SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Sunshine Group Australia Pty Ltd v Trappando Pty Ltd [2023] QCA 214
PARTIES:
SUNSHINE GROUP AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
ACN 168 390 083
(appellant)
v
TRAPPANDO PTY LTD
ACN 112 828 958
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 6461 of 2023
SC No 154 of 2022DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Cairns – [2023] QSC 87 (Bowskill CJ)DELIVERED ON:
3 November 2023
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
25 September 2023
JUDGES:
Boddice JA and Burns and Ryan JJ
ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed on the standard basis.
CATCHWORDS:
CONVEYANCING – THE CONTRACT AND CONDITIONS OF SALE – AGENT’S COMMISSION – where the respondent was appointed as real estate agent for the sale of the appellant’s property by way of a Form 6 appointment – where the Form 6 indicated the appointment was for an “exclusive agency” that would continue as an “open listing” at the end of the exclusive agency period – where the sales manager of the respondent, the director of the appellant and a third party who claimed to have interested buyers also entered into a Deed of Agreement shortly prior to the relevant appointment in order for the third party to be rewarded for any introduction of the buyer to the property – where, pursuant to the Deed of Agreement, no commission was payable unless the contract actually proceeded to settlement – where a contract of sale was entered into, but later terminated for the buyer’s breach, and the deposit was forfeited – where the respondent was successful in recovering the agent’s commission, on the basis that it was the effective cause of the sale and was entitled to its commission despite the termination of the contract – whether the respondent was properly appointed by the appellant despite the relevant Form 6 not including a mandatory statement that the commission was to be worked out only on the ‘actual’ sale price – whether the Form 6 was to be read and construed jointly with the Deed of Agreement – whether the respondent was the effective cause of sale within the term of the appointment
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 48A(2)
Property Occupations Act 2014 (Qld), s 89, s 105Golden Mile Property Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Cudgegong Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 18 BPR 36,121; [2016] NSWCA 224, cited
JKC Australia LNG Pty Ltd v CH2M Hill Companies Ltd (No 2) [2020] WASCA 112, cited
Smith v Chadwick (1882) 20 Ch D 27; [1882] UKLawRpCh 73, consideredCOUNSEL:
M A Jonsson KC for the appellant
S W Couper KC, with C J Ryall, for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Preston Law for the appellant
O’Reilly Stevens Lawyers for the respondent
BODDICE JA: On 18 May 2023, the primary judge gave judgment for the respondent in its claim against the appellant for relief in relation to commission due and…
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- Case
- [2023] QCA 214
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the arguments of the appellant, including the contention that the respondent was not properly appointed by the appellant as the relevant Form 6 did not include a mandatory statement that the commission was to be worked out only on the actual sale price. However, the court found that the omission of the word “actual” did not matter as the plain meaning of the words in part 7 was that the commission for the service was worked out on the price for which the property was agreed to be sold, not, for example, an advertised or listed price. The court also found that the respondent was the effective cause of sale, not the sales manager in his personal capacity. The court concluded that the respondent was the appointed real estate agent for the sale of the property, by the relevant Form 6, and that the respondent was the effective cause of sale of the property “within the Term” of the appointment.
The court found that commission was payable in accordance with the terms of the 2019 appointment. The terms of the 2019 appointment were not to be read down and construed conjointly with the Deed of Agreement. The respondent was not a party to the Deed of Agreement which, insofar as it purported to record an appointment of Anderson personally with Soh as agents for the sale of the property, would be unenforceable for non-compliance with the Act in multiple respects. Further, the Form 6 appointment was an agreement between the respondent as real estate agent and the appellant as seller. Clause 15.1 of its essential terms and conditions specifically provided that it constituted the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the subject matter and superseded all prior negotiations or expressions of intent or understandings.
The appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed on the standard basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, the primary judge found that commission was payable in accordance with the terms of the 2019 appointment. Its terms were not to be read down and construed conjointly with the Deed of Agreement. The respondent was not a party to the Deed of Agreement which, insofar as it purported to record an appointment of Anderson personally with Soh as agents for the sale of the property, would be unenforceable for non-compliance with the Act in multiple respects. Further, the Form 6 appointment was an agreement between the respondent as real estate agent and the appellant as seller. Clause 15.1 of its essential terms and conditions specifically provided that it constituted the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the subject matter and superseded all prior negotiations or expressions of intent or understandings.ConsiderationGround 1 The appellant submits that on a proper construction of s 105 of the Act, the respondent was not properly appointed under that Act by the appellant as the relevant Form 6 did not include a mandatory statement that the commission was to be worked out only on the actual sale price. Section 105 of the Act provides:“105 Other requirements—commission(1)This section applies to an appointment of a property agent or resident letting agent for a service that is the sale or letting of property or the collecting of rents if commission is payable for the service and is expressed as a percentage of an estimated sale price or amount of rent to be paid or collected.(2)The appointment must state, in writing, that the commission for the service is worked out only on—(a)for the sale of property—the actual sale price; or(b)for the letting of property—the actual rental for the property; or(c)for the collecting of rents—the actual amount of rent collected.” Section 105(1) of the Act only has operation if the commission payable for the service “is expressed as a percentage of an estimated sale price…”. Only, in that event, is there a requirement that the appointment state, in writing, that the commission is worked out only on the actual sale price of the property. In the present case, the relevant Form 6 provided that commission was to be payable for the relevant service as follows:(1)For a sale price up to and including $6,300,000 plus GST, 4.4 per cent of the sale price;(2)For a sale price of over and including $6,300,001 plus GST, for money above $6,000,000 plus GST, to be paid to the agent plus GST. Having regard to the wording of that clause, it may be doubted that the commission was expressed as a percentage of an estimated sale price. However, as the respondent has not filed a notice of contention, it is unnecessary to determine that question. In any event, there was no error in the primary judge’s conclusion that the omission of the word “actual”, before “sale price”, rendered the relevant Form 6 of no legal effect. The words used in the Form 6 do not set out or express any formula or provision for the payment of commission to the respondent other than by reference to a particular sale price. The only proper construction of the words “sale price” in the relevant Form 6 was that it was referring to the price for which the property was agreed to be sold, which, for the purposes of the section, is the actual sale price.