SZEZQ v Minister for Immigration - [2005] FMCA 636

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZEZQ & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION

[2005] FMCA 636

MIGRATION – Refugee – illogical basis – no basis for decision.

Migration Act 1958, former Part 8, s.65

Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] 86 FCR 547
Thevendram v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] 182 ALR 290
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] 198 ALR 59
NACB v Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 235
S635/2003 v Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1162
NABE v Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No. 2) [2004] FCAFC 263
Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Yusuf [2001] 206 CLR 323
Re Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs: Ex parteDurairajasingham [2000] HCA 1

Applicants:

SZEZQ & SZEZR

Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

File Number:

SYG 2811 of 2004

Judgment of:

Nicholls FM

Hearing date:

9 November 2004

Date of Last Submission:

1 November 2004

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

30 May 2005

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr. I. Archibald

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Ms. M. Byers

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr. A. Markus

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

The application is dismissed.
The applicant to pay the respondent’s costs set in the amount of $4000 pursuant to rule 21.02(2)(a) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 2811 of 2004

SZEZQ & SZEZR

Applicants

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application filed in this Court on 13 September 2004 seeking review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 7 June 2001 and handed down on 28 June 2001 to affirm the decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister made on 11 October 2000 to refuse a protection visa to the applicants.
The applicants before the Tribunal were husband, wife and daughter who are nationals of the Peoples Republic of China and who arrived in Australia as visitors on 31 July 2000. On 28 August 2000 they lodged an application for protection visas with the respondent Minister’s Department.
At the first Court date in this matter on 22 September 2004 the solicitor for the applicant wife (“the applicant”) and the applicant daughter, Ms Byers, advised that no instructions had ever been received from the applicant husband (“the husband”), that his whereabouts were unknown and that he had been named in these proceedings because he was first in the order in the Tribunal decision and because the applicant’s claims were based on the husband’s claims. In these circumstances the husband was removed as a party to these proceedings which appear to have commenced without his knowledge.
I also have before me:
1)
Notice of Objection to Competency filed by the respondent on

