Suleyman and Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2000] AATA 1100
•14 December 2000
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2000] AATA 1100
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No N1998/953
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )
Re ZAKARIYA HARUN SULEYMAN
Applicant
And DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Ms G Ettinger, Senior Member
Date14 December 2000
PlaceSydney
Decision The Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirms the decision of the Respondent, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs dated 24 June 1998 to refuse, pursuant to section 13.(1) of the Citizenship Act 1948, the Applicant Mr Zakariya Harun Suleyman's application for Australian citizenship.
..............................................
Ms G Ettinger
Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
Citizenship application - permanent residence cancelled – discretion re citizenship – "good character" - decision to refuse citizenship affirmed
LEGISLATION
Australian Citizenship Act 1948 ss 13.(1) & 52A.(2)
Australian Citizenship Instructions
CASES
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Gray (1994) 33 ALD 13
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273
Mlinar and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 48 ALD 771
Peterson v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (AAT 13432, 6 November 1998)
Re Dainty and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 12 ALD 416
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
Re Hamwi and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (AAT 9639, 25 July 1994)
Re Naumovski and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 20 AAR 388
Re PE and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (AAT 9990, 6 February 1995)
Suleyman and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (RRTA N1999/28566, 23 December 1999)
Suleyman v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 610
Suleyman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (FCA N547/00, 23 August 2000)
REASONS FOR DECISION
14 December 2000 Ms G Ettinger, Senior Member
The decision under review before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") was the decision of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs ("DIMA"), as delegated by its Minister, dated 24 June 1998 (T1/3), to refuse the application for citizenship of Mr Zakariya Harun Suleyman, or Zakariya Suleyman, previously known as Abdi-Rashid Hassan Farah, pursuant to section 13.(1)(f) of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 ("the Citizenship Act").
Section 13(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act requires that an applicant for citizenship must satisfy the Minister that he/she is of good character. MIMA, taking into account Mr Suleyman's criminal history, found that he did not satisfy the requirement of "good character" pursuant to section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act.
The Applicant was self-represented before the Tribunal and the Respondent, DIMA, by Mr G Peek, Principal Solicitor of the Australian Government Solicitor. Oral evidence was given by Mr Suleyman and his former wife, Ms Rosalie May Bannerman, who gave her evidence by telephone. The hearing was adjourned to give the parties the opportunity of making written submissions.
ISSUE BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL
The issue under consideration was:
· Whether the Applicant satisfied the permanent residency requirements pursuant to section 13.(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act;
· If so, whether the Applicant was of "good character" pursuant to section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act.
· Whether the discretion to grant citizenship should be exercised to grant the Applicant citizenship pursuant to section 13.(1) of the Citizenship Act.
BACKGROUND
The matter before this Tribunal has had a lengthy history since the date of Mr Suleyman's application dated 20 July 1998 (T1/5) for review of the decision by DIMA not to grant him Australian citizenship. I have detailed the progress of Mr Suleyman's application for the purposes of clarifying his current position. As relevant, it follows.
A hearing set down for 21 January 1999 was vacated at the request of the Respondent on 2 December 1998 in order to enable it to reassess Mr Suleyman's permanent residency status, and because it was claimed that the Applicant was absent from Australia and was not expected to return until mid-January 1999.
A "Notice of Intention to Cancel Under Section 109 of the Migration Act 1958" was sent to Mr Suleyman on 21 December 1998 advising that his failure to comply with section 101 of the Migration Act 1958, which resulted in a conviction in the Sydney District Court pursuant to section 29B of the Crimes Act 1914 for making a number of false statements to DIMA, may result in his visa being cancelled.
A further "Notice of Intention to Cancel Visa Under Section 501 of the Migration Act 1958" was forwarded to the Applicant on 22 January 1999. The notice invited a response from Mr Suleyman within fourteen days of receipt of the letter, adding that in the absence of a response, a decision to cancel his visa would be made on the available material.
This Tribunal set down another Hearing for 23 March 1999, which was vacated at the Respondent's request on 22 February 1999. DIMA advised that Mr Suleyman was still out of the country and could not be contacted. Ms Quayle for the Respondent stated that:
"... I am concerned that Mr Suleyman has not been pursuing his AAT application. The previous hearing set down for 21 January 1999 was vacated at the Respondent's request due to the Department's cancellation action. The vacation was also appropriate as he had left the country and would not be returning anytime in the foreseeable future. It may be appropriate that his application be dismissed for want of prosecution …"
DIMA then cancelled Mr Suleyman's visa pursuant to section 109 of the Migration Act 1958 on 12 May 1999, one day before a Directions Hearing listed before me on 13 May 1999. Mr Suleyman attended the Directions Hearing of 13 May 1999 in person, and Ms Quayle for the Department, attended by telephone from Canberra. Mr Suleyman claimed not to have received notification of the cancellation of his visa on 12 May 1999, and was given a copy at the Tribunal on 13 May 1999. Mr Suleyman requested that the Tribunal postpone making a decision regarding his application until he had obtained a further determination with regard to his visa from the Refugee Review Tribunal. I agreed to do as he requested on that occasion.
Section 52A.(2) of the Citizenship Act provides that a person is not entitled to make an application for review of a decision pursuant to section 13 of the Citizenship Act unless the person is a permanent resident. However, the Tribunal noted that Mr Suleyman's visa was cancelled after he had applied to have the decision not to grant citizenship reviewed. The Tribunal considered Mr Suleyman's accrued rights to have his decision reviewed on the merits, and held that he should be availed of the opportunity of putting argument before the Tribunal with respect to his accrued rights.
At a further Directions Hearing on 6 March 2000, Mr Suleyman told the Tribunal that he had received a refusal from the Refugee Review Tribunal for the grant of a protection visa (Suleyman and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (RRTA N1999/28566, 23 December 1999)). Mr Suleyman advised that he had appealed the decision to the Federal Court of Australia, and requested that the Tribunal postpone making a decision with regard to his application until the Federal Court had heard his application, which was listed for 20 April 2000.
