SZACP v Minister for Immigration
[2003] FMCA 268
•3 July 2003
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZACP v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION | [2003] FMCA 268 |
| MIGRATION – Review of decision of the RRT – application for a protection visa – whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group – whether her fear of violence by husband was of a private nature – whether the Tribunal’s decision was unreasonable – whether the applicant had access to effective protection – whether there is reviewable error in the Tribunal’s decision. |
Minister for Immigration v Khawar (2002) 187 ALR 574
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration [2003] HCA 26
Singh v Minister for Immigration (2000) 105 FCA 453
Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 WLR 379
Minister for Immigration v Tas [2000] FCA 1657
Sowrimuthu v Minister for Immigration [2001] FCA 300
A v Minister for Immigration [1999] FCA 116
Paramanayagam v Minister for Immigration [2000] FCA 1744
| Applicant: | SZACP |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| File No: | SZ 1335 of 2002 |
| Delivered on: | 3 July 2003 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Hearing date: | 12 June 2003 |
| Judgment of: | Raphael FM |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr J Patel |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr T Reilly |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Blake Dawson Waldron |
ORDERS
Application dismissed.
Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs assessed in the sum of $4,250.00.
Recommendation to the Minister to exercise his discretion to intervene.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SZ 1335 of 2002
| SZACP |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant is a citizen of Nepal who arrived in Australia on 7 March 1999. On 1 April 1999 she filed an application for a protection visa. That application was found by the Refugee Review Tribunal to have been invalid on 6 June 2000. On 7 August 2000 the applicant lodged a further application for a protection (Class XA) visa. On 18 August 2000 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant protection and on 11 September 2000 she applied for a review of that decision.
The Refugee Review Tribunal considered the matter and invited the applicant to a hearing which took place on 11 October 2002. The Tribunal made its decision on 30 August 2002 and handed it down on 21 November 2002. The decision affirmed the original decision of the delegate.
The applicant married in 1982. The marriage continued without violence until 1991 when her husband returned from a six month visit to Thailand. She stated that her husband demanded a divorce because he wished to marry a Thai woman. The applicant refused this request because of the social stigma associated with divorce in conservative Nepalese society. This stigma would extend not only to the wife but also to her son. The parties separated and the applicant returned to live with her parents. The husband threatened to take her child away from her and came to the house from time to time and was violent towards herself and her father. The applicant claimed that in 1992 her husband began to get drunk on a daily basis and often came to the house and beat her.
The applicant’s father died and the travel business which he had been operating was passed on to his son-in-law. He neglected the business so that it was no longer continuing in operation. After her father had died the applicant had less protection from the violence threatened by her husband. She left Nepal in 1999 and came to Australia.
At [CB 121] the Tribunal provides this narrative:
“The Tribunal asked the applicant if either she or her parents ever approached the authorities to seek protection from her violent husband. She stated that they did not approach the police because in Nepal such matters are considered very “embarrassing” and better kept within the family. The applicant stated that they never approached the police for assistance. She stated that on one occasion the neighbours called the police and they came to her house. The applicant stated that her husband gave the police an undertaking that he would refrain from further violent behaviour against the applicant and her family. She stated that for one month he did not harass her or her father. She stated that later he came back drunk and abusive. She stated that as usual he demanded money from her father.”
The Tribunal examined the country information concerning violence to women and the attitude of the Nepalese authorities towards it with the applicant. It came to the following conclusion:
“The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s claims regarding her violent husband. It accepts that he harmed her before and may do so again in the future. However, the Tribunal is not satisfied by the evidence that the applicant was targeted by her husband for a Convention reason or that he will harm her in the future for a Convention reason. The applicant’s adviser argued that the applicant was harmed because of her membership of a particular social group, that group being ‘women in Hindu society’. However, the applicant’s description of her circumstances in Nepal, indicates to the Tribunal that her husband had a propensity for violence and he acted violently towards her and her family due to his violent nature, quarrels between him and the applicant, and excessive drinking. The Tribunal finds that the applicant’s difficulties with her husband were essentially a form of ‘private persecution’ unrelated to a Convention reason (see Applicant A & Anor v MIEA & Anor (1997) 190 CLR 225, at 257-58 per McHugh J). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant was harmed by her husband because she was a ‘woman in Hindu society’ and it is not satisfied that she is at risk of harm by her husband solely or primarily due to her gender.
The Tribunal considered the applicant’s initial claim that she was not assisted by the authorities in Nepal. At the hearing the applicant stated that she never approached the police for assistance and the Tribunal accepts this claim. The Tribunal finds that the applicant cannot claim a failure of state protection when she did not make a meaningful attempt to obtain protection from the State. The Full Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Kandasamy [2000] FCA67 (Hill, Whitlam, Carr JJ, 10 February 2000), found that there cannot be a failure of State protection where a government has not been given the opportunity to respond to a form of harm in circumstances where protection might reasonably have been forthcoming. The same considerations apply in the present matter. The Tribunal noted that on the one occasion when police intervention was sought, by her neighbour, the police intervened appropriately.
The Tribunal considered information from external sources summarised above regarding the effectiveness of State protection offered to women at risk of harm by their husbands. The Tribunal noted that considerable shortfalls remain in protection mechanisms for women married to violent men, this being particularly the case for women living in rural communities. However, the reports considered by the Tribunal also indicate that government and non-government organisations in Kathmandu have increasingly been able to provide effective protection to women who seek protection from violent husbands. The Tribunal is satisfied that despite inadequacies in the protection system, and pervasive social attitudes against government intervention in such matters, the Tribunal is satisfied that women living in Kathmandu have access to effective protection services such as the police and the courts, as well as non-government organisations dedicated to assisting women abused by their husbands. The Tribunal is satisfied that in Kathmandu, where the applicant lived throughout her life and where she will live in the reasonably foreseeable future, the applicant will have access to effective protection by the State if she is at risk of harm by her husband. The Tribunal considers it significant that on the one occasion when protection was sought on behalf of the applicant, the police demonstrated the ability and willingness to provide protection.”
The applicant completed the application for review herself and it gives no indication of the real nature of her claim. At the hearing she was represented by Mr Patel who provided me with some written submissions. As I understand them, they appear to take the following form. First, the applicant argues that the reasoning of the Tribunal was incorrect when it came to the finding that the persecution suffered by the applicant was of a private nature and not linked to a convention reason. Mr Patel submitted that a proper reading of Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 187 ALR 574 established that a woman who suffered domestic violence could be considered to have a well founded fear of persecution for convention reasons where the circumstances were similar to those which were found in that case. He submitted that the facts in the instant case were almost identical to those found in Khawar.
In Khawar when referring to the expression “a particular social group” in the context of the circumstances in Pakistan, Gleeson CJ stated at [26], [32] and [35]:
“As her case is argued, and as a matter of principle, it would not be sufficient for Ms Khawar to show maladministration, incompetence, or ineptitude, by the local police. That would not convert personally motivated domestic violence into persecution on one of the grounds set out in Art 1A(2). But if she could show state tolerance or condonation of domestic violence, and systematic discriminatory implementation of the law, then it would not be an answer to her case to say that such a state of affairs resulted from entrenched cultural attitudes. An Australian court or tribunal would need to be well-informed about the relevant facts and circumstances, including cultural conditions, before reaching a conclusion that what occurs in another country amounts to persecution by reason of the attitude of the authorities to the behaviour of private individuals; but if, after due care, such a conclusion is reached, then there is no reason for hesitating to give effect to it.
…In my view, it would be open to the Tribunal, on the material before it, to conclude that women in Pakistan are a particular social group.
…Women in any society are a distinct and recognisable group; and their distinctive attributes and characteristics exist independently of the manner in which they are treated, either by males or by governments. Neither the conduct of those who perpetrate domestic violence, or of those who withhold the protection of the law from victims of domestic violence, identifies women as a group. Women would still constitute a social group if such violence were to disappear entirely. The alleged persecution does not define the group.”
case.”
