FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
STYB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2004] FCAFC 295MIGRATION – appeal – no error disclosed
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 91S
Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] HCA 25; (2004) 206 ALR 242, applied
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1 referred to
SCAL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 301, referred to
STCB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Society [2004] FCAFC 266, referred to
STYB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
SAD 141 OF 2004
COOPER, MARSHALL AND MANSFIELD JJ
12 NOVEMBER 2004
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
SAD 141 OF 2004
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE COURT
BETWEEN:
STYB
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
COOPER, MARSHALL AND MANSFIELD JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
12 NOVEMBER 2004
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal, including reserved costs (if any), to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
SAD 141 OF 2004
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE COURT
BETWEEN:
STYB
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
COOPER, MARSHALL AND MANSFIELD JJ
DATE:
12 NOVEMBER 2004
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT
This matter is an appeal from a judgment of Selway J in which his Honour dismissed the appellant’s application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”). The RRT decided that the appellant was not entitled to a protection visa by reference to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 1967 (“the Convention”). The application before Selway J was one in which prerogative relief was sought against the respondent in respect of the appellant’s application for a protection visa.
On 4 November 2004, the Court heard the appeal and, at the conclusion of argument by counsel for the appellant, ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs.
Background
The appellant is a citizen of Albania and is Catholic by religion. He entered Australia on 27 October 2000, using his brother’s Australian passport. Prior to coming to Australia the appellant had lived in Greece since 1990, apart from a few brief visits to relatives in Albania where he effectively was in hiding. Before that, from 1988 until 1990 he served in the Albanian army. The appellant has never married. He has two sisters who live in Albania, a brother who lives in Australia and three other brothers whose whereabouts are unknown.
On 21 November…
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- Case
- [2004] FCAFC 295
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the RRT erred in its application of section 91S and whether it considered the correct social group. Counsel for the appellant argued that the RRT wrongly excluded material showing the Albanian authorities' passive inactivity in protecting those at risk from blood feuds. However, the court found no basis for this submission, as no claim was made to the RRT on the basis of a wider social group. The appellant's claim related only to the possible activities of one hostile family, not the wider application of the Kanun, a 15th-century code of customs.
The court concluded that the RRT correctly applied section 91S and that there was no misapprehension of the relevant legislation. The RRT was not presented with any claim of membership of an alleged wider social group or any evidence as to the persecutory fate of its members. The court also noted that even if such a group existed, it would not constitute a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention, as all members of Northern Albanian society would qualify for membership.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal, including reserved costs (if any), to be taxed if not agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal, including reserved costs (if any), to be taxed if not agreed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: COOPER, MARSHALL AND MANSFIELD JJ
Counsel for the appellant submitted that the RRT wrongly excluded from its consideration available material which showed “passive” inactivity by Albanian authorities in protecting those at risk from blood feuds.Consideration We see no basis for the appellant’s submission that the primary judge erred in his consideration of the matter before him. In our view, the primary judge correctly observed that no claim was made to the RRT on the basis of the alleged wider social group. We also consider that he was correct in saying that there was no evidence before the RRT which identified the wider group. Before the delegate, the appellant claimed to fear persecution because of his membership of his family. That claim was again made before the RRT by the appellant’s advisor. The only blood feud referred to by the appellant before the RRT was the feud between his family and one other family. There was no claim, or evidence to support a claim, that the appellant was at risk because of being subject to the Kanun and subject to a blood feud. In the country information referred to by the RRT the existence of the Kanun of Lek Dukagjini is referred to and described as a “15th century code of Customs handed down orally through generations…”. The country material tended to suggest that the Kanun was used as an excuse for a wide range of killings. However, there is no claim made by or on behalf of the appellant in any of the material before the RRT that he was at risk because of the application of the Kanun. On the contrary, the claim related only to the possible activities of one family, which was hostile to his family. The first suggested jurisdictional error, that is, that the RRT considered the wrong social group, and on the material it was open to it to consider another one, is without foundation. No misapprehension of s 91S occurred. The section applied to the claims of the appellant and was correctly applied by the RRT, as the primary judge appropriately observed. The second suggested jurisdictional error is also not established. The RRT was not presented with any claim of membership of the alleged wider social group or with any evidence as to the persecutory fate of its members. The material before the RRT did not give rise to a case which the RRT failed to address: cf Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1; [2002] HCA 14 per McHugh and Gummow JJ at 27 – 28, [81] – [82]. Even if the existence of the suggested wider group was established, it would not constitute a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention. That is because all members of Northern Albanian society would qualify for membership. Accordingly it would not satisfy the test referred to in Applicant S at [36]; In SCAL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 301 at [17], a Full Court said:“The second ground of appeal is that the primary judge erred in concluding that the re‑cast social group comprised the whole community and would include everyone who for one reason or another had a well‑founded fear of persecution. It is said that the Tribunal had before it evidence that the social group did not encompass the entire Albanian community, and that the group is limited by factors including geographical location, education and wealth. The primary judge did not so err. In his description of the Code his Honour recorded that with the collapse of communism in Albania the Code “re‑emerged and was followed in the northern parts of Albania from which the applicant came”. Later in his reasons he said the re‑cast social group “embraces everyone in the geographic areas of Albania where the customary law is being applied”. After referring to the parts of the Code that were in evidence, his Honour said at [19]:“The Kanun is to be treated, at least in the geographical areas from which the applicant comes, as a law or practice of general application. Whilst the whole community may be subject to it, it does not render the whole community a particular social group for the purpose of the definition of ‘refugee’.”The appellant treats the “whole community” as meaning the whole Albanian community. However, in context, the primary judge’s “whole community” is the community of the area in which the Kanun is applied, namely the northern parts of Albania from which the appellant came. The appellant’s submission is based on a misreading of the primary judge’s reasons, and must be rejected.”See also STCB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Society [2004] FCAFC 266 at [30] to [31].