Ms Quayle, who appeared by telephone link from Canberra, representing the Respondent DIMA, opposed the application, submitting that without permanent residence, the Applicant had no standing to apply for citizenship.
Ms Quayle submitted that if Mr Suleyman were to be successful before the Federal Court, the Court might remit his case to the Refugee Review Tribunal for re-determination. He would then have the opportunity of lodging a fresh application which, if necessary and appropriate, could be appealed to this Tribunal. She submitted that the appropriate course would be for the Tribunal to therefore dismiss Mr Suleyman's application.
With considerations of fairness to both parties and in an attempt to finalise the matter, the Tribunal contacted the parties by letter dated 31 May 2000 and requested written submissions concerning:
the decision of the DIMA of 24 June 1998 to refuse the Applicant citizenship pursuant to section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act; and
the issue of any accrued rights the Applicant may have because his visa was cancelled pursuant to section 109 of the Migration Act 1958 on 12 May 1999 during the currency of his appeal to this Tribunal from the decision of DIMA not to grant him citizenship.
Submissions, which the Tribunal considered raised issues requiring clarification at a hearing, and through the calling of witnesses, were received from the Respondent on 1 May 2000 and the Applicant on 11 May 2000.
The matter was listed for Hearing on 3 and 15 August 2000.
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
The relevant legislation in this matter is the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, particularly sections 13.(1) and 52A.(2).
Section 13.(1) provides, as relevant, that:
"13. (1) Subject to this section, the Minister may, in the Minister's discretion, upon application in accordance with the approved form, grant a certificate of Australian citizenship to a person who satisfies the Minister that:
(a) the person is a permanent resident;
…
(f) the person is of good character…"
Section 52A. (2) of the Citizenship Act restricts the categories of persons entitled to make an application for review of a decision under section 13 of the Citizenship Act:
"52A. (2) A person is not entitled to make an application under subsection (1) for review of a decision under section 13 (other than paragraph 13 (9) (a) or (b)) unless the person is a permanent resident."
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL
The documents lodged pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 were as follows exhibits:
ITEM DATE NAME
Submissions of the Applicant together with Photographs Exhibit A1
Letter from AH Farah to Kenya High Commission 29 May 2000 Exhibit A2
Statement of Rosalie Bannerman 8 August 2000 Exhibit A3
T-Documents Exhibit R1
Documents Issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (5 pages) Exhibit R2
Letter from Department of Immigration Kenya to Mr Abdi-Rashid Hassan Farah 14 September 1999 Exhibit R3
Decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal 23 December 1999 Exhibit R4
File Note Regarding Home Visit to Rosalie Bannerman 11 May 1999 Exhibit R5
Letter to Department of Immigration Visa Cancellation Section from Rosalie Bannerman 10 June 1999 Exhibit R6
The Tribunal also had before it:
· 'Notification of Cancellation' under section 109 of the Migration Act 1958 dated 12 May 1999 from DIMA to the Applicant; and
· a 'Change of Name Certificate' dated 17 June 1996 issued by the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages, NSW indicating a name change from Abdi-Rashid Hassan Farah to Zakariya Suleyman, born at Garissa, Kenya on 30 December 1970 (T20/154). I noted that there was no mention of the name "Harun" used by Mr Suleyman in later correspondence.
The Tribunal noted from the T-documents and other documents provided by the Respondent on 13 May 1999, that Mr Suleyman had arrived in Australia on 20 February 1993, and that he had been engaged in attempts to remain in Australia from that time.
EVIDENCE OF THE APPLICANT, MR ZAKARIYA HARUN SULEYMAN
The Applicant, whose date of birth was given variously as either 30 December 1970, 3 January 1971 or 31 January 1971, the latter date recorded on his Administrative Appeals Tribunal application, gave oral evidence.
Mr Suleyman told the Tribunal that he considered the conviction recorded against him in 1998 was not sufficiently serious to warrant the application of section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act to refuse him Australian citizenship on the basis that he was not of "good character".
While he did not dispute that he had committed an offence and that he was legally prosecuted and had been convicted of it, Mr Suleyman argued that what was legal was not necessarily fair. He said that the circumstances should be considered when assessing the good faith requirement in section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act. He said that his actions were a mistake but that the offence was committed out of desperation and a fear of being deported. Of the Respondent's refusal to grant him citizenship due to this conviction, Mr Suleyman said, "the end does not justify the means". He further submitted that he was subject to a good behaviour bond, which expired in April 2000 and accordingly, had been punished enough.
When cross-examined about the delay in proceeding with his application, Mr Suleyman said that he was ready to proceed with his application at the Hearing scheduled for March 1999 but that he was not given a chance to do so as the Respondent had requested a vacation due to his absence from Australia. He stated:
"So the process was unduly long, unfairly long and it was – that itself was a punishment enough. Yes. And I was not given a fair chance in this matter, regarding the citizenship and they have used … their legal power to stop the process of this hearing …"
He said that his preparation was interrupted by his urgent departure overseas to visit his sick mother.
When questioned about travel documents Mr Suleyman answered:
"When I travelled back in late '98 and early '99 I possessed an Australian travel document which is issued under the UN charter and I entered Kenya through a neighbouring country, Uganda, because Kenya will not give me a visa without any passport so basically I have again manipulated my way to enter Kenya."
I noted that Mr Suleyman had obtained the travel document on the basis of being a Somali citizen.
The Applicant informed the Tribunal that he was also attempting to obtain a Kenyan passport but that the Kenyan authorities refused to replace his earlier passport which he had used to enter Australia initially. When I asked him if that had been a genuine passport he said:
"You could call it genuine. Others would call it not genuine because I obtained it due (sic) pressure and bribery and yes, after Immigration through Department Immigration there. So I have to give them some money to give me passport so their files are just, you know, they can be destroyed…"
I noted also a document from the Department of Immigration in Kenya addressed to Mr A H Farah dated 14 September 1999 (Exhibit R3) in which it stated:
"Please note that, this Department gives passports to bona fide Kenya citizens. Since there are no records of your name or the passport number A247264 that you have provided I am afraid that you are not eligible for a Kenyan passport.
