Stubbings v Tenkate

Case [2004] QDC 181


DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Stubbings v Tenkate & Ors [2004] QDC 181

PARTIES:

MALCOLM JOHN STUBBINGS
Plaintiff
v
ALEXANDER RICHARD TENKATE
First Defendant
and
LEFT STOCK PTY LTD (ACN 010 838 703)
Second Defendant
and
ROBERT GOODMAN
Third Defendant

FILE NO/S:

D2711 of 2000

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court of Queensland at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

11 June 2004

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

28 May 2004

JUDGE:

Judge Alan Wilson SC

ORDER:

1.   That the plaintiff has leave to proceed with this action under r398(2) by taking a new step

2. That the respondent plaintiff pay the applicant first and second defendant’s costs of and incidental to their application (and the plaintiff’s application under r389(2)), assessed on the standard basis

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – dismissal of proceedings for want of prosecution – leave to proceed after delay of more than two years – principles applicable – relevant considerations

Trade Practices Act
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rr 5,280,371,389


Cases considered:
Cooper v Hopgood & Ganim (1999) 2 Qd R 113 Dempsey v Dorber (1991) Qd R 418 at 420
Lilyville Pty Ltd v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Ltd (1999) QSC 372
Rigato Farms Pty Ltd v Ridolfi [2000] QCA 292
Tyler v Custom Credit Corporation Limited & Ors [2000] QCA 178

COUNSEL:

Mr A Hoare for the applicant first and second defendants
Mr P W Hackett for the respondent plaintiff

SOLICITORS:

Abbott Tout for the applicant first and second defendants
Baker Johnson for the respondent plaintiff

  1. This proceeding began as an application by the first and second defendants to strike out the plaintiff’s action for want of prosecution.  On its face, the application was brought under UCPR r 280[1].  The third defendant was served, but did not appear.  Initially, the plaintiff resisted the application on the basis that there had been no inordinate delay and, in particular, no delay of more than two years (an argument founded on UCPR r 389(2), which prevents a party from taking a new step without leave, when more than two years have elapsed since the last step).

    [1] Application filed 23 April 2004

  1. In the course of the hearing it became apparent, however, that the plaintiff had not taken a step in the action since 28 August 2001 and his counsel, Mr Hackett, applied instanter for leave under r 389(2). That course was not opposed by the first and second defendants (who had previously urged it[2]) who contended, nevertheless, that leave should be refused.

    [2] Affidavit of Paul Wayne Evans filed 23 April 2004, Ex PWE-30

  1. The claim arises out of the plaintiff’s sale of his interest in a partnership to the first defendant in September 1994.  He alleges the sale was induced by oral misrepresentations made by the first defendant on his own behalf, and on behalf of the second defendant.  The defence of the first and second defendants denies the representations were made, although a statement they provided to their solicitors which was disclosed in the proceedings appears to…

Continue reading Stubbings v Tenkate

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Stubbings v Tenkate [2004] QDC 181
Case
[2004] QDC 181
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Stubbings v Tenkate, the plaintiff sought leave to proceed with a personal injury claim that had been delayed for more than two years. The defendant opposed the application on the basis that the delay was unreasonable and that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The case was heard in the County Court of Victoria. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiff was entitled to leave to proceed with the action despite the significant delay. The court considered the principles applicable to such applications and the relevant factors to be taken into account in determining whether leave should be granted.

The court noted that the delay in proceeding with the action was significant and that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a satisfactory explanation for the delay. However, the court also noted that the plaintiff had made efforts to proceed with the action, including filing an application for leave to proceed under rule 389(2) of the County Court Rules. The court considered the relevant factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the prejudice to the defendant, and the prospects of success of the action. The court found that the delay was not so inordinate as to make it just to dismiss the action and that the plaintiff had demonstrated a sufficient explanation for the delay. The court also found that the plaintiff had a good prospects of success in the action.

The court granted the plaintiff leave to proceed with the action by taking a new step. The court also ordered the plaintiff to pay the costs of the defendant’s application and the plaintiff’s application under rule 389(2), assessed on the standard basis. The court found that the delay was not so inordinate as to make it just to dismiss the action and that the plaintiff had demonstrated a sufficient explanation for the delay. The court also found that the plaintiff had a good prospects of success in the action. The court emphasised that such applications are to be decided on a case-by-case basis, and that the court will consider all relevant factors in determining whether leave should be granted.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. That the plaintiff has leave to proceed with this action under r398(2) by taking a new step

2. That the respondent plaintiff pay the applicant first and second defendant’s costs of and incidental to their application (and the plaintiff’s application under r389(2)), assessed on the standard basis

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.