Streimer v Tamas

Case

[1981] FCA 123

21 May 1981

No judgment structure available for this case.

CATCHWORDS

l

Discovery - Legal professional privilege.

BRAMBLES HOLDINGS LIMITED

v. TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION.

N.S.W. NO.G.44

Of 1978.

FRANK1 J.

Sydney.

21 May 1981 5 June 1981 25 June 1981.

The question of costs has not yet been determined.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA)

1

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY) No. G.

44 of 1978

1

GENERAL DIVISION

BETWEEN: BRAMBLES HOLDINGS LIMITED

Applicant

AND: TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION

Respondent

21 May 1981

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FRANK1 J.

Brambles Holdings Ltd, the applicant, is the second

defendant in proceedings No.G.44

of 1978 brought by the Trade

Practices Commission

("the Commission") against it and eight

other defendants in which breaches

of s.45 of the Trade Practices

-

Act

1974

("the Act") are alleged and penalties are sought

i

pursuant to ss.76 and 77 of the Act and

an injunction is sought

pursuant to s.80 of the Act.

The proceedings

were commenced before

the current

Federal Court Rules, S.R. No.140

of 1979, were made and therefore

the relevant rules are those appearing

in S.R. No. 20 of 1977.

2

The effect of 0.2 r.1 of those Rules is that the Rules of the

High Court are applicable "subject

to any directions

of the Court

or a Judge". See also s.38

of the Federal Court

of Australia Act

1976.

The applicant filed an application

on 16 March 1981

seeking orders

:

1.

That the plaintiff make, file and serve within

14 days

an affidavit making further and better discovery:

2 .

That the

claim of the plaintiff

to legal professional

privilege made by paragraph

3 of the affidavit

of Wynne Patricia

Hannon, sworn 27 January 1981, is not justified: and

3.

That

he

plaintiff

make

available

for

inspection

a

number of documents which were identified in the Notice

of Motion

and

for

which the plaintiff has claimed legal professional

privilege.

No formal Notice for Discovery had been given pursuant

to 0.32

r.9

of the High Court Rules but it was agreed that

I

should treat this application as if the Commission had been

served with a Notice for Discovery and

it had sought to comply

with obligations then falling upon a party

so served.

The first Affidavit

of Discovery filed

on behalf of the

Commission was that

of Glen Catherine Smith, sworn on 15 January

1980. The schedule to this affidavit listed a number of documents

of various types and claims were made for privilege. A further

3

and much more detailed Affidavit

of Discovery was sworn on 27

January 1981 by Wynne Patricia Hannon and this affidavit referred

to 31 volumes of documents and claimed privilege in respect of

certain documents. The documents referred to in the affidavit

were described in an exhibit

to the affidavit which comprised

537

pages ("the Schedule"). The exhibit contained a

list of

documents in the first four volumes

of documents referred to in

the affidavit and described in it as "Documentary material of the

plaintiff and its solicitors". Various documents in the schedule

were marked to show that privilege was claimed for them.

However, senior counsel for the Commission said that it was not

seeking to maintain privilege in regard to documents of a date

prior to 5 April 1978 which was the .date when the Commission

decided to commence the proceedings. Senior counsel made it

clear that he was not conceding that privilege did not extend to

documents prior

to that date but was simply not seeking to

maintain any existing privilege.

The day before the motion was commenced a further

affidavit sworn on that day by

Mr. Graham Walker setting out the

grounds upon which privilege was claimed

was filed on behalf of

the Commission. After two days hearing the matter was adjourned,

and a few days before the hearing was resumed a telex was sent by

the Commission

to the applicant setting out the text

of a further

affidavit to be sworn by Miss Hannon. When the matter resumed

before me on 8 May 1981 the further affidavit

of Miss Hannon was

filed in Court.

It is fair to say that it is not possible

to

4

reconcile the precise grounds upon which privilege is claimed in

the four affidavits and in the telex. Counsel for the applicant

asked me

to hold that the claim

for privilege had not been

established because of the inconsistencies arising out

of the

affidavits.