If you had a Kenyan passport in the past as you claim, this department suspects that you obtained it under questionable means.
As we have established that you are not a Kenyan citizen you could be jailed and/or deported to whence you came from if you were to come back to this country."The Tribunal further noted that the Respondent raised concerns at the Hearing about the authenticity of the letter at Exhibit R3. Mr Peek said:
"From my recollection it was the subject of a factual finding by the Refugee Review Tribunal that it was not genuine."
Mr Suleyman also told the Tribunal that he had been residing in Australia for a period of seven years, during which time he had not only dedicated a lot of time and passion to Australia, but that he had also had a child with his former wife, an Australian citizen. The Tribunal noted that this child is five years old and currently resides with her mother in Sydney. Mr Suleyman stated that he was not prepared to leave her behind and that it was his priority to be a father for her. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant provided photographs of himself and his daughter which were annexed to Exhibit A1.
Mr Suleyman told the Tribunal, that while he was travelling overseas to the United Kingdom and the United States of America, he had the opportunity of applying for refugee status in those countries, but that he returned to Australia because he was not prepared to leave his daughter without her father. The Tribunal also noted Mr Suleyman's comments that if he "… could be accepted anywhere else he would be prepared to leave Australia".
Mr Suleyman said without Australian citizenship, he had "no country to return to". He said that he was originally born in Somalia but brought up on the Kenya/Somalia border. Mr Suleyman informed the Tribunal that he travelled to Australia on a Kenyan passport and at the time of his application for refugee status, he said that he was a Kenyan citizen. He said that he did not declare his Somalian background due to the fact he had been given wrong advice. However, he had subsequently disclosed the correct information regarding his past. Mr Suleyman said, despite his representations, that he is a Somalian by both ethnicity and nationality.
Mr Suleyman said if he was a citizen of Kenya, he would have the protection of Kenyan citizenship. Mr Suleyman said that if the Tribunal denied his application for citizenship, he would be deported to a country where he had no rights or even citizenship. Of Exhibit R3, he maintained that he is being refused a passport, despite a subsequent request to the Kenyan High Commission of which he has received no response to date, and would potentially be deported to a country where he has no rights. He said that he would risk being gaoled or even further deported to Somalia, a war-torn country. The effect, he said, was that he would be "lost in the jungles of Africa with no protection and no rights".
Mr Suleyman submitted that the Department's cancellation of his visa was wrong because he believed it was cancelled to "stop him from applying for citizenship". Further, he argued that he was struggling to obtain citizenship and recognition, which was a basic human right for all people.
EVIDENCE OF THE APPLICANT'S FORMER WIFE, ROSALIE MAY BANNERMAN
Ms Bannerman, whose statement dated 8 August 2000 was Exhibit A3 before the Tribunal, gave evidence by telephone at the Hearing.
The contents of the Departmental file note concerning a visit by two officers of the Visa Cancellation Unit of DIMA (Exhibit R5) were read to Ms Bannerman who informed the Tribunal that she had seen this document for the first time when she was prosecuted for being knowingly concerned in an offence of imposition pursuant to sections 5 and 29B of the Crimes Act 1914 (T28/184). She said that the words used by the two officers were not the words that she used at the time of their visit on 29 April 1999. In particular Ms Bannerman vehemently denied much of the information recorded in the file note at Exhibit R5 and claimed that "they [the Immigration officers] have milked the statement – extended the statement".
Ms Bannerman said at the time of the visit, she had been looking after six children, and had taken medication approximately fifteen minutes earlier. Ms Bannerman said: "the house was a mess and I was a wreck". The Tribunal noted Ms Bannerman's comments that while she answered all questions to the best of her ability, she was "under medication due to a severe nervous disorder" (Exhibit R6). Ms Bannerman also said that at the time of the visit, she had had no contact with the Applicant for some time. She said that eight weeks prior to the Applicant's departure overseas (in November 1998), she and Mr Suleyman had had an argument when he came to visit their daughter, and she had told him to "stay away and leave us alone".
In this regard, the Tribunal noted her comments at Exhibit R6 in which she said that:
"At the time of the interrogation by the 2 officers I spoke rather angrily and irrationally, as I resented Mr Farah involving me in any way with his affairs. I had no idea of what was to follow the incident with the two officers.
With hindsight, and a thorough understanding of the possible repercussions in years to come … I would not like it said to her [our daughter] that Immigration had interviewed Mummy and about a week later Daddy's legal status was taken away from him and he was placed in detention!
My position is although Mr Farah and I have no relationship I believe that his daughter … has an undeniable right to establish a relationship with her father, should she choose to do so, now or in years to come."
Ms Bannerman said that within forty-eight hours of the visit from the Immigration officers, she suffered the "horrific" experience of being arrested. She said that officers did not inform her that they were from Visa Review (sic) and how the information was to be used. Ms Bannerman told the Tribunal that she felt a person had "a right to understand what was happening and why they were being questioned".
Ms Bannerman denied saying, as recorded in Exhibit R5 that their daughter "… sees him as a stranger and rejects any contact with him". She did, however, inform the Tribunal that at the time of the visit by DIMA officials, the child had taken on a very loving role with her new father (Ms Bannerman's husband after she and the Applicant divorced). According to Ms Bannerman, the reason why this was so was that he was there twenty-four hours a day and at the time, the child looked to him as her father figure. Ms Bannerman also said that this perception by the child was reinforced when the child witnessed the argument between herself and the Applicant in which she asked him to leave them both alone. Ms Bannerman said that she believed that the child took the view that "if mummy doesn't like him, then I won't like him".
Ms Bannerman said that while there was "not love lost" between the Applicant and herself, she had always told the child who her father was, and accepted that she should have contact with the Applicant. Ms Bannerman said that the child had always identified the Applicant as "daddy" and since she was a little baby, she called him "da da". She denied telling the Departmental officials that the child did not want to call the Applicant "Daddy".