19 October 2004; (this was not pressed)
2)Transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal filed by the applicant on 29 October 2004 under cover of a Notice to Admit Facts;
3)Affidavit sworn by the applicant on 8 November 2004.
At the hearing before me the applicants were represented by Mr. Archibald and Mr. Markus appeared for the respondent. Both parties agreed that if I were minded to find that there was some jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal then both parties would be provided with a further opportunity to address the respondent’s position that there is unwarrantable delay in the commencement of these proceedings and that the Court should exercise its discretion not to grant the relief sought.
By way of application filed on 13 September 2004 the applicants assert one ground of review, namely that the Tribunal’s decision involved jurisdictional error in that it was illogical, not based on probative material and involved an error of law. This is particularised by:
“a. The Tribunal found certain matters to be implausible including:
i.The sending of ten police to Beijing to arrest the applicant [husband].
ii.That the applicant visited his mother after leaving prison and then left his city undetected.
iii.The concealment to the 10 year old daughter of the father’s arrest.
There was no probative basis for the finding of implausibility.
“b. It was illogical and there was no probative basis for the Tribunal to find against the applicant being permitted to leave prison on payment of bail to visit his terminally ill mother, because he had been imprisoned for five months without visitors.
c. There was no probative basis for the finding of inconsistency in the account of the departure from China.”
The Tribunal had before it, relevantly, the:
a)Protection visa application to the respondent’s Department. Court Book 1-39.
b)A written statement by the husband attached to that application dated 25 August 2000. CB 40-45.
c)The respondent’s delegate’s decision record. CB 57-65.
d)The application for review to the Tribunal. CB 70-7.3
e)The Tribunal’s record of the claims put forward by the husband at the hearing before the Tribunal on 31 May 2001. CB 90-95.1.
f)Independent country information.
The husband claimed to be an active and senior member of Falun Gong in the Dalian area of China. He claimed that in July 1999 he organised a group of Falun Gong to go to Beijing to petition the government. While there, the group was approached by ten policemen from the Dalian Public Security Bureau, and once identifying him as the “director” of the group, took him to the airport, flew him to Dalian, where on arrival he was put into prison. He claimed that on the payment of bail money and production of a hospital certificate he was allowed out of prison to visit his terminal ill mother in hospital. He and his wife and daughter used this opportunity to leave China.
The applicants complain that the Tribunal’s rejection of the husband’s account of past persecution and rejection of the real chance of serious harm if he were to return to China and practice Falun Gong in the same manner as he had in the past, was based on the Tribunal finding:
a)The following inconsistencies in the applicant’s account:
i.The husband’s answer in his protection visa application that he had never used another passport.
ii.That he the failed to mention that he had travelled to Egypt when asked about travel out of China.
iii.That the applicant had given two different accounts of how they left China and that both were different to the account given by the husband.
b)The following implausible matters:
i.The account of the husband’s imprisonment and release on bail.
ii.The fact that ten police would be sent from Dalian to Beijing to arrest the applicant and fly him back.
iii.That the husband was not allowed to have visitors in the five months after his arrest, but was then allowed to leave prison on bail for five days and then left the city undetected and with no difficulties.
iv.That the daughter would not know or be told that her father was in prison for five months.
In submissions Mr. Archibald for the applicants relied on:
(1)Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [1998] 86 FCR 547 and in particular at 558 where the Full Court said that a decision maker who adopts an incorrect approach to the issue of credibility will have failed to ask the right question, and will have thereby erred in law or failed to properly exercise their jurisdiction. A decision on credibility must never be allowed to become a substitute for the true test in the Refugee Convention.
(2)Thevendram v Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2001] 182 ALR 290, and in particular relying on Lee, J for the following propositions:
-That a conclusion made by a Tribunal will lack a logical foundation unless appropriate findings of fact can be made to support it.
-That the question for the Tribunal is whether a claimed fear converts to a well founded fear. That a bare statement that a claim was not credible may give rise to the question as to whether the Tribunal had carried out the review required of it by the Migration Act.
-That the decision making process engaged in by the Tribunal may require analysis if the Tribunal does no more than assert some part of the applicant’s account of past events is not credible.
-That in the absence of probative material or logical grounds capable of supporting a conclusion that a claim by an applicant that an event or circumstance occurred or existed, is fraudulent, then a Tribunal could not be shown to have made a determination as to satisfaction required by the Act.
-A Tribunal must exercise great caution before drawing inferences from perceived inconsistencies in the evidence of an applicant, where these inferences are relied upon to discount the applicant’s credibility.
-“If that material finding of a fact, upon which the Tribunal determined that it was not satisfied as required by the Act, was not supported by logical grounds then the Tribunal did not carry out the function directed by the Act and grounds for jurisdictional review would arise.”
