SZCNZ v Minister for Immigration
[2006] FMCA 318
•3 April 2006
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZCNZ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2006] FMCA 318 |
| MIGRATION – Review of the Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a protection visa – failure to give written notice to the applicant of determinative information – breach of s.424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). |
| Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.91X, 483A |
| Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2 SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471 WACW v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 155 |
| Applicant: | SZCNZ |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG174 of 2004 |
| Judgment of: | Lloyd-Jones FM |
| Hearing date: | 1 March 2006 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 3 April 2006 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr J Smith |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Blake Dawson Waldron Lawyers |
ORDERS
The Refugee Review Tribunal is joined as the second respondent.
A writ of certiorari be issued quashing the decision of the second respondent made on 27 November 2003 and handed down on
22 December 2003.
A writ of prohibition be issued directed to the first respondent prohibiting her from acting upon or giving effect to or proceeding upon the decision of the second respondent on 27 November 2003 and handed down on 22 December 2003.
A writ of mandamus be issued requiring the second respondent to determine the applicant’s application for a protection visa according to law.
There will be no order as to costs.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG174 of 2004
| SZCNZ |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The Proceedings
These proceedings were commenced by an application under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), invoking s.483A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). The application was filed in the Sydney Registry of the Federal Magistrates Court on 22 January 2004 for a judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The Tribunal decision was made on 27 November 2003 and handed down on 22 December 2003, affirming the decision of the delegate of the respondent (“the delegate”) made on 6 December 2002 to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) Visa. The applicant seeks relief against the decision of the Tribunal.
The applicant in these proceedings is not to be identified pursuant to s.91X of the Act and has been granted the pseudonyms “SZCNZ”.
The applicant has not sought to join the Tribunal as a party, however given that it is an exercise of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction that is under review, I will make the appropriate order that the Tribunal is joined as a party: SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 (“SAAP”) at [43], [91], [153] and [180].
Background
The Tribunal decision contains a summary of the applicant’s background which states the following. The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, arrived in Australia on 31 August 2002. On 18 September 2002, he lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) Visa with the Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs under the Act. On 6 December 2002, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant a protection visa and on 30 December 2002, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision (CB 60).
The applicant was born in 1962. He stated in his visa application that he was a businessman but at the Tribunal hearing claimed that he was “a worker”. The applicant claimed that he was fired from Zhengzhou cigarette factory in September 1998. He claimed that he worked there for over 18 years and because of ‘system’/economic reforms he was discharged. On 3 January 1999, he organised 39 other unemployed people from his former factory into a procession. They gathered in front of the factory. The applicant claimed he was promised his job back but nothing happened. On 4 January, police came to his home and arrested him for anti-government activities. He claimed he was detained for two and a half months in the Zhengzhou Public Security Bureau. On promising the authorities that he would not organise any more protests, he was released (CB 62-63).
In May 2000, he planned to establish the Henan Unemployed Alliance (“HUA”), which had a membership of unemployed workers. It came into being in August 2000 and he was Deputy Chairman. He claimed the organisation had a membership of 48 people and was divided into three groups; he was in charge of one. On 21 May 2002, he decided to reorganise the structure of the organisation and so met with three key members. They decided to rename the group the Henan Workers Pioneer (“HWP”). On 1 July 2002, he organised the last activity for the HWP and delivered hundreds of copies of a petition in a procession (CB 63).
The tribunal’s findings and reasons
The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s claims to be truthful. It found that the application, and oral evidence given by the applicant at the Tribunal hearing, was general and conflicted and that the claims were not factually based. On this basis, the Tribunal found there was no basis for his claim of a genuine fear of persecution for a Convention reason.
Application for review of the tribunal’s decision
On 22 January 2004, the applicant filed an application for review in this Court setting out the following grounds:
1.There was an error of law in the Tribunal’s decision constituting a jurisdictional error;
2.There was procedural error in the Tribunal’s decision constituting an absence of natural justice.
Particulars
a)Ms G Hoeben, constituting the respondent, failed to fairly, carefully and responsibly consider my claims.
b)Particularly, during the hearing, Ms G Hoeben, constituting the respondent, has never ever clearly informed me, or indicated me, or asked me that she wanted some details regarding to my claims; instead, she just simply summarised my claims at the beginning of the hearing; and did not allow me to provide any detailed information; and also many times interrupted my claims.
c)It is obviously unfair to refuse my application mainly for the reason that my claims is vague and incomplete.
d)I never ever belief that Ms G Hoeben, constituting the respondent, has sought correct and proper Independent Country Information (ICI) to consider my claims because:
i) the latest ICI document was dated around 1998, and most of ICI document was in 1994;
ii) No ICI document has been referred since 1998.
