Green & Ors v Australian Hydrocarbons Nl

[1988] HCATrans 314

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4 ~

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Sydney No S75 of 1988

B e t w e e n -

NEVILLE GEORGE GREEN

MARIE ANNETTE GREEN

STEPHEN RICHARD LACHER

PHILIP EDWARD GREEN

ANDREW DAVID GREEN

Applicants

and

AUSTRALIAN HYDROCARBONS N.L.

Respondent

Application for special leave

to appeal

MASON CJ

WILSON J TOOHEY J

Green

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 9 DECEMBER 1988, AT 11.09 AM

(Continued from 25/11/88)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

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MR R. GYLES, QC: If Your Honours please, I appear with my

learned friend, MR J. CALLAWAY, for the applicants.

(instructed by N.G. Green & Co)

MR D.F. JACKSON, QC:  May it please the Court, I appear

with my learned	friend, MR J.S. WHEELHOUSE, for
the respondent.	(instructed by Allen Allen &
Hemsley)

MASON CJ:	Yes, Mr Gyles.
MR GYLES:	Your Honours, the special leave point, in our

submission, is the interrelationship between the general order in relation to solicitors'

costs which was made under the CONVEYANCING ACT

which permitted a gross fee to be charged on

the one hand and the provisions of the LEGAL

PRACTITIONERS' ACT dealing with the submission,

service and so on, of bills of costs and taxation

on the other.

I hasten to say that the particular statutory

framework which was applicable at the time has

since been amended. However, the point remains

virtually identical under the present legislation

because the order made under the CONVEYANCING

ACT has been continued in force so far as is

relevant by a series of later legislative enactments.

I will take Your Honours to that if I may to

show that the point is still a live one.

The issue can be identified from

Mr Justice McHugh's judgment commencing at page 58

of the book and running through to page 61 of

the book. The same point was dealt with by

Mr Justice McLelland as the second ground at

pages 34 and 35 of the book and it was dealt with

by the master at pages 7 to 10 of the book.

have the statutory enactments before Your Honours. Your Honours, it would be necessary to

I would hand them up in sequence: the first

set of enactments is the 1898 LEGAL PRACTITIONERS

ACT as it stood before the 1984 amendments;

secondly, Your Honours, there are the 1984 amendments,

THE LEGAL PRACTITIONERS (SOLICITORS REMUNERATION)

AMENDMENT ACT - I have four copies of that;

there are the saving provisions of that Act.

Then there are the relevant provisions of the

LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 1987 and the relevant saving

provisions under that Act.	Then, Your Honours,
there is the Conveyancing	General Order. The

relevant clause is set out in all of the judgments,

we thought, however, it would be best to have

available a full copy of the general order.

We have photocopied, Your Honours, the 1984 general

order which governed some but not all of the

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bills in question. Your Honours, clause 10, which

is the relevant clause for present purposes,

was the same in both the pre-1984 and post-1984

general order.

To complete the picture, Your Honours,

there are the determinations which have been

made subsequently to 1984 - perhaps I will leave

those, Your Honours, it is a little confusing

at the moment. As the Act stood - - -

MASON CJ:  Are you conducting this as an appeal or

as an application for special leave?

MR GYLES: No, Your Honour, it is is just that without

the documents, Your Honours, I cannot make the

short - it is quite a short point.

MASON CJ:  I see. VQu are just try .to frighten us.

MR GYLES:  Your Honours, under Part V of the 1898 Act there

are provisions which Your Honours, with which

Your Honours will be familiar, requiring delivery

of a signed bill before action, references to

taxation. Section 29 is the particular section

involved which provided that:

The Court may in any case make such order

for the delivery of such bill as aforesaid

by any solicitor -

and section 36 I especially draw attention to,

which says that in the event of:

The payment of a bill ..... application for

such reference be made within twelve months

after payment.

Your Honours, in the present case, side by side

with those provisions was - I did not hand up

the CONVEYANCING ACT, Your Honours - - -

MASON CJ:  Has section 29 been in the Act since its inception

in 1898?

MR GYLES: Yes, Your Honour. It is a section which came

from earlier Acts.

MASON CJ: There is nothing that was in existence in 1898

that operates in any way to cut down the general

words of section 29?

MR GYLES:  No, Your Honour. I had thought the explanation

may have been that it was really a section which

dealt with the delivery of documents rather than

bills of costs unassociated with documents and

whilst that might be right, historically, it

is not the way the section has been construed.

