Stringer and Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIS) - [2025] ARTA 2192

Stringer and Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIS) [2025] ARTA 2192 (13 October 2025)
Applicant:Sarah May Stringer
Respondent: Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency
Tribunal Number: 2024/7014

Tribunal:General Member A Colvin
Place:Brisbane
Date:13 October 2025

Decision:The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review made on 26 August 2024, which affirmed an approval of a statement of participant supports dated 20 June 2024, and remits this matter to the Respondent with a direction that within 21 days of the date of this decision, the Respondent must facilitate the approval of a statement of participant supports (SOPS) for the Applicant, containing the following provisions:
1. A provision to approve funding for the following supports:
(a) fortnightly psychology in place of the funding for psychology services in the existing SOPS dated 20 June 2024;
(b) no funding for plan management; and
(c) replication of the remaining reasonable and necessary supports in the existing SOPS dated 20 June 2024 on a pro rata basis from the date the supports in 1(a) and (c) are included in a SOPS to the varied review date; and

2. A provision that the funding be self-managed.

...........[SGD]....................
General Member A Colvin
Catchwords
NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME – National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) – consideration of section 34 – reasonable and necessary supports – psychology – occupational therapy – physiotherapy – osteopathy – nutritional therapy – exercise sessions – support worker assistance – gardening service – cleaning service – whether self-management of funding would present an unreasonable risk to participant – whether funding must be Agency-managed
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)
Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth)
National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth)
National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Getting the NDIS Back on Track No 1) Act 2024 (Cth)
National Disability Insurance Scheme (Supports for Participants) Rules 2013 (Cth)
National Disability Insurance Scheme (Getting the NDIS Back on Track No. 1) (NDIS Supports) Transitional Rules 2024 (Cth)
National Disability Insurance Scheme (Getting the NDIS Back on Track No. 1) (Miscellaneous Provisions) Transitional Rules 2024 (Cth)
National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Management of Funding and Plan Management) Rules 2025 (Cth)
Cases
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 60
National Disability Insurance Agency v WRMF [2020] FCAFC 79
Miller and National Disability Insurance Agency [2025] ARTA 1870
Secondary Materials
NDIS – Operational Guidelines Reasonable and necessary supports
Statement of Reasons
BACKGROUND

Ms Stringer is an adult participant in the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). She has multiple tertiary qualifications, works fulltime, is single and has two school-aged sons. Ms Stringer was granted access to the NDIS based on impairments arising from autism spectrum disorder (ASD), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and anxiety disorder.
As an NDIS participant, Ms Stringer has a plan that includes a statement of participant supports (SOPS). The current…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

AGLC: Stringer and Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIS) [2025] ARTA 2192
Case: [2025] ARTA 2192
Decision Date: 13 October 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Stringer and Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIS) involved a dispute over the management of disability funding for Ms Stringer. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether self-management of funding would present an unreasonable risk to Ms Stringer, and if the funding must therefore be managed by the Agency. Ms Stringer sought to have her funding managed by herself rather than the Agency, arguing that she could effectively manage her own funds and supports. The primary legal issue was whether Ms Stringer could manage her own funding without presenting an unreasonable risk to herself, as required under the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth).

The court considered the evidence provided by Ms Stringer’s treating practitioners, including reports from a psychologist, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, and an osteopath. However, none of these practitioners provided oral evidence, which limited the court's ability to clarify or test their opinions. In contrast, Ms Houston, an Agency employee, provided oral evidence and her report complied with the Tribunal’s practice directions. The court found that Ms Houston’s evidence was more reliable and up-to-date. Additionally, there were concerns about the qualifications and expertise of Dr Couchman, a treating practitioner, as the provided evidence did not clearly establish her credentials as a clinical psychologist.