The applicants also rely on Justice Merkel in the same case and in particular paragraphs [55], [56] to [59] to put the claim that in this case the question is whether the Tribunal had a proper basis for rejecting the account of past persecution in light of the fact that it was rejected because it was seen to seen to be implausible, and on the basis of Amnesty International information.
In summary the argument for the applicants is that following their Honours reasoning:
a)The Tribunal was not in a position to make appropriate findings of fact about matters for which there was no evidence before it.
b)That following Merkel, J a step in the reasoning has become the basis for the ultimate finding.
c)The findings were not supported by some probative material or logical grounds.
d)The Tribunal failed to exercise great caution before drawing inferences from perceived inconsistencies in the evidence of the applicant where those inferences are relied upon to discount the applicant’s credibility.
Mr. Markus for the respondent’s Minister submitted in relation to the ground of illogicality:
a)That while some members of the High Court in Re MIMIA; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] 198 ALR 59 expressed some support for illogicality as a ground of review, the utility of illogicality is limited.
b)In NACB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] FCAFC 235 at [29] and [30] the Full Federal Court held there is nothing in the remarks of the High Court in S20 which would warrant a departure from earlier line of decisions in the Federal Court to the effect that illogical reasoning does not in itself constitute an error of law or jurisdictional error:
“[29] In our view, there is nothing in these remarks which would warrant a departure from the earlier line of decisions in this Court to the effect that illogical reasoning does not of itself constitute an error of law or jurisdictional error. Nor does the want of logic which has been identified in the present case sound a “warning note” of the type referred to in Epeabaka (at 422) as to whether there was only a purported, and not real, exercise of power by the RRT.
[30] Accordingly, the conclusion we have reached in the present case is that there is substance in the argument that there was a want of logic in one aspect of the reasoning of the RRT. However, want of logic does not of itself suffice to constitute error of law, still less error of law which is jurisdictional. There is nothing else in the material, apart from the one aspect of illogicality, to cast doubt upon the RRT’s reasoning. Moreover, there are several bases upon which that reasoning can, in any event, be supported. Accordingly, on the present state of the authorities, there is no reviewable error.”
c)In S635/2003 v MIMIA [2004] FCA 1162 Moore, J held that notwithstanding various observations of members of the High Court about illogical reasoning, he was bound to follow NACB.
d)NABE v MIMIA (No. 2) [2004] FCAFC 263 at [53] – [54] which stated:
“[53] It is desirable first to restate the uncontroversial proposition that mere factual error by the Tribunal will not ground judicial review unless it relates to a jurisdictional fact or is a manifestation of some error of law, substantive or procedural, which constitutes jurisdictional error and thereby vitiates the purported decision. This is evident from the discussion, in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] 206 CLR 323, of jurisdictional error as a ground for the review of Tribunal decisions under the former Pt 8 of the Migration Act. If the Tribunal identifies a wrong issue or poses the wrong question for itself or does not have regard to relevant material or takes into account irrelevant material, so as to affect the exercise of its powers, error of law and/or jurisdictional error may be identified (at 351 to 352 per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). An error of fact in the course of a decision is unlikely to be a jurisdictional error unless the fact is a jurisdictional fact …”
“[54] Error of law may occur within jurisdiction – S20/2002 at 72 [57] …The observations in the joint judgement in S20/2202 did not offer any clear guidance upon the circumstances in which factual error may amount to jurisdictional error for the purposes of the exercise by the High Court of its constitutional jurisdiction under s. 85(v) or the exercise by this Court of its analogous statutory jurisdiction under s. 39B of the Judiciary Act. The comments did, however, indicate that, absent a question of jurisdictional fact, which in itself may be a matter of some complexity involving questions of fact and law, the circumstances in which factual error will amount to or evidence jurisdictional error are likely to be quite limited.”
The Tribunal relevantly had before it:
a)The applicants’ protection visa application. [CB 1-37]
b)A statement by the husband. [CB 40-45]
c)The decision record of the respondent’s delegate. [CB 57-65]
d)The application for review to the Tribunal. [CB 70-71]
It is clear that only the husband made specific claims under the Refugees Convention. In her part of the application forms, the applicant states “Please refer to statement” which is a clear reference to the husband’s statement attached. Further, at the hearing before the Tribunal held on 31 May 2001 the Tribunal records that the husband confirmed that the wife and daughter did not have distinct claims and that he was the main applicant. That is confirmed by the transcript of hearing provided by the applicant at Transcript page 1.
The Tribunal clearly identified its task pursuant to s.65 of the Act as needing to be satisfied that the prescribed criteria for a protection visa have been met. [CB 88.4]. The Tribunal records the applicants’ claims as set out in the protection visa application, notes there are no additional claims in the application for review, [CB 91.5] and reports on the claims as stated at the hearing before it. [CB 91-95.1] The Tribunal then reports on independent evidence [CB 95.2-99.5] and then begins its “Findings and Reasons” with:
“The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant [husband] was a Falun Gong leader in Dalian City and that as a result of this he was imprisoned in China. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant faces arrest and further detention on returning to China. The Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s claims because they contain inconsistencies and aspects of the claims are implausible.”
The Tribunal then proceeds to give its reasons for this finding.
In relation to the inconsistencies in the applicants account:
a)The Tribunal at CB 99.8 states:
“The applicant claims to be of a member of the People’s Committee and to be a high profile member of Falun Gong. In the hearing the applicant stated that he had not taken part in the Falun Gong demonstrations in Tianjin nor the April 25 demonstration in Beijing (cited in the independent evidence at page 9 of this decision). When asked about this the applicant stated that he was overseas at the time and for this reason had not participated. It was pointed out to the applicant that his passport does not indicate that he was overseas at this time. The applicant stated that he had a second passport, which was for government business and that he was overseas on government business. In the protection visa application in response to question 27, “have you ever had or used any other passport or travel document?” the applicant stated that he had not. In the protection visa application in response to question 28 “Did you ever travel outside your home country … before your current journey to Australia?” the applicant makes no reference to a trip to Egypt.”
b)Relevant to the issue of inconsistencies the husband provided the following in answer to relevant questions in his protection visa application [CB 14]:
“27. Have you ever had, or used, any other passport or travel document?
The husband answered “No.”.
“28. Did you ever travel outside your home country or country of residence before your current journey to Australia?”
The husband provided in response a reference to three journeys to two different countries, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, before travelling to Australia.
c)The transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal provided by the applicant, shows:
At T11 and T12:
“MEMBER: Did you go to any of the demonstrations in China?
APPLICANT: I didn’t take part in the one held on 25^th of May.
MEMBER: 25^th May.
APPLICANT: Sorry, its 25^th of April, sorry. I was out in Egypt at the delegate.”
At T17:
“MEMBER: You said you were in Egypt on 25^th April, is that correct:
APPLICANT: Yes.
MEMBER: How long were you there for?
APPLICANT: Almost twenty days.
MEMBER: I couldn’t find anything in your passport.
APPLICANT: I’ve got two passports. On business purpose I would use another passport.”
d)There is a clear inconsistency between the husband’s answers to questions in his protection visa application and information provided at the hearing before the Tribunal. In relation to his travel out of China the husband did not mention “Egypt” in his protection visa application, and in relation to his second passport his answer in the protection visa application form was that he never had another passport.
e)The husband, and his migration adviser, who assisted with the application for review put to the Tribunal [see CB 71], would have been on clear notice that generally inconsistencies in the applicant’s claims were critical to the protection visa assessment process and that this was of particular relevance in this case. The respondent’s delegate, in the record of decision reproduced at CB 57-65 states at CB 60.5 under the reasons for refusing the protection visa application:
“In view of the many inconsistencies in the applicant’s claims, as detailed below, and the vague nature of such claims, I am unable to accept that he has had the difficulties in China that he claims to have had.”
f)The third inconsistency finding complained of by the applicant is that the Tribunal found inconsistencies in the applicants’ (husband and wife) accounts of their departure from China. The Tribunal states that:
i.In the hearing before it the applicant (wife) stated they left China illegally by crossing the border at Shenzhen at a “cargo point” [see CB 100.9]
ii.In the application for a protection visa both the husband and wife, in answer to question 43 [see CB 21 and CB 35] stated they had left legally.
iii.The Tribunal further contrasted the statements above by reference to the husband’s statement attached to the protection visa application [CB 45] that they flew to Hong Kong from Huanggang Port.
g)
In an affidavit sworn by the applicant on 8 November 2004 (which was the subject of some objection by Mr Markus, in relation to the penultimate paragraph of the affidavit) the applicant says that they passed the border control through Huanggang cargo border control in Shenzhen (which still appears to contradict the husband’s account that they flew to Hong Kong) and that this was a cargo port and not for use by travellers. She explains that at the Tribunal hearing she described the departure as “illegal” because travellers were not allowed to leave by this port and they had to ask a friend for assistance. She further says that her husband told her that he had said the departure was “not illegal”, because the passports and visas were genuine. This explanation still does not address the applicant’s description of the departure as “legal” in the application form and the description by the applicant now that they left illegally at least to the extent that she says they passed through border control at a crossing, where “normal travellers are not allowed to pass”, with the help of a friend. But whatever the applicant’s explanation now, the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal, provided by the applicant, shows that the husband described their departure as “pass the border” after the Tribunal put the question that they were allowed to cross the border [T 29]. This contrasts with the earlier written statement that they flew to Hong Kong. Further, the applicant confirmed at the hearing before the Tribunal

