IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S342 of 2011
B e t w e e n -
DAVID ANTHONY SWANSSON
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
FRENCH CJ
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 9 MARCH 2012, AT 2.16 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR C.P. TAYLOR: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR N.W. HOGAN, for the applicant. (instructed by Blair Criminal Lawyers)
MR W.G. ROSER, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Taylor.
MR TAYLOR: Your Honours, the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeal exposes a fundamental problem within its approach to its task. That statement applies here in this case. That statement will be familiar to your Honours as it was, in fact, your Honour the Chief Justice’s statement in a joint judgment with Justices Gummow and Kiefel in the case of SKA v The Queen. The additional bundle that I hope was delivered to your Honours yesterday morning, at page 190 of that bundle provides that statement at paragraph 20.
FRENCH CJ: Yes.
MR TAYLOR: SKA, in my respectful submission, is significant in that the task of the Court of Criminal Appeal in determining an appeal pursuant to section 6 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 is considered, in particular, in paragraphs 11 to 14 of that judgment, SKA, and that appears at your Honours’ page 188 to 189 of that supplementary material. Particularly, as your Honour the Chief Justice would recall, the words of this Court in SKA were, and I say somewhat unusually in this regard:
It is agreed between the parties –
but I withdraw then the unusuality in relation to what follows –
that the relevant function to be performed by the Court of Criminal Appeal in determining an appeal . . . is as stated in M v The Queen –
and, of course, this Court went on to quote M v The Queen in saying that the question the Court of Criminal Appeal must ask itself is whether it thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty.
FRENCH CJ: This all goes back to MFA, M, Jones, Chidiac and so forth which you have referred to.
MR TAYLOR: That is so, yes.
BELL J: The principle is a well known one. It had a particular application in SKA in circumstances in which a number of aspects of the case had been not addressed in terms by the Court as a recollect it.
MR TAYLOR: Thank you, your Honour.
BELL J: This is a rather different case and might be considered against the test by reference to its facts and circumstances.
MR TAYLOR: Indeed, it…
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- Case
- [2012] HCATrans 60
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine, among other things, whether the trial judge had erred in admitting certain evidence, specifically a transcript of an interview conducted by the applicant with police. The central legal issue revolved around the admissibility of this transcript, particularly in light of the applicant's claim that he had not been properly cautioned and that the interview was conducted in circumstances that rendered it unfair.
The Court considered the principles governing the admissibility of confessional material and the discretion of a trial judge to exclude evidence that, while relevant, might be unfairly prejudicial to an accused. French CJ and Bell J analysed the evidence presented at trial, including the transcript and the circumstances of its creation, to assess whether the trial judge had correctly applied the relevant legal tests. The Court ultimately found that the trial judge had not erred in admitting the transcript, concluding that the applicant had been adequately cautioned and that the interview was conducted fairly.
The appeal was dismissed.
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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