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MASON CJ: No, and delivery up of documents is the subsidiary

part of the section; it is the second limb of

the section?

MR GYLES:  Yes, that is so, Your Honour. I do not think

I handed up to Your Honours the CONVEYANCING

ACT as it stood which provided the foundation

for the general order. Section 206, which is

the relevant section.	Your Honours will see
that the CONVEYANCING ACT, of course, was	a

later Act than the LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT and,

in section 206, it provided for, in effect, a

committee to make general orders for remuneration

and conveyancing et cetera. It was pursuant

to section 206 that the general order which

Your Honours have before you was made and it

has had various forms over the years.

MASON CJ:  But you would run into generalia specialibus

if you were trying to run an argument that

section 206 operates at some kind of implied

repeal of section 29.

MR GYLES:  Your Honour, the question of which statute prevails

is not relevant because the general order expresses

itself to be - - -

MASON CJ: Without prejudice.

MR GYLES:  - - - subject to, at least, the other provisions.

So one has to work them together. But that is

the foundation for the general order.

MASON CJ: When you say "work them together", "without prejudice

to" signifies 'ho detract ion from':

MR GYLES: Well, the words are not "without prejudice",

Your Honour. They are -

MASON CJ:  What are the words?

MR GYLES:  The words, Your Honour, are - - -

WILSON J: "Without prejudice to the power possessed by

the Court".

MR GYLES: Yes, I am sorry, Your Honour:

Without prejudice to the power possessed

by the Court under the ..... Act ..... or otherwise or

to the powers conferred upon the solicitor.

So it is not "without prejudice" to the Act,

it is without prejudice to the powers possessed

by the court under the Act. So it is not quite

as simple as Your Honour put to me.

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MASON CJ:	But section 29 gives the court a power.
MR GYLES:	Yes, Your Honour, indeed.

MASON CJ: So it is without prejudice to that power.

MR GYLES:	Yes, Your Honour.
MASON CJ:	I may be taking a step backward but it is an almost

imperceptible step, Mr Gyles.

MR GYLES:  Your Honour, the point, if I may put it this way, is

that clause 10, whatever else it may or may not

do, does permit the remuneration of a solicitor

to be by a gross sum in lieu of by detailed charges.

It has, in the proviso, a procedure by which

the client may require a detailed bill and that

detailed bill may be taxed.

Your Honours, Sir Nigel Bowen, in the case

of FLORENCE INVESTMENTS - and I hand it up to
Your Honours - - -

MASON CJ: This is the judgment referred to in - - -

MR GYLES: Referred to in the judgment under appeal. That

is FLORENCE INVESTMENTS V H.G. SLATER & CO,

(1975) 2 NSWLR 398. Your Honours, at pages 401

to 403, at the top, His Honour considered the

question whether the bill was a taxable bill.

It was a case in which a solicitor had, first

of all, sent a lump sum bill; when there was
an objection to it he sent a detailed bill for

a very much greater amount and various questions

arose following that. The first question was

whether the first bill which went out, the smaller

bill, the gross bill, the lump sum bill, was

taxable. I will not take Your Honours right
through the history that His Honour looked at there

but, at page 402B, His Honour, after referring

to the general principles that a bill, under

the LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT, must be an itemized

bill, said:

However, in New South Wales, the CONVEYANCING

ACT, 1919, Pt XXIV, dealing with "Solicitors'

Remuneration", provides by s.206 -

and that is then set out. His Honour then concludes,

at E:

This general order permitted a solicitor

to render his costs by way of a gross sum

in lieu of detailed charges. It would

seem that such an account, if properly signed and delivered, would constitute a bill on which he could sue his client,

provided his client did not require "a

detailed bill of charges".

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His Honour then went on to say it was more doubtful

as to whether it could be properly referred for

taxation.

Your Honours, in our respectful submission,

what His Honour the Chief Judge in Equity there

said was plainly correct. His Honour then, under

the heading, "Whether taxation is limited to

$5000", exhaustively reviewed the authorities

on that question and examined both the English

and the New South Wales provisions which enable

solicitors to deliver a gross sum bill. There

is quite a history to it, Your Honours. It was

the CONVEYANCING ACT which was the mechanism

for that being done in New South Wales and it

took various forms, as it had in England.