[T 35.3] that she left China illegally because she did not have an exit permit. The transcript at T 35.6 shows:
“MEMBER: So you left illegally, your husband left illegally, and your daughter, all three of you left without exit permits?
APPLICANT’S WIFE: Yes. As far as I know anyone who has to leave the country has to get the permit.”
In all these circumstances, the Tribunal was entitled on what was before it to point to inconsistencies in the accounts as to whether they left legally or illegally and whether they flew to Hong Kong or crossed at the border crossing. On what was before it, it was open to the Tribunal to find that there were inconsistencies in the various accounts of the departure from China.

In submissions at the hearing before me Mr. Archibald for the applicant also submitted that the Tribunal made various findings of implausibility and that there was an absence of evidence for the various findings and that this led to jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
The husband’s central claim was that he was a high profile Falun Gong leader in the city of Dalian. He claimed he became a Falun Gong practitioner in August 1997. He claimed that in July 1999 he organised a group to go to Beijing to petition the Government on behalf of the Falun Gong. He claimed ten policemen from Dalian arrived in Beijing, caught him and flew him back to Dalian where he was imprisoned. He claimed further that he remained in prison until December 1999 when he was released for five days to visit his sick mother. He claimed to have left China with his wife and child at that time and that he cannot return because he is wanted by the police.
The Tribunal found the following to be implausible in the husband’s claims of arrest, imprisonment and release:
a)That ten policemen would fly from Dalian city to Beijing to arrest him and then fly back.
b)That as against his high profile and his statement that the was not permitted visitors while in detention for five months, he was nonetheless allowed to leave prison for five days on bail to visit his sick mother.
c)That there was independent information from Amnesty International which indicated that Falun Gong practitioners arrested in Dalian City at the time of the applicant’s claimed detention were sent to labour camps, imprisoned for nine years and sent to re-education camps. Yet the applicant who claimed to be a high profile public person and a high profile member of Falun Gong was granted bail to spend time with his mother and that this was inconsistent with the treatment of other high profile Falun Gong persons.
d)That the 10 year old daughter would not know of her father’s imprisonment given his high profile and as against the public manner in which the government harassed Falun Gong and punished its followers.
The applicant’s position as put by Mr. Archibald is that there is no factual basis for the findings of implausibility by the Tribunal and that there is a lack of a probative basis for the Tribunal’s ultimate finding on whether there was a well-founded fear of persecution, and that this is linked to an unreasonable or illogical approach on the part of the Tribunal. The respondent’s Counsel, Mr. Markus, submitted that the Tribunal found that certain of the husband’s central claims were implausible and that in essence these were findings on credibility. He referred to Re Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs: Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1.
A central part of the Tribunal’s decision was the failure of the husband to satisfy the Tribunal that notwithstanding his high profile as a Falun Gong leader he was treated differently and in some ways more leniently than other Falun Gong leaders in his city at the time he alleges he was detained. It is clear on a plain reading of the Tribunal’s decision that the aspects of the husband’s claims that it found implausible arose from what the husband himself had put:
-That he was a high profile Falung Gong
-That he was arrested in Beijing by ten policemen from Dalian who had flown to Beijing for the purpose of detaining him as the leader of his group
-The he was detained for a period of five months in prison
-That he was not allowed visitors while in prison
Yet in spite of this, says the Tribunal, he is simply allowed to leave prison for five days and then is able to leave his city undetected and with no difficulties. Further, the Tribunal found it inconsistent that as against independent information indicating the treatment of Falun gong practitioners arrested at the time of the applicant’s claimed detention who were sent to labour camps, imprisoned for nine years and sent to re-education camps, the husband who claimed a high public profile and a high Falun Gong profile would be treated so differently that he would be allowed out of prison to spend time with his sick mother.
Mr. Archibald now submits that:
-In his statement attached to his protection visa application the husband set out his high public profile (a member of a provincial congress [CB 40], a senior person in business [CB 40] and a high profile member of Falun Gong)