I have found that it is extremely unfair to refuse my application simply relied on or based on those ICI documents which obviously cannot demonstrate current situation in China.
(e)As a matter of fact, Ms G Hoeben, constituting the respondent, failed to provide me complete ICI documents before, during and after the hearing. She failed to provide me a chance to consider and comment the ICI documents.
(f)The significant mistake in the refusal decision is that:
i) Ms G Hoeben, constituting the respondent, believed that my passport was a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) passport after she carefully checked my passport during the hearing. However, my passport is obviously not a MFA one!
ii) it is significant evidence to demonstrate that Ms G Hoeben, constituting the respondent, even does not have basic knowledge about the Chinese passport. How is she qualified to be a member of Refugee Review Tribunal? How is she able to make a correct, fair and careful assessment on my application?
g)Ms G Hoeben, constituting the respondent, failed to assess my claims according to ss.91R(1) and (2) of the Act.
i) I am facing a serious threat to my life and liberty. I have been subjected to detention for two and half month. I have been tortured by the policemen and also by those criminals who detained together with us. I have been regarded as a political dissident who had strong dissident opinions against the government. I have been dismissed and totally lost my basis human rights since then.
ii) I have been subjected to significant physical harassment and ill-treatment.
iii) I have been subjected to denial of capacity to earn a livelihood in my home country.
h)Ms G Hoeben, constituting the respondent, failed to carefully and fairly consider my claims based on procedures and criteria prescribed in Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (“UNHCR Handbook”).
i) I have been guided by paragraph 190, Part II, UNHCR Handbook that a qualified examiner should have necessary knowledge and experience, and an understanding of an applicant’s particular difficulties and needs. Especially, an applicant for refugee status is normally in a particularly vulnerable situation. He finds himself in an alien environment and may experience serious difficulties, technical and psychological, in submitting his case to the authorities of a foreign country, often in a language not his own.
Ms G Hoeben, constituting the respondent, failed to demonstrate its necessary knowledge and experience and such an understanding.
ii) I have been guided by paragraph 196, Part II, UNHCR Handbook, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner. It may be for the examiner to use all the means at his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the application. Also, if the applicant’s account appears credible, he should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt.
Ms G Hoeben, constituting the respondent, failed to use all the means at its disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the application. Also, the Tribunal failed to demonstrate that there are good reasons to the contrary.
iii) I have been guided by paragraph 42, Part I, UNHCR Handbook, the applicant’s statements cannot, however, be considered in the abstract, and must be viewed in the context of the relevant background situation.
Ms G Hoeben, constituting the respondent, failed to consider the applicant’s statements in the context of the relevant background situation. Especially, the Tribunal failed to demonstrate its sound knowledge of conditions in the applicant’s country of origin.
iv) I have been guided by paragraph 53, Part II, UNHCR Handbook, the various elements involved may, if taken together, produce an effect on the mind of the applicant that can reasonably justify a claim to well-founded fear of persecution on “cumulative grounds”.
Ms G Hoeben, constituting the respondent, failed to give weight to the fact that various sufferings and experiences of the applicant in China, if taken together, must produce a strong effect on his mind that can reasonably justify his claim to well-founded fear of persecution on cumulative ground.
i) In conclusion, I have never ever believed that Ms G Hoeben, constituting the respondent, has made a fair decision on my application.
The law
The present application is affected by the privative clause contained in s.474 of the Act. The High Court in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2 and Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicants S134/2002 [2003] HCA 1, held in broad terms that the privative clause does not protect Tribunal decisions that are affected by jurisdictional error or bad faith: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia at [76] and Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicants S134/2002 at [15].
An administrative tribunal exceeds its powers and thus commits a jurisdictional error if it identifies a wrong issue, asks a wrong question, ignores relevant material, relies on irrelevant material or, in some circumstances, makes an erroneous finding or reaches a mistake and conclusion in the way that affects the exercise or purported exercise of the tribunal’s power: Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [179] and Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26.