I appreciate that in a case involving discovery of

the magnitude

of that involved in this case

it is extremely

difficult to prepare an affidavit which is beyond criticism,

without that affidavit being

of an almost impractical length and

complexity. In saying this

I do not wish

it to be thought that

I

am suggesting that litigants can expect the Court

to

read

affidavits of discovery with particular sympathy but in this case course.

The applicant asked that Mr. Walker

be cross-examined on

his affidavit. Counsel could not refer

me

to

any case where

cross-examination of the deponent to an affidavit of

discovery

had been allowed and

I refused to permit the cross-examination

of

Mr. Walker.

I

consider that Mulley v. Manifold

(1959).

103

C.L.R. 341 at p.343

is sufficient authority for this decision.

Counsel for the applicant relied mainly

on 0.32 r.12,

r.13 and r.18 of the High Court Rules. However, the applicant no

longer seeks any further affidavit but merely seeks inspection

of

those documents

for which privilege

has not been established.

5

At the conclusion

of argument I indicated that

I was not

prepared to hold that no claim for privilege had been

established, but that

I considered that the most practical course

was to deal with a number

of those documents referred

to in the

schedule to Miss Hannon's first affidavit which had been

specifically dealt with by senior counsel for the applicant. I

said that I proposed to examine the description

of each document

under consideration set

out in the schedule

and then decide

whether from its description it appeared that it fell within any

of the grounds referred

to in the second affidavit

of Miss Hannon

if privilege could be claimed under that ground.

In a particular case,

I appreciated that it might be

necessary to inspect a document before I could rule on whether

' I

the claim for privilege was made out. I consider that the most

practical course is for me

to

rule

on such of the documents

referred to by senior counsel for the applicant as

I can without

inspection and to leave the parties

to

consider my judgment

before

proceeding

further.

It

is

possible

that

any

issues

remaining undetermined may

be agreed by the parties.

1

Whilst still pressing his application that I should rule

on the affidavits that no satisfactory claim for privilege had

been shown, counsel for the applicant agreed that if I was not

prepared to do this the course

I proposed was reasonably suitable

and senior counsel for the Commission also agreed.

6

Senior counsel for

the applicant submitted a document

classifying certain

of

the documents for which privilege was

claimed into 11 categories and he dealt with the description

of

those documents in the annexure to Miss Hannon's first affidavit.

It is not necessary

to consider categories 3 , 10 and 11 because,

prior to the resumed hearing privilege was either

not claimed or

was waived in respect

of those categories.

The grounds of privilege from the production of

documents

for

which privilege is claimed were set out in the

second affidavit

of Miss Hannon as follows:

"(i) prepared by the Plaintiff's legal advisers for use by them in these proceedings; or

(ii) brought into existence by the Plaintiff

for the sole purpose of submission to

its legal advisers for advice or for use

by them in connection with these

proceedings: or

(iii) brought into existence

at the request

of

the Plaintiff's legal advisers solely

to

enable the Plaintiff's legal advisers

to

advise the Plaintiff or to conduct these

proceedings on its behalf: or

communications

passing

between

the

Plaintiff and third parties after the institution of these proceedings at the request or suggestion f the Plaintiff's

legal

advisers

relating

to these

.proceedings; or

internal memoranda of the Plaintiff

prepared after the institution

of these

proceedings relating to advice or information obtained or to be obtained from or for the Plaintiff ' S legal

advisers

relation

in

to these

proceedings: or

7

(vi)  communications between the legal representatives of the parties or notes of discussions between the parties or

their legal representatives

which

communications and discussions

were

without prejudice

(vii) confidential communications between the

Plaintiff and its legal advisers made

to

or by the legal adviser, with a view to obtaining or giving legal advice or assistance, or notes of these confidential communications."

I note that only grounds (ii) and (iii) refer

to the

"sole" purpose.

Although I have been referred

to a number of authorities

which I have carefully considered,

I take the view that the

two

recent decisions of the High Court in Grant

v. Downs (1976) 135

C.L.R. 674 and National Employers' Mutual General Insurance

Association Ltd v. Waind

(1979) 141 C.L.R. 648 set out the

relevant principles applicable

to this case.

In the application before me the claim which was pressed

to justify non discovery of the relevant documents was that of

legal professional privilege.

In Waind's case the judgment

of Mason J., with whom

Barwick C.J., Stephen. Jacobs and Aicken

JJ.

agreed, contained

the following passages at pp.654 and 656 which make it clear that

the intended use of documents in litigation is insufficient to

8

attract legal professional privilege but that this privilege

attaches to communications passing between the legal adviser and

client.

At p. 654:

"Two preliminary comments should

be made about

the way in which the case for the appellant

was presented. First, the argument at times

seemed to suggest that

it is the intended use

of documents in litigation which attracts the

relevant privilege. This of course is not so. The relevant head of privilege is legal professional privilege which attaches to communications passing between legal adviser

and client. Documents submitted by the client

to his solicitors for advice

or for use in

anticipated litigation attract the privilege,

but it is very doubtful whether there is a

privilege for documents coming into existence

as materials for the purposes of an action to

be conducted by a litigant in person (see

Laws of England, 4th ed;: vo1.13, p.68).

.Of

course it may be that privilege can be claimed

on the ground that a document relates solely

to the case of the party, a head of privilege

still available in New South Wales. Secondly,

the argument did not always make clear the

distinction between the purpose for which

information is obtained and the purpose for

which a document recording information

is

brought into existence."

And at p. 656:

"If, on the facts, the documents are brought

into existence for the

dual purpose of

deciding what it will do and for use in

litigation by legal advisers when appropriate,

the purpose should

be considered as one

purpose which, including as it does submission

to legal advisers, would attract

the relevant

head of privilege.

That

is the

argument.

Unfortunately for the appellant, it is an argument which runs headlong into Grant v.

9

Downs (1976) 135 C.L.R. 674. As Glass J.A.

observed in the Court of Appeal @978] 1

N.S.W.L.R., at p. 376,' when he applled the

remarks of Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ. in

Grant v. Downs:

'If the purpose which actuates the party who commissions documents is not single but multiple each must be identified. Unless all

of them fall within the protected group of

purposes namely submission to legal advisers

or use in litigation, no privilege attaches.'

The argument is not only inconsistent with the

sole purpose test enunciated

by Stephen, Mason

and Murphy JJ. (1976) 135 C.L.R.

at p.688; it

is also inconsistent with the dominant purpose

test favoured by Barwick C.J. (1976) 135

C.L.R.

at p.678 and in my view it fails

to

satisfy the test proposed by Jacobs

J. (1976)

135 C.L.R. at p. 692 - Does the purpose of supplying the materials to the legal adviser account for its existence?"

The following passage from the judgment

of

Barwick C . J .

at p.657

also illustrates the importance

of the purpose

of

submission to legal advisers'.

"However useful these documents might prove in

any supervening litigation, they were not in

any sense proofs of witnesses or statements

prepared for submission to legal advisers."

Aicken J. at p.651 said:

"I agree with the reasons given by my brother

Mason for this conclusion.

The judgment of Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ.

makes it clear

that to attract legal

professional privilege it is necessary that

the sole purpose for bringing the relevant

document into existence was its submission

to

legal advisers for obtaining legal advice

or

for use in litigation".

.

10

I read this passage as stating that legal professional

privilege is not attracted unless the sole purpose for bringing

the relevant document into existence was its submission to legal

advisers (a)

for obtaining legal advice

or (b) for use in

litigation.

In Grant v. Downs (supra) Barwick C.J.,

who dissented,

nevertheless took

the view at

p.678

that the document under

consideration must have been produced -

for the solicitor in

relation to proceedings pending, threatened

or anticipated, i.e.

at the time

of its production.

Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ.

in a joint judgment said

at p. 682:

"What then

are the relevant principles of law

governing the privilege which attaches to communications and materials submitted by a client to his solicitor for the purpose of advice or for the purpose of use in existing or anticipated litigation, in particular when

the materials have been called into existence to serve more than one purpose, submission to the solicitor being only one of the purposes?"

It is to be noted that this passage refers to "communications and materials submitted

by

a client

to his

solicitor.

. .

' I .

At p.688 the joint judgment continues:

“It is not right that the privilege can attach

to documents which, quite apart from the

purpose of submission to a solicitor, would

have been brought into existence for other

purposes in any event, and then without

attracting any attendant privilege.“

Jacobs J. at p.692 said:

“I think that the question which the court

should pose to itself is this - does the

purpose of supplying the material

to the legal

adviser account for the existence of the

material?

I use the word purpose here in the

sense of intention - the intended use.“

Again it is to be noted that the reference is

to the

supply of material to the legal adviser.

I am therefore of the opinion that in order to attract

legal professional privilege the document must have been brought

into existence for the sole purpose of submission to the legal

adviser either for obtaining legal advice

or for use in the

litigation. Unless the document was brought into existence

for

the purpose of putting

it

before the legal adviser legal

professional privilege does not attach

to it. Whilst neither of

the cases

I have mentioned deal specifically with the question of

copies I am satisfied that legal professional privilege attaches

to a draft or copies

of a document which is itself entitled to

that privilege, at least if the existence of the draft or copy represents a reasonably necessary stage in the preparation of the document to which privilege attaches.

12

The first category

of documents dealt with by the

applicant was that under the general heading

of

"File notes,

internal memoranda or papers". The first

of those was that dated

17 October 1978. The description in the schedule is "File Note

of telephone conversation between MS G. Smith, a member of the

staff assisting the plaintiff and Mr

N. Stock concerning contact

with certain defendant companies".

The only claim for privilege relevant

to the document

of 17 October 1978 is that in paragraph (v)

of Miss Hannon's

second affidavit. There is no suggestion that the document was prepared solely for submission to legal advisers. I reject the

claim for privilege in respect

of this document.

The next document in this category is that

of 25 May

1979. The

description of

it

in

the

schedule

is

"Internal

briefing paper

of

the plaintiff entitled 'T.P.C. v. T.N.T.

(Management) Pty. Ltd and Others, Outline

of Industry and Effect

of Arrangement"'.

The only claim for privilege relevant to this

document appears to be that in paragraph (v)

of Miss Hannon's

second affidavit which does

not allege any sole purpose. Ground

(v) is not limited

to an internal memorandum merely setting out

legal advice whlch has been obtained and which would be the

subject of legal professional privilege

if it was a record of a

communication of advice from a legal adviser in the litigation.

Ground (v) in its terms is applicable

to an internal memorandum

setting out legal advice together with comment on that advice by

13

other persons in the Commission .

In such a case that part of

the memorandum which set out the legal advice would

be privileged

but not that part which set out the comment on the advice.

I

agree with the unreported views

in this regard of Rath J. in

Komacha v. Orange City Council delivered on 30 August 1979.

It

may be that the parties can agree in the light

of this statement

whether all or only part of the document should

be produced for

inspection.

The next document referred

to by the applicant

is that

dated 25 January 1980 and described

in the schedule

as "Internal

memorandum of the Plaintiff concerning progress in this matter".

That also does not appear

to

fall within any valid ground of

privilege claimed.

It is not solely for submission

to legal

advisers nor does it appear

to record legal advice and so it is

not privileged.

The next document

is that of

10 March 1980 which appears

to fall in the same category as the last document.

The next document is that of 28 April 1980 described in

the schedule as "File note

of telephone conversation between Ms.

E. Barton, a member

of the staff assisting the plaintiff and Mr.

McGrillen, a member of staff of the Public Transport Commission of New South Wales concerning the seventhnamed defendant." This

document falls into the same category as the file note

of 17

October 1978 and it is not privileged.

14

The next document

is that of 29 April 1980. It is

described as a letter. It is not privileged.

The next document is that

of 21 July 1980 described as

"Internal briefing memorandum

of the

plaintiff concerning

settlement of this matter".

If the parties cannot agree with

respect to this document it will be necessary for me to inspect

it.

The next document is that of August 1980 described as

"Internal Working Paper

of the plaintiff entitled 'Specific

Competition Evidence Needed"'. Privilege is not established for this document except for any part which records legal advice received.

The next document is that of

2 September 1980 described

in

the

schedule

as

"Internal

memorandum

of

the

plaintiff

concerning witnesses in this matter". This document does not

appear to have been solely prepared

for submission to legal

advisers and therefore

no claim for privilege is established

9

except for any part which records legal advice received.

The next category

of documents is entitled "Internal

briefing paper". This document is described in the schedule as:

"Internal briefing paper

of the plaintiff entitled 'Effect

on

Competitlon of Exclusion of Brokers from National Freight

Forwarding Industry"'.

Also, apparently included in this

i

15

category, are three undated documents described

as follows;

“Broadsheet being a chronology

of the evidence relating to this

matter “;

“Broadsheet detailing evidence

of

‘giving effect’ to

the alleged arrangements by the defendants ‘l;

“Broadsheet being

analysis of the pleadings and the evidence in this matter.”

The date of these documents is not established as being

after 5 April 1978, nor does it appear that any of them were

prepared for the sole purpose of submission

to legal advisers and

they are not privileged.

The documents in category

4, being letters from the

Minister, are no longer the subject of a claim for privilege.

The next category of documents is headed “Record

of

discussion

within

Commission“.

The

first

document

in

this

category is dated

1 May 1978 and is described in the schedule

as:

“Record of discussion between a Commissioner and members

of staff

assisting the plaintiff concerning competition matters“.

This appears to be in the category

of a record of a

discussion and appears to be an internal document which is not claimed to have been prepared solely for submission to legal advisers and it is not privileged.

The next document in this category is that dated

13 July

1978 which is described in the schedule as: “Record of

*

<

16

discussion between a Commissioner and members

of staff assisting

the plaintiff concerning competition aspects

of' this matter".

This document is not privileged.

The next category of documents is entitled "Records of

interviews re Freight Arrangements and Tradestock". The first is

dated 18 July 1978 and is described in the schedule as "Record

of

interview between Mr

J. O'Neill and

MS G. Smith, members

of staff

assisting the plaintiff and Mr

T. Henderson, T.F. Henderson

&

Associates, concerning the freight forwarding industry".

This document appears to have been brought into existence €or internal purposes and not solely for submission

to

legal advisers. It is not privileged.

The next documents are both

of

7

August 1978 and

described in the schedule as: "Record

f interview between Ms.

G.

Smith, a member of staff assisting the plaintiff, and Mr. Coull, Hardy Spicer, concerning freight arrangements and Tradestock Pty Ltd" and "Record of interview between Ms. G . Smith, a member of

staff assisting the plaintiff, and

Mr Daws, Mindrill, concerning

freight arrangements and Tradestock Pty. Ltd.". Again neither

of

these documents appear

to have been prepared solely for the

purpose of submission to solicitors and neither is privileged.

17

The next document is

dated 4 October 1979 and is

described in the schedule as "Statement of Mr. T. Henderson on

matters relating to the Freight Forwarding Industry". From its

description this document does not appear

to be any more than a

statement from a Mr. Henderson and it does not appear

to have

been brought into existence for the sole purpose

of submission to

legal advisers. It is not privileged.

The next category of documents is entitled "Minutes of

Commission". The first document in this category is that of 28 April 1978 which is entitled "Minutes of Commission Meeting of the plaintiff". These minutes appear to be no more than of a meeting of the Commission and they do not appear to have been

prepared solely for the purpose

of presentation to legal advisers

nor

as a record of legal

advice

received.

They

are

not

privileged.

The next category of documents is entitled "Letters

written by or to the

plaintiff or to or

by various named

persons". Those written by a Mr. Haymen on 6 February 1979 and

to him on

14 February 1979 were discussed. These letters are

described in the schedule as: "Letter

of Mr. J. Haymen, Tomasetti

E,

Son Pty. Ltd. enclosing copies of correspondence concerning

freight arrangements and Tradestock Pty. Ltd.'' and "Letