SZAFD v MIMIA

Case [2005] HCATrans 557


[2005] HCATrans 557

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S22 of 2004

B e t w e e n -

SZAFD

Applicant

and

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 5 AUGUST 2005, AT 11.57 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR L.J. KARP:   May it please your Honours, I appear for the applicant.  (instructed by Parish Patience Immigration)

MR S.B. LLOYD:   I appear in this matter for the Minister.  (instructed by Clayton Utz)

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, Mr Karp.

MR KARP:   Your Honour, this was a matter which was adjourned on order of the Court in March for the applicant to obtain legal representation.  In my submission, this is a case about the role and duties of the Refugee Review Tribunal and, by inference, other tribunals of like type.  It arises in a context of an administrative procedure where there is no opponent, no sets of issues which are defined by the parties other than the claims which are placed before the Tribunal and where the Tribunal acts as an inquisitor, judge and jury.

Against that background, the applicant advances three propositions:  firstly, that the Tribunal is permitted to make findings of fact on issues that are not advanced by the applicant in the appropriate case; secondly, that once having made findings of fact about such issues it must, as part of its duties to review a decision under section 414 of the Migration Act, follow through on the consequences of these findings and; thirdly, in the circumstances of this particular case, the Tribunal failed to consider whether or not the applicant would succumb to lead a conventional rather than a homosexual lifestyle and whether this would lead to persecution.  This also raises the issue of whether pressure to marry and maintain a conventional lifestyle in the circumstances of Bangladesh would operate differentially upon a male homosexual and whether that would cause serious harm in terms of section 91R of the Migration Act.

Your Honours, the facts of the case are, I do not think, in dispute.  At page 10 of the application book the Tribunal rejected the vast majority of the individual claims that the applicant made.  It did, however, accept that he was a homosexual from Bangladesh; that the community deeply disapproved of homosexuality; but it did not accept that he would be prosecuted or killed because of it.  It also accepted that there would be pressure upon an applicant to adopt a conventional lifestyle but it was:

not satisfied the opprobrium of family and neighbours amounts to persecution under the Convention.

Your Honour, in the circumstances of this case I would submit that what the Tribunal should have done was to decide whether he was likely to succumb to pressure to adopt a conventional lifestyle and whether that would amount to persecution in terms of the…

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SZAFD v MIMIA [2005] HCATrans 557
Case
[2005] HCATrans 557
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *SZAFD v MIMIA*. The applicant, SZAFD, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (MIMIA). The dispute concerned the Minister's decision to refuse SZAFD's application for a protection visa.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Minister's delegate had erred in law by failing to consider, or adequately consider, certain evidence presented by SZAFD in support of his claim for a protection visa. Specifically, the court was asked to determine if the delegate's assessment of the evidence was so unreasonable that it could be characterised as an error of law, thereby vitiating the decision.

The High Court, comprising Gleeson CJ and Heydon J, found that the delegate's reasons for refusing the protection visa did not demonstrate a failure to consider the relevant evidence. Their Honours held that the delegate had, in fact, considered the evidence but had reached a conclusion that was open to them on the material before them. The legal principle applied was that a decision-maker does not err in law simply because a court might have reached a different conclusion on the evidence; rather, an error of law arises from a failure to consider relevant evidence or a misapplication of the law.

The appeal was dismissed.

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