His Honour, in looking at that matter, concluding

at page 407, examines, in our respectful submission,

all of the relevant authorities and it is a reasoned

decision which	is,	in our submission, difficult
to quarrel with.

When the point arose in the present or

instant case, whilst this authority was referred

to the Court, to the judges who looked at it,

the decision in question totally ignores the

fact that His Honour had held - and, in our

submission, rightly held - that a gross bill submitted in accordance with the CONVEYANCING ACT general order was such a bill as could be

sued upon by the solicitor, and would amount

to a bill under the LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT and

that the provisions of the New South Wales conveyancing

order alter the position as it was when there

was no authority for a solicitor to send a gross

bill. And the whole of the reasoning of the

courts below - both the Court of Appeal and the

judge at first instance - proceeds upon the footing

that you must - to fall within the LEGAL PRACTITIONERS

ACT - have a detailed bill.

There must have been some, Your Honours,

misunderstanding about the matter because in

the Court of Appeal Mr Justice McHugh - in

Mr Justice McHugh's judgment - said it was "common

ground" that the bill was not a bill within the

meaning of the LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT. I was

not below but when Mr Caldwell's argument is

considered, he was clearly putting the view that

it was such a bill - and that appears, clearly

enough in our submission, from page 58 line 15

and following and, particularly, of course, his

reference at page 60 line 12, to the provisions

of section 36 of the Act. Because, if I could

remind Your Honours of section 36, in the case

of a paid bill any challenge must be made within

12 months of payment and, if Sir Nigel Bowen

was correct, that a gross bill - a lump sum bill.-

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is a bill, then payment after 12 months would be a

barrier to review. That point could only have

been run by Mr Caldwell if it were contended

that the bill which was sent in this case, was

a bill within section 36.

Your Honours, in our respectful submission,

Appeal is flawed by the assumption which does not come to grips with the FLORENCE

the point is a point of considerable importance. the Court of

INVESTMENTS decision which, in our submission,

is plainly right: that a gross bill, if you

are permitted to send it, then you may sue upon
it subject, of course, to the provisions both
of the LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT and of the conveyancing

order itself.

TOOHEY J:  But is that not the question, Mr Gyles? Can

you point to anything in the FLORENCE INVESTMENTS

case in which Sir Nigel Bowen suggested that

section 29 was not available to a client to whom

a lump sum bill had been rendered?

MR GYLES:  No, His Honour was not looking at that question,

I readily concede, Your Honours, and I have put

the special leave point in the way I have for

this reason: it may be that a residual section 29

discretion still exists even though you are

post-12 months after payment. That is possible.

TOOHEY J: Post-12 months or post-six months?

MR GYLES:  Or either. 12 months because of section 36;

six months because of the general order. That

wi 11 be a matter, on appeal, I would argue "No" but,

even if that be incorrect, then the way the courts

below approach discretion, in my respectful submission,

would have to be radically recast because of

the misapprehension under which they laboured

as to the nature of the bill which went out. The special leave point is of great importance

because the way in which - as Your Honours would

know - there would be very few solicitors who

would send out their bill in a matter in relation
to which the general order governed the position

otherwise than in accordance with the general order. The point thus arises in relation to,

one supposes, most bills which have been sent

out by solicitors at the time.

Your Honours, I have put the submission

that the question still remains under the present

legislative scheme. Perhaps that is a matter

I should await to hear from my learned friend

on if he disagrees with that proposition.

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I think the thing that I have not handed to

Your Honours or taken Your Honours through,

is the legislation which has taken place since

1984 but I, perhaps, should deal with that in

reply if it is raised against me, Your Honours.

MASON CJ:  Yes, thank you, Mr Gyles. Yes, Mr Jackson,

we would particularly value your assistance on

section 29 and as to what the word "bill" connotes

or denotes.

MR JACKSON:  Yes, Your Honours. May I indicate first of

all that one of our submissions is that the issue

is not attended with sufficient doubt and may

I deal with the point Your Honour has raised

in connection with that.

MASON CJ:  Yes, the question is really related to that

submission which you intend to make.

MR JACKSON:  Your Honours, could I say, in relation to

that, one preliminary thing, it is this: none

of the judges in the three courts below has accepted

the arguments on behalf of the applicant and

the argument now sought to be advanced has not

been advanced before - I will come to that in
a moment.

I might also say, Your Honours, that in the Court of Appeal we were not called on, although

it is right to say that the parties before had

handed up outlines of argument - and I will come

to that in a moment.