Ms Bannerman said further that since the Applicant's return from overseas, he had not missed any Saturday access visits with their daughter for eighteen months nor had he failed to pay child support according to their private maintenance agreement.
Ms Bannerman informed the Tribunal, that for the last two school holidays, the child had stayed with the Applicant, where she learnt Somalian and had her hair done like a Somalian woman. In her statement at Exhibit A3, Ms Bannerman said:
"[The child] recognises her father as "daddy" and every single weekend she stays with him. He pays an agreed amount of child support every week and has contributed a minimal amount to her schooling expenses."
Ms Bannerman said that the Applicant has behaved in a perfectly fatherly fashion and that she supported his claim for citizenship for the sake of their daughter. She expressed her concern her daughter would blame her if the Applicant were to be deported as she spoke to the Departmental officials, who misrepresented what she said and the context in which she said it. She said:
"As [the child] is now five and attends school and is fully aware of whom her father is, it would be an emotional devastation to her to lose him as a result of these matters, which are no fault of her own.
While there is no love lost between Mr Farah and I, for the sake of [the child's] emotional and psychological well-being and her future welfare, I give a wholehearted support to his current application for citizenship and his bid to remain in Australia."I found Ms Bannerman an extremely credible witness and while I have noted her comments regarding the misrepresentation of her comments by the Immigration Officers in Exhibit R5 and the fact that the file note was not a contemporaneous record of the events on 29 April 2000, I am also mindful of the evidence of Ms Bannerman that she had taken medication fifteen minutes prior to the attendance of the Immigration officers to her home.
SUBMISSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Having heard the evidence, I had to take it, and the parties' submissions into account, as well as the legislation and case law to make the correct and preferable decision as to whether Mr Suleyman's application for Australian citizenship should be granted.
As noted above, I was required to consider:
Whether the Applicant satisfied the permanent residency requirement pursuant to section 13.(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act;
If so, whether the Applicant was of good character pursuant to section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act.
Whether a discretion to grant citizenship should be exercised to grant the Applicant citizenship pursuant to the Citizenship Act.
WHETHER THE APPLICANT SATISFIED THE PERMANENT RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13.(1)(a) OF THE CITIZENSHIP ACT
I was mindful that Mr Suleyman's application for citizenship was complicated by the fact that at the time of the Hearing, he was no longer a permanent resident of Australia following the cancellation of his protection visa by the Respondent on 12 May 1999.
Following a protracted appeal process, the Full Court of the Federal Court on 23 August 2000 dismissed Mr Suleyman's appeal against the Respondent's decision to cancel his protection visa as affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal on 23 December 1999, and Matthews J of the Federal Court in Suleyman v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 610 on 12 May 2000.
Mr Suleyman submitted that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to review the decision of the Respondent dated 24 June 1998 pursuant to section 52A.(1) of the Citizenship Act.
Ms Gardiner, in the Respondent's written submissions dated on or about 1 May 2000, addressed the effect of the cancellation of the Applicant's protection visa on his application for citizenship. She submitted:
"16. The Respondent acknowledges that the Applicant was a permanent resident at the time of his application to the Tribunal and that therefore the Tribunal does have jurisdiction to hear the matter.
17. However, the Respondent submits that, as the Applicant does not currently hold permanent resident status, the powers of the Tribunal are more limited; for example, the Tribunal cannot declare the Applicant to be an Australian Citizen as he is not a permanent resident of Australia."
I was mindful that the Tribunal derives jurisdiction to hear appeals regarding the application of section 13.(1) to refuse citizenship pursuant section 52A.(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act. As relevant the section follows:
"Review of decisions
52A. (1)Applications may be made to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of:
…
(a)decisions of the Minister under section 13 or subsection 23D (1) refusing an application;
…"
Mr Suleyman, however, argued that section 52A.(2) of the Citizenship Act was not relevant to the Tribunal's consideration of his eligibility for a grant of citizenship. Mr Suleyman, in his written submissions, submitted that:
"The applicant submits that this clause is not relevant in this particular case as the applicant has already made a valid application and indeed the delegate of the Minister was satisfied that this particular criterion was met. In other words when the citizenship application was made the applicant had a permanent legal and continuous residence in Australia for more than two years."
I noted that section 52A.(2) of the Act states that a person is not entitled to make an application for review of a decision under section 13 unless the person is a permanent resident. Section 52A.(2) is as follows:
"Review of Decisions
…52A. (2)A person is not entitled to make an application under subsection (1) for review of a decision under section 13 (other than paragraph 13 (9) (a) and (b)) unless the person is a permanent resident."
Bearing in mind the Applicant's application for review was received on 22 July 1998, I agreed with the Applicant and the comments of the Respondent at paragraph 16 of its submissions dated on or about 1 May 2000, that Mr Suleyman was entitled to make an application for review against a decision made under section 13, because he was a permanent resident at the time when he sought the review.
I then turned to consider whether Mr Suleyman satisfied the permanent residency requirement of section 13.(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act. Section 13.(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act provides:
"13. (1) Subject to this section, the Minister may, in the Minister's discretion, upon application in accordance with the approved form, grant a certificate of Australian citizenship to a person who satisfies the Minister that:
(a)the person is a permanent resident;
…"
Mr Peek, for the Respondent, submitted that while the decision to cancel Mr Suleyman's protection visa was made after the date of his application for review of the decision to refuse the grant of citizenship pursuant to section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act, which was received by the Tribunal on 22 July 1998:
"… the de novo nature of the Tribunal's function on review requires it to make its decision in the context of the cancellation."
Therefore, according to Mr Peek, at the time of the Hearing Mr Suleyman did not meet the criteria for a grant of citizenship as he was:
"… not a permanent resident within the meaning of section 13(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act 1948 (the Act) and … [was] not a person of good character within the meaning of section 13(1)(f) of the Act."
He further submitted that the intent of section 13.(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act could be clearly ascertained from its construction. Mr Peek maintained that:
"… the use of the present tense "is" in section 13(1)(a) of the Act denotes an intention that a person must be a permanent resident as at the time of the time of a decision to grant citizenship, as distinct from the additional requirement that a person must have been resident in Australia as a permanent resident for two out of the five years immediately preceding the date of application set out in section 13(1)(e)."
