SZAPY v Minister for Mmigration - [2005] FMCA 277

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZAPY & ORS v MINISTER FOR MMIGRATION

[2005] FMCA 277

MIGRATION – Visa – protection visa – Refugee Review Tribunal – application for review of decision of the RRT affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa – applicants are citizens of Sri Lanka – applicants are mother and two adult daughters.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s.475A

Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 179 CLR 510
Commissioner of ACT Revenue and Alpha One Pty Limited(1994) 49 FCR 576
Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] 86 FCR 47
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No.2) [2004] FCAFC 263
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs ex parte Durairajahsingham (2000) 168 ALR 407
Re Refugee Review Tribunal ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82
SFGB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 231
SZAFJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 291
W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 185 ALR 703

First Applicant:

SZAPY

Second Applicant:

SZAPZ

Third Applicant:

SZAQA

Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

File Number:

SYG 864 of 2003

Judgment of:

Scarlett FM

Hearing date:

28 April 2004

Date of Last Submission:

28 April 2004

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

25 February 2005

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Ms Tucker

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr Reilly

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

That a Writ of Certiorari issue quashing a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 31 March 2003 and handed down on

23 April 2003.
That a Writ of Mandamus issue requiring the Refugee Review Tribunal to redetermine the matter according to law.
Time to lodge an appeal is not to run until the publication of written reasons for decision.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 864 of 2003

SZAPY

First Applicant

And

SZAPZ

Second Applicant

And

SZAQA

Third Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Application

This is an application for review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 31 March 2003 and handed down on 23 April 2003. The decision of the Tribunal was to affirm a decision by a delegate of the Minister not to grant Protection Visas to the three applicants.
By means of an amended application filed on 22 April 2004 the applicants seek orders as follows:
i)A Writ of Certiorari quashing the decision.
ii)A Writ of Mandamus compelling the respondent to re-hear and redetermine the matter according to law.
iii)An order that a Writ of Prohibition be directed to the first respondent prohibiting her from acting upon giving effect to or proceeding further upon the decision refused to grant a Protection Visa to the applicant.
The grounds of the application are these:
i)That the Tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction in its determination as to the credibility of the applicant. The applicant was denied procedural fairness in this matter and such denial may have affected the outcome of the Tribunal process.
ii)The Tribunal made findings of fact in the absence of evidence or contrary to the evidence before it such as to constitute jurisdictional error.
iii)The Tribunal’s conduct of this matter was such as to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Tribunal.
The applicants provided particulars of those grounds which I shall deal with shortly.
The background to this matter are that the applicants are a mother and her two adult daughters from Sri Lanka. The mother was born on

11 February 1950 and the two daughters were born on 28 November 1979 and the 30 April 1981. They are of Tamil ethnicity. The applicants arrived in Australia on 18 November 2000. On

20 December 2000 they lodged application for Protection Visas.
In her application, applicant SZAPY, the elder of the two daughters and the primary applicant so far as these proceedings are concerned, described how she was taken into custody on the 8 June 2000 and accused of being a member of the LTTE, an organisation which supports a Tamil militant group called the Tamil Tigers. She said that the authorities had found her name in the diary of a tutor who had tutored her who was a supporter of the LTTE and who had persuaded her to distribute some pamphlets at some time.
She said that whilst she was in custody by members of the army, that she was punched and kicked and one soldier tried to molest her sexually. She described as being forcibly undressed at gunpoint. She was later released and sought medical advice.
The applicant also described experiencing anti-Tamil riots by Singhalese mobs in the past, including hearing screaming and crying of a Tamil family who were burnt alive. She said that the authorities did not protect them.
The applicant described increasing harassment and verbal abuse by Singhalese thugs after their father died in April 200. The family had been living in Colombo and the applicant said that they did not wish to relocate up north, to the Jatma area because she and her sister feared that they would be forcibly inducted into the LTTE. The family asked the mother’s sister, who lives in Australia, to sponsor them and they left Sri Lanka on 6 November 2000.
Applicant SZAPZ expressed similar fears. She did not complain of the same incident that the sister complained of but she did describe episodes of harassment and assault. She stated that the authorities would not help her because she belongs to the Tamil race.
On 30 October 2001 a delegate of the Minister refused the applicant’s application for Protection Visas. The applicant sought a review by the Refugee Review Tribunal and a hearing took place on 4 February 2003. The applicants, through their immigration consultant, submitted a written submission to the Refugee Review Tribunal. The applicants attended the hearing and gave oral evidence. Applicant SZAPY told the Tribunal that she had in fact been raped when she was taken into custody. The applicant’s mother gave evidence of seeing bruises on her daughter and taking her to a doctor.
On 19 February 2003 the applicants made a further written submission to the Tribunal. The Tribunal made its decision on 31 March and handed down that decision on 23 April 2003. The Refugee Review Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant Protection Visas. The Tribunal’s reasons are set out on pages 201 to 203 of the Court Book.
On page 201 the Tribunal says:
The Tribunal considers that aspects of the applicant’s claim as to how the authorities came to believe that she had an association with the LTTE are implausible.
At about point five on the page the Tribunal says:
Further, the Tribunal considers it implausible that he - - -
Meaning the tutor:
- - - would discuss the LTTE with her during tuition and that she felt pressured by him to join the LTTE but that she never raised this matter with her parents such that the mother claimed to have no idea that he had any association with the LTTE.
The Tribunal also considered it to be implausible that the parents would allow a person into the family home over such an extended period of time while knowing so little about the person and making contact with them through a post office box number only.
The Tribunal considered that the modus operandi of the main applicant, that is SZAPY, following her claimed arrest and the timing of the applicant’s departure from Sri Lanka, belies the applicant’s claim that they fled Sri Lanka out of fear of persecution because the main applicant was detained and raped by the authorities and feared

re-arrest.
The Tribunal notes that the applicant claims that she was detained on the 8 June 2000 and released on 9 June. Following her release the applicant went to stay with a Singhalese friend but continued to attend classes and in August 2000 sat her exams. On 24 August 2000 she applied for a visa to Australia which was granted on 25 August 2000. The applicant mother sold the family home on 1 November 2000. The applicants departed Sri Lanka on 6 November 2000 and spent some ten days in Singapore before arriving in Australia on 18 November 2000.
At page 202 of the Court Book the Tribunal goes on to say:
The Tribunal considers it to be incongruent that a person traumatised by rape and fearing re-arrest and further assault such that she considered that her safety can only be guaranteed by fleeing the country takes so few immediate steps to guarantee her safety and maintains a relatively normal lifestyle. The Tribunal is unconvinced by the applicant mother’s claim that they delayed departure because they needed to sell the family home in order to pay for tickets to Australia. The Tribunal notes that the applicants have an aunt living in Singapore whom they have previously visited. The points outlined above, considered collectively, lead the Tribunal to reject the main applicant’s claim that she was detained in June 2000 and raped as she was suspected of LTTE association. Further, the applicant departed Sri Lanka legally on a passport issued in her own name without difficulty.
At page 203, at about point five, the Tribunal said:
The Tribunal considers it to be incongruent that the applicant claims to fear pressure to join the LTTE such that she cannot return to her country but in the four years in which she is tutored by this person in her own name, in her own home, she does not at any time raise with her parents the fact that this pressure is being applied to her while she is receiving tutoring or make any attempt to dispense with his services. The Tribunal accepts that the applicants may have been subject to harassment from some Singhalese youths in the area in terms of verbal abuse. However, the Tribunal does not accept that this harassment is of a type or a degree that amounts to persecution as required by s 91A of the Migration Act.
Counsel for the applicant, Ms Tucker, submitted that the Tribunal was required to afford the applicant procedural fairness in its review of her application. She says the applicant was denied procedural fairness in this matter and such denial may have affected the outcome of the Tribunal process.
In the application it will be recalled that there were three grounds:
i)The Tribunal acting beyond its jurisdiction in its determination as to the applicant’s credibility.
ii)The Tribunal’s findings in relation to the evidence of the applicant and the applicant’s mother were contrary to the evidence. The Tribunal made findings of fact in the absence of evidence or contrary to the evidence before it such as to constitute jurisdictional error.
iii)The Tribunal’s conduct of this matter was such as to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Tribunal.
Dealing with those three grounds. First of all, dealing with the credibility issue. The particulars are that the Tribunal found against the applicant in relation to her evidence concerning her tutor and her delay in leaving Sri Lanka. The Tribunal’s concerns with these issues were not put to the applicant in the hearing, nor were they concerns that would have necessarily been apparent to the applicant in the course of the hearing such that she would have been on notice to address these issues.
Ms Tucker submitted that the Tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction in its determination as to the applicant’s credibility.
The Tribunal found against her in relation to her evidence concerning her tutor and her delay in leaving Sri Lanka.
The Tribunal’s concerns with these issues were not put to the applicant on the hearing. She went on to say:
The Tribunal made findings of fact in the absence of evidence or contrary to the evidence before it such as to constitute jurisdictional error.
She submitted that the errors and mis-statements in relation to the applicant’s evidence and country information in the Tribunal’s decision with combination with its failure to afford the applicant procedural fairness at the hearing demonstrated an apprehended bias in the Tribunal’s conduct of the matter.
As far as findings of fact in the absence of evidence or contrary to the evidence is concerned, it was submitted the grounds were the Tribunal’s findings in relation to the evidence of the applicant and the applicant’s mother were contrary to the evidence and that the Tribunal’s finding in relation to the country information was in the absence of evidence and contrary to the evidence.
The apprehension of bias was particularised as the Tribunal’s commission of numerous errors and mis-statements in relation to the applicant’s evidence and country information in combination with its failure to afford the applicant procedural fairness in the hearing, demonstrated the suspicion of bias in the Tribunal’s conduct in this matter in that selective consideration of the country information.
On the question of denial of procedural fairness; Ms Tucker submitted that the Tribunal found against the applicant on the basis of credibility yet did not identify the issues critical to this finding at the Tribunal hearing. She went on to say that at no stage in the hearing did the Tribunal indicate that it did not accept that the applicant had been detained and raped.
As the delegate to the Minister had accepted the applicant’s evidence on this point, there was nothing to indicate to the applicant that she needed to provide any further evidence in relation to this incident. The risk of an adverse credibility finding did not necessarily inhere in the issues to be decided and thus a specific warning of the risk should have been made to the applicant to allow her to express any such concerns held by the Tribunal member. I am referred to the decision in re Refugee Review Tribunal ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR, pp 82 at paragraph 101.
Ms Tucker submitted that as the Full Court stated in Commissioner of ACT Revenue and Alpha One Pty Limited (1994) 49 FCR 576:
The decision maker is required to advise of any adverse conclusion which has been arrived at which would not obviously be open on the known material.
The submission is the Tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction in its determination as to the applicant’s credibility. The submission also was made that the Tribunal was in error in representing the applicant’s evidence in relation to her and her parent’s knowledge if her tutor was accepted. Or, in the alternative, that this evidence was not an issue of concern to the Tribunal.
It was also submitted that the Tribunal was in error in representing that the applicant’s evidence concerning her attendance at college and subsequent to her attack did not give rise to any concern in the Tribunal’s assessment and whether the applicant had a fear of persecution.
The applicant concedes that the delegate of the Minister did rule against them on this point and she was thus on notice that this was an issue she needed to address in the hearing. She submits, however, that the approach taken by the Tribunal member was such that it indicated that the member did not share the concerns of the delegate.
The applicant submitted that such comments by the Tribunal member should be considered in the light of earlier comments of the Tribunal in relation to what was required to verify the applicant’s account and at no stage in the hearing did the Tribunal member indicate that she required further information to verify any other part of her claim.
The submission is that the comments or the lack of them didn’t indicate that the member doubted the credibility of the applicant’s core claim with regard to her detention and rape. The member did not ask any further questions of the applicant in relation to her attending school.
There is also a submission that there were findings in the answers that were contrary to the evidence. The submission was that findings made by the Tribunal contrary and critical to its decision as to the applicant’s credibility to its decision as to any future risk faced by the applicant were not open to it on the evidence before it, such as to constitute a jurisdictional error. I am referred to SFGB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 231.
The submission is that the Tribunal’s findings to credibility were based in part on its mis-stated evidence of the applicant and her mother. Those mis-statements, it is claimed are:
i)That the applicant did not tell her mother that her tutor had tried to force her to join the LTTE and submitted that the applicant and the mother both told the Tribunal that the applicant told the mother in March 2000 of this.
ii)
That the applicant’s mother said she was waiting until she sold the house before she bought the tickets to leave

