he prepared his protection and review applications and associated submissions. He told the Tribunal that he had only received assistance from some Bangladeshi friends who were refugees and that these friends prepared his applications and submissions for him. He denied that he had received assistance in any way from a migration advisor. When it was put to him that this claim appeared inconsistent with the standard of the documentation [he] had submitted he said he had no comment. Given the professional appearance of the documentation submitted to the Department and the Tribunal by the Applicant, in particular his 19 page submission of 3 December 2004 which contains a significant amount of legal argument, the Tribunal does not accept that he has told the truth about the way in which it was prepared.
Counsel debated before me whether the Tribunal’s opinion as to “the standard of the documentation” involved the use of “information” as referred to in s.424A. Counsel for the Minister submitted that it did not involve the use of “information” taken from those documents, but only the appraisal or assessment of the material put forward by the applicant in a manner which comes within the exclusionary proposition made in VAF (supra) at [24(iii)].
However, I do not need to resolve this issue, since in my opinion any obligation under s.424A(1) was excluded in relation to all “information” obtained by the Tribunal from the documentation submitted by the applicant, including with the visa application, when finding that the applicant had obtained professional assistance in a manner inconsistent with his denial at the hearing.
The exclusion arises by reason of s.424A(3)(b), because the applicant “republished” the original documentation to the Tribunal, and therefore “gave” it “for the purpose of the (review) application” within s.424A(3)(b) (see SZDMJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1034 at [5] and [6]). I consider that the situation falls within the situation described by Gray J in M55 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 13 at [25]. Using the tests suggested by Gray J, I consider that the applicant “invited reference” to the documentation submitted to the Department and “intended that the Tribunal should look at this material”. I reject the submission of the applicant’s solicitor that the case is indistinguishable from NAZY v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 744 (see [26‑37]).
My conclusion on this matter relies upon the content of the applicant’s first paragraph in his submission to the Tribunal which I have set out above, and in particular his statement: “I am providing the submissions based on the statements provided to DIMIA along with some recent documents … ”. I consider that as a result of this statement any information or knowledge taken by the Tribunal from the applicant’s visa application documents was “information … that the applicant gave for the purpose of the (review) application”. I therefore reject ground 1.2.
Ground 1.3 provided a further particular of a breach of s.424A(1):
1.3CB81.6 – the Tribunal refers to discrepancies between the applicant’s claim in his primary visa application regarding his being a Jubo league leader and organiser, and later claims to have been only a member. The information in the primary application should have been the subject of a section 424A notice, and the discrepancies should have been outlined as why it was relevant to the review.
This ground refers to the Tribunal’s stated fourth reason for not accepting the truth of the applicant’s claims in relation to his experiences in Bangladesh:
Fourth, the Applicant’s knowledge of the Jubo League, as indicated in his responses to questions about its policies, does not support his claim to having been an activist within the party who was responsible, among other things, for exerting an influence over new members and who was well and favourably known to the League’s central leadership. Even when allowances are made for the fact that the Applicant claims only to have been a member of a branch of the League in his home town of (town), the Tribunal is not satisfied that his answers demonstrate that he ever occupied even this position. The Tribunal is strengthened in this view by the notable vagueness of the Applicant’s account of his own activities in the League, his inability to say when he had joined it and the discrepancies between his claims to having been a Jubo League leader and organiser, in his primary application, and his later claims to have been only a member. In reaching its conclusion the Tribunal places no weight on the letter submitted by the Applicant and purportedly written by the President of the League’s (town) Branch. When the Applicant was asked why the letter was undated he had no comment. When he was invited to comment on the independent evidence indicating the extent of document fraud in Bangladesh, he made no substantive response other than to maintain that the letter is genuine. Given the fact that the Applicant claims to have purchased and falsified a passport, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the letter is anything more than a fabrication designed to strengthen his claims. (emphasis added)