-With reference to the Transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal, that the Tribunal raised with the applicant (T10) the delegate’s reasons for refusing the protection visa application and including the fact that the delegate had looked at the reports about Dalian and that Falun Gong people had been arrested but that the applicant’s name was not amongst them. Mr Archibald contends that with reference to the relevant passages at T16 and T20 regarding the applicant’s account of the Dalian police in coming to Beijing and to bring him back to Dalian, that the Tribunal misapprehended the nature of the detention of the applicant. That there was no formal arrest with a charge, and that the police did not arrest the husband, they were simply detaining him in order that he might talk to them. The applicant’s submission is that there was no probative basis for any finding that there was a formal warrant of arrest. The contention is that the husband’s case had not been finalised, he had not been convicted or sentenced and presumably that is why he was not dealt with in a similar fashion to that reported in the independent evidence, as having been done to others detained in Dalian at the same time.
The essence of the applicants’ contention is that there was an absence of evidence for the finding made. In relation to the specific issue of the husband’s detention and whether it would be characterised as an arrest or otherwise and to argue that the Tribunal had no evidence to make a finding that the applicant had been arrested, in my view does not address the central finding made by the Tribunal. On a plain reading of the Tribunal’s decision record it is clear that relevantly, what the Tribunal found as implausible is that the applicant would be treated so favourably by the Chinese authorities given the claims that he had made. The reference by the Tribunal to the independent information was clearly used to contrast the treatment claimed by the husband in being allowed release on bail to visit his sick mother, with the treatment meted out to other high profile Falun Gong which was harsh. This is clearly what the Tribunal said at [CB 100.8]:
“That the applicant who claims to be a high profile public person and a high profile member of Falun Gong was granted bail to spend time with his sick mother is inconsistent with the authorities treatment of Falun Gong persons who were arrested.”
It is not the role of this Court to over zealously read each word of the Tribunal’s decision record. On any plain reading of the Tribunal’s decision record, the words:
“treatment of Falun Gong persons who were arrested”
was clearly not meant to focus on the arrest, but was a descriptor of the group of Falun Gong who had fallen foul of the authorities. In that sense whether the husband had been formally arrested or not, whether he had been charged or convicted as had the others, is not relevant. The independent evidence showed the Tribunal that high profile Falun Gong were dealt with harshly, those with a lower profile not so. If on the husband’s account he was not only a high profile leader of the Falun Gong, but also a person of high profile generally, it is implausible, said the Tribunal, he would have been released by the authorities to visit his mother and then was able to leave undetected and with no difficulties. This finding was open to the Tribunal on the independent evidence before it and on the claim as put by the husband himself.
The inconsistencies in the applicant’s claims found by the Tribunal were open to the Tribunal to make on the material before it. The finding of implausibility in relation to the husband’s central claim that he was detained as a Falun Gong leader and he feared harm on this basis if he were to return to China, was also open to the Tribunal to make on what was before it. The Tribunal clearly summarised this in its decision record at CB 101.2:
“In summary, the Tribunal does not accept that Chinese authorities detained the applicant because he was a Falun Gong leader and that he managed to escape China illegally while on bail. The Tribunal does not accept this because the Tribunal finds the applicant’s account to contain inconsistencies, to be inconsistent with the independent evidence and to be implausible.”
The applicant’s contention of illogicality in the Tribunal’s reasoning, to the extent that this is available to the applicant to argue, including the contention of no probative basis for the decision, is not made out for the reasons above. I can see no jurisdictional error in what the Tribunal has done in relation to the grounds advanced on behalf of the applicants. In the absence of any other apparent ground arising from the circumstances of this case, I accordingly dismiss the application.

I certify that the preceding twenty-two (22) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM.

Associate: Wagma Aziza

Date: 23 May 2005