SZEGG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZEGG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

[2006] FCA 775

SZEGG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD 577 OF 2005

STONE J
22 JUNE 2006
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 577 OF 2005

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZEGG
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 JUNE 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The Refugee Review Tribunal be joined as a respondent to this appeal.
  2. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 577 OF 2005

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZEGG
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE:

22 JUNE 2006

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal from the judgment of Federal Magistrate Lloyd-Jones in which his Honour dismissed an application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal.  In a decision made on 30 July 2004 the Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent refusing to grant the appellant a protection (Class XA) visa.  In accordance with the judgment of the High Court in SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 215 ALR 162, the Tribunal will be joined as the second respondent to the appeal.

    BACKGROUND

  2. The background to the appellant’s application for a protection visa was set out by the Tribunal and repeated by the Federal Magistrate.  The Tribunal’s account, which has not been challenged, is as follows:

    ‘The Applicant, who was born in Vietnam in 1971, was taken from his homeland in 1985 by an older sibling.  He was 14 at the time.  He spent almost four years in UNHCR-administered refugee camps in the Philippines.  He and his siblings were selected for resettlement under Australia’s refugee and humanitarian resettlement programme.  He and his sibling would not have been subjected at that time to any case-by-case determination of refugee status.  In those days, all Vietnamese asylum seekers were regarded en masse as prima facie refugees and offered by UNHCR for resettlement in third countries, in an arguably pragmatic exercise that ended in the late 1980s.  Under what came to be known as the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), all asylum seekers who arrived in Hong Kong after 16 June 1988 and in other southeast Asian countries after 14 March 1989 were required to undergo case-by-case screening of their refugee claims.  Meanwhile multilateral and bilateral negotiations were expedited to set up an Orderly Migration Program (ODP) for Vietnamese citizens.  The ODP was aimed, in part, to discourage unauthorised departures in non-seaworthy boats, and to help bring the exodus…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 775
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal arises from a decision of the Federal Magistrate, Lloyd-Jones, who dismissed an application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, refusing to grant the appellant a protection (Class XA) visa. The appellant, born in Vietnam in 1971, left his homeland in 1985 and spent several years in refugee camps before being resettled in Australia in 1989. Despite his initial recognition as a refugee, the Tribunal held that the appellant no longer qualified for refugee status due to changed circumstances in Vietnam. The appellant contested this conclusion, arguing that his refugee status should continue to be recognised unless the cessation provisions in the Refugee Convention applied to him. He also contended that he feared persecution on grounds independent of those relied on for his initial recognition as a refugee.

The legal issues in this case revolved around whether the appellant's refugee status remained valid under the Refugee Convention and whether he faced persecution if returned to Vietnam. The central issue was whether the cessation clause in Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention applied to the appellant, given the changes in Vietnam's policies and attitudes towards him. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the appellant's fears of persecution in Vietnam, based on his political opinion, membership of certain social groups, and criminal convictions, were valid. The Federal Magistrate found that the Tribunal's decision was correct, and the appeal was dismissed.

The court held that the Tribunal had correctly determined that the appellant's refugee status had ceased to exist due to changed circumstances in Vietnam. The Tribunal's reasoning focused on the significant changes in Vietnam's policies and attitudes towards the appellant, such as his ability to travel freely in and out of the country without punishment. The court agreed that these changes indicated a departure from the circumstances that originally led to the appellant's recognition as a refugee. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the Tribunal's decision was affirmed. The Federal Magistrate also noted that the appellant's fears of persecution in Vietnam, while distressing, did not alter the fact that his refugee status had ceased to exist.

In summary, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Tribunal's findings that the appellant's refugee status had ceased to exist due to changed circumstances in Vietnam were affirmed. The court further held that the appellant's fears of persecution in Vietnam, though concerning, did not impact the conclusion that his refugee status had ended. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Refugee Review Tribunal be joined as a respondent to this appeal.

2. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from the judgment of Federal Magistrate Lloyd-Jones in which his Honour dismissed an application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. In a decision made on 30 July 2004 the Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent refusing to grant the appellant a protection (Class XA) visa. In accordance with the judgment of the High Court in SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 215 ALR 162, the Tribunal will be joined as the second respondent to the appeal.BACKGROUND The background to the appellant’s application for a protection visa was set out by the Tribunal and repeated by the Federal Magistrate. The Tribunal’s account, which has not been challenged, is as follows:‘The Applicant, who was born in Vietnam in 1971, was taken from his homeland in 1985 by an older sibling. He was 14 at the time. He spent almost four years in UNHCR-administered refugee camps in the Philippines. He and his siblings were selected for resettlement under Australia’s refugee and humanitarian resettlement programme. He and his sibling would not have been subjected at that time to any case-by-case determination of refugee status. In those days, all Vietnamese asylum seekers were regarded en masse as prima facie refugees and offered by UNHCR for resettlement in third countries, in an arguably pragmatic exercise that ended in the late 1980s. Under what came to be known as the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), all asylum seekers who arrived in Hong Kong after 16 June 1988 and in other southeast Asian countries after 14 March 1989 were required to undergo case-by-case screening of their refugee claims. Meanwhile multilateral and bilateral negotiations were expedited to set up an Orderly Migration Program (ODP) for Vietnamese citizens. The ODP was aimed, in part, to discourage unauthorised departures in non-seaworthy boats, and to help bring the exodus from Vietnam into manageable order. A few years passed before Vietnam’s national and provincial authorities were all working in harmony on processing applicants for orderly departure.The Applicant arrived in Australia on 1 February 1989, “attached” to his older sibling’s travel document. He was 17 at the time. The Applicant did not become a citizen as a result of a number of complex circumstances, including alienation, lack of English, lack of parental guidance, and an unfortunate lapse into drug-related crime.The Applicant has three criminal convictions. He served his last sentence in 2001-2. Those convictions are relevant to his present application, but only in relation to his protection prospects in Vietnam.’ The Tribunal noted that when the appellant and his brother left Vietnam they did so illegally. According to the Tribunal:‘It is probable that they would have been punished by the authorities if caught in the attempt of departing, or if returned to Vietnam in the following four years, up until the time that the policy of Doi Moi was introduced, and the above-mentioned CPA took effect.’

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

STONE J
On 29 April 2004, the appellant lodged an application for a protection visa. The delegate of the first respondent refused this on 6 May 2004 and the appellant sought review before the Tribunal.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION Before the Tribunal the appellant argued that the Minister’s decision ought to be set aside for two reasons. First, the appellant submitted that his refugee status, recognised by Australia in 1989, ought to continue to be recognised unless the cessation provisions in the Convention applied to him. Secondly, the appellant claimed to fear persecution on grounds independent of those relied on for his initial recognition as a refugee. The latter, sur place, claims were that the appellant faced persecution in Vietnam for his perceived political opinion and membership of two social groups, namely convicted drug offenders and Vietnamese returnees. More specifically, the appellant claimed to fear persecution as a result of his association with family members who had left Vietnam and remained in exile, and because on returning to Vietnam he would be perceived as an Australian spy. The appellant also claimed that he would be required to pay a prohibitive bribe in order to obtain documents necessary to live in Vietnam, since the authorities demanded higher bribes from returnees from Western countries. Finally the appellant claimed that he may face gaol in Vietnam because of the crimes he had committed (and been imprisoned for) in Australia. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant is a national of Vietnam and a citizen of that country. It also accepted, ‘for the purposes of this decision’, that the appellant was recognised as a refugee in or around 1989 on the basis that he was ‘a person who arrived in a relevant country of first asylum before 14 March 1989 who had fled the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’. The Tribunal held that the appellant remained a refugee (and thus entitled to Australian protection) unless one of the cessation clauses in the Refugee Convention, relevantly Article 1C(5), applied. Article 1C(5) provides that the Convention will cease to apply to a person if:‘(5)He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality;’ Although the Tribunal noted that it had not examined the fine print of the appellant’s ‘Australian Refugee Settlement Program Application for Refugee Settlement’, which was a document that the appellant claimed contained a decision of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs certifying him as a refugee, it accepted that ‘some reference to Vietnam’s status as a “Communist” country was made’. On this basis, the appellant argued that since the whole of Vietnam is still ruled by the same political party as in 1975, there had been no change of circumstances so as to invoke Article 1C(5). In considering the application of Article 1C(5) the Tribunal made the following statement:‘The Tribunal notes that the whole of Vietnam is still ruled by the same political party as has ruled it since 1975, but considers it superficial to assume that this should be the only factor to take into account in the present case, particularly since the Applicant, whilst still a national of Vietnam not only voluntarily returned to Vietnam in 1991, 1992 and 1994, but more importantly was permitted to re-enter Vietnam. This in itself is very strong evidence of significant change of circumstances. The Applicant would very probably have been punished had he returned to Vietnam prior to 1989, particularly if he were unable to argue that he had only been a child, at the time of his departure, who was led away by someone else. He was not punished in 1991, 1992 and 1995 and, in the greatest contrast with what would have been the state of affairs back in 1985, when he was taken out of Vietnam, he was permitted unconditionally to travel abroad again in 1992, 1993 and 1995.These facts cannot escape being taken into account. They indicate very strongly that, at least as of the early 1990s, the “Communist” government did not have the same attitude to the Applicant, or to people of similar status, as it had towards them in 1985. It may well have been persuaded to change its attitude based on pragmatism, but it changed them and those changes evidently still obtain [sic]. On this basis alone, the fact that the party in government in Vietnam retains the same name it had back in the 1970s and 1980s is somewhat superficial; there is evidence of a change in its policies and, at least in relation to the free movement of its citizens, there has been plenty of time to observe their consolidation.’

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: STONE J