There was no dispute between the parties that this reference to discrepancies involved the taking of information from “his primary visa application”. However, I consider that this information, which was in the statutory declaration given to DIMIA, was republished to the Tribunal both through the opening paragraph of the applicant’s submission and also in the passage “cut and pasted” from the original statutory declaration into the submission.
Applying the same reasoning as in relation to the previous grounds, I therefore reject this ground.
Turning to ground 2, it is convenient to address ground 2.4 before ground 2.2 (grounds 2.1 and 2.3 were not pressed). It contended:
Ground 2
2.The Tribunal failed to afford the applicant procedural fairness/natural justice. The Tribunal should have alerted the applicant to, and provided the applicant with an opportunity to respond to the following matters:
…
2.4Other matters raised above in the context of section 424A that the Court may regard as falling outside of section 424A.
In support of this, the applicant’s solicitor argued that there had been a failure of procedural fairness by the Tribunal when concluding that there was inconsistency in the applicant’s claims about being a leader of the “Jubo League” in the passage which I have addressed above under ground 1.3. He withdrew reliance under this ground on any of the other matters identified in ground 1.
I was taken to the transcript of the Tribunal’s hearing where the applicant was questioned concerning his claims to have been involved in politics in Bangladesh as a leader or member of the “Jubo League”. The relevant questioning appears from questions 159 through 193 of the transcript, but it is unnecessary for me to set out the whole of this discussion. I shall merely set out questions and answers 169, 170 and 171:
Q169O.K. And so did you have any particular position in the Jubo League, what position did you have?
ANo, just …
A (Int) :Just member.
Q170All right. In your statement, in your application, you talk about yourself as being a leader. You said that – just excuse me for a minute while I find the reference but you said – you said that you started organising the party in (town) and you said that you were a leader in the party. That doesn’t seem to be what you’re saying now. Can you comment on that?
A (Int) :There is a lot of faculty in there and in fact the duties are detailed to various persons, the juniors or junior politicians of that area actually respected me and also the seniors … me and they used to give me some tasks to do like organising … because I was very active in that place, in that area.
Q171So what sort of things did you do?
A (Int) : I used to attend meetings, demonstration and about some other job that junior politician they used to respect me and also the senior politician have hundred per cent faith on me that whatever task I have been given that they will get it hundred per cent and also that I have be able to comment on, I mean, new politician, those who were joining, the new members.
It was argued that common law procedural fairness would have required the Tribunal to have asked more questions of the applicant, alerting him to the possibility that the Tribunal would consider that there was an inconsistency between the applicant saying he was “just member” of the Jubo League, and his written claims to have been “a promising Jubo Leaguer leader”.
The test of the obligation to raise matters with an applicant so as to comply with the “fair hearing rule”, was described by McHugh J in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 at [101]:
[101] One of the fundamental rules of the fair hearing doctrine is that a decision‑maker should not make an adverse finding relevant to a person’s rights, interests or legitimate expectations unless the decision‑maker has warned that person of the risk of that finding being made or unless the risk necessarily inheres in the issues to be decided. It is a corollary of the warning rule that a person who might be affected by the finding should also be given the opportunity to adduce evidence or make submissions rebutting the potential adverse finding.
In my opinion, assuming that that obligation applied to the Tribunal in relation to the present matter, I do not consider that the Tribunal failed to afford procedural fairness before giving weight to its opinion that there were discrepancies in the applicant’s claims. The discrepancy was apparent in the two statements made by the applicant to the Tribunal in support of his claims for protection. In my opinion “the risk necessarily inhered” in the nature of the proceeding and the questioning of the Tribunal, that it might identify inconsistencies and draw adversely from them when assessing the truth of the claims.

