Swain v Balanced Securities Limited

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Supreme Court

New South Wales

Case Title: Swain v Balanced Securities Limited
Medium Neutral Citation: [2014] NSWSC 1550
Hearing Date(s): 4 November 2014
Decision Date: 04 November 2014
Jurisdiction: Equity Division
Before: Rein J
Decision:

Summons dismissed.

Catchwords: EQUITY - Application to set aside consent orders - Application under 'the slip rule' 36.17 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 - Application under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court - Where there is no ambiguity in the consent orders - Where there is no clerical mistake, error arising from an accidental slip or omission identified - Rule 36.17 not applicable in the circumstances - Where there is no conduct to invalidate the plaintiff's agreement to the consent orders
Legislation Cited: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005
Cases Cited: 168 Wharf St v Amstar [2005] QCA 44
Commissioner of Taxes v British Australian Wool Realisation Association Ltd [1932] VLR 109
Commonwealth v McCormack (1984) 155 CLR 277
Deputy Commission of Taxation v Healy (2003) 52 ATR 330
Gould v Vaggelas (1995) 157 CLR 215
Harvey v Phillips (1956) 95 CLR 235
L Shaddock & Associates Pty Limited v Parramatta City Council (No 2) (1982) 151 CLR 590
Newmont Yandal Operations Pty Limited v J Aron Corporation and Goldman Sachs Group (2007) 70 NSWLR 411
R v Cripps; Ex parte Muldoon [1984] 1 QB 686
Stowe v Stowe (Supreme Court of Western Australia, Full Court, 15 September 1995 and 16 October 1995)
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Peter Rolf Swain (Plaintiff)
Balanced Securities Limited (Defendant)
Representation
- Counsel: Counsel:
M Auld (Plaintiff)
M Gilbert (Defendant)
- Solicitors: Solicitors:
Delaney Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Thomson Geer (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2014/193493

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT

  1. On 10 October 2011, I made orders in proceedings 2011/217401 Balanced Securities Limited v Warren Perry Anderson & Ors, which I shall refer to as "the Balanced Securities proceedings", as follows:

    THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
    Orders 1-4 be made by consent between the plaintiff and third defendant.
    1. Judgment for the plaintiff against the third defendant for possession of the land contained in Certificate of Title Folio Identifier 1/570484 and known as 1145 Mulgoa Road, Mulgoa, New South Wales (the 1145 Mulgoa Road Property).
    2. Leave be granted to the plaintiff for a writ of possession to issue forthwith in respect of the 1145 Mulgoa Road Property.
    3. The third defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of these proceedings.
    4. The Commercial List Cross-Summons filed by the first cross-claimant against the first cross-defendant be dismissed.

    THE COURT ALSO ORDERS THAT:
    5. Mark Conlan as trustee of the estate of Warren Perry Anderson (a bankrupt) be removed as a party to this proceeding.
    6. George Lopez and Evan Verge as trustees of the estate of Warren Perry Anderson (a bankrupt) be added as the fourth defendant to this proceeding, in substitution for Mark Conlan.
    7. Judgment for the plaintiff against the first defendant, the second defendant and the fourth defendant for possession of the land contained in Certificates of Title Folio Identifiers 64/247308,…

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Details
Case
[2014] NSWSC 1550
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Swain v Balanced Securities Limited involved a dispute between the plaintiff, Balanced Securities Limited, and the defendant, Mr Swain, over the interpretation of consent orders. The dispute centred on the scope of the orders and the liability of Mr Swain for costs. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The legal issues before the court were whether there was ambiguity in the consent orders, whether there was a clerical mistake or error, and whether the orders could be set aside based on the inherent jurisdiction of the court.

The court held that there was no ambiguity in the consent orders, and no clerical mistake or error had been identified. The court also found that Mr Swain's counsel had not expressed any intention to agree to different orders, and there was no evidence of any conduct by Balanced Securities that would invalidate Mr Swain's agreement to the orders. The court rejected the argument that the orders could be set aside based on the inherent jurisdiction of the court, as there was no unilateral mistake by Mr Swain or any other basis for setting aside the orders.

