NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT COURT
CITATION:
Suttram Pty Limited v Michelin Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWDC 429
FILE NUMBER(S):
4530/06
HEARING DATE(S):
JUDGMENT DATE:
17 March 2009
PARTIES:
Suttram Pty Limited
Michelin Australia Pty Ltd
JUDGMENT OF:
Cogswell SC DCJ
COUNSEL:
Mr Sharpe for Suttram Pty Ltd
Mr Vincent for Michelin Australia Pty Ltd
SOLICITORS:
CATCHWORDS:
CIVIL LAW
evidence
application of s 136 Evidence Act
statement of party as factual basis for opinion of expert
danger that a particular use of the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to a party
review of authorities
LEGISLATION CITED:
Evidence Act 1995 s 60, s 136
CASES CITED:
Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 7) [2003] FCA 893
Lardil, Kaiadilt, Yangkaal, Gangalidda Peoples v State of Queensland [2000] FCA 1548
Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297
Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907
Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371
TEXTS CITED:
DECISION:
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
This judgment concerns a ruling which I am invited to make by one of the parties to limit the use to be made of particular evidence. A judge may make such an order under s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995.
The need for a ruling arises in circumstances where an expert has been called by the second defendant in these proceedings. His name is Mr Henry Herzog. He has expressed opinions in writing and in oral evidence before me. It is common ground that amongst the documents provided to him to assist him in expressing his opinions about questions posed to him was a statement by Mr Ross Weatherburn dated 4 May 2007. Mr Ross Weatherburn is the principal of the plaintiff in these proceedings and was the driver of a truck which was involved in an accident which is the subject of these proceedings.
Mr Sharpe, who appears for the plaintiff, has tendered the statement of Mr Weatherburn because it had been provided to Mr Herzog for him to consider in expressing his opinions. Mr Vincent, who appears for the second defendant, does not object to the tender and accordingly I have admitted the statement, which is now marked exhibit Y in these proceedings. It was formerly MFI 7.
However, Mr Vincent asks me to limit the use to be made of exhibit Y. The limitation which he seeks is that exhibit Y be limited so that it does not represent evidence of the facts which are asserted in the statement, but is merely evidence of the material taken into account by Mr Herzog to enable me to better understand Mr Herzog's evidence. Mr Sharpe opposes such an order limiting the use which can now be made of exhibit Y.
In arguing his case for a limiting order under s 136 of the Evidence Act, Mr Vincent relies on the provision that for such an order to be made there needs to be demonstrated a danger that a particular use of the evidence might be unfairly…
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- Case
- [2009] NSWDC 429
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the evidence in question was admissible under section 136(1)(a) of the Evidence Act, which prohibits the admission of evidence that might be unfairly prejudicial to a party. The court had to balance the probative value of the evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice. Michelin argued that the statement was highly prejudicial and irrelevant to the issues in the case. Suttram contended that the evidence was relevant and should be admitted. The court considered the authorities on the application of section 136 and the principles guiding the admissibility of expert evidence.
The court found that the evidence in question was indeed unfairly prejudicial to Michelin. The court emphasised that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court noted that the statement was highly prejudicial and could lead the jury to decide the case on an emotional basis rather than on the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence should be excluded under section 136(1)(a) of the Evidence Act. Consequently, Suttram's application to adduce the expert evidence was dismissed.
The Federal Court of Australia ordered that the expert evidence in question was inadmissible. The court's decision was based on the application of section 136 of the Evidence Act, which prohibits the admission of evidence that might be unfairly prejudicial to a party. The court's ruling was grounded in the need to maintain a fair trial and prevent the jury from being influenced by irrelevant or prejudicial evidence. The outcome of the case underscores the importance of ensuring that expert evidence is both relevant and fair in civil proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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