He submitted that not only was the Applicant required to be a permanent resident at the time of the Tribunal's decision, but that the provisions of section 13.(1) of the Citizenship Act were cumulative. Therefore, as Mr Suleyman was no longer a permanent resident, he was not eligible for a grant of Australian citizenship regardless of whether he satisfied the character requirement of section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act. Specifically, Mr Peek said:
"4.The respondent has submitted that all of the paragraphs in section 13(1) of the Act are cumulative and contain mandatory pre-conditions to the exercise of the discretion to grant citizenship. If the Tribunal is of the view that the applicant fails to meet any one of them, this is sufficient to preclude the granting of citizenship.
So far as the Tribunal regards there to be any residual discretion to be exercised under section 13(1) of the Act, after considering the pre-conditions for grant set out in the paragraphs to sub-section 13(1) of the Act, the respondent has submitted at hearing that the Tribunal would not exercise the discretion to grant the applicant citizenship in any event.
…
The respondent has submitted that to do so would be to grant Australian citizenship to an impostor and would fly in the face of the principles enshrined in Act."
Mr Suleyman submitted that his protection visa was cancelled by the Respondent in a deliberate attempt to prevent him from securing citizenship. However, he also added that it was impossible to substantiate those claims. He referred the Tribunal's attention to the decision of Re Dainty and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 12 ALD 416 where I noted the Court held that the importance of permanent residence to a grant of citizenship is that it demonstrates a commitment to adopt Australia as a home and an entitlement to do so.
In this respect, I noted the Applicant's evidence that he has been residing in Australia for a period of seven years, and his evidence that he has dedicated time and passion to Australia.
I was mindful that there was no evidence Mr Suleyman has been employed for any extended period although there was a reference dated August 1997 on Australian Bureau of Statistics letterhead which stated that he had worked in that organisation for eleven months from September 1996. From a further document before the Tribunal, it appeared Mr Suleyman worked six weeks as a temporary ASO1 at the Australian Taxation Office. There was also a letter from the Ogaden Relief Association of Australia Inc. dated January 1998 which indicated Mr Suleyman had worked as a volunteer with the Horn of Africa Community Development and the Ogaden Relief Association of Australia and Voiceless Children's Network of Horn of Africa. Mr Suleyman told me at the time of the hearing that he was not working in paid employment.
I also noted that Mr Suleyman has a five year old child with an Australian citizen and that the child currently resides with her mother in Sydney. Mr Suleyman was keen to make it known how attached he was to the child and how often he saw her. However, the evidence before me was that he had taken little interest in the child, and had not assisted with maintaining her until he realised in approximately 1999 that the interests of the child were taken into account in immigration issues. There was evidence before me regarding his travel to Africa in late 1998 for a period of some months until his return in early 1999, and that he left the country without notifying his former wife and child, nor was there evidence that he was in touch with them during his absence. It is my opinion based on the evidence before me that Mr Suleyman's interest in his daughter has increased in proportion to his recent anticipated problems with his visa and his citizenship application.
Mr Suleyman said at paragraph 5 of his written submissions:
"… the other case before the Federal Court of Australia should not influence the outcome of this case, at least not unfavourably to the applicant. The applicant acknowledges that both cases are related in a way and unrelated in another. Related, in the sense that it was not until after the applicant applied for a certificate of citizenship, that the procedures necessary to cancel the Protection Visa were put in train. In fact the applicant learnt the cancellation of his visa (as the Tribunal itself is aware) during his first appearance before this Tribunal on 13th May 1999. On the other hand it is unrelated in the sense that certificate of citizenship was refused under section 13(1) (f) "the person is of good character" and not under section 13(1) (a) "the person is a permanent resident"."
While I noted the submissions of Mr Suleyman that his application was refused under section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act only, I preferred the submissions of the Respondent that permanent residency is a pre-requisite condition that must be satisfied prior to considering Mr Suleyman's application for citizenship pursuant to section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act. Notwithstanding, I have also noted that the preamble to section 13.(1) expressly provides for the exercise of an overriding discretion. Specifically,
"13. (1) Subject to this section, the Minister may, in the Minister's discretion, upon application in accordance with the approved form, grant a certificate of Australian citizenship to a person who satisfies the Minister that …"
Therefore, while I accept that since Mr Suleyman's protection visa was finally cancelled following the exhaustion of his appeal rights, and he is no longer a permanent resident, I am nevertheless able to exercise the overriding discretion afforded to me by the preamble to section 13.(1) of the Citizenship Act, to grant Mr Suleyman Australian citizenship, should I find that he satisfies section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act. I say this mindful that unless there are compelling circumstances, I must apply Ministerial policy (Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No2) (1979) 2 ALD 634).
WHETHER THE APPLICANT WAS OF "GOOD CHARACTER" PURSUANT TO SECTION 13.(1)(f) OF THE CITIZENSHIP ACTI then turned to consider whether Mr Suleyman satisfied the "good character" requirement of section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act.
As a preliminary matter, I noted Ms Gardiner, in her written submissions for the Respondent, referred me to the case law which has established that the "… Administrative Appeals Tribunal should follow publicly declared Ministerial policy or Departmental Guidelines unless there is some good reason not to ..." (Re Drake (supra); Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Gray (1994) 33 ALD 13). The Respondent submitted, that the instant case was not one in which a departure from either guidelines or policy was appropriate.
In this respect, I noted that the Court found in Drake (supra) that while the Tribunal is free to apply the Minister's policy or not in reaching the correct or preferable decision in each case, that policy can furnish assistance in arriving at the preferable decision. The Court stipulated that any departure from the policy should be made cautiously and sparingly, particularly, if the policy has been scrutinised and approved by Parliament.
The Court outlined the process the Tribunal should follow in cases reviewing the exercise of the discretionary power of the Minister and held that where the Minister has adopted a general policy to guide him or her in the exercise of the power, the Tribunal will ordinarily apply that policy in reviewing the decision, unless the policy is unlawful or unless its application tends to produce an unjust decision in the circumstances of the particular case.
