SZEOE v Minister for Immigration
[2004] FMCA 1096
•16 December 2004
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZEOE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION | [2004] FMCA 1096 |
| MIGRATION - Application for review of decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal – applicant citizen of Morocco – claimed persecution because of homosexuality – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
Migration Act 1958
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001, Rule 21.02(2)(e)
NAUV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 124
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Khawar and Ors [2002] HCA 14
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo and Another [1997] 191 CLR 559
The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1
Plaintiff S157 of 2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 4
| Applicant: | SZEOE |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| File No: | SYG3071 of 2004 |
| Delivered on: | 16 December 2004 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Hearing date: | 16 December 2004 |
| Judgment of: | Nicholls FM |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Nil |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Nil |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms L. Clegg |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
That the application is dismissed.
That the applicant pay the respondent's costs set in the amount of $3,750 pursuant to Rule 21.02(2)(a) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG3071 of 2004
| SZEOE |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from Transcript)
This judgment arises from an application filed in this Court by the applicant on 11 October 2004 seeking judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 5 September 1997 and notified to the applicant by letter on 9 September 1997, to affirm the decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister, made on
7 May 1997, to refuse a protection visa to the applicant.
The applicant is a citizen of Morocco and arrived in Australia on 20 March 1997 and was detained by the respondents Department. He lodged an application for a protection visa on 26 March 1997. The applicant claimed that he would be persecuted if he returns to Morocco because he is a homosexual and that he had been arrested and put in gaol for immoral behaviour. He claimed that he escaped from custody in Morocco and would be persecuted because of his escape, because of his leaving Morocco illegally and for being a homosexual. He sought review by the Tribunal on 14 May 1997.
The Tribunal acknowledged the applicant's application for review by letter (dated 14 May 1997) sent to the applicant at the Villawood Immigration Detention Centre (VIDC) where he was being held in immigration detention. A copy was sent to his immigration adviser. This letter is at Court Book 62 and puts the applicant on notice that the Tribunal had received his application for review and gave the applicant the opportunity to forward documents or written arguments to the Tribunal. It also put the applicant on notice that irrespective of whether he forwarded any further documentary material the Tribunal would consider the application on the basis of documents in its possession and would then either grant the application or invite the applicant to attend a hearing to further deal with his application.
On 12 June 1997, the Tribunal received correspondence (CB 63) which advised the Tribunal that the applicant had escaped from the VIDC and was subsequently provided with a letter in Arabic and a translation (CB64), the letter having been left by the applicant prior to his escape. It is not clear as to the exact time of the applicant's actual escape from the VIDC although it is clear that the applicant did escape. On 17 June 1997, the Tribunal sent a letter addressed to the applicant at the VIDC inviting the applicant to attend a hearing of the Tribunal to give oral evidence and provided the time, date and place for this hearing and put the applicant on notice that a failure to contact the Tribunal in response to the hearing invitation or a failure to complete and return the enclosed form, would lead to a hearing not taking place and that the Tribunal may make a decision on the evidence it already had before it. The Tribunal’s letter also made a reference that a change of hearing date could only be given if the applicant had very strong reasons for not attending. The Tribunal relevantly also made reference to the option available to the applicant to bring an adviser to the Tribunal hearing but that the adviser would not have the right to speak at the hearing.
It is clear that there could have been no real expectation that the letter would have been delivered to the applicant. However, a copy was sent to the applicant’s migration adviser. [CB 68]. Although there is nothing in the material before me, I can reasonably infer from CB 69, being a letter from the Tribunal to the applicants then migration adviser, that the applicant's migration adviser responded to the Tribunal's letter and had sought to attend the applicant's hearing on his behalf and present his case to the Tribunal.
The Tribunal responded that it did not consider that the applicant's case would be advanced by the adviser presenting oral evidence at the Tribunal hearing on the applicant's behalf if the applicant were not present. Nonetheless it gave the adviser the opportunity to submit written arguments which the adviser subsequently did, see copy beginning at CB 70-80, and also submitted on the applicant's behalf a statutory declaration see copy at CB 81. Significantly, the adviser did not seek any adjournment of the hearing date and I accepted Ms Clegg’s submission for the respondent, that the conduct of the adviser in making submissions was acquiescence on the applicant's behalf of the manner in which the Tribunal proceeded in this situation.
