Reported Decision: (1999) 17 ACLC 1242
New South Wales
Supreme Court
CITATION: Super John Pty Limited & 4 Ors v Futuris Rural Pty Limited [1999] NSWSC 627 revised - 28/07/99 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Equity FILE NUMBER(S): 2746/99 HEARING DATE(S): 16/06/99, 21/06/99, 22/06/99 JUDGMENT DATE:
22 June 1999PARTIES :
Super John Pty Limited ACN 000 375 093 (P1/Applicant1)
Batoka Pty Limited ACN 002 904 930 (P2/Applicant2)
Elizabeth Lancy & Julian Lancey as trustees for Elizabeth Superannuation Fund (P3/Applicant 3)
Allistair Hazard (P4/Applicant 4)
Ian Morton (P5/Applicant 5)
Futuris Rural Pty Limited ACN 009 339 333 (D)JUDGMENT OF: Santow J
COUNSEL : S J Blanks (Sol) (Ps)
M Bennett (D)SOLICITORS: Stephen Blanks & Associates (Ps)
Watson MangioniCATCHWORDS: CORPORATIONS — Compulsory acquisition — Application to Federal Court under s701(6) of Corporations Law over two years ago which did not anticipate successful challenge to Federal Court’s jurisdiction generally in Corporations Law matters — Settled view of law at time of application in favour of Federal Court’s jurisdiction — Subsequent decision to contrary over two years later — Fresh application to Supreme Court of New South Wales under s701(6) of Corporations Law out of time unless dispensation given under s1322(4) of Corporations Law or covered by s1322(2) — Availability of dispensation — Does substantial injustice preclude. ACTS CITED: Corporations Law Ch 6, s447A, s459G s701(6), s730, s743, s1322(4), s1322(6)(c) CASES CITED: BP Australia Ltd v Amman Aviation Pty Ltd (1996) 62 FCR 451
Richard Campbell Brien & 1 Ors v Australasian Memory Pty Limited & Anor (1997) 25 ACSR 1 at 48 and (1999) 29 ACSR at 344
David Grant & Co Pty Limited v Westpac Banking Corporation (1994-95) 184 CLR 265
DB Management Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investment Commission and Others [1999] FCA 293
Elderslie Finance Corporation Limited v ASC (1993) 11 ACLC 787
Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346
Kleinwort Benson Ltd & Ors v Lincoln City Council [1998] 3 WLR 1095
Re Wakim; ex parte McNally [1999] HCA 27DECISION: To give dispensation under s1322(4) Corporations Law for late filing of application in NSW Supreme Court under s701(6)
SuperJohn.22June99 — 23 June, 1999: Super John P/L & 4 Ors v Futuris Rural P/L 822 June 1999
REVISED — 24 June, 1999
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
IN EQUITYSANTOW J
No. 2746/99
SUPER JOHN PTY LIMITED ACN 000 375 093
First Plaintiff/First ApplicantBATOKA PTY LIMITED ACN 002 904 930
Second Plaintiff/Second ApplicantELIZABETH LANCEY & JULIAN LANCEY as trustees for ELIZABETH SUPERANNUATION FUND
Third Plaintiff/Third ApplicantALLISTAIR HAZARD
Fourth Plaintiff/Fourth ApplicantIAN MORTON
Fifth Plaintiff/Fifth ApplicantJUDGMENT — ex tempore
FUTURIS RURAL PTY LIMITED ACN 009 339 333
Defendant/RespondentTHE ESSENTIAL ISSUE
1 The essential issue before me is whether the Plaintiffs’ application for dispensation for late filing of an application by a dissenting shareholder under s701(6) of the Corporations Law should be granted pursuant to s1322(4) of the Corporations Law. 2 The original application was made in time to…
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- Case
- [1999] NSWSC 627
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues involved the interpretation of sections 701(6), 1322(4), and 1322(2) of the Corporations Law, particularly concerning the timing of applications and the availability of dispensation when jurisdiction is subsequently called into question. The court had to balance the principle of finality in legal proceedings against the potential for substantial injustice if the application was not considered. The settled view of the law at the time of the initial application was in favour of the Federal Court’s jurisdiction, but the subsequent contrary decision necessitated a re-evaluation of the application's validity and the circumstances under which it could proceed in the Supreme Court.
In determining the availability of dispensation, the court found that while there was a general principle against allowing out-of-time applications, dispensation could be granted if it would prevent substantial injustice. The court considered whether the applicant, Super John Pty Ltd, had acted reasonably and whether the circumstances warranted an exception to the usual rules regarding timeliness of applications. Ultimately, the court decided that the substantial injustice test was met, and dispensation was granted under section 1322(4) of the Corporations Law. This allowed the fresh application to proceed despite being out of time.
The final orders of the court permitted the application to proceed, recognising the exceptional nature of the circumstances and the need to prevent substantial injustice. The court emphasised the importance of finality in legal proceedings but acknowledged that exceptional cases may require flexibility in the application of procedural rules. The decision highlights the need for careful consideration of jurisdictional issues and the potential consequences of changes in the settled view of the law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter originated with an initial application by Super John Pty Ltd to the Federal Court for compulsory acquisition of shares under section 701(6) of the Corporations Law. This application was made in the context of a settled view that the Federal Court had jurisdiction. Subsequently, a decision was made that contradicted the settled view, leading Super John Pty Ltd to apply to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for compulsory acquisition under the same provision. The application to the Supreme Court was out of time, necessitating either dispensation under section 1322(4) of the Corporations Law or coverage under section 1322(2). The case proceeded to determine the availability of dispensation in light of the substantial injustice caused by the delay in the application.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the settled view of the law at the time of the initial application to the Federal Court preclude the Supreme Court from considering the subsequent application for compulsory acquisition under section 701(6) of the Corporations Law?
2. Can the substantial injustice caused by the delay in applying to the Supreme Court preclude the granting of dispensation under section 1322(4) of the Corporations Law?
3. Is the subsequent application to the Supreme Court covered by section 1322(2) of the Corporations Law, thereby allowing it to proceed despite being out of time?
Held
1. The settled view of the law at the time of the initial application to the Federal Court does not preclude the Supreme Court from considering the subsequent application for compulsory acquisition under section 701(6) of the Corporations Law.
2. The substantial injustice caused by the delay in applying to the Supreme Court does not preclude the granting of dispensation under section 1322(4) of the Corporations Law.
3. The subsequent application to the Supreme Court is not covered by section 1322(2) of the Corporations Law, thereby preventing it from proceeding despite being out of time.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court examined whether the settled view of the law at the time of the initial application to the Federal Court precluded the Supreme Court from considering the subsequent application under section 701(6) of the Corporations Law. The Court held that the settled view of law at the time of the initial application did not preclude the Supreme Court from considering the subsequent application. The Court reasoned that the settled view of the law at the time of the initial application was that the Federal Court had jurisdiction over Corporations Law matters, but subsequent decisions changed this understanding. This change in the settled view of the law did not bind the Supreme Court to the same extent as a binding precedent, allowing it to consider the subsequent application.
The Court also considered whether the substantial injustice caused by the delay in applying to the Supreme Court precluded the granting of dispensation under section 1322(4) of the Corporations Law. The Court found that substantial injustice did not preclude the granting of dispensation. The Court reasoned that while delay alone is not sufficient to grant dispensation, the circumstances surrounding the delay and the potential for substantial injustice were relevant factors. In this case, the Court found that the delay did not cause substantial injustice sufficient to preclude the granting of dispensation.
Finally, the Court examined whether the subsequent application to the Supreme Court was covered by section 1322(2) of the Corporations Law, which allows for certain applications to proceed despite being out of time. The Court held that the subsequent application was not covered by section 1322(2). The Court reasoned that section 1322(2) applies to situations where there is a substantial question to be tried, and the delay in bringing the application was not due to any fault or neglect on the part of the applicant. The Court found that the delay was due to the applicant’s reliance on the settled view of the law at the time of the initial application, which did not preclude the Supreme Court from considering the subsequent application.
The binding legal principle established by this decision is that changes in the settled view of the law regarding jurisdiction do not bind the Supreme Court to the same extent as binding precedent, allowing the Supreme Court to consider subsequent applications even if they are out of time, provided there is no substantial injustice caused by the delay. The Court did not follow, distinguish, or depart from prior authority in this case.