Sri Lanka. The applicant’s mother did not say this. She told the Tribunal she had to wait for money from the sister in Australia to buy the tickets.
iii)That the friend with whom the applicant stayed after her attack organised to drive her to college each day. Whilst this was strictly true, it mis-represented the whole of the applicant’s evidence on this issue. The applicant explained that the friend with whom she stayed was attending classes with her and they would be driven to and from college each day.
It is also submitted that the Tribunal’s findings concerning country information were not supported by the evidence to which its statements had regard. In particular was the paragraph:
Most particularly the authorities are no longer addressing persons on the grounds of suspected association with the LTTE.
The evidence cited by the Tribunal, Ms Tucker points out, does not support this finding.
The combination of errors in the findings and the failure to afford the applicant procedural fairness could be such as to demonstrate to a reasonable person that the Tribunal did not bring an open mind to its consideration of the matters before it, thus there is claim of apprehended bias.
On behalf of the respondent, Mr Reilly of counsel, submitted that it was apparent that the applicant was unsuccessful because of the view the Tribunal took of the facts, in particular the findings that the applicant was not credible and the rejection of her most significant claim. He submitted that such findings are matters of fact for the Tribunal par excel lance. He referred to re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs ex parte Durairajasingham (2000 168 ALR 407:
So long as the Tribunal’s credibility findings were open to it, no error is demonstrated in such conclusions.
See Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR, file 47 and W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 185 ALR, 703. Mr Reilly also submitted that the applicant’s procedural fairness ground appears to be that the Tribunal did not put to the applicant its preliminary conclusions, including as to her credibility during a course of the hearing. This may be imposing the impossible task as the Tribunal may well not have formed any such conclusions during the hearing. See SZAFJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) FCA, 291, judgment of Tamberlin J. In any event, the submission is contrary to well-known authority. See Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 179 CLR 510, at [187]. The rules of procedural fairness do not in general require disclosure of the Tribunal’s thought processes or preliminary conclusions.
Turning to the applicant’s claims. I would comment that Mr Reilly’s submissions about credibility are a correct statement of the law. The ascertainment of credibility of a witness is a task for the Tribunal. The Court cannot substitute its own view, even if the reasoning appears wrong, as long as there is evidence to support the finding. The Tribunal’s finding that credibility of the applicant and to a lesser extent of the applicant’s mother, that finding being the behaviour was implausible, is based, I note, not upon the demeanour or the speech of the parties but on the description of the applicant’s post-rape actions.