Reasons
The applicant appeared as a self-represented litigant with the aid of a Mandarin interpreter. He attended a directions hearing on 14 May 2004, where he was offered the opportunity to participate in the Court’s “RRT Legal Advice Scheme”. He was subsequently appointed a panel advisor. At the same directions hearing, the applicant consented to short minutes of order which included the filing and serving of an amended application and any evidence which he proposed to rely upon at the hearing. The applicant apparently elected to rely upon his original pleadings. He did not file any amendments or affidavit evidence, nor were written submissions filed and served prior to the hearing.
When the applicant was invited to make oral submissions, he made three brief points. The first concerned his passport. The second that the independent country information referred to by the Tribunal member was outdated. Thirdly, he referred to another case considered by the Tribunal, which was substantially the same as his own. However, in that case the applicant was successful in his application for judicial review.
The Tribunal referred to the applicant’s passport in its decision under the heading “Claims and Evidence” where it made the following observation:
Independent country information (ICI) indicate that there are two types of passports are issued, namely, the MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and PSB (Public Security Bureau) (1192, DFAT, CX11486) (1998, CHN13262, page 4). The Tribunal has noted that the applicant has an MFA passport and from this it has inferred that the applicant has sponsored the government. The PSB passport is issued to ordinary citizens and private students. The MFA passport (also known as the official or public affairs passports) is issued to those travelling overseas in an official capacity. A 1998 source quoted the MFA as stating that:
…public affairs passports are issued only to government officials and employees of state owned enterprises who travel abroad on official business. The application must be approved by the relevant department of MFA. Passports must be returned within 15 days of return to China, unless the holder expects to travel again soon. When travelling in a delegation, passports will be collected and controlled by one person. The same procedure applies to service passports, which are only issued to more senior persons (NFI)”. (CX27863).
It was considered unlikely that an official would risk processing the exit documents of a high profile dissidents, and face the serious consequences (1994, CX199980). (CB 63)
The applicant repeated to me the evidence he had given to the Tribunal: that a friend obtained his passport for him. He did not know how this person obtained the passport, but knew that he worked for the government. The applicant submitted that the Tribunal was wrong in the inferences it had drawn, that the applicant was not a worker as he claimed, when he was travelling on a MFA passport. I will return to this issue later.
The applicant claimed that the independent country information relied on by the Tribunal member was outdated and could not be relied upon. Yet he did not tender any evidence in support of this claim. Similarly, the applicant did not provide this Court with a name or file number, identifying the case that he claimed was identical to the circumstances of his claim, which had achieved a beneficial outcome for that applicant on judicial review. The applicant did not provide any further evidence in respect of this contention.
Mr Smith, counsel for the respondent, filed written submissions responding to each of the claims made in the original application. The applicant claimed that there was an error of law and he was denied natural justice. These were particularised in nine separate paragraphs.
Mr Smith submitted that the first two particulars went together and that these particulars rely on factual assertions in respect of which there is no evidence other than that which is contained in the Court Book. The Tribunal’s summary of what occurred at the Tribunal hearing does not support the applicant’s factual assertions.
The Tribunal decision records (CB 64.5) that the member first summarised the applicant’s claims as alleged in his application. The member then asked the applicant if he wished to say anything else about his claim. It is then set out in the Tribunal’s “Findings and Reasons” what the applicant stated in response. The applicant then asked for and was granted an adjournment, the first of a number that occurred during the hearing.
The Tribunal asked a number of questions of the applicant in order to obtain details about his factual claims. It also did so to put to the applicant various country information, which it considered adverse to his application. The applicant’s advisor also made submissions during the hearing. I accept Mr Smith’s submission that on this evidence alone, it cannot be established that the Tribunal did not allow the applicant a reasonable opportunity to present his case or, specifically, that the applicant was interrupted many times during the hearing.
The third particular of the original application asserts that it is unfair to refuse the application because of the vagueness or incompleteness of the applicant’s claims. Mr Smith submitted that it was a matter for the applicant to put forward each claim and the evidence in order to support his Tribunal application. It was then the Tribunal’s task to determine whether, on that material, it was satisfied that the applicant has met the criteria for the grant of a visa. This involved, in the first instance, an assessment of the evidence and a determination of whether or not the Tribunal accepted his actual claims. I accept Mr Smith’s submission that this is the quintessential task of the Tribunal and it is not for this Court to review its findings of fact in the course of that task.
The third particular is no more than an attack on the merits of the Tribunal’s factual conclusions.
