Stuart v Chief of Army

Case [2003] FCA 1291


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stuart v Chief of Army [2003] FCA 1291

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Termination of enlistment of member of Australian Defence Force – Challenge to validity of two decisions: decision to terminate enlistment and decision to reject application for redress of grievance – Whether either decision manifestly unreasonable – Whether decision-makers failed to take into account relevant considerations or took into account irrelevant considerations – Whether applicant was denied procedural fairness – Whether decision-maker failed to exercise true discretion.

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5

Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth)reg 87

DIANA BETTINA STUART v CHIEF OF ARMY

N 567 of 2003

WILCOX J
13 NOVEMBER 2003
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 567 of 2003

BETWEEN:

DIANA BETTINA STUART
APPLICANT

AND:

CHIEF OF ARMY
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WILCOX J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 NOVEMBER 2003

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant, Diana Bettina Stuart, pay the costs of the proceeding incurred by the respondent, Chief of Army.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 567 of 2003

BETWEEN:

DIANA BETTINA STUART
APPLICANT

AND:

CHIEF OF ARMY
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WILCOX J

DATE:

13 NOVEMBER 2003

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WILCOX J:

  1. Private Diana Bettina Stuart applies to this Court for review of two decisions concerning her prospective discharge from the Australian Defence Force (‘ADF’).  The respondent to the application is Chief of the Army.

  2. The application is brought pursuant to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘the ADJR Act’). It identifies the relevant decisions as:

    (i)a decision made by a delegate of the respondent, Colonel J R Moug, on 11 April 2003, that the applicant be discharged from the ADF pursuant to reg 87(1)(e) of the Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth) (‘the Regulations’); and

    (ii)a decision of another delegate of the respondent, Brigadier M L Clifford, on 20 September 2003, to reject an application by Private Stuart for redress of grievance concerning Colonel Moug’s decision.

  3. No question has been raised by the respondent as to the competency of the application made to the Court. The case has been argued by Mr B Levet and Ms B Boss, counsel for the applicant, and Mr A Markus, solicitor for the respondent, by reference solely to the question whether the proved facts reveal the existence of a ground of review provided by the ADJR Act.

    The facts

  4. The applicant joined the Australian Regular Army on 3 October 1990.  In July 1995, she was charged with a number of offences under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) (‘the DFD Act’), relating to alleged theft of ammunition. She pleaded not guilty but was convicted of some offences and suffered punishments consisting of restrictions of privileges (‘ROPs’) and detention.

  5. Notwithstanding having suffered the punishments, the applicant petitioned the convictions, but was…

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Stuart v Chief of Army [2003] FCA 1291
Case
[2003] FCA 1291
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Stuart v Chief of Army involved the applicant, Diana Bettina Stuart, who sought to challenge the validity of two decisions made by the respondent, the Chief of Army. The first decision was to terminate her enlistment in the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and the second was to reject her application for redress of grievance. Stuart claimed that these decisions were made without proper consideration of relevant factors, included irrelevant considerations, and denied her procedural fairness. The case was argued in the court with reference to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act) and the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act).

The primary legal issues that the court had to address were whether the decisions to terminate Stuart's enlistment and to reject her grievance application were manifestly unreasonable, whether the decision-makers failed to consider relevant factors or took into account irrelevant ones, and whether Stuart was denied procedural fairness. The court also had to consider whether the decision-makers failed to exercise their discretion properly. The applicant contended that the decision-makers did not take into account the full facts of her case, including the alleged unlawful detention on 23 April 2002 and the matter concerning Craftsman Rosemond.

The court found that the applicant's contentions were not supported by the evidence. The court noted that the full facts concerning the alleged unlawful detention and the matter involving Craftsman Rosemond were not before the decision-makers, and thus could not be considered as relevant factors. Furthermore, the court determined that the decision-makers did not take into account any irrelevant considerations, as the complaints regarding the report on her treatment during the ROP punishment and the comment by Lieutenant Commander Hase did not contravene the ADJR Act. Regarding procedural fairness, the court dismissed the complaints about the FOI material and the ROP report, finding that the applicant did not pursue her FOI request and that neither decision-maker was responsible for complying with it.

The court concluded that the decisions to terminate Stuart's enlistment and to reject her grievance application were not manifestly unreasonable and were made in accordance with the law. The applicant's claims were dismissed, and the court ordered that Stuart pay the costs of the proceeding incurred by the Chief of Army.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant, Diana Bettina Stuart, pay the costs of the proceeding incurred by the respondent, Chief of Army.

Background

Background to the litigation

No question has been raised by the respondent as to the competency of the application made to the Court. The case has been argued by Mr B Levet and Ms B Boss, counsel for the applicant, and Mr A Markus, solicitor for the respondent, by reference solely to the question whether the proved facts reveal the existence of a ground of review provided by the ADJR Act.The facts The applicant joined the Australian Regular Army on 3 October 1990. In July 1995, she was charged with a number of offences under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) (‘the DFD Act’), relating to alleged theft of ammunition. She pleaded not guilty but was convicted of some offences and suffered punishments consisting of restrictions of privileges (‘ROPs’) and detention. Notwithstanding having suffered the punishments, the applicant petitioned the convictions, but was initially unsuccessful. She received a notice to show cause why she should not be discharged from the ADF. A discharge decision was made and a redress of grievance application failed. However, the applicant succeeded in obtaining an order in this Court, dated 28 June 2000, quashing the 1995 convictions. The discharge decision was then withdrawn. Over her period of service, the applicant has faced 59 separate charges, apparently all under the DFD Act. The evidence does not disclose the history of each of them. Many of the charges were either dismissed at trial or resulted in convictions that were later quashed. However, it seems there were at least nine unquashed convictions. They range in date from 13 September 1991 to 25 June 2001. Most of the convictions were for insubordinate behaviour or disobedience of a lawful command. During the period between her first and last conviction, the applicant served in four different Army units. It appears that, in about September 2001, the applicant was required to attend an examination by an ADF psychologist. The psychologist recommended that she be discharged from the ADF. On 17 February 2003, Lieutenant Colonel P Short, as a delegate of Chief of Army, issued to the applicant a termination notice, pursuant to reg 87(2) of the Regulations. The notice stated a proposal to terminate the applicant’s services in the ADF on the ground that she was ‘not suited to be an enlisted member of the Defence Force’. This is a ground of termination stated in reg 87(1)(e) of the Regulations. A further ground of termination, set out in reg 87(1)(c), is that ‘the enlisted member is medically unfit (including unfitness because of mental incapacity)’. In the termination notice, Lieutenant Colonel Short identified the material he had considered when deciding to issue the notice. This included two psychological reports of 24 September 2001; the applicant’s conduct record ‘consisting of the convictions and punishments’ previously listed; and her ‘complete service history as contained on her personal file’. The applicant responded to this notice with a lengthy submission, called ‘Statement of Reasons in response to Termination Notice of 17 Feb 03’. In para 2 of the document she said:‘I say that I have been the victim of an ongoing vendetta by the Army establishment, seeking to have me removed from the Army. Over the past few years, efforts have been made to remove me using disciplinary, administrative and medical means. All have so far proved unsuccessful. Ref A is yet another attempt, for improper purposes to achieve my removal.’‘Ref A’ is the termination notice issued by Lieutenant Colonel Short.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

WILCOX J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WILCOX J

The relevant considerations particularised in this case are the applicant’s allegation of unlawful detention on 23 April 2002 and the material concerning Craftsman Rosemond. The full facts concerning the detention were not before either decision-maker. No facts concerning Craftsman Rosemond were before either of them. The ground is plainly untenable.Taking irrelevant considerations into account This ground of review refers to s 5(2)(a) of the ADJR Act, read with s 5(1)(e). Two items are particularised.(i) ROP treatment The first item is not properly a complaint of taking into account irrelevant material. It will be recalled that Colonel Moug responded to the applicant’s claims of mistreatment during her ROP punishment at 5 BASB by having the claims investigated: see para 19 above. As appears from an exhibit tendered by Mr Markus, the claims were investigated by Lieutenant Mark Russell, Adjutant at Holsworthy Barracks. Lieutenant Russell contacted the applicant by email. He asked her to clarify her complaint and put to her 15 specific questions, all of them pertinent to any proper investigation of her complaint. She responded with an email saying ‘I would prefer to seek legal advice before answering any allegations.’ Lieutenant Russell pointed out to the applicant that there were no allegations made against her; rather that the allegations were made by her. He said: ‘[n]evertheless, I acknowledge your decision and this will be reflected in my report.’ Lieutenant Russell’s report is not in evidence. However, it appears from Brigadier Clifford’s letter to the applicant that he read the report before making his decision. He said that, having regard to the report, he was ‘satisfied that your complaint is without merit’. Given that the applicant had elected not to provide Lieutenant Russell with the detail he needed to evaluate her complaint, this result is unsurprising. As the applicant herself raised the issue of her treatment at 5 BASB, it is difficult to understand her complaint that Lieutenant Russell’s report into that matter was irrelevant to the decision that Brigadier Clifford had to make.(ii) Lieutenant Commander Hase’s recommendation This aspect of the irrelevant considerations ground relates to a comment made by Lieutenant Commander Hase regarding a reference by the applicant to an appreciative remark made by the former Chief of Army in a letter to the applicant dismissing an earlier petition by her. Lieutenant Commander Hase commented that, at the time, the Chief of Army was unaware of pending discharge proceedings against her. Sensibly, counsel for the applicant did not press this issue. Lieutenant Commander Hase’s comment, which was apparently factually correct, could not possibly amount to ‘unsubstantiated allegations’ or contravene s 5(2)(a) of the ADJR Act.Procedural fairness(i) FOI material The complaint is that both decision makers ‘exercised the power without first complying with the Applicant’s request pursuant to’ the FOI Act. However, this complaint is misconceived. As already indicated, the applicant did not pursue her FOI request. In any event, neither decision-maker was responsible for complying with that request.(ii) The ROP report