As I said, it is not open to a Court to substitute its own view of the evidence, even in a situation where a Court with some experience of people who have suffered sexual assault, would take the view that the behaviour described by the applicant is not at all inconsistent with the behaviour of rape victims. As long as there is evidence upon which a finding of fact can be made, then it is up to the Tribunal to make that finding. It is not an error of jurisdiction for a Tribunal in fact, considering the evidence, to come to an incorrect finding.
As far as a breach of procedural fairness is concerned; I concur with the submissions by Mr Reilly of counsel that there is shown no breach. In my view, with respect, his description of the law relating to procedural fairness is a correct statement of the law.
The matters that cause me some concern I will set out now. If irrelevant considerations are taken into account by a Tribunal, that may amount to jurisdictional error. I note that the Tribunal sounded critical of the primary applicant for her vagueness about her late father’s business. This concerned the father having died in April 2000. It is difficult to see what relevance that has and why that would reflect on the credibility of the applicant.
The Tribunal’s refusal to accept evidence that the parties waited to sell the house in order to buy an air ticket has been criticised on factual grounds by counsel for the applicant. The reason given by the Tribunal is curious, to say the least. At page 202 of the Court Book, at about point three the Tribunal says and I quote:
The Tribunal is unconvinced by the applicant mother’s claim that they delayed departure because they needed to sell the family home in order to pay for tickets to Australia. The Tribunal notes that the applicants have an aunt living in Singapore whom they had previously visited.
I find it difficult to establish any sort of a connection between those two statements. The fact that a party has an aunt living in Singapore does not have any logical bearing of whether or not parties have to wait in order to obtain money to obtain air tickets to Australia. If the suggestion was that the parties were able to obtain money from the aunt living in Singapore then there needs to be some evidence of that and even some reference to it, but there is none. The statement is just a complete non sequitur and cannot be evidence to support the conclusion that the Tribunal came to.
The claim also is that – on page 202 at about point eight:
Further, the applicant departed Sri Lanka legally on a passport issued in her own name without difficulty.
To my mind that is not a piece of evidence that can meet the applicant’s contention. It may be evidence in answer to the applicant’s fear that she may be detained or arrested in the future. But it is quite common to see a claim in Refugee Review Tribunal findings that a party was able to leave their home country on a passport in their own name and this fact is produced triumphantly by the Tribunal as proof of fact that an applicant does not have a fear of persecution in their home country. At times it is difficult to see the causal connection and in my view this is such a time.
The Tribunal decision does lead me to infer that the Tribunal has misconstrued the evidence. The Tribunal said at page 203:
The Tribunal considers it to be incongruent that the applicant claims the fear of pressure to join the LTTE such that she cannot return to her country but in the four years in which she is tutored by this person - - -
Meaning his maths tutor, Mr Ragu:
- - - she does not at any time raise with her parents the fact that this pressure has been applied to her while she is receiving tutoring or makes any attempt to dispense with his services.
In my view, this is just a complete misconstruction of the evidence and complete mis-statement of it. The evidence about the concern by the applicants, the two young women, about being forcibly inducted into the LTTE is given as an explanation as to why they cannot relocate from the Colombo area where they are part of a minority and move up to Jaffna which is an area controlled by the Tamil Tigers.
Turning to the subject of credibility. As I said, it is established that an assessment of credibility is the task of the Tribunal. But findings without evidence or misconstruction of evidence or misapplying the law can constitute an error of jurisdiction. Failing to consider a part of the applicant’s claim can constitute an error of jurisdiction.
I note that when the Tribunal applies the “what if I am wrong test”, which is found at page 202 of the Court Book at about point six:
However, if the Tribunal considers that even if it was to accept that the main applicant was detained for two days on suspicion of LTTE association or was raped during this detention, the Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance of re-arrest on her return to Sri Lanka. The Tribunal reasons to this finding as follows.
Further, there is the reference to the fact that the applicant departed Sri Lanka on a passport issued in her own name. The fact that in the five months in which the applicant continued to reside in Colombo and attend college she did not face any further attention from the authorities, although she had been staying with a friend, and there is a reference to the peace accord that was at that stage in place in Sri Lanka and was continuing to hold. Most particularly the authorities no longer arrested persons on the grounds of suspected association with the LTTE.
Well clearly that “what if I am wrong” test relates to one of the claims but there is not one claim, there are two. There is the claim which has been addressed in that the applicants have been persecuted by the authorities because of suspicions that one of the applicants at least is associated with the LTTE and it was that being taken into custody that led to the allegation that the first applicant was raped. But there is another claim which has been articulated which to my mind has not been addressed by the Tribunal at all. That is that the applicants have suffered persecution by Singhalese thugs because of their race. These people are not members of the police or the army but the applicants said that the police will not take action against them because of their race and the fact that they, the applicants, are Tamils. In my view that claim has been clearly articulated but has not been addressed.
And in the decision of NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263:
Failure to consider claims may lead to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. This may or would arise where there is say a failure to deal with a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts or failure to deal with a case raised by the material or evidence, a case which is apparent on the face of the material before the Tribunal.
The Full Court has also said in NABE:
That the Tribunal is not required to engage in a constructive or creative activity in order to expose a claim and the Tribunal is not required to deal with claims that are not articulated and do not clearly arise from the material before it.
In my view, there is a claim that the applicants are and have been – or have been until they left Sri Lanka – persecuted, not just on political reasons on account of alleged association with the LTTE and the Tamil Tigers but that in the Colombo area they have been subject to persecution on behalf of being Tamils. There is no suggestion that that would cease necessarily because of the cease fire. And indeed, and in their original applications for a Protection Visa, both applicants, SZAPY and SZAPZ make that clear. SZAPY refers in particular to her detention and her sexual assault. She also refers to memories of the anti-Tamil riots by Singhalese mobs back in 1983. She referred to a massacre of Tamil boys in Bindunuwewa in the central province of

