Swan v Santos GLNG Pty Ltd and Ors

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Swan v Santos GLNG Pty Ltd & Ors [2019] QCA 6

PARTIES:

STEVEN JOHN SWAN
(applicant)
v
SANTOS GLNG PTY LTD
ACN 131 271 648
(first respondent)
PAPL (DOWNSTREAM) PTY LTD
ACN 147 649 205
(second respondent)
TOTAL GLNG AUSTRALIA
ARBN 146 680 524
(third respondent)
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE ADMINISTERING THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT 1994
(fourth respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 2779 of 2017
Appeal No 4367 of 2017
DC No 80 of 2015

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Miscellaneous Applications – Civil

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Maroochydore – [2017] QPEC 2; [2017] QPEC 17 (Robertson DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

1 February 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

24 November 2017

JUDGES:

Fraser and McMurdo JJA and Henry J

ORDERS:

In CA 2779/17

1.   Refuse the application for leave to appeal, with costs.

In CA 4367/17

1.   Grant the application for leave to appeal.

2.   Allow the appeal with costs.

3.   Set aside the costs order made in the Planning & Environment Court on 24 March 2017, and instead order that the applicant pay the costs incurred by the respondents after 16 June 2016.

CATCHWORDS:

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT – ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – where part of the respondent’s [Santos’] gas pipeline was built on the applicant’s properties – where Environmental Authorities were granted to Santos – where the applicant filed an originating application applying for declarations under s 505 of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) that Santos was in breach of various conditions of the Environmental Authorities – where the applicant sought the appointment of an independent expert to report to the court on the extent of the breaches and the rehabilitations required – where the primary judge found that the orders sought at trial were beyond power – where Santos’ expert believed that all recommended rehabilitation had been undertaken except those obligations that required ongoing maintenance – where Santos undertook to continue that ongoing maintenance

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING – COURTS AND TRIBUNALS WITH ENVIRONMENT JURISDICTION – QUEENSLAND – PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT AND ITS PREDECESSORS – COSTS – GENERALLY – where the applicant was wholly unsuccessful in the proceeding below – where the primary judge ordered the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs of the proceedings on the standard basis or as agreed – where s 457(1) of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) provides that the costs of the proceeding are in the discretion of the Planning and Environment Court – where it was accepted that the general rule that costs follow the event did not apply and instead the non-exhaustive list of considerations in s 457(2) should be considered – where the primary judge observed that the court never ruled against the no case submission – where the court did in fact rule against the no case submission – where the primary judge considered the factor in s 457(2)(d) of whether a party commenced or participated in the proceeding without reasonable prospects of success in light of this error – whether…

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Details
Case
[2019] QCA 6
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Swan, brought an action against Santos GLNG Pty Ltd and others, seeking declarations that Santos was in breach of conditions attached to environmental authorities permitting the construction of a gas pipeline over Swan's properties. Swan also sought the appointment of an independent expert to report on the extent of any breaches and the required rehabilitation. The primary judge ruled that the orders sought were beyond the court's power and found that Santos had not breached the conditions of the environmental authorities. Swan appealed the decision on the grounds that the primary judge had erred in law and misapplied the statutory discretion under s 505 of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld). Santos argued that the appeal should be dismissed as the trial judge's decision was correct and the appeal was without merit.

The court considered whether the trial judge had erred in concluding that the orders sought by Swan were beyond the court's power or uncertain, and if the trial judge had failed to consider the submissions made by Swan. The court noted that the primary judge had assumed, contrary to his findings, that Swan had established the alleged offences. The court also examined whether the primary judge had taken into account irrelevant considerations when exercising the statutory discretion. The court found that the primary judge had not erred in concluding that the orders sought were beyond power or uncertain, and had properly exercised his discretion under s 505 of the EPA.

In relation to the costs order, the court found that the primary judge had erred in ordering Swan to pay the respondents' costs on the standard basis or as agreed, as the primary judge had ruled against the no case submission made by Santos. The court set aside the costs order made in the Planning and Environment Court on 24 March 2017, and instead ordered that Swan pay the costs incurred by the respondents after 16 June 2016.

In CA 2779/17, the Court refused the application for leave to appeal, with costs. In CA 4367/17, the Court granted the application for leave to appeal, allowed the appeal with costs, and set aside the costs order made in the Planning and Environment Court on 24 March 2017, and instead ordered that Swan pay the costs incurred by the respondents after 16 June 2016.