The applicant's claims before the Tribunal are summarised in paragraphs 7 to 18 of the respondent's written submission filed on
8 December 2004 and I adopt these for the purposes of this judgment.
“7. The applicant claims he will be persecuted if he returns to Morocco because he is homosexual.
8. The applicant arrived in Australia on 20 March 1997. He was interviewed by an officer of the Department and found to be travelling on a false French passport. The applicant stated that he had come from Morocco via Jordan, Malaysia, Bangkok (where he had purchased the false passport) and Cambodia. He stated that he was proposing to travel to New Zealand to lodge a refugee claim. He said that the basis for his application for refugee status was that his sister’s boyfriend wanted to kill him. He later stated that his girlfriend’s brothers wanted to kill him. Initially he said he was university educated, but later said he was a farmer.
9. On his application form, the applicant stated that he had 14 years at school and one year at university, and that he had worked as an assistant electrician, in a café and as a room boy.
10. The applicant claimed that he had worked in Libya in 1994 and met a director of an Italian company. He commenced a homosexual relationship with the man (“the male partner”). In September 1994 someone found out about the liaison and this led to the applicant being forced to leave Libya. His family found out about the homosexual relationship and did not treat the applicant very well as a result. The male partner wanted to get married and live in the United States. In December 1996 the male partner came to Morocco for a visit. The male partner rented a house and the applicant and the male partner stayed together in the rented house for a week. This made some people suspicious about the applicant’s homosexuality.
11. At some point in time (apparently before the male partner had arrived in Morocco) the applicant got to know a “girl” who was lesbian. The applicant started having sexual relations with the girl. The girl’s brothers discovered this and in June 1996 began to beat the girl. The brothers also beat the applicant when they encountered him. On once occasion the applicant had to seek refuge in a stranger’s house in order to avoid being beaten by the girl’s brothers.
12. On New Years Eve in 1996 the applicant and his male partner, another male friend and two girls went to a hotel to celebrate New Years Eve. The applicant saw the lesbian girl’s brothers, who attacked him. The applicant and his male partner returned to the rented house and in the morning they (the applicant and his male partner) went to the applicant’s sister’s house. He later returned to the rented house and discovered that the house had been broken into and a number of things had been stolen. One of the stolen items was a video tape of the applicant and the male partner having sex. The applicant was contacted by his sister by telephone who informed him that the police were looking for him. The applicant alleged that the thieves (said by the applicant to be the lesbian girl’s brothers) had given the tapes to the police.
13. The applicant decided to leave the country and withdrew his money from his bank. He went to Casablanca with his brother in order to book a ticket and to convert the Moroccan currency into US dollar. He gave an official (the Chief of the Department of Water and Forestry) (Ministry) about 3 million Magrebien (Moroccan) as a bribe to get him out of the airport. On their way home the applicant was arrested by the police for immoral behaviour and for being a homosexual. The applicant was detained in jail on 5 January 1997. The applicant arranged for his brother to smuggle into the jail some “headache tablets”. The applicant overdosed on 10 of the “in an attempt to commit suicide” and was taken to the hospital from where he escaped and subsequently departed the country.
14. There is a reference in the Tribunal’s decision to a Departmental interview at which the applicant elaborated upon his claims. In that interview the applicant claimed:
–He was bi-sexual
–Two women had also participated in the sexual encounter which had been recorded on the video;
–He had been detained by the Moroccan police in the “secret services” section of the jail’s maximum security wing;
–The pills which he had swallowed had been brought to him concealed in food (because his family had bribed a guard to allow this to happen);
–During the trip to Casablanca the applicant and his brother had been stopped twice by police who had not asked for their papers;
–The official from the Ministry to whom the applicant had paid the bribe found out about the applicant’s arrest and arranged fro someone at customs to help the applicant leave the country. At the airport the applicant’s passport was stamped and a stage member accompanied him through exit control.