The fourth particular asserts that the Tribunal ought not to have relied upon the country information that it referred to in its decision. I agree with Mr Smith’s submission that the question of whether country information relied upon by the Tribunal is accurate or not is a matter for the Tribunal and not for this Court. If this Court were to make its own assessment of the truth of certain country information, it would be engaging in merits review. A Court does not have the power to do so: NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10, per Grey, Tamberlin and Lander JJ at [11]. In SZANK v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1478, Hely J followed NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs and found that it was a matter for the Tribunal to decide what weight should be given to country information as part of its fact finding function. His Honour also found that the question of the accuracy of country information and its relevance to a person in the position of the appellant is one for the Tribunal not the Court. A subsequent special leave application to the High Court in respect of that decision was refused.
The fifth particular alleges that the Tribunal did not provide the applicant with complete country information documentation before, during or after the hearing. It therefore failed to provide him a chance to consider and comment on the documents. I accept Mr Smith’s submission that there was no obligation on the Tribunal to provide the applicant with complete country information. To the extent that the Tribunal is obliged to provide the applicant with any information which is adverse to his interests, that is dealt with in s.424A of the Act. The country information relied upon by the Tribunal however, was not information about the applicant, and so fell within the exception found in s.424A(3)(a) of the Act. Consequently, there was no obligation on the Tribunal to provide the country information it relied upon to the applicant for comment.
The sixth particular alleges that the Tribunal made a mistake in finding that the applicant’s passport was a Ministry of Foreign Affairs passport rather than one issued to ordinary citizens. I accept Mr Smith’s submission that this particular only raises a question of fact which goes to the merits of the Tribunal decision and not the function of this Court. Without pursuing this matter further, it may be noted that the passport specifically states, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China requests all civil and military authorities of foreign countries…” (CB 26). This was sufficient basis for the Tribunal to conclude that the passport was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The seventh particular asserts that the Tribunal failed to assess the applicant’s claim in accordance with s.91R(1) and (2) of the Act. I accept Mr Smith’s submission that this ground is misconceived. The Tribunal in fact rejected all factual claims made by the applicant. There was nothing which the Tribunal could have been satisfied with that any treatment suffered by the applicant in the future could amount to persecution within the meaning of the Convention as understood in light of s.91R of the Act.
The eighth particular asserts that the Tribunal erred in failing to follow the procedures set out in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook’s “Procedure and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status”. I accept Mr Smith’s submission that the Handbook is meant only for the guidance of government officials concerned with determination of refugee status in various contracting States (Item VII of the foreword of the handbook). It has no force of law in Australia. Failure to follow the procedures set out in it, even if established, does not give rise to any transgression of the law and consequently does not result in any error of law or jurisdictional error: WACW v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 155, per Gray, R D Nicholson and Emmett JJ at [17].
The ninth particular does not raise any claim and does not require to be addressed.
Mr Smith submitted that there was one further matter not addressed in the written submissions, but was now significant in the light of the recent Full Court decision of SZEEU v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 2 (“SZEEU”). In the Tribunal’s reasons, it referred to information contained in the protection visa application. That information is:
a)There have been no details which would shed light upon the assertion that the applicant was ever employed in a factory in the capacity as a worker. Indeed, the applicant by himself indicated that he is not a worker, but a businessman. (CB 68.1)
b)There is also still the unanswered question as to how it was the applicant resided at the same address for over 10 years prior to his departure for Australia but did not attract the adverse attention of authorities in the last three to four years, despite his alleged 1 July 2002 activities. (CB 68.5)
c)The Tribunal noted the applicant’s explanation for delay in submitting his application but did not consider this to be reasonable if, indeed, the applicant was in fear of persecution for a Convention related reason as alleged. (CB 69.2)
Prior to SZEEU, in order to determine whether there was an obligation imposed upon the Tribunal by s.424A, this Court would have to determine whether those pieces of information were a significant and essential part of the Tribunal’s reasons: VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471 (“VAF”). In SZEEU, Their Honours, Weinberg and Allsop JJ found that was no longer the correct test. His Honour Moore J, declined to overrule the test.
Mr Smith made two submissions in respect of SZEEU. The first was that this Court ought to still apply the reasoning in VAF. Mr Smith took the Court to passages extracted from SZEEU, referring to Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396 (“Paul”) and VAF.
Mr Smith argued that Moore J was correct in his approach because the High Court did not address the issue in question in SAAP. Namely “what is the reason or a part of the reason?” Further the extracts from the judgments in Paul and VAF show that the analyses by the Full Federal Court in those cases did not in fact import the notion of natural justice other than by way of employing a purposive analysis of those provisions. Mr Smith argued that the approach of the Full Federal Court in both Paul and VAF is consistent with the approach of the majority of the High Court in SAAP.
The second submission made by Mr Smith was that even if there was an obligation under s.424A, because the three pieces of information set out above were a part of the reasons for the decision, relief ought to be refused as a matter of discretion. This was because there was an alternative and independent reason for which the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review. It was submitted that SZEEU is authority now for the proposition that if there is an independent basis for the Tribunal’s reasons or decision, even if there is a breach of s.424A, relief may be refused on a discretionary basis.
This requires examination of the Tribunal’s reasons to determine whether there was in fact an independent basis for the decision. Mr Smith contended that the crux of the Tribunal’s reasons can be found at CB 69. Leading up to that page, there was reference to information from the protection visa application. The Tribunal, at the first critical passage at CB 69.3, referred to the oral evidence given by the applicant:
The Tribunal has noted the general and vague answers the applicant gave in relation to the HUA (HWP) and his activities in relation to it.
Mr Smith contended that on that basis, even if the Tribunal did accept the HUA existed, the applicant did not play a significant role in it. If he did play a role in the organisation, it was only in a limited capacity and not sufficient to attract the adverse attention of the authorities. The applicant claims to be a refugee because of his involvement with that group and the activities undertaken as part of his involvement, resulted in adverse attention from the authorities.It is argued that the Tribunal rejected that. It can be seen from the decision that its finding has nothing to do with any information contained in the protection visa application, but rather relating to matters which the applicant raised in his evidence.
Mr Smith also contended that the Tribunal did in turn reject all of the factual claims. The bases given were the generality and conflict in both the application and the oral evidence. The oral evidence, compared with the independent country information before the Tribunal, lacked in detail and substance. Mr Smith submitted that the vagueness of the evidence led the Tribunal, independent of any conflict with the protection visa application, to reject the essential or main integer of the applicant’s claim. It was not possible for the Tribunal to do anything but affirm the decision of the delegate.
Mr Smith conceded that there was indeed jurisdictional error, but relief ought to be refused on the grounds that there was an alternative basis independent of that jurisdictional error for the Tribunal’s decision.
As to the submission that I exercise my discretion, I am guided by Allsop J in SZEEU at [231]:
In SAAP McHugh J referred to the discussion by Gaudron J and Gummow J of the issue and relevant cases in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 at [57]-[62]. From that I take the following to be in accordance with principle. First, subject to what follows, if s 424A is not complied with, the Court does not engage in an enquiry as to whether the breach was so trivial as not to warrant relief. The failure to comply with the statutorily mandated provisions leads to the conclusion that there was a lack of statutory authority to make the decision. In the operation of s 424A and the principles of procedural fairness, adherence to mandated process and procedure is vital. Secondly, as a matter of discretion, relief will be withheld for reasons going to the conduct of the applicant as discussed in Aala and SAAP. No such considerations apply here. Thirdly, if it can be shown that there is a basis, otherwise unimpeached, upon which the decision was reached, unaffected by the failure to accord procedural fairness or to comply with the required statutory procedure, relief can be withheld.
I refer also to Weinberg J in SZEEU at [111]:
It is important to note that the majority went on to reject the contention that, in the absence of any actual unfairness being demonstrated, the court should refuse to grant relief in the exercise of its discretion. According to the majority, in the absence of factors such as delay, waiver, acquiescence or unclean hands (which their Honours acknowledged might be relevant to the exercise of judicial discretion), a breach of s 424A, whether it led to actual unfairness or not, would normally result in the Tribunal’s decision being set aside.
In the matter presently before this Court, I cannot be satisfied that the independent reason identified by Mr Smith is in fact totally independent and has not been infected to any degree by the information contained in the material, which was the subject of the operation of s.424A of the Act. In the circumstances, I decline to exercise the discretion requested.
Conclusion
The failure to comply with s.424A has not been shown to be entirely separate from the other elements of the decision because the issue of creditability pervades the whole of the Tribunal’s reasons. I am unable to discern a clear basis upon which the failure to follow s.424A had no possible effect on each element of the ultimate decision.
I order that a writ of certiorari be issued, quashing the decision of the Tribunal handed down on 22 December 2003. I further order a writ of mandamus be issued, requiring the Tribunal to reconsider the application before it according to law.
There will be no order as to costs. Since the applicant has represented himself, he has no entitlement to costs.
I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Lloyd-Jones FM.
Associate:
Date: 30 March 2006
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