Orders

Orders of the court

In CA 2779/17

1. Refuse the application for leave to appeal, with costs.

In CA 4367/17

1. Grant the application for leave to appeal.

2. Allow the appeal with costs.

3. Set aside the costs order made in the Planning & Environment Court on 24 March 2017, and instead order that the applicant pay the costs incurred by the respondents after 16 June 2016.

Background

Background to the litigation

The grounds of the proposed appeals to this Court are confined to error in law.[1] I will first discuss the application for leave to appeal against the substantive judgment.[1]Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) s 498(1)(a).Background Santos built a 420 kilometre gas pipeline between the Surat and Bowen Basins and Curtis Island near Gladstone. Environmental Authorities (“EA”) were granted to Santos in November 2011 and March 2015 approving the construction of the pipeline under a petroleum licence (“PPL 166”) subject to numerous conditions. The relevant conditions are identical or materially identical, so it is necessary to refer only to terms of the EA granted in 2015. The pipeline was designed, supplied, constructed and commissioned by Santos’ contractor Saipem Australia Pty Ltd (“Saipem”). The applicant owns two properties near Moura known as Inala (Lot 12) and Mulawa (Lot 3), as well as other properties nearby. He uses the properties for grazing beef cattle and operating a cattle stud. Part of the pipeline was built on the applicant’s properties. By deeds dated 21 June 2011,[2] the applicant’s father (who then owned the properties) covenanted to grant easements over both properties to Santos to allow for the construction and maintenance of the pipeline (the right of way, “RoW”).[3] The RoW is 30 metres wide together with an adjacent “Working Space” ten metres wide.[4][2]Deeds of Option for Easement with the attached easement documents over Inala (Ex SJS-1 at 23-82) and Mulawa (Ex SJS-1 at 83-144).[3]Reasons [17], [18].[4]Reasons [18]. Construction of the Pipeline over Inala and Mulawa commenced in March or April 2013[5] and was completed by 8 September 2014 at the latest.[6] The applicant alleged that during the work there were contraventions of conditions of the EA, many of which were not rectified despite his complaints to Saipem and Santos.[5]Reasons [13].[6]Reasons [102]. Section 430 of the EPA applies to a person who is the holder of an EA or to a person who is acting under an EA. It is an offence for a person to contravene a condition of an EA: s 430(3). The holder of an EA (in this case, Santos) must ensure that everybody acting under it complies with its conditions: s 431(1). If “another person” (that is, someone other than the holder – in this case, Saipem) acting under an EA commits an offence against s 430, the holder commits the offence of failing to ensure the other person complies with the conditions: s 431(2). Section 431(4) provides that it is a defence for the holder to prove that the holder issued appropriate instructions and used all reasonable precautions to ensure compliance with the conditions, and the offence was committed without the holder’s knowledge, and the holder could not by the exercise of reasonable diligence have stopped the commission of the offence. Section 505(1) of the EPA provides that proceedings may be brought in the Planning and Environment Court for an order to remedy or restrain an offence against the Act, or a threatened or anticipated offence against the Act, by (amongst others) a person whose interests are affected by the subject matter of the proceeding. The applicant is such a person in relation to the alleged contraventions of the conditions of the EAs. Section 505(5) empowers the Court to make orders it considers appropriate to remedy or restrain an offence if the court is satisfied that an offence against the Act has been committed or will be committed unless restrained.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Santos also submits that if leave to appeal is granted the appeal should be dismissed, substantially for the same reasons submitted to justify the rejection of leave and because the trial judge did not err in law in finding that the applicant had not established the alleged offences or in finding that Santos had established the statutory defence.The first main ground for the decision: the orders sought at trial are beyond power The applicant’s draft notice of appeal does not contain any ground that challenges the first main ground for the trial judge’s decision. However in a supplementary submission dated 29 November 2017 the applicant sought to rely upon a new ground of appeal which challenges that ground for the decision:“That the trial judge erred in law:(a)in concluding at [132] of his reasons for judgment that orders 2 and 3 sought in the Amended Originating Application sought to have the Court concede its jurisdiction to a lay person in the respects identified by his Honour;(b)in concluding at [135] of his reasons for judgment that orders 2, 3 and 4 sought in the Amended Originating Application lacked sufficient certainty and that court supervision was not appropriate in the circumstances described by his Honour;[37] and[37]The reference to court supervision not being appropriate concerns the applicant’s challenge to the second main ground for the decision.