Therefore, in light of the above, I am minded to also consider the Australian Citizenship Instructions ("Citizenship Instructions") insofar as they relate to the issue of "good character" in reaching a decision as to whether the Applicant meets the requirement in section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act.
In his written submissions, Mr Suleyman directed the Tribunal's attention to the Citizenship Instructions at 4.8.16, to outline what constitutes good character. I noted that paragraph 4.8.16 provides:
"4.8.16The term 'good character' is not defined in the Act, so decision makers should be guided by the ordinary use of the words in making assessments. As a matter of policy, an applicant may be presumed to be of good character unless there is evidence to the contrary. In most cases, such evidence would be in the form of a serious criminal record, however, general conduct and associations may also be relevant."
Mr Suleyman also referred me to the decision of Matthews J in Peterson v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (AAT 13432, 6 November 1998), where she held that it was well settled that the words:
"'good character' refer to the enduring moral qualities of a person, and not to the person's fame or reputation in the community."
The Applicant submitted that the only reason why his application for citizenship was rejected by the Respondent pursuant to 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act was that he was serving a two year good behaviour bond. He drew the Tribunal's attention to the Statement of Reasons of the Respondent dated 30 July 1998, which were before the Tribunal at T2/7 and said:
"After evaluating the evidence and have (sic) regard to Section 13[1][f] and 13[11] of the Act and the policy guidelines I formed the view that Mr Suleyman did not meet the good character requirement because he is under a bond is imposed by a court of law."
I noted however that the decision rejecting Mr Suleyman for citizenship at T1/3 dated 24 June 1998, which is the relevant document describing the decision under review, the Respondent had stated simply that section 13.(1)(f) had not been satisfied "because of your criminal history."
Mr Suleyman maintained that since the period of the bond had expired without incident in April 2000, and that as he has a "… proven record of good character", he should be found to satisfy the requirement of section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act, and granted citizenship accordingly.
In this respect, I noted that paragraph 4.8.24 of the Citizenship Instructions requires the decision-maker to consider extenuating circumstances in respect of the commission of a crime by the Applicant. Specifically, it provides:
"Circumstances leading to the crime being committed. Consider whether there were any extenuating circumstances relating to the crime being committed … The onus is on the applicant to provide evidence supporting a claim of extenuating circumstances."
Of the offence he committed, Mr Suleyman said in evidence that the actions that led to his conviction were a mistake, but that he did what he did out of desperation and a fear of being deported. He emphasised that he served a two year good behaviour bond which had now expired. Since this had expired without incident, Mr Suleyman maintained that he had been punished enough. In his written submissions, Exhibit A1, at paragraph 21 Mr Suleyman stated:
"The applicant accepts that he consciously and deliberately intended to deceive the Australian Government, he intentionally caused to divert the Respondent's resources, and showed a blatant disregard for the values and expectations of the Australian Community. However, the applicant submits that he did not contest the Respondent's allegations in court and was subsequently punished according to Australian law. The applicant believes that he did the crime and served the time and has contributed to the Australian Community and the Commonwealth through his employment with the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO)."
I noted at T40/222, that conviction resulted because Mr Farah "… untruly represented he was Zakariya SULEYMAN for a Protection Visa". I further noted that he was sentenced on 16 March 1998 to three months imprisonment with court costs of $51., which he appealed. His appeal before Acting District Court Judge Stewart on 6 April 1998, concluded with the following result.
"In lieu of sentence in lower court defendant, pursuant to s.20(1)(b) Crimes Act 1914, sentenced to imprisonment for 3 months but to be released forthwith on entering a recognisance self $2,000.00 to be of GB 2 years & accept supervision of P&PS and obey all reas. directions."
Of the remaining Citizenship Instructions relating to the good character requirement of section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act, Mr Suleyman submitted that paragraphs 4.8.20, 4.8.22, 4.8.23, 4.8.26 and 4.8.28 "… could be considered favourable to the applicant."
Whilst Mr Suleyman did not provide a great deal of elucidation in his written submissions as to why he considered the above paragraphs favourable to his application, I have, for completeness, reproduced the text of these subparagraphs below:
"4.8.20Nature of any offence(s). Consider the seriousness of any offences committed by the applicant in the context of ordinary community standards. For example, crimes of violence, sexual abuse, drug trafficking, major fraud and other crimes which have incurred a prison sentence or sentences totalling 12 months or more are ordinarily considered to be serious, and should be given due weight in an assessment. Alternatively, less serious offences would be reflected by the leniency of a sentence and, possibly, in the remarks of the sentencing Judge if available.
…
4.8.22Consider whether there are any on-going obligations in relation to the sentence received, such as the existence of a good behaviour bond. The existence of a bond may indicate that insufficient time has elapsed since the commission of the crime to establish the applicant's good character. However, there may be circumstances in which a person is considered to be of good character despite the existence of a good behaviour bond. (Note that periods on parole or proceedings pending must be considered under subsection 13(11).)
4.8.23Number of offences committed. Consider whether a crime was a one-off occurrence that can now be considered "out of character", or whether the person's criminal record shows repeated offences and a pattern of unlawful behaviour which would suggest that the applicant is not of good character. Where the offence was not out of character, consider whether the applicant has been re-habilitated (see 4.8.26 – 4.8.28 below).
…
4.8.26Behaviour since the crime was committed. A person's previous behaviour as evidenced by a criminal record is relevant in assessment of character, but it is the person's behaviour and reputation at the time of the decision which has greatest relevance. Decision-makers must be satisfied that a person is of good character at the time of decision. Policy does not establish any specific time requirement for a finding of good character. However, a reasonable amount of time will need to have passed since the last crime was committed to establish a pattern of good behaviour and thus justify a conclusion that a person is now of good character."
