SZEEG v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZEEG & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION [2005] FMCA 140
MIGRATION – RRT decision – Bangladeshi changed claim of party affiliation – no procedural unfairness when questioned – no other error found.

Migration Act1958 (Cth), ss.422B, 483A, 425, Part 8
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B

Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510
Durairajasingham v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 50 ALD 469
Meadows v Minister for Immigration (1998) 90 FCR 370
NAQF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 130 FCR 456
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S154 (2003) 201 ALR 437
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82
WACO v The Minister for Immigration (2003) 131 FCR 511

Applicants: SZEEG, SZEEH, SZEEI, SZEEJ & SZEEK
Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
File No: SYG 2537 of 2004
Delivered on: 7 February 2005
Delivered at: Sydney
Hearing dates: 12 January, 7 February 2005
Judgment of: Smith FM

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicants: Mr S M Hegedus
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms S Koya
Solicitors for the Respondent: Phillips Fox

ORDERS

  1. Application dismissed.

  2. First and second applicants to pay the respondent's costs in the sum of $4875. 

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 2537 of 2004

SZEEG, SZEEH, SZEEI, SZEEJ & SZEEK

Applicants

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(revised from transcript)

  1. This is an application under section 483A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) seeking to set aside a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 17 June 2003 and handed down on 26 August 2003. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate refusing to grant protection visas to the applicants, who are a husband and wife and their children. Since their applications relied upon the claims of the husband, I shall refer to him as “the applicant”.

  2. The application to this Court was filed on 13 August 2004 and no explanation for the delay has been put forward to the Court.  However, since I have decided that the application fails on its merits, there is no need for me to consider whether I would have refused relief due to unwarranted delay in seeking judicial review. 

  3. The jurisdiction of the Court under section 483A is "the same jurisdiction as the Federal Court in relation to a matter arising under this Act", and in the present circumstances that jurisdiction is the Federal Court's general jurisdiction under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) but subject to limitations under Part 8 of the Migration Act. As interpreted in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 and subsequent cases, those limitations require the Court to identify jurisdictional error vitiating the Tribunal’s decision before the Court has power to set aside the decision and remit the matter back for further hearing. The Court has no power…

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Details
Case
[2005] FMCA 140
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was an appeal by Szeeg against a decision of the Tribunal that he did not qualify for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958. The Tribunal found that Szeeg did not have a genuine fear of persecution in Bangladesh, and therefore, he was not a refugee. Szeeg's application for review of the Tribunal's decision was heard by the court. The court examined whether the Tribunal's decision was correct and if the appeal should be upheld.

The court considered whether Szeeg had a genuine fear of persecution if he were to return to Bangladesh. The Tribunal had found that Szeeg had some local prominence in the past but had not provided credible evidence that his old opponents would seek him out in other parts of the country. The court had to decide whether the Tribunal's finding that Szeeg did not have a well-founded fear of persecution was correct.

The court found that the Tribunal's decision was based on credible evidence and reasoning. The court noted that Szeeg had ample time to obtain a transcript of the Tribunal's hearing but failed to do so. The court also found that Szeeg's change of political affiliation and his explanation for it were not credible. The court held that Szeeg did not have a well-founded fear of persecution and dismissed the appeal. The court ordered Szeeg to pay the respondent's costs.

The court dismissed Szeeg's application for review of the Tribunal's decision and ordered Szeeg to pay the respondent's costs in the sum of $4875.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Application dismissed.

2.

First and second applicants to pay the respondent's costs in the sum of $4875.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal concluded:In short, the applicant might have had some local prominence in part of Dhaka and part of Khulna division but that was many years ago and there is no credible reason to suppose that old opponents would bother to seek him other than in those old haunts, which leaves him the rest of the country in which to relocate if he fears trouble from his past – he can relocate safe in the knowledge that his party is in government, which confers significant benefits in Bangladesh, and he would in any event enjoy the protection of the courts if trouble arose.The reasons set out above lead me to conclude that the applicant did not and does not have a genuine fear of persecution and that he had no well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the Convention. Accordingly, I am satisfied that he is not a refugee.CONCLUSIONHaving considered the evidence as a whole, Tribunal is not satisfied that the first named applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Therefore the first named applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a) of the Act for a protection visa. As I have indicated above, the applicant filed an application for review of the Tribunal's decision in August 2004. His application listed six general grounds for review without any particulars. Counsel appearing for the applicant today has accepted that to the extent that any of them are pressed, they are encompassed by grounds pleaded in subsequent amended applications which I shall refer to. It is therefore not necessary for me to address any of the originally pleaded grounds. The matter came on for a first hearing on 31 August 2004. The applicant was directed to file and serve an amended application by 22 October, given a hearing date on 12 January 2005, and directed to file a written submission 14 days in advance. The applicant did file an amended application on 19 October 2004, and on a previous occasion the applicant's counsel informed me that the applicant was assisted by him in drawing up that document. It appears that counsel's brief then came to an end. The applicant then had opportunity to get advice from a member of the funded legal advice scheme. On 6 January 2005 the applicant's present counsel informed the Court during the vacation that he had recently received instructions to appear at the hearing, but he considered that a transcript was needed of the Tribunal’s hearing and sought an adjournment. I entertained that adjournment application at the start of the hearing on 12 January 2005 and refused the adjournment. I gave reasons at the time which can be revised and provided to the parties if they are ever required. Briefly, I considered that the applicant had had ample time to obtain a transcript of a tape which it appeared that he had had in his possession for a long time. Counsel too had had opportunity to listen to the tape but told me that he had not done so. No ground of application was put forward on instructions as requiring an examination of the tape, except a natural justice argument concerning the Tribunal's finding that the applicant's change of political affiliation and his explanation for it were not credible.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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