I therefore do not accept the premise of this ground of review: that there was a common law failure of procedural fairness, assuming that the Tribunal was under relevant duties.
There was debate before me as to the effect of authorities which have considered whether s.422B has the effect that s.424A provides an exhaustive statement of the Tribunal’s duties in relation to putting adverse material or conclusions to an applicant. The applicant’s solicitor referred me to the judgment of Gray J in Moradian v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 81 ALD 565. Other justices appear to have come to differing opinions (c.f. Wu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 221 and VXDC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1388). In my opinion, the current weight of authorities tends to support the proposition that s.424A is exhaustive of the Tribunal’s duties of procedural fairness, at least in relation to the right to be invited to comment whether in writing or otherwise about adverse matters upon which a Tribunal relies (see also NAQF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 130 FCR 456 at [85‑87] and Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v NAMW (2004) 140 FCR 572 at [132] and [139]). However, for the reasons I have given above I do not need to enter into any further investigation of the differences of opinion in this area.
The remaining ground which was argued was ground 2.2. This presented an additional particular in relation to the claim of breach of common law procedural fairness:
2.2CB81.3 – The Tribunal’s view that the applicant’s failure to instruct a lawyer to defend the false charges in Bangladesh was difficult to believe and that it suggested his claims about the false charges were untrue. There are many possible explanations as to why he may not have engaged a lawyer for those cases, yet he was not asked about it, and was not given the opportunity to respond.
This ground identified a finding made by the Tribunal in its third reason for being dissatisfied as to the truthfulness of the applicant’s account of his experiences in Bangladesh:
Third, the Tribunal does not accept that the Applicant has been subjected to harm at the hands of his political enemies, as he claims. His claims in this area are notably vague and, even in the claimed incidents in which he says he was beaten up in 2001 and kidnapped in 2003, his account is unconvincing and lacking in detail. The Tribunal rejects as fantasy his claim that, despite the attempts by his enemies to beat, torture and kill him, they nevertheless offered him money to join them on many occasions. As noted, the Tribunal does not accept that the Applicant was on the run from the police for any reason in the period from 2002 to 2004, and is not satisfied as to the credibility of his claim that false cases were lodged against him. His account of the details of these cases, the number of which he said he did not know, was unconvincing as was his claim not to have consulted a lawyer about them. Finally, the Tribunal is satisfied that, if the Applicant had been targeted for serious harm for an extended period, as he claims, he would have attempted to flee Bangladesh long before April 2004, using his genuine passport to do so. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant provided any convincing answer when asked what made him decide to leave Bangladesh so urgently that he could not wait to obtain an Australian visa in his own passport but instead purchased a passport which already had an Australian visa in it. (emphasis added)
In relation to the statement I have emphasised above, I was taken to the transcript of hearing, where the applicant was questioned about his claims to have encountered false charges and to have been fearful of arrest upon those false charges. Questions 128 through 144 are relevant, but I shall not set out the whole of this. Towards the end of the Tribunal’s questioning, it said:
Q141Did you get a lawyer?
ANo.
A (Int) :No.
I note that the applicant answered both in English and through the interpreter.
In my opinion, assuming common law obligations of procedural fairness were applicable, there was no further obligation on the Tribunal to explain to the applicant how it might assess his response to that question. I do not accept the submission that the Tribunal was obliged to have warned the applicant that it might regard his failure to employ a lawyer as being “inconsistent” with the events having occurred as claimed. I consider that this was a matter of assessment for the Tribunal of the applicant’s evidence which common law procedural fairness would not have required the applicant to have been warned about, since it was inherent in the nature of the proceeding (see Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 at 591). For that reason I reject ground 2.2.
The applicant’s solicitor did not press any other ground pleaded in the amended application, nor in the application previously filed by the applicant prior to his engaging solicitors. My rejection of the grounds argued has the consequence that I find that the Tribunal’s decision was not affected by jurisdictional error. It was therefore a privative clause decision within s.474(1) for which relief is barred, and I must dismiss the application.
RECORDED : NOT TRANSCRIBED

I certify that the preceding thirty‑eight (38) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Smith FM

Associate: Lilian Khaw

Date: 19 October 2005