15. The applicant also sent a letter to the Department apologising for having escaped from detention. The thrust of the letter was to say that he was not lying, and that he would not fabricate his claims. The applicant invited the Tribunal to contact the Moroccan bank concerning the amount of money he had there. He also invited the Tribunal to contact the Moroccan authorities to determine “whether his life was at stake”.
16. The applicant’s advisor provided lengthy submissions in support of the application. The advisor’s submission for the most part addressed issues and/or deficiencies in the applicant’s claims which had been raised by the delegate. The advisor was particularly concerned with explaining the inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence so as to attempt to respond to the adverse creditability findings of the delegate.
17. The advisor also submitted a statutory declaration from a Moroccan person in detention. Mr Tikat declared that he was aware of a department called the Department of Forestry and Water Resources or something to that effect. He also declared that it is against the law in Morocco to participate in homosexual or extramarital activity. He also declared that it is possible to depart “illegally” from Morocco with the assistance of an important official.
18. The application says he well be persecuted (because he will be imprisoned for 30 years or possibly executed) on the basis of his homosexuality if he returns to Morocco.”
The Tribunal had before it the:
– report of an interview with the applicant on his arrival in Australia.,
– his application for a protection visa submitted to the respondent’s Department,
– a Departmental interview report,
– a letter from the applicant,
– a submission from the applicant's adviser,
– a witness statutory declaration submitted on behalf of the applicant,
– independent country information.”
From its decision record, it is clear that the Tribunal found the applicant's credibility to be a serious issue. [CB 90.8]. It acknowledged that the applicant had not contacted the Tribunal and it was therefore not able to explore the claims directly, but on the material before it, it found:
At CB 90.8:
“… there are serious doubts about the Applicant's credibility. The Applicant's claims have expanded and changed considerably and are in the Tribunal's view, at the very least exaggerated. Furthermore, many of the things he has stated are later directly contradicted.”
At CB 91.2:
“The applicant's evidence also lacks important detail, for example about the nature and type of sexual activity on the video, who was involved in specific activities, how and why only the applicant was identified on the tapes, what, if any, interest did the authorities have in anyone else on the video and the reason for that. There is no detail.”
At CB 91.3:
“… there is no evidence about the Applicant's previous homosexual or bisexual activities and no suggestion that he has ever been harmed or even discriminated against for either his homosexuality or bisexuality and no evidence to suggest that the Applicant ever had any problems with the authorities for these reasons in the past even though he had lived in Morocco most of his life.”
At CB 91.4:
“The Tribunal finds that many of the applicant's claims are implausible and contradictory and the Tribunal does not accept them.”
At CB 91.8:
“The Tribunal accepts the independent country information above and finds the Applicant's assertion that the security service handled his case as it was too complex for the general police highly implausible. Other aspects of the applicant's evidence also suggest to the Tribunal that his claims are untrue or exaggerated.”
At CB 91.9:
“…the Tribunal finds that the applicant is not a credible witness. Despite the Applicant's assertion that he has not fabricated his story the Tribunal concludes that his claims have been at the very least highly exaggerated and that his evidence is contradictory, implausible or fabricated.”
The Tribunal made this credibility finding largely on the basis of the applicant’s lack of detail and contradictions in his various claims and partly on the basis of country information. The Tribunal found the applicant’s claims not to be credible and that he had contrived his claims, and on this basis found he did not face a real chance of persecution on return to Morocco. It was not satisfied that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. Such findings on credibility are of course for the primary decision maker. They were open to the Tribunal on the material before it, and it gave returns for these findings. The application to this court does not identify any grounds for review. It amounts to a request to impermissibly reconsider the merits of the applicant's refugee case.
In an affidavit filed in Court on 11 October 2004, the applicant asserts certain matters, which again go to claims before the Tribunal, and asserting that what the applicant has claimed is true. A further document was sent by the applicant to the respondent's solicitors, as I was advised at the hearing before me, dated 23 November 2004 and received by the respondent's solicitors on 1 December 2004. This document was made available to the Court during the hearing today.