From [100]-[102] Kirby J held:
“...But in light of the substantial, apparently reliable and consistent material that she had produced concerning the situation in Pakistan affecting her and persons like herself, it was not open to the Tribunal to ignore the respondent's claim that her case was a paradigm instance of the discrimination of Pakistani law and official practice against women in her position, which amounted to persecution, justifying her fear about returning to Pakistan.
It follows that I agree with the primary judge and the majority in the Full Court of the Federal Court that the Tribunal committed an error of law in failing to make findings of fact on the respondent's allegation that she was unable to secure protection of the law and its agencies in Pakistan against the serious harm perpetrated against her and that she was a member of a "particular social group" of at least one of the kinds propounded before the Tribunal.
In the most recent High Court decision of Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration [2003] HCA 26 Kirby J dealt with the circumstances which review is available. At [87] and [88] he said:
“Thus, it is essential to establish something more than an error of law within jurisdiction. Difficult as it may sometimes be to differentiate jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error with exactitude, in a case where there has been a fundamental mistake at the threshold in expressing, and therefore considering, the legal claim propounded by an applicant, the error will be classified as an error of jurisdiction. It will be treated as a constructive failure of the decision-maker to exercise the jurisdiction and powers given to it.
.…Obviously, it is not every mistake in understanding the facts, in applying the law or in reasoning to a conclusion that will amount to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. But where, as here, the mistake is essentially definitional, and amounts to a basic misunderstanding of the case brought by an applicant, the resulting flaw is so serious as to undermine the lawfulness of the decision in question in a fundamental way.” (my emphasis)
In the case before me however, I don’t think that there was a fundamental misunderstanding of this fact. The applicant in Dranichnikov was an unrepresented litigant while the applicant in this case had an adviser helping her at the Tribunal hearing and was also represented at the court hearing. The Tribunal did consider whether the applicant was a member of a particular social group, that group being, “women in Hindi society” and it found that she was but came to the conclusion that “the applicant’s difficulties with her husband were essentially a form of “private persecution” unrelated to a convention reason. But even if the treatment meted out to the applicant was “of a private nature” it could constitute an essential element of a claim based upon the failure of the home government to proved the applicant with effective protection from such incidents [Khawar-supra].
Mr Patel also submitted that the Tribunal failed to apply the correct definition of convention related fear which would have in turn required it to make its decision on the basis of the legal and proper interpretation of the convention definition of effective protection. He argued that the Tribunal did not do this. Mr Patel further argued that the Tribunal’s decision evidenced Wednesbury unreasonableness in that it came to a conclusion about effective protection which no reasonable Tribunal could have come to based upon the evidence which it considered.
I shall deal with each of these matters in the context of the Tribunal’s decision in turn.
With this in mind, I will now consider the disputed material. The most relevant area of dispute in the country information arose from the Tribunal’s interpretation of information from external sources regarding the effectiveness of state protection offered to women at risk of harm by their husbands. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that it was satisfied that the women living in Kathmandu had access to effective protection services such as the police and the courts as well as non-government organisations dedicated to assisting women abused by their husbands. The applicant argued that the country information does not support this finding.
The major document used is the “Report on domestic violence in Nepal” by the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights found between [CB 136 and 160]. Use is also made of a document entitled “Nepal – The First CEDAW Impact Study” found between [CB 162 and 207].
It would be fair to say that the Minnesota Report is a damming document. At [152] its conclusion is in the following stark form:
“Women in Nepal are systematically denied their basic, fundamental right to be free from violence. By failing to respond to the high incidence of domestic violence and by discriminating against victims of domestic violence in the prosecution of its criminal laws, the Nepalese government has failed to meet its commitment as a member of the United Nations and has violated international human rights law. The Nepalese government should immediately take the steps outlined in this report to eliminate the serious human rights abuses currently being suffered by women in Nepal.”
In its summary of findings at [139] the report states:
“The Nepali legal system does not provide an effective remedy to women subjected to domestic violence. Civil law provides for the material support of abused women by partition of the husband’s property. Delays in the Nepalese legal system, however, often effectively deny women their right to partition. Divorce is extremely uncommon and provides very limited, if any, financial security. Civil law and the state’s administration of the property laws thus reinforce dependency.