(c)in concluding consequently that the application did not succeed because the relief sought was either beyond the Court’s jurisdiction or uncertain;in that his Honour(d)failed to take into account:(i) the orders that the applicant in fact sought at trial;(ii) the applicant’s explanation of the intent of the orders sought;(iii) the applicant’s submission as to the Court’s jurisdiction, and the appropriateness of the orders sought (as explained and sought at trial); and(iv) the manner by which the applicant submitted the proceeding ought continue and orders ought be made if the Court found that the respondents had breached s 430 or 431 and therefore the Court’s discretion under s 505 of the Environment Protection Act 1994 had arisen;(e)consequently denied the applicant procedural fairness in not considering the case put to the Court by the applicant.” The denial of procedural fairness contended for in (e) depends upon acceptance of the contention that the trial judge erred in the way described in (d). Appropriately, the parties’ arguments focussed upon the alleged failure to take into account submissions made by the applicant’s counsel of the kind described in (d). The applicant relied upon s 505(5) of the EPA as the source of power to make the orders it sought at the trial:“505 Restraint of contraventions of Act etc.(5)If the Court is satisfied– (a) an offence against this Act has been committed (whether or not it has been prosecuted); or(b) an offence against this Act will be committed unless restrained;the Court may make the orders it considers appropriate to remedy or restrain the offence.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It will be evident from the reasons already given that in holding that the discretion should be exercised against granting the claimed relief the trial judge assumed in the applicant’s favour, contrary to findings which the trial judge went on to make, that the applicant established the offences he alleged.Appeal grounds 7 – 10: the Planning and Environment Court took irrelevant considerations into account. Grounds 7 – 10 challenge the exercise of the discretion to withhold relief under s 505(5). In the way in which this part of the application was argued, it is governed by the well-known principles applicable in an appeal against the exercise of statutory discretion:“It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge had reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance.”[69][69]House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ). The question for the appellate court is not whether it thinks the exercise of the discretion was correct. The applicant does not contend that the case is one in which the trial judge’s exercise of discretion was “unreasonable or plainly unjust”, so as to justify an inference that there had been a failure properly to exercise the statutory discretion. The effect of these grounds of appeal is only that the trial judge took into account matters which were not relevant to the exercise of the discretion.Appeal ground 7: that the Planning and Environment Court committed an error of law, when considering a notional exercise of discretion pursuant to s. 505(5) EPA, by placing weight on a partial refusal of access to the right of way areas by the Appellant, between 18 September and 12 November 2015, in circumstances where, from September, 2014, the First, Second and Third Respondents had signaled a complete rejection of, and refusal to comply with, its obligations pursuant to the conditions of the environment authorities referred to in grounds 1 to 4, above, and only desisted from that rejection and refusal after the proceeding, below, had been commenced and the Appellant had served the First, Second and Third Respondents with the report of Mr. Dudgeon in that proceeding. Ground 7 is based upon the following passage in the trial judge’s reasons:“[191] Santos' position is that in 2015 Swan unreasonably denied access to its contractors to effect rehabilitation and address a lot of the issues raised in the OA, until forced to do so as consequence of the November 2015 court order. On 18 September 2015, Mr Manning wrote to Carter Newell (Santos' solicitors) as a result of his client being told that ‘work crews’ were moving along the pipeline ‘to conduct rehabilitation works’.[192]By then Swan was disenchanted with Santos as well as Saipem. That letter sought to place conditions on any entry in accordance with Exhibit 10 which is Swan's Position Statement prepared consequent upon an order of this court made on 11 June 2015. The statement provided very prescriptive conditions for entry and undertaking remedial works, including condition 12:‘12. Powers of O2 Environment + EngineeringThe powers of O2 Environmental + Engineering will be:12.1. To monitor and inspect all aspects of the Remedial Works, other works and access.12.2. To require Santos to stand down such workers who have shown a continuing lawful disregard for the EA, Easement Terms and Deed.12.3. To require work to cease on site where there is not an insubstantial non-compliance with the EA, Easement Terms and Deed.’[193]Not surprisingly, Santos would not accept such a condition. It is common ground that in June 2015, Swan denied access to Ausecology, described in Exhibit 18 as a third party monitoring rehabilitation works undertaken by Santos' contractor along the pipeline. By then Dudgeon, a principal of O2 Environment + Engineering, had been notified as an expert on behalf of Swan.[194]At the review on 12 November 2015, Swan argued strongly for a highly proscriptive order which I did not accept for reasons published that day. It was not until the order was made on that day that Santos had the ability to progress its obligation under the EAs and the Deeds relating to Swan's land.[195]Both experts inferentially acknowledged the need to implement rehabilitation programs sooner rather than later after such major disturbance, and this need was frustrated by Swan's entrenched position. It is a factor that is relevant to the exercise of the discretion.”