I adjourned for a short period and read through that document. But, again, could find nothing that could be characterised as grounds to support the application made to this Court. The document variously took issue with the decision made by the Departmental delegate, which is not the decision before this Court today, and again reiterated the refugee claims generally before the Tribunal and gave an explanation for the escape from the VIDC. A number of documents were attached to this handwritten document, these appear to be various documents in a foreign language. Again, I have nothing before me to show their relevance to the application before me.
The applicant appeared before me unrepresented and he was assisted by an interpreter in the Arabic language, although the applicant indicated that he had some competence in English and at times chose not to use the interpreter.
I note also that the applicant was given the opportunity to access the Court’s Legal Advice Scheme, and note that the applicant was given such advice on 23 November 2004, and this was confirmed by the applicant at the hearing before me today.
At hearing the applicant made written submissions. I went through these in outline with the applicant. They appear to go over much of the material already provided by the applicant and again do not go to providing grounds for judicial review. Not only is the application and subsequent submission and documentation lacking in grounds for review they lack any particularity as to any error on the part of the Tribunal.
I note, relevantly, that the application to this Court was filed on
11 October 2004 and this is over seven years after the Tribunal decision. In submissions put to me by the respondent’s Counsel the respondent has asserted that it is appropriate for the Court to refuse to entertain this application on discretionary grounds based on the unexplained delay of the applicant in filing the application. In that regard the respondent's counsel has referred me to the Full Federal Court decision in NAUV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 124, which, of course, with respect, is binding on me. [In that case the Court looked at a situation of 18 months delay in circumstances where the applicant had escaped from detention.]
It is well settled that there is discretion to dismiss applications on the basis of unwarrantable and unexplained delay and this could be done with caution, but without deciding the merits of an applicant's alleged grounds of review before the Court.
In the case before me the applicant has not articulated the nature of the relief sought other than asking for his refugee claims to be reconsidered. I note, however, that delay is a discretionary criterion for the denial of certiorari and prohibition and unreasonable delay may also suffice to justify a discretionary refusal of mandamus. The delay in the present case is very great, more than seven years. By way of explanation the applicant has put that he escaped from the VIDC because he felt that the Tribunal would not make a fair decision and that, as I understood the applicant, he formed this view on receipt of the first letter from the Tribunal dated 14 May 1997 which is the date on which the applicant made his application for review to the Tribunal. In this regard, and given the nature of the letter from the Tribunal, I find it difficult to accept what the applicant has put to me. But in any event, the only other explanation for the great delay provided by the applicant was that he was generally fearful, that he was very scared after the first interview, meaning the interview with the respondent Minister's delegate, and fearful because he felt that the delegate’s rejection had no basis. His fear appeared to be a fear related to the respondent’s Department. There is nothing before me to satisfactorily explain why the applicant delayed for seven years in bringing this application to this court. Given the length of the delay, and in the absence of any satisfactory explanation for it, this is a case where the Court could exercise its discretion not to entertain the applicant's application and that is one basis on which I could consider dismissing this application.
In any event of looking at whether there is any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision, no error of law has been identified by the applicant in relation to the Tribunal decision. But given that the applicant is unrepresented before me (albeit with the benefit of some legal advice) I look to consider the following issues:
The first issue is the failure of the applicant to attend the Tribunal hearing and whether in the circumstances this was a failure on the part of the Tribunal to afford the applicant procedural fairness. The respondent acknowledges that in this case the Tribunal was required to follow the rules of common law procedural fairness and that the relevant legislation is that as at May 1997. In relation to the statutory requirements and in particular ss.425 and 426 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), the Tribunal did write to the applicant on
14 May 1997, and invited him to forward documents and written arguments to support his claim. The applicant was in the VIDC at that time and the Tribunal wrote to the applicant's address as provided by the applicant himself in his application. A copy of this letter was sent to the applicant's migration adviser. There is nothing before me up until that point to show any statutory or other breach.