Perpetrators of domestic violence are generally not prosecuted in the Nepali criminal justice system. The National Code does not require the state to prosecute the crime of assault. Accordingly, assault is usually left to private prosecution. The state prosecutes some assaults that disturb the public peace, as violations of a lesser, ancillary law. Because women lack the financial resources to seek private legal relied and given the non-public nature of most assaults on women, domestic violence has been related to a second class crime. Women rarely report incidents of domestic violence to the police. When a report is made, an arrest is very unlikely and police usually encourage the woman to reconcile with her partner. Unless domestic violence rises to the level of murder or attempted murder, state prosecutors will generally not pursue the cases.”
The Tribunal in its reasons for decision quoted a number of other pieces of country information which appear to corroborate the information contained in the Minnesota report. At [CB 122] and [123] it deals with the creation in Kathmandu of a “Women’s Cell”:
“The police department has a “women’s cell” in five cities, including Kathmandu, and in 16 districts. These cells include female officers who receive special training in handling victims of domestic violence. The police also have sent our directives instructing all officers to treat domestic violence as a criminal offense that should be prosecuted. However, according to a police official, this type of directive is difficult to enforce because of entrenched discriminatory attitudes. Even though the police may make an arrest, further prosecution often is not pursued by the victim or by the Government.”
And at [CB 123]:
“In Kathmandu, the police established the Women’s Cell, a special unit headed by a female inspector to handle police matters involving women. Although the women are extremely reluctant to come forward and report domestic violence, the Women’s Cell logged 115 domestic violence cases in one eight month period in 1996. A police inspector reported that domestic violence victims were cut, punched, beaten by sticks and burned by cigarettes…
In an eight month period in 1996, the Women’s Cell also logged 72 cases of men illegally taking second wives…
Virtually every police official interviewed reported that domestic violence is commonplace but mostly goes unreported. Police and prosecutors repeatedly emphasised that they do not have the authority under the National Code to investigate or prosecute domestic violence absent a death or attempted murder.”
These are the only extracts from country information which support the Tribunal’s finding that:
“Reports considered by the Tribunal also indicate that government and non-government organisations in Kathmandu have increasingly been able to provide effective protection to women who seek protection from violent husbands. The Tribunal is satisfied that despite inadequacies in the protection system and pervasive social attitudes against intervention in such matters, the Tribunal is satisfied that women living in Kathmandu have access to effective protection services such as the police and the courts, as well as non government organisations dedicated to assisting women abused by their husbands. The Tribunal is satisfied that in Kathmandu, where the applicant lived throughout her life and where she will live in the reasonable future, the applicant will have access to effective protection by the state if she is at risk of harm by her husband. The Tribunal considers it significant that on the one occasion when protection was sought on behalf of the applicant the police demonstrated the ability and willingness to protect protection.”
On the issue of unreasonableness the Federal Court in Singh v Minister for Immigration (2000) 105 FCR 453 at [24] held:
“However, as the primary judge pointed out, a reviewing court is not entitled to find Wednesbury unreasonableness simply because the court disagrees – even profoundly disagrees – with the weight given by the decision maker to the various factors relevant to his or her decision. There must be more than that. In Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council [1983] 1 AC 768 at 821, Lord Diplock described unreasonable decisions as those which "looked at objectively, are so devoid of any plausible justification that no reasonable body of persons could have reached them". Words like "absurd", "irrational" and "illogical" have often been used in this context. I venture to repeat a comment I made in Taveli v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 86 ALR 435 at 453:
"In numerous cases the comment has been made that unreasonableness, in this sense, is a difficult ground to establish. Probably the ground has its most frequent application in cases in which the challenger can demonstrate an illogicality in, or misapplication of, the reasoning adopted by the decision-maker; so that the factual result is perverse, by the decision-maker's own criteria. Parramatta City Council v Pestell (1972) 128 CLR 305 and Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155; 65 ALR 549 constitute examples of this type of case. There may be cases – although I think that they are likely to be rare – in which all of the factors germane to a particular decision point in one direction. If such a case arose, it would seem proper to brand as unreasonable a decision to the contrary effect. But ordinarily there will be factors pointing in each direction. Where that is the situation, the weight of those factors is a matter for evaluation by the decision-maker. In such a case, even though a particular judge might feel that the preferable decision would have been otherwise, that feeling would not be sufficient to justify the condemnation of the decision as unreasonable, in the relevant sense. As Menzies J said in Pestell (at 323):
“There is, however, a world of difference between justifiable opinion and sound opinion. The former is one open to a reasonable man; the latter is one that is not merely defensible – it is right. The validity of a local rule does not depend upon the soundness of a council's opinion; it is sufficient if the opinion expressed is one reasonably open to a council. Whether it is sound or not is not a question for decision by a court.”
On the question of effective protection the House of Lords in Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 WLR 379 Lord Hope said at 388:
“The standard to be applied is therefore not that which would eliminate all risk and would thus amount to a guarantee of protection in the home state. Rather it is a practical standard, which takes proper account of the duty which the state owes to all its own nationals. As Ward L.J. said [2000] I.N.L.R. 15, 44G, under reference to Professor Hathaway's observation in his book, at p. 105, it is axiomatic that we live in an imperfect world. Certain levels of ill-treatment may still occur even if steps to prevent this are taken by the state to which we look for our protection. I consider that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal in this case applied the right standard when they were considering the evidence."
And at 398 Lord Clyde said:
"It seems to me that the formulation presented by Stuart-Smith L.J. in the Court of Appeal may well serve as a useful description of what is intended, where he said [2000] I.N.L.R. 15, 26, para. 22:
“In my judgment there must be in force in the country in question a criminal law which makes the violent attacks by the persecutors punishable by sentences commensurate with the gravity of the crimes. The victims as a class must not be exempt from the protection of the law. There must be a reasonable willingness by the law enforcement agencies, that is to say the police and courts, to detect, prosecute and punish offenders.'
And in relation to the matter of unwillingness he pointed out that inefficiency and incompetence is not the same as unwillingness, that there may be various sound reasons why criminals may not be brought to justice, and that the corruption, sympathy or weakness of some individuals in the system of justice does not mean that the state is unwilling to afford protection. `It will require cogent evidence that the state which is able to afford protection is unwilling to do so, especially in the case of a democracy.' The formulation does not claim to be exhaustive or comprehensive, but it seems to me to give helpful guidance."
(See Minister for Immigration v Tas [2000] FCA 1657)
In Sowrimuthu v Minister for Immigration [2001] FCA 300 Lindgren J set out the law on effective protection in Australia from [48]-[50]:
“[48] Ultimately, however, Prathapan was decided on the basis that there was evidence establishing the existence of effective law enforcement and judicial systems in France and of the respect of the French government for human rights, and that the respondent had failed to prove he would not be given adequate protection.
I stated (at 106):
"It is not countervailing evidence to show that the authorities cannot guarantee immunity from persecution and reprisals. The material on which Mr Prathapan relied did not even begin to suggest that level of ineffectuality of state protection that would allow or give rise to a real chance that he would be persecuted by the LTTE regardless of his resorting to the French authorities."
[49] In A, the Full Court stated that the obligations imposed on states by the Convention is "conditioned upon the need for protection" (at [36]) and that a person "cannot be said to be at risk of persecution if she can access effective protection in some part of her state of origin" (also at [36], quoting from Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, Butterworths, Toronto, 1991 at 135 - my emphasis). The Full Court stated (at [38]):
"...the language of Art 1A [of the Convention] focuses upon the well-founded fear of persons claiming Convention protection and their inability or unwillingness, owing to such fear, to avail themselves of the protection of the country of nationality. In that sense the willingness or ability of the country of nationality to provide protection is not the ultimate question. But it is a question which must be considered in the assessment of refugee status. The availability of protection in the country of origin or nationality is relevant to the existence of an objective basis upon which the well-founded fear of persecution that is necessary for Convention protection rests." (my emphasis)
[50] Their Honours made the following observations concerning the approach to be taken in relation to the question whether effective protection is available:
* Firstly, there is no "golden rule" that a person may never be given refugee protection if the person comes from "a democratic country governed by the rule of law and with generally effective judicial and law enforcement institutions" (at [39]).