The court's reasoning was based on the clear language of the consent orders, the absence of any evidence of error or mistake, and the limited circumstances in which orders can be set aside. The court also noted that Mr Swain had challenged Balanced Securities' entire claim as a means of resisting the specific claim against him, thereby exposing himself to the order for costs that was sought by Balanced Securities and made. The court found that there was no basis for setting aside the orders and dismissed the application.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the application to set aside the consent orders and held that there was no ambiguity in the orders, no clerical mistake or error had been identified, and no basis for setting aside the orders existed. The orders remained in place, and Mr Swain was liable for the costs as ordered.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Swain v Balanced Securities Limited involves a dispute regarding consent orders made between the parties. Mr Swain, the plaintiff, had an allotment of 2 hectares of land under an agreement with Mr Anderson. The total area of the property at Fernhill was 700 hectares. Mr Swain claimed an equitable interest in the Mulgoa Road property due to the agreement and improvements made to the property. However, he did not claim to have an interest in any other part of the property and was not a party to the $31 million facility provided by Balanced Securities to Mr Anderson or the corporations he controlled. The case revolves around the interpretation and enforcement of the consent orders made between the parties.

The matter came before the court following an application by Mr Swain to set aside the consent orders made between him and Balanced Securities. The application was made under rule 36.17 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, commonly referred to as the 'slip rule', and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The court heard written and oral submissions from both parties and considered relevant case law and precedents in making its decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Part 36 rule 36.17 says as follows:36.17 Correction of judgment or order ("slip rule") If there is a clerical mistake, or an error arising from an accidental slip or omission, in a judgment or order, or in a certificate, the court, on the application of any party or of its own motion, may, at any time, correct the mistake or error. I have received written submissions from Mr Auld of counsel who appears for Mr Swain and from Mr Gilbert of counsel who appears for Balanced Securities, and I heard further oral submissions today. Mr Auld contends that: (a)The orders provide a demarcation between orders which resolve the dispute between Balanced Securities and Mr Swain, orders 1 to 4 on the one hand, and order 5 to 9, which concern orders between Balanced Securities and other defendants.(b)That because of the demarcation "these proceedings" must mean the proceedings relating to disputes between Balanced Securities and Mr Swain arising from Mr Swain's amended commercial list response and his cross-claim in the case, and those proceedings relating to the dispute between Balanced Securities and the other defendants.(c)That there is an ambiguity in the order for costs against Mr Swain. Mr Auld submits that support for the construction for which Mr Swain contends can be found in the pleadings, the judgment and the background to the dispute. Part of this argument centres on the fact that Mr Swain resided in an allotment of 2 hectares pursuant to an agreement between himself and Mr Anderson whereas the total area of the property at Fernhill was 700 hectares. Mr Swain, it is said, claimed an equitable interest in the Mulgoa Road property arising from that agreement and because of improvements made to that property but did not claim to have an interest in any other part of the property and was not a party to the $31 million facility provided by Balanced Securities to Mr Anderson or the corporations he controlled. Mr Auld makes reference to Mr Swain's affidavit, para 31, in which Mr Swain says he thought that he was liable to pay the plaintiff's costs "only as related to orders 1 to 4" (see CB p 5). Mr Auld has made reference to a number of cases dealing with the Court's power to amend orders pursuant to the slip rule and inherent jurisdiction - particularly Newmont Yandal Operations Pty Limited v J Aron Corporation and Goldman Sachs Group (2007) 70 NSWLR 411 ("Newmont"). Mr Auld put forward the following propositions:(1)A superior court can interpret an earlier decision by declaration "where a dispute arises relating to whether subsequent conduct is or is not within the orders contemplated".(2)The Court has inherent jurisdiction to amend orders including on terms to avoid injustice.(3)The Court has inherent jurisdiction to amend orders including costs order "for inadvertence of counsel": see the case of Stowe v Stowe (Supreme Court of Western Australia, Full Court, 15 September 1995 and 16 October 1995).(4)The Court has power pursuant to the slip rule to amend orders for inadvertence of counsel: L Shaddock & Associates Pty Limited v Parramatta City Council (No 2) (1982) 151 CLR 590; Gould v Vaggelas (1995) 157 CLR 215 (from 271) and Commonwealth v McCormack (1984) 155 CLR 277 are cited in support.(5)The Court has power to amend ambiguous orders: R v Cripps; Ex parte Muldoon [1984] 1 QB 686; Commissioner of Taxes v British Australian Wool Realisation Association Ltd [1932] VLR 109; Deputy Commission of Taxation v Healy (2003) 52 ATR 330; and 168 Wharf St v Amstar [2005] QCA 44.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Auld has made reference to a number of cases dealing with the Court's power to amend orders pursuant to the slip rule and inherent jurisdiction - particularly Newmont Yandal Operations Pty Limited v J Aron Corporation and Goldman Sachs Group (2007) 70 NSWLR 411 ("Newmont"). Mr Auld put forward the following propositions:(1)A superior court can interpret an earlier decision by declaration "where a dispute arises relating to whether subsequent conduct is or is not within the orders contemplated".(2)The Court has inherent jurisdiction to amend orders including on terms to avoid injustice.(3)The Court has inherent jurisdiction to amend orders including costs order "for inadvertence of counsel": see the case of Stowe v Stowe (Supreme Court of Western Australia, Full Court, 15 September 1995 and 16 October 1995).(4)The Court has power pursuant to the slip rule to amend orders for inadvertence of counsel: L Shaddock & Associates Pty Limited v Parramatta City Council (No 2) (1982) 151 CLR 590; Gould v Vaggelas (1995) 157 CLR 215 (from 271) and Commonwealth v McCormack (1984) 155 CLR 277 are cited in support.(5)The Court has power to amend ambiguous orders: R v Cripps; Ex parte Muldoon [1984] 1 QB 686; Commissioner of Taxes v British Australian Wool Realisation Association Ltd [1932] VLR 109; Deputy Commission of Taxation v Healy (2003) 52 ATR 330; and 168 Wharf St v Amstar [2005] QCA 44. Accepting all of the above propositions, as Mr Gilbert did, there are a number of matters which in my view compel rejection of the contentions advanced on behalf of Mr Swain:(1)I do not accept that there is any ambiguity in the order.(2)I accept that orders 1-4 are orders as between Balanced Securities and Mr Swain and orders 5-9 are orders between Balanced Securities and the other defendants but it was appropriate (particularly since one of the parties was consenting and the others did not appear) to have different orders for each set of defendants and both sets of orders provide for the defendants in each set to pay the costs of the proceedings without limitation. I am unable to accept the construction advanced on behalf of Mr Swain, which is entirely inconsistent with the words used. (3)No clerical mistake, error arising from an accidental slip or omission has been identified and rule 36.17 therefore has no application.(4)Mr Swain was at the hearing on 10 October 2011 represented by counsel (Mr O'Brien).(5)The orders that were made were made by consent.(6)The circumstances in which orders can be set aside are quite limited as Newmont acknowledged (see [29]). There is no evidence from Mr O'Brien that he meant to agree to some different orders. Indeed there is no evidence that Mr Swain informed Mr O'Brien of his understanding or instructed him to agree to orders that limited his liability for costs. Further, I should add that although there may be cases in which evidence from counsel in support of exercise of the inherent jurisdiction as to counsels' belief as to the effect of the orders made, may not be required see Newmont at [133] (where it was clear that the order made had an unintended legal consequence in respect of the other proceedings on foot), I do not think that this is such a case, since the order in question was absolutely clear in effect and could not reasonably have been viewed by counsel as having any different effect. (7)There is nothing to suggest that there was any conduct by those representing Balanced Securities or any reason to invalidate the agreement of Mr Swain to the order: see Harvey v Phillips (1956) 95 CLR 235 at pp 243-244 on the circumstances in which consent orders can be set aside. Unilateral mistake by Mr Swain as to the meaning of the orders is not such a basis.(8)The relevant order for costs made against Mr Swain was that sought by the plaintiff and set out in its notice of motion of 19 September 2011 and in submissions provided by counsel for the plaintiff: see CB pp 131-144, particularly para 54 of those submissions. The order for costs made reflected what Balanced Securities was seeking.(9)Mr Swain had not only asserted that his agreement with Mr Anderson gave him an equitable interest which was entitled to priority over Balanced Securities' interest but also asserted that as a matter of construction of Balanced Securities' mortgage over all of the land it did not secure the loans between Balanced Securities and Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd ("Owston") and that it was null and void. He therefore was by his defence and cross claim challenging Balanced Securities' entire claim as a means of resisting the specific claim against him, thereby exposing him to the very order for costs which was sought by Balanced Securities and made.