By documents received by the Tribunal on 12 June 1997, [CB 63 to CB 66] the Tribunal was aware that the applicant had escaped from the VIDC. [CB 67]. Nonetheless, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant at the VIDC with a copy sent to the applicant's migration adviser, notifying the applicant of a right to attend a hearing and inviting the applicant to a hearing. It put the applicant on notice that it was unable to make a favourable decision on the information that the Tribunal had before it, and notified the applicant of time, date and place of the hearing and provided information to the applicant as to what would happen if he did not attend the hearing and gave information relevantly as to the role of the adviser.
On the face of it, the Tribunal did comply with the statutory requirements. The issue before me is whether this invitation was an empty gesture and whether it breached any common law rules relating to procedural fairness, particularly given that at the time of the sending of the letter to the applicant at the VIDC the Tribunal was on notice that the applicant was no longer there and that it could be reasonably inferred that any letter sent to the applicant at that address would not be forwarded to the applicant by the authorities, particularly given that his whereabouts were unknown.
Nonetheless the Tribunal dealt with the applicant's adviser and provided an opportunity to the adviser to make written submissions on behalf of the applicant which the adviser subsequently did. This submission was taken into account by the Tribunal in making its decision. The Tribunal also took into account a statutory declaration submitted on behalf of the applicant at that time. It is clear that the Tribunal was faced with a difficult situation. The applicant, by his own actions, made his whereabouts unknown to the Tribunal. There is nothing before me to show that the applicant made any attempt, even through his adviser, to contact the Tribunal to pursue his claim before the Tribunal even though he was on notice of the possible consequences. In addition the applicant confirmed before me today that he did not contact his adviser nor make any attempt to pursue his claims before the Tribunal. I also note the applicant's claims that he was fearful, and that he was concerned that he would not receive a fair hearing. Also relevant here is his claim that his fear was of the respondent’s Department. There is nothing before me to support any legitimate fear of the Tribunal.
Relevantly in the case of NAUV v MIMIA, to which I have already said I was earlier referred, the Court looked at a situation that also involved an applicant who had escaped from the VIDC and who, in that case, had remained at large for a period of 18 months and had thereby missed the opportunity to make an application to the Tribunal. At paragraph [80] the Court said that:
“The appellant’s submission again overlooks the fact that his missed opportunity arose entirely from his own conduct”.
Also [again in the context of the exercise of discretion] at paragraph [43] the Court said:
“Prejudice due to delay was raised by the respondent, who submitted before his Honour that most of the complaints made by the appellant were about all the additional things he now says he would have put forward had he not “become very upset and frustrated”, which, the respondent asserted, was an allegation easily made and difficult to refute. Necessarily, those difficulties, and the difficulties in ascertaining the facts as to what had occurred more generally, became greater with the passage of time.”
Also at paragraph [44], the Court, in referring to the judgement at first instance, says:
“He placed particular weight, correctly in our view, on the fact that the appellant, by his own unlawful conduct, had deprived himself of his right to apply to the Tribunal within time. We see no reason why that circumstance could be said to be irrelevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion in this context.”
Of course, these references are all in the context of the exercise of discretion to which I earlier referred. But the Full Court's findings in that case have relevance in the case before me as to whether the applicant was treated fairly. I also note my earlier reference to submissions by the Minister's counsel, which I have already indicated that I accepted, on the point relating to the adviser's acquiescence. The Tribunal did comply with the statutory requirements and in all the circumstances it did all that it could reasonably be expected to do to contact the applicant and it is of note that it continued to deal with his adviser who was given the opportunities as I have already noted. In these circumstances the invitation cannot be said to be an empty gesture. There is nothing in what the applicant has put before me today, nor in what the applicant said today by way of explanation or otherwise, and nor can I see anything in the circumstances before me, to show that the Tribunal did not afford procedural fairness to the applicant in relation to this matter.