Sri Lanka by Singhalese mobs in October 2000.
She says, at page 28 of the Court Book:
The mob, armed with dangerous weapons has carried out the attack and no efforts have been made to resist the attack.
She refers to her family being tortured by Singhalese thugs from 1992 onwards and she referred to harassment, verbal abuse on the street and public humiliation by thugs as well as by male army officers carrying out body checks under the pretext of security checks. And she refers to harassment by Singhalese thugs increasing after their father’s death in April 2000.
The applicant SZAPZ, the younger sister, also refers to this. I note that the Tribunal makes a finding about harassment but it does not, in my view, meet the claim or show that the full claim by the applicants has been considered. At page 203, at about point six, the Tribunal says, quote:
The Tribunal accepts that the applicants may have been subject to harassment from some Singhalese youths in the area in terms of verbal abuse. However, the Tribunal does not accept that this harassment is of a type or a degree that amounts to persecution as required by s 91A of the Migration Act.
What applicant SZAPZ said is that it was more than verbal abuse. At page 43 of the Court Book at point five:
The Singhalese thugs harassed us for money. Sometimes they would even break into our house, show us knives and scars on their body, tell us that we would get scars on our bodies like theirs if we do not give them money.
At about point seven:
When they discovered that I wouldn’t talk to them, they started harassing me. They would continuously spit at me whenever I went out, come really close to me riding their bicycles and would either pull my hair, pinch me hard, push me down or use obscene language on me. Sometimes I would get bruises on my body due to this physical abuse.
Again, applicant SZAPZ refers to the body checks by the police. Again, she referred to harassment by Singhalese people, the EPDP boys. At page 44 of the Court Book:
They started to harass me every day. They would continuously spit at me, pinch me hard, pull my hair, rub against me and push me down.
She described her fears of abduction, sexual abuse and fears of being harassed or killed at about point eight and in that same paragraph:
I’m afraid that riots similar to what happened in 1983 might happen again. And the Tamils especially, suspected Tamils like us would be inhumanely attacked by the Singhalese thugs.
There are, as I said, two claims. In my view the Tribunal only considered one claim, the claim of harassment on the ground of being suspected of LTTE involvement and did not consider the claim of persecution including physical assault on the ground of racial basis. That to my mind is a clear in jurisdiction and that is not therefore covered by a privative clause and I propose to grant the application and I will make orders accordingly.

I certify that the preceding seventy (70) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Scarlett FM

Associate: S.Polley

Date: 10 March 2005