* Secondly, the proposition that "a person claiming refugee status is not ordinarily entitled to rely upon the supposed inadequacy of reasonable state protection available to him or her if it is not inferior to that available to a fellow citizen at risk of serious criminal harm for non-convention reasons" may need to be treated with caution (at [40]).
* Thirdly, the Court rejected the presumption which had been recognised in Ward that nations are capable of protecting their own citizens, and stated that the conclusion of the primary Judge, Nicholson J, in A, "that `there is no foundation in authority or principle which should lead this court to accept the [Minister's] submission for the existence of a presumption in terms of Ward' is plainly correct" (at [41]). Their Honours characterised the rejected presumption as one "without a basic fact" and therefore as "a rule of law relating to the existence of a burden of proof [which] has no part to play in administrative proceedings which are inquisitorial in their nature" (also at [41]).
* Fourthly, the Court stated "the broad proposition that there must be information or material available to the decision-maker from some source or sources on the issue of effective protection", and added "[i]n some cases the claimant may have to do little more than to show that [he or she] falls within a particular class of person or possesses particular attributes to make out want of effective protection as a basis for a well-founded fear of persecution and inability or unwillingness to avail [himself or herself] of the relevant protection [while] [i]n other cases the claimant may face a very difficult task indeed" (at [43]).
Their Honours stated (at [42]):
"Thus the delegate may well have the view that a particular country is one which has effective judicial and law enforcement agencies, is governed by the rule of law and has an infrastructure of laws designed to protect its nationals against harm of the sort said to be feared by the claimants. In such a case and in the absence of evidence advanced by the claimant, the delegate will be entitled to reject the contention that the claimant is unable or unwilling because of a well-founded fear of persecution for a convention reason, to avail him or herself of the protection of that country...In other cases a delegate or the [RRT] might be apprised of information indicating that for persons of particular classes or circumstances the relevant protection was ordinarily not forthcoming from their state of nationality."”
In A v Minister for Immigration [1999] FCA 116 at [40]:
“It has been suggested that a person claiming refugee status is not ordinarily entitled to rely upon the supposed inadequacy of reasonable state protection available to him or her if it is not inferior to that available to a fellow citizen at risk of serious criminal harm for non-convention reasons - Prathapan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 47 ALD 41 at 48 (Madgwick J).
In summarising the effect of A, Merkel J said in Paramanayagam v Minister for Immigration [2000] FCA 1744 at [8]:
“..it is necessary that the decision maker form a conclusion about the effectiveness of the relevant State protection and do so on material presented by the claimant or on material otherwise available to the decision maker.”
I am satisfied that in this case the decision maker did form a conclusion about the effectiveness of the relevant state protection and did so upon the material presented both by the claimant or otherwise available to him and discussed with the claimant. A court reviewing the decision of the Tribunal based upon this information may well strongly disagree with the conclusion to which it came. But it could not be said there was no evidence whatsoever upon which it could come to a conclusion that in Kathmandu there was effective protection. The Tribunal cites the creation of the “women cells” and the existence of complaints made to them as well as the fact that the police did arrive when a complaint was made previously by the applicant’s relatives. For the court to make an argument that the Minessota Report and other documents would appear, in their conclusions, to belie a possibility of effective protection would be to descend into a debate upon the merits which the court is unable to do. It also follows from the very fact that there can be debate upon this matter that “Wednesbury unreasonableness”, cannot be established.
I am therefore obliged to dismiss the application. I do so with a heavy heart because it does seem to me from the evidence produced that a woman in the situation of the applicant may well suffer significantly if she is obliged to return to Nepal. Another Tribunal could easily have so found. In those circumstances I feel justified in respectfully suggesting to the Minister that this might be a case in which he could exercise his discretion to intervene on behalf of this woman who appears to be so much at risk. I order that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs which I assess in the sum of $4,250.00 pursuant to Part 21 Rule 21.02(2)(a) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules.
I certify that the preceding twenty-four (24) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Raphael FM
Associate:
Date:
1
12
0