Mr Suleyman argued that the offence for which he was convicted was not as serious as those contemplated by the Citizenship Instructions. He said that it was not as serious because of the :
"… leniency of the sentence and the positive remarks of the sentencing judge. His Honour, the sentencing judge in this case believed that the actions taken against the applicant in the past … were justified in the circumstances. However, his view was that "some of the [applicant's] actions was (sic) brought about by extreme fear of being sent back from whence you came and although wrong and against the law, were understandable."
He submitted His Honour also believed that the applicant "would be a good citizen if granted either Refugee status or Australian citizenship".
Mr Suleyman submitted that the Respondent failed to consider, taking into account the Citizenship Instructions, the pattern or the seriousness of the crime or his behaviour since the crime was committed. He said that the examples of serious crimes in the Citizenship Instructions were "crimes of violence, sexual abuse, drug trafficking, major fraud and other crimes totalling 12 months or more." Of this failure to take into account relevant considerations, Mr Suleyman submitted:
"From the outset it appears that procedural fairness, which are enshrined in the ministerial guidelines were not accorded by the decision-maker".
Mr Suleyman also informed the Tribunal that he considered Australia his home, strengthened by ties of friends and family. He said that an indication of this feeling was that he returned to Australia, his home, from his travels in the USA, United Kingdom and other parts of Europe whilst on notice of his visa cancellation. He said that the reason why he did that can be "… attributed to the social, physical and emotional inclinations the applicant has to Australia".
Mr Gardiner, for the Respondent, submitted that the term "good character" was not defined by the legislation and that the decision-maker should be guided by the ordinary use of the words pursuant to 4.8.16 of the Citizenship Instructions:
"… the standard of good character is even higher for citizenship cases because of the importance of citizenship and the greater responsibilities and privileges attached to it. [See DP Chappell in Miroslav Mlinar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (unreported, 15 May 1997 at page 9]. It is the duty of the Australian Government to protect the Australian community and as citizenship forms an absolute bar to visa cancellation or deportation, the Respondent therefore submits that the higher threshold to the grant of citizenship in this case should be observed."
I was mindful of the comments of DP Chappell of this Tribunal in Mlinar and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 48 ALD 771 that the standard of good character was higher for citizenship cases due to the responsibilities and privileges attached to a grant of citizenship. DP Chappell also said that the requirement of "good character" in section 13.(1) of the Citizenship Act should be given the same meaning at it is in section 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Re Hamwi and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (AAT 9639, 25 July 1994); Re Naumovski and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 20 AAR 388 and Re PE and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (AAT 9990, 6 February 1995)).
I noted that in Hamwi (supra), DP McMahon provided instructive comments as to determining the "good character" of an applicant for citizenship. He said:
"In Re Strangio and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Decision NO 9593, 8 July 1994 at paragraph 33, I again emphasised that in deciding what constitutes a "good character" one must look at the aggregate of the subject's distinguishing qualities objectively to determine whether the person is held in good repute. I suggested in that decision that ordinary community standards should be applied in giving content to a good character required by the statute. It was not necessary that the person should have an exemplary or saintly character. I said "one should look at his or her general reputation in the Australian community on the basis of full disclosure, or if the person is not in not in Australia then whether those qualities are likely to be accepted as demonstrating an adherence to ordinary standards of good behaviour in the Australian community. So long as the legislation relies on this concept, then a value judgment needs to be made in each case. It is to be made upon the basis of the situation existing at the time when the decision is to be made, either by the original decision-maker or by this Tribunal".
Ms Gardiner submitted that the nature of the offence committed by Mr Suleyman, which led to his conviction, was sufficiently serious to find that he was not of "good character" pursuant to section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act. She said:
"The Applicant consciously and deliberately intended to deceive the Australian Government, intentionally diverted the Respondent's resources, and showed a blatant disregard for the values and expectations of the Australian community. In addition the Applicant has shown no remorse for his criminal action."
At the Hearing, Mr Peek reinforced the Respondent's earlier submissions stating that in applying section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act, the Tribunal should:
"… regard the nature of those offences as one which in the context of this legislation would give rise to a finding that an application is not of good character. That's on the basis that the crimes relate directly and in fact resulted in the issue of the visa that's being relied on to found the citizenship application …
It's submitted by the respondent that it would be offensive to the spirit of the Citizenship Act and having regard to the underlying policies and community attitudes to in fact make a grant of citizenship to a person on the basis of a visa that was issued to that person as a result of fraudulent representations."
Mr Peek further reiterated the Respondent's view that Mr Suleyman was not of "good character" because of his deception with DIMA. In his written submissions dated 13 September 2000, Mr Peek stated:
"… the nature of the offences committed by the applicant go to the very heart of the power being exercised, as they arise out of the applicant having obtained the visa which is relied on to support the grant of citizenship by false representations. These led to the visa being granted to a non-existent person. To grant citizenship to the person who fraudulently obtained the visa which is relied on to found an application for citizenship, particularly when that visa has itself been cancelled because it was obtained fraudulently, could only be of extreme repugnance to the Australian Community and contrary to the intention of the Act."
In reaching a determination as to whether the Applicant displayed the requisite degree of "good character" pursuant to section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act, I noted that the events leading up to Mr Suleyman's conviction were recorded in the decision of the Respondent dated 12 May 1999 in which Mr Suleyman's protection visa was cancelled. It was recorded that:
"Mr Farah arrived at Melbourne airport on 12 November 1994 using the name Zakariya Harun Suleyman without travel documentation, claiming to have arrived on Qantas flight QF 22 and claiming he had destroyed a false passport on the aircraft prior to landing in Australia …
It was established several months later Mr Farah had boarded an international flight at Sydney Airport as a domestic passenger under the name of Mr A Hassan and flown to Melbourne.
On 12 November 1994 Mr Farah lodged an Application for Protection Visa in the name of Zakariya Harun Suleyman. In the Application it was claimed he was a Somali citizen born 31 January 1971 and that he had lived in Kenya for six months prior to coming to Australia. Mr Farah gave a detailed account of his claims for refugee status. In part, Mr Farah advised, he is a Somali national born in Kismayo, Somalia, he is the eldest unmarried son of the family. His father is a wealthy businessman and owned a chain of stores in Kismayo. He also advised that Kismayo was relatively peaceful until the overthrow of the Somali dictator Mohamed Siyad Barre. Mr Farah also states that he was taken to a torture camp by the morgan militia. He claims he was released on the condition he leave Kismayo …
From Mr Farah's arrival at Melbourne airport on 12 November 1994 he has attempted to conceal his true identity in order to obtain refugee status in Australia. In his Protection Visa Application lodged on the day of his arrival to Melbourne he has assumed another identity, together with fabricating family members and his claim for refugee status."
I am mindful as I have already said above that Mr Suleyman's interest in his daughter increased when he realised this might assist with visa and citizenship matters. The evidence before me was that previously he had not assisted with her maintenance or visited regularly. Mr Suleyman left Australia for an extended trip to Africa without telling his former wife or daughter in late 1998. He has provided no evidence of employment except for short periods in 1996/7, and said at the hearing that he was not engaged in employment. Mr Suleyman's only reference with regard to his community work was dated January 1998.
I have noted Mr Suleyman's evidence and submissions with regard to his inability to obtain a Kenyan passport. As far as this Tribunal is concerned, that is only of minimal relevance in the exercise of a discretion to grant citizenship pursuant to section 13.(1) of the Citizenship Act. I am not persuaded that even if Mr Suleyman could establish to my satisfaction that he cannot obtain a Kenyan passport, and he has not done so, that this would cause me to exercise the discretion to grant citizenship in his case.
I prefer the submissions of the Respondent which emphasise that the nature of the offence committed by Mr Suleyman which led to his conviction was sufficiently serious to find that he was not of "good character" pursuant to section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act. While his actions were not of the nature of those offences outlined in 4.8.20, I am nevertheless mindful that the Applicant consciously and deliberately intended to deceive the Australian Government, intentionally diverted the Respondent's resources, and showed a blatant disregard for the values and expectations of the Australian community.
I have also noted that while Mr Suleyman was convicted pursuant to section 29B of the Crimes Act 1914 and served seven months of a custodial sentence, and that on 6 April 1998 he was given a two year good behaviour bond, he has not re-offended in the six years subsequent. I further noted that the period of the bond has now been completed and that this can be taken into account in my decision making (Citizenship Instructions). Notwithstanding, when I weighed up all the evidence and submissions, I was not satisfied that Mr Suleyman could meet the tests of "good character" intended in section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act.
I have noted the comments of the Full Court in Suleyman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (FCA 547, 23 August 2000) with regard to Mr Suleyman's lack of preparation for hearings. I am mindful that he has been unrepresented and that he was unrepresented before this Tribunal. However, he appeared to not be taking matters seriously as is evidenced by the exchange with me which appears at page 7 of the transcript of the hearing on 3 August 2000. It occurred a short time after the commencement of the hearing and just as Mr Peek had outlined the Respondent's case. Mr Suleyman said:
"I was wondering if we could take a fifteen minute break …
Ms E: What is the problem?
Mr S: Just want a break.
Ms E: Pardon?
Mr S: I thought we could continue from there after.
Ms E: Can you tell me why?
Mr S: OK. No.
Ms E: Pardon?
Mr S: It's all right. I'll continue. I will not take long.
Ms E: If you need to use the bathroom or something please say. Is it because of that?
Mr S: No, it's not because of that.
Ms E: Are you able to say why?
Mr S: It's not a request, it's not a big problem.
Ms E: So are you able to continue?
Mr S: Yes
Ms E: Do you need to get some advice?
Mr S: No, no, it's all right.
Ms E: You can make a telephone call if you need to get some advice, is that what it is?
Mr S: No, it's just that I parked my car wrong here, just maybe I thought it will last one hour so it doesn't matter.
Ms E: Well, I don't think we should adjourn because you've parked your car somewhere.
Mr S: Yes
Ms E: So I think we'll just continue please.
Mr S: Yes, yes, continue. I'll just briefly now…
Ms E: What would you like to tell me?
Mr S: Obviously not a lot. This matter, you know, ever here …"While I have noted that the offence committed by the Applicant is not one specifically listed as being serious in 4.8.20 and recognise that the Applicant has served both a custodial sentence and a good behaviour bond without incident, in considering the evidence before me and the Citizenship Instructions as a whole, I find that the offence committed by Mr Suleyman can be characterised as an offence of the serious nature contemplated by the Citizenship Instructions. I find that Mr Suleyman consciously and deliberately intended to deceive the Australian Government, intentionally diverted the Respondent's resources, and showed a blatant disregard for the values and expectations of the Australian community. Therefore, I am not able to find that the Applicant meets the test of "good character" pursuant to section 13.(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act and exercise the discretion to grant citizenship.
Submissions were also received regarding the rights of the child, Mr Suleyman's daughter in accordance with the decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273. While I am sympathetic to the fact that Mr Suleyman does not wish to render his daughter fatherless in the event of his deportation, my role is to determine whether Mr Suleyman is eligible for a grant of citizenship pursuant to section 13.(1)(a) and (f) of the Citizenship Act only. I respectfully note the words of Matthews J in Suleyman v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (supra) with regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ("the Convention"). The Convention is only minimally relevant to this case. In addition, I find that Mr Suleyman's recently demonstrated concern for his daughter does not alter my view that I should not exercise the discretion to grant him citizenship.
Mr Suleyman is not prevented by this decision from applying again for citizenship at a later date.
DECISIONThe Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirms the decision of the Respondent Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs dated 24 June 1998 to refuse, pursuant to section 13.(1) of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, the Applicant Mr Zakariya Harun Suleyman's application for Australian citizenship.
I certify that the 106 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Ms G Ettinger, Senior Member
Signed: .....................................................................................
AssociateDate/s of Hearing 3 and 15 August 2000
Written Submissions Received 6 October 2000
Date of Decision 14 December 2000
Counsel for the Applicant N/A
Solicitor for the Applicant Self-Represented
Counsel for the Respondent N/A
Solicitor for the Respondent Mr G Peek
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