The court concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate that Ms Stringer’s self-management of funding would present an unreasonable risk. The court emphasised the importance of the participant’s right to exercise control over their own life, as stipulated in section 31 of the NDIS Act. Consequently, the court set aside the decision affirming the approval of the statement of participant supports and directed that Ms Stringer’s funding be self-managed, with specific provisions for the approval of certain supports.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I make the following observations about the evidence.Evidence from allied health professionals It was submitted on Ms Stringer’s behalf that I should prefer the evidence of her treating practitioners to that of Ms Houston. The information that Ms Stringer provided included reports from the following practitioners:·Dr Couchman (various letters, most recently 17 September 2025);·Mr Phoon, physiotherapist (report dated 9 August 2024);·Ms Tay, occupational therapist (report dated 7 August 2024);·Ms Hayward, occupational therapist (report dated 14 December 2023);·Ms Botter, osteopath (report dated 6 November 2023); and·Mr Metrovich, occupational therapist (report dated 1 September 2022). However, none of the above practitioners gave oral evidence. That meant that the Tribunal was unable to clarify or test the opinions they had expressed in their reports. Also, most of the reports were at least a year old and Ms Stringer’s circumstances had changed significantly. In contrast, Ms Houston gave oral evidence and could indicate her current view in light of Ms Stringer’s evidence and changed circumstances. It was also possible to clarify with Ms Houston her reasoning for some of the conclusions she had reached. Further, unlike Ms Houston’s report, the reports by the above practitioners generally did not comply with all the requirements in the Tribunal’s practice directions regarding expert reports. Those requirements include requirements that the Tribunal be provided with details of the qualifications and expertise of the expert, and letters of instruction, and that the report contain a declaration that the expert understood they had an overriding duty to provide impartial assistance to the Tribunal and that no matters of significance had been withheld from the Tribunal. Failure to comply with these requirements can affect the reliance the Tribunal can place on a report. This was a significant issue with Dr Couchman’s letters. Until recently, Ms Stringer saw Dr Couchman regularly for counselling. Ms Stringer described a process of going back and forth with Dr Couchman about the content of Dr Couchman’s recent letter. Ms Stringer denied telling Dr Couchman what to write in that letter but did give examples of suggestions she made to Dr Couchman. None of that exchange with Dr Couchman, or any earlier draft of Dr Couchman’s letter, was provided to the Tribunal. In addition, the Tribunal was not provided with reliable evidence of Dr Couchman’s qualifications and experience. Ms Brix contended that Dr Couchman was a psychologist but Dr Couchman described herself in her most recent letter as an ‘autism psychotherapist’ who had provided ‘counselling’ to Ms Stringer. There is nothing on the face of that letter to indicate that Dr Couchman has medical qualifications or qualifications and current registration as a clinical psychologist. Ms Brix provided a resume for Dr Couchman generated by Ms Brix from internet sources, using AI. It states that Dr Couchman has a Master of Clinical Psychology and PhD in Clinical Psychology, that she is registered as a psychologist with AHPRA, and that she is currently a Senior Lecturer in Clinical Psychology at the University of Sydney. Given the potential for serious error in that document I am unable to rely on it as an accurate representation of Dr Couchman’s experience and qualifications.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I have had regard to Part 3 of the Management of Funding Rules, particularly the matters set out in Rule 6(2). I have also had regard to the principles in section 31 of the NDIS Act, including that the management of funding be underpinned by the right of the participant to exercise control over his or her own life. I am not satisfied on the present evidence that any risk to Ms Stringer reaches a level that constitutes ‘unreasonable risk’ as that term is used in paragraph 44(1)(b) of the NDIS Act. This means that paragraph does not apply to Ms Stringer and that there is no requirement under subsection 43(3) of the NDIS Act for funding to be Agency-managed.DECISIONThe Tribunal sets aside the decision under review made on 26 August 2024, which affirmed an approval of a statement of participant supports dated 20 June 2024, and remits this matter to the Respondent with a direction that within 21 days of the date of this decision, the Respondent must facilitate the approval of a statement of participant supports (SOPS) for the Applicant, containing the following provisions:1. A provision to approve funding for the following supports:(a)fortnightly psychology in place of the funding for psychology services in the existing SOPS dated 20 June 2024;(b) no funding for plan management; and (c) replication of the remaining reasonable and necessary supports in the existing SOPS dated 20 June 2024 on a pro rata basis from the date the supports in 1(a) and (c) are included in a SOPS to the varied review date; and2. A provision that the funding be self-managed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In determining, for the purposes of subsection 44(1) of the NDIS Act, whether self-management would present an unreasonable risk to a participant, regard must be had to Part 3 of the Management of Funding Rules, particularly the matters set out in Rule 6(2).CONSIDERATIONMs Stringer’s goals Ms Stringer’s goals, set out in her current plan, include goals around healthier eating habits, friendships, coping strategies, budgeting, developing skills at home and in the workplace, and maintaining a clean house and garden. The evidence I make the following observations about the evidence.Evidence from allied health professionals It was submitted on Ms Stringer’s behalf that I should prefer the evidence of her treating practitioners to that of Ms Houston. The information that Ms Stringer provided included reports from the following practitioners:·Dr Couchman (various letters, most recently 17 September 2025);·Mr Phoon, physiotherapist (report dated 9 August 2024);·Ms Tay, occupational therapist (report dated 7 August 2024);·Ms Hayward, occupational therapist (report dated 14 December 2023);·Ms Botter, osteopath (report dated 6 November 2023); and·Mr Metrovich, occupational therapist (report dated 1 September 2022). However, none of the above practitioners gave oral evidence. That meant that the Tribunal was unable to clarify or test the opinions they had expressed in their reports. Also, most of the reports were at least a year old and Ms Stringer’s circumstances had changed significantly. In contrast, Ms Houston gave oral evidence and could indicate her current view in light of Ms Stringer’s evidence and changed circumstances. It was also possible to clarify with Ms Houston her reasoning for some of the conclusions she had reached. Further, unlike Ms Houston’s report, the reports by the above practitioners generally did not comply with all the requirements in the Tribunal’s practice directions regarding expert reports. Those requirements include requirements that the Tribunal be provided with details of the qualifications and expertise of the expert, and letters of instruction, and that the report contain a declaration that the expert understood they had an overriding duty to provide impartial assistance to the Tribunal and that no matters of significance had been withheld from the Tribunal. Failure to comply with these requirements can affect the reliance the Tribunal can place on a report. This was a significant issue with Dr Couchman’s letters. Until recently, Ms Stringer saw Dr Couchman regularly for counselling. Ms Stringer described a process of going back and forth with Dr Couchman about the content of Dr Couchman’s recent letter. Ms Stringer denied telling Dr Couchman what to write in that letter but did give examples of suggestions she made to Dr Couchman. None of that exchange with Dr Couchman, or any earlier draft of Dr Couchman’s letter, was provided to the Tribunal. In addition, the Tribunal was not provided with reliable evidence of Dr Couchman’s qualifications and experience. Ms Brix contended that Dr Couchman was a psychologist but Dr Couchman described herself in her most recent letter as an ‘autism psychotherapist’ who had provided ‘counselling’ to Ms Stringer. There is nothing on the face of that letter to indicate that Dr Couchman has medical qualifications or qualifications and current registration as a clinical psychologist. Ms Brix provided a resume for Dr Couchman generated by Ms Brix from internet sources, using AI. It states that Dr Couchman has a Master of Clinical Psychology and PhD in Clinical Psychology, that she is registered as a psychologist with AHPRA, and that she is currently a Senior Lecturer in Clinical Psychology at the University of Sydney. Given the potential for serious error in that document I am unable to rely on it as an accurate representation of Dr Couchman’s experience and qualifications.