During the course of the hearing before me I was very mindful of the fact that the applicant appeared unrepresented. Although as I have earlier stated he did have access, and did receive advice under the Court’s Legal Advice Scheme. But mindful of the need to exercise caution when dealing with an unrepresented applicant, I raised with the respondent's counsel the issue of whether there may have been any “Khawar-type” situation in this case. [Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Khawar and Ors [2002] HCA 14]. In particular, in that case, the fear of harm was from private individuals and the state tolerated or condoned such harm.
On the material before me, at various times the applicant had made reference to the family of a girl with whom he claimed to have been involved in a relationship, and that the girl's brothers had wanted to kill him. There was a reference to this at CB 2, being part of the immigration inspector's report of an interview with the applicant on the applicant's arrival in Australia, and at CB 21 where the applicant provided a statement in support of answering question 36 in his application for a protection visa. The question was:
"Why did you leave that country?"
The applicant in part said:
“Her brothers said that I got to know a girl whose father lost the presidency of the village committee to my father. Because of this there was animosity between the two families. This girl was a lesbian. I got to know her and soon after we started having sexual relations together. Her brothers discovered this fact and started to beat her, around June 1996.
They began to beat and assault me whenever we encountered one another. On one occasion I was followed by the two brothers and was forced to seek refuge in the house of a stranger where I knocked on the door and asked for help. The residents of the house chased the brothers away.”
This was put in the context of the brothers having given some tapes involving the applicant to the police, and as a result that the police were looking for him.
I am satisfied on the material before me that, the applicant never put his claims in a “Khawar-type” context, nor did he claim to be a member of a particular social group in the context of this particular harm feared. Nor did he claim that the authorities had failed to protect him from that harm. It was clear from the applicant's claims that the fear of harm that he claimed, came directly from the authorities. Firstly, on the basis of his homosexuality and the illegal status of homosexual acts in Morocco, and secondly, the harm that he claimed would flow from his illegal departure from Morocco linked to his claimed escape from custody [in Morocco] relating to his claim that he had been put in gaol, subsequently taken to a hospital and that he had escaped from the hospital. Significantly, in the “Khawar-type” context, the fear of harm from the private individuals in this case arose out of a heterosexual relationship and there is nothing before me to show that the applicant feared any particular harm from those private individuals based on his membership of a particular social group, which in this case could have been the group of people in Morocco who are homosexual. I accept the respondent's submissions that the claims were never put in that way, and nor is there anything in the circumstances before me to show that a “Khawar-type” situation arose and that there was any failure on the part of the Tribunal to turn its mind to those issues. It is clear that the Tribunal dealt with the applicant's case as the applicant had put that case in the various materials before the Tribunal to which I have already referred.
The applicant claimed to have a fear of harm amounting to persecution. The applicant has an obligation to make out his case. It is for the decision maker to be satisfied that the relevant statutory requirements are made out. In the case of the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo and Anor [1997] 191 CLR 559, the Court at [596] said:
“It remains for the Minister in the first place to be satisfied and where that decision is adverse and a review is sought ... for the applicant to persuade the reviewing decision-maker that all of the statutory elements are made out.”
In the case before me, the Tribunal did look at all the claims put by the applicant and essentially it did not believe him. Findings of fact, including findings on credibility are for the primary decision-maker “par excellence” [The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1].
I should emphasise for the benefit of the applicant that it is due to his own actions and omissions that he did not pursue the opportunities that were available to him to support his claims. I note his comments of his fears, but in all the circumstances the Tribunal acted reasonably and on the material before it, was entitled to come to the view that it did. On that basis I can see no error, let alone a jurisdictional error.
On this basis this is therefore, the Tribunal’s decision is a privative clause decision as explained by the Hight Court in Plaintiff S157 of 2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 4, and the application could also be dismissed on the basis that it was lodged outside the time limited prescribed in s.477(1A) of the Act. The application is dismissed on that basis as it lacks merit. I note, nonetheless, I could have dismissed on the basis of unwarrantable delay but felt it was appropriate to provide the applicant with a more complete explanation as to the ultimate reason for the dismissal of his application to the Court.
I certify that the preceding twenty-nine (29) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM
Associate: Wagma Aziza
Date: 15 March 2005
0
3
0