Swan v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SWAN v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR [2019] FCCA 702
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Bridging E (class WE) Bridging E (General) (subclass 050) visa – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss. 116, 499

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg. 2.43(1)

Ministerial Direction No.63, Bridging E visas – Cancellation under section 116(1)(g) – Regulation 2.43(1)(p) or (q)

Cases cited:

Applicant M190 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1362
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; 206 CLR 323
NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
Tran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 297

Applicant: DAVID SWAN
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: MLG 1944 of 2018
Judgment of: Judge Mercuri
Hearing date: 28 February 2019
Date of Last Submission: 28 February 2019
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 21 March 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the applicant: Mr Krohn
Solicitors for the applicant: Kerdo Legal
Counsel for the respondents: Mr Grant
Solicitors for the respondents: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

  1. The applicant’s application for judicial review filed on 5 July 2018 as amended on 28 November 2018 be dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in a sum to be fixed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 1944 of 2018

DAVID SWAN

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 28 June 2018 (“the tribunal”). In its decision, the tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Home Affairs


    (“the Minister”) to cancel the applicant’s Bridging E (class WE) Bridging E (General) (subclass 050) visa (“the visa”). 

  2. The applicant’s application for judicial review was initially filed on


    5 July 2018 and amended on 28 November 2018. 

  3. This proceeding is made pursuant to section 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). To succeed in his claim, the applicant must demonstrate jurisdictional error in the tribunal’s reasons.

Background

  1. The factual background is not in dispute.  The applicant was born in the United Kingdom and married an Italian national.  Together with their daughter, the applicant and his wife came to Australia in 2014[1].  Initially, the applicant’s wife was granted a student visa and the applicant became the primary carer for their daughter. 

    [1] The applicant and his wife had previously travelled to Australia where they initially met.

  2. In 2015, the applicant’s wife obtained employment and was granted a Temporary Work (Skilled) (Subsequent Entrant) (subclass 457) visa.  In July 2016, she undertook further study and applied for a student visa.

  3. Tragically in January 2017, the applicant and his wife lost their second child, a son, when…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 702
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Swan v Minister for Home Affairs* concerned an appeal against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The appellant challenged the Tribunal's understanding and application of a Direction concerning visa cancellation.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied the Direction, specifically sub-clause 6.1(1), in its consideration of whether to cancel the appellant's visa. The appellant argued that the Tribunal misunderstood the Direction, believing it mandated cancellation in almost all circumstances where discretion was enlivened, rather than merely relating to the initial consideration of whether to cancel.

The court found that the Tribunal had indeed misunderstood the Direction. It reasoned that the Direction's emphasis on applying certain grounds "rigorously" related to the preliminary step of deciding whether to consider cancellation, not to the subsequent exercise of discretion in deciding whether to cancel. The Tribunal had mistakenly interpreted this rigour as requiring strict or mandatory cancellation, thereby failing to properly exercise its jurisdiction by not adequately weighing mitigating factors. The court clarified that the government's view, as expressed in the Direction, was a matter to be weighed in the exercise of discretion, not a directive to cancel.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant in ACH15 challenged this decision on the basis that:The Tribunal understood the Direction, and in particular the first primary consideration set out in sub-cl 6.1(1) of the Direction to mean that cancellation must, almost always follow the enlivenment of the discretion. It was argued by the applicant that that understanding was incorrect because sub-clause 6.1(1) of the Direction only relates to consideration of whether to consider cancellation of the visa. In my view, although there are some contextual considerations which strain against the applicant’s argument, the clear words of the Direction support that argument (emphasis added).[57][57] ACH15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1250 at [17]. ACH15 does not, in my view, stand for the proposition advanced by the applicant. The error identified in ACH15 was that the tribunal was of the view that it had to apply the grounds of cancellation in Regulation 2.43(1)(p) “rigorously” in the exercise of its discretion as to whether to cancel the visa, rather than simply at the preliminary step of determining that it was appropriate to consider whether to cancel the applicant’s visa. In this case, the tribunal was aware of the reasoning in ACH15 and indeed appropriately referred to it when it said:…the Tribunal is satisfied that the ground for cancellation in s116(g) exists. As that ground does not require mandatory cancellation under section 116(3), the Tribunal must proceed to consider whether the visa should be cancelled.[58][58] Court book page 196 at paragraph [9]. Moreover, the tribunal appreciated the effect of the decision in ACH15 when it said:One of the prescribed primary considerations in cl6 of the Direction is the Government’s view that the prescribed grounds in r2.43(1)(p) and (q) should be applied rigorously, in that every instance of non-compliance should be considered for cancellation in accordance with the discretionary cancellation framework. The rigour referred to in this clause is addressed solely to the question of whether to enter into consideration of cancelling the visa and is not saying that the power to cancel should be exercised rigorously. The decision maker must take the government’s view as part of the matters to be weighed in the exercise of the discretion, rather than simply follow that view (emphasis added).[59][59] Court book page 197 at paragraph [24]. At paragraphs 28 to 31 of the decision in ACH15, the limitation on the matters determined in that case were clarified. In particular, his Honour noted that:The Tribunal did not understand and apply the Direction according to its proper meaning. Rather than understanding that the government’s view that the relevant grounds should be applied rigorously in the sense described above, it understood that view to be that the exercise to cancel should be exercised rigorously, that is, strictly. Thus, in spite of having found many mitigating factors in favour of the applicant, it cancelled the visa simply because it thought it was directed to do so. That misunderstanding by the Tribunal caused it to fail to properly review the decision of the delegate and so I constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction. [60][60] ACH15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1250 at [31].