Your Honours, could I come then to section 29.

The position is simply this, Your Honours: if

one goes to the way in which the argument is

dealt with in the Court of Appeal, it commences

at page 57 line 26 and it goes on to page 60

line 11.	Your Honours will see that after having
set out section 29 at the bottom of page 57,

His Honour then deals with the two bases upon

which the contentions there made about section 29

are rejected.

TOOHEY J: Mr Jackson, just before you take us to those,

what is the significance of the words "as aforesaid"?

MR JACKSON:	Your Honour, the section seems to be in some way defective as a matter of printing. What
I mean by that is this: that it says that:

The Court may in any case make such order -

which one would think means either an order for the

delivery of such bill; the "as aforesaid" referring

back, Your Honour, to section 21(3) which says

what a bill is.

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The other possible way of dealing with the

opening words of section 29 is to say that they

mean, "Make such order as it thinks fit".

TOOHEY J:  It is odd to find a section like that in which

it is said that it provides for the delivery

of a detailed bill in a section which then speaks

of the handing over of papers.

MR JACKSON:  Your Honour, it recognizes that two things

may happen:  one is that a solicitor may not

make a bill - in "bill" I can put it shortly,

a bill in taxable form, that is the bill contemplated

by section 21(3) - but on the other hand it recognizes

that a solicitor may not be prepared to deliver

up documents at some time without the intervention

of the Court. It deals with two topics, with

respect, Your Honour.

TOOHEY J:  Does your argument involve g1v1ng "bill" a different

meaning in section 29 to the meaning that it bears

in other sections?

MR JACKSON: No, Your Honour, not at all. It means, simply, to

put it shortly, the bill contemplated by section 21(3),

that is the -

bill of such fees, charges and disbursements - and that such a bill is a bill, to put it shortly,

in taxable form. That is, one which sets out

'

SD	the items and the amounts in relation to each.
And one goes from there to section 29, and section 29
says that the court may make an order for the
solicitor to deliver such a bill, that is, a bill in
taxable form.

Your Honours, when one comes also to section 36,

to which reference has been made, and it has been held in a number of cases, in the Privy Council and in three different jurisdictions in Australia, that the	term "bill" there means the bill contemplated by	section 21(3), that is, the bill in taxable form
and section 36 is not directed to the situation prior
to delivery of such a bill but to payment after
such a bill has been delivered. So that, Your Honours,
the point I am really getting to with all that is
this, that section 29 simply says that the court
may order a solicitor to deliver what is contemplated
by section 21(3), that is, the bill of fees, charges
and disbursements and that is the bill which it
provides for. Now, Your Honours, that power is not
limited in any way except by the exercise of a
judicial discretion.

If I could move from there then to what is said

in the reasons for judgment in the Court of Appeal at

page 58. Your Honours will see that the endeavour to

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read down the ambit of section 29 failed on two

grounds. The first ground was that the terms of

the general order were expressed with the prefatory

remarks appearing at the bottom of page 58:

"Without prejudice to the power possessed

by the Court under the LEGAL PRACTITIONERS

ACT ..... ''

And the second ground was that there was not, in any

event, any conflict between the two provisions. What

I mean by that, Your Honours, is simply this, that if Your Honours look at the terms of clause 10

it will be seen that the second paragraph of clause 10,

the proviso, says:

Provided that within six months after

delivery of a charge made under this

paragraph, whether it has been paid or not, the client may require that a detailed bill of charges shall be delivered -

and so on.

Now, Your Honours, clause 10, in that proviso,

speaks of the right to have a bill in taxable form

whereas section 29 speaks of a discretion. The right

to have the bill in taxable form conferred by the
proviso does not cover the same ground, however, as

the ambit of the discretion conferred by section 29

and it does not cover the same ground because it

exists only for the time provided for by the proviso
whereas the time within which the power under section 29
may be exercised is not limited temporarily. And,

Your Honours, those two grounds are the grounds referred to at page 59 in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and commencing about line 15:

'TI1e short answer to the submission of

Mr Caldwell is found in the opening words

of clause 10 -

and His Honour deals with that between lines 10 and

18, and then says:

However, even if those words were not

contained in Clause 10, there would be no inconsistency between s29 and clause 10 -

and then deals with, in the next paragraph, with the

argument to which I have just referred, the fact there

is no inconsistency in any event.

So that, Your Honours, if one looks at the terms

of the two provisions, we would submit, it is plain,

in fact, that there is no conflict between the provisions.

Clause 10 speaks of the right to have a bill in taxable

form. Section 29 speaks of a discretion. The right is

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limited temporily; the discretion is not. And,

Your Honours, the presence of the opening words

of clause 10 is eloquent, in our submission.

Those views adopted by the Court of Appeal seem

clearly open, in our submission, on the words of

the provisions and represent a perfectly

intelligible and, in our submission, plainly

correct reading together of the two provisions.

Your Honours, may I say one other thing on

the substance of the case, and it is this: the

second basis for contending before the Court of

Appeal that the power conferred by section 29 was

in some way limited was the existence of section 36

of the LEGAL PRACTITIONERS and, Your Honours, our

learned friends flirted with that .....
in their argument today. That argument was disposed

of by the Court of Appeal at page 60, line 12,

through to page 61, line 8. Your Honours will see

about line 12 the reference to section 36, and what

section 36 says relevantly is that the payment of a

bill shall not preclude the court from referring the

bill for taxation, and then it has a proviso

permitting that to be done:

within twelve months after payment.

But as the court pointed out, it is the payment of

a bill which precludes the court from referring that

bill for taxation. Your Honours will see that it was

common ground - and, Your Honours, this was in

response to a question by the Court of Appeal -
it was accepted before the Court of Appeal that the
accounts rendered were not bills for the purposes of

sections 21 or 29.

Now, Your Honours, as the court said, correctly,

in our submission, nothing in section 36 operates to

cut down the general power of the court under

section 29 and, in our submission, there is no

reason why one should take a different view of the

terms of the expression - or the meaning of the

term "bill".

Your Honours, I mentioned before that there

were cases on the equivalent of section 36. They

have always held that the bill referred to is a bill

of the nature referred to in section 21(3). Could

I give Your Honours the references to them? The

decision of the Privy Council in DUFFETT V McEVOY,

(1895) 10 AC 300 at pages 302 to 303 - Your Honours,

I do not intend to go to all these cases in detail.

TS	May I take Your Honours to this one for a moment? Your Honours will see at page 302, in the new
paragraph on the page:

sect. 41 of the ATTORNEYS AND SOLICITORS

ACT -

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which is the equivalent of section 36, is referred

to and Your Honours will see it is in relevantly

identical terms. And Their Lordships say:

Now, the argument is, that where there

has been payment of the attorney's demand at

all, there a bill should be ordered to be

to be taxed afterwards, when there are

special circumstances, and that it should not

be done at all if twelve months has been

allowed to elapse after payment; but when

the terms of the section are looked at, it

does not amount to that. If there had never

been any bill at all, which seems to have been

the case here, that is to say, nothing that

would give any details or items, or enable

the party to judge of the goodness of the
items, the bill may be ordered to be

delivered, it not necessarily following that

then it would be ordered to be taxed, the

object of ordering the delivery of a bill

being to see whether there are such special

circumstances as would cause it to be taxed,

and for some reason or other the attorney in

the present case has apparently been very

reluctant indeed to allow his bill -

meaning "bill" in that sense of the term -

to be seen.

That decision, Your Honours, is followed in Victoria

in EX PARTE BECK, (1895) 21 VLR 362 at 364; in

Queensland in EX PARTE WILSON AND HEMMING, (1913) St R Qd 34,

and in New South Wales, in EX PARTE LEVY, (1902)
19 NSWWN 252. Your Honours, I do not propose to
go to those cases although I have copies for

Your Honours here. It is sufficient to say about them

that whether or not they refer specifically to

DUFFETT V McEVOY, each of the cases in each of the

three jurisdictions holds that in the case

of provisions such as section 36 the bill contemplated
is a bill in taxable form.	The cases are all one

way on the question, Your Honours, and with respect,

seem right.

Your Honours, I mentioned before that the

parties before the Court of Appeal set out their

arguments in writing as well as orally. May I hand

to Your Honours copies of the outline of the

appellants' argument before the Court of Appeal. It

is annexed to an affidavit to that effect, Your Honours.

Your Honours will see that our learned friend's

argument today has an element on freshness compared

with the arguments in the Court of Appeal. After

setting out, at pages 1, 2, 3 and 4, the background

matters, the matters argued are set out in the middle

of page 4. Your Honours will see the argument that

is set out in respect of grounds 1 and 2. It appears

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at pages 4 to 7 and then ground 3, Your Honours,

does not seem to touch upon the present case.

Your Honours, those are out submissions.

MASON CJ: Yes, thank you, Mr Jackson. Yes, Mr Gyles?

MR GYLES:  Your Honours, firstly, as to the no submission of doubt

point, the question which my learned friend does not
address is the argument that if it be correct that a

bill submitted in accordance with the general order

is a bill within the meaning of the relevant part of

the LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT, that that is a bill for

the purposes of section 21 and section 29 and section 36.

And thus it would be that, in those circumstances,

the court would be asked to make an order for the
delivery of something which has already been delivered.

My learned friend has read into the word "bill" the

words "bill in taxable form". Now, whilst it is

correct that in the absence of the general order

section 10, the authorities would have that conclusion,

the principle being their client should know whether
to tax or not, the introduction in 1920 in England,

and in 1919 in New South Wales, of the provision

for 8-0licitors to charge gross sums has-altered the

basis upon which those older authorities were

formulated. ·

DUF'.FEl'I'' s case and the other cases, Your Honours will note,

all pre-date by many years the introduction in

England in 1920 and in New South Wales in 1919 - or actually it was later, I think - the ability to charge

a gross sum. Once it is granted that such a bill is

a bill within the meaning of the LEGAL PRACTITIONERS

ACT then, in my respectful submission, the reasoning

in the courts below falls to the ground because

section 29 and section 36 and section 21 would all

apply to a gross bill and the ability to - section 29

is obviously directed to a situation in which the

solicitor will not send a bill which can then be

dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the

Act. Where he has sent a bill in accordance with the

order it really has no application; either no

application as a matter of jurisdiction or virtually
none in the proper exercise of discretion.	So, we

submit there is a very real question in the present

case and if Sir Nigel Bowen is right then, we submit,

the court below was wrong.

As to the argument that this was not put below,

I did in-chief refer to the fact that whilst that statement appears in Mr Justice McHugh's decision,

it is impossible to understand - I mean, the point

in substance was clearly put. Mr Caldwell referred

to the FLORENCE decision; he referred to section 36
and the burden of the argument both before the
master, Mr Justice McLelland and the Court of Appeal

was that the general order must be read with the

LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT and it is impossible to

understand the significance of a reference to section 36

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in this context if it were not being argued that a

bill in accordance with the order was a proper bill.

Your Honours, I have only just had the

opportunity of looking at these written submissions

which I have not seen before but it does, with

respect, appear that the argument as to grounds 1 and

2 which appears between pages 4 and 7 certainly

squarely put the interrelation between the two

sections; clearly put that section 29 is directed

to a situation where no bill has been delivered,

and that appears - if Your Honours look at page 5

of those written submissions at point 5:

Clause 10 is specifically directed to

situations such as the present where there

has been a gross sum bill and no request

within 6 months.

Reference to the purpose of the six month limitation

period.

Section 29 ..... should not be read so as to render clause 10 otiose.

Clause 10 does not require a solicitor to

deliver a bill.

That is correct.

The proviso deals with the situation where

a solicitor has in fact delivered a gross sum

bill of charges.

If the solicitor does not deliver any bill of charges then clause 10 does not apply

and the solicitor can be required by S.29

to deliver a bill. Thus S.29 clearly

has work to do -

and so on.	So, I submit that the point was clearly
adverted to in the written submissions and there must

have been some cross-purposes as to any concession. It,

no doubt, would have been correct to concede that apart

from the provisions of the general order the

authorities would indicate that an itemized bill should

be sent but where the general order prevails then, in

my respectful submission, it is a totally different

situation. If Your Honours please.

MASON CJ: Yes, thank you, Mr Gyles.

It is only in an exceptional case that this

Court grants special leave to appeal in matters relating to the taxation of solicitor/client costs

under State laws. This is not such a case, the more

so when it appears, as it does, that there are strong

SlT6/4/PLC	17	9/12/88
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grounds for thinking that the decision of the

Court of Appeal affirming the decision of

Mr Justice McLelland was correct.	The application
is therefore refused.

MR JACKSON:	We ask for costs of the application?
MASON CJ:	You cannot oppose costs, can you, Mr Gyles?
MR GYLES:	No.
MASON CJ:	The application is refused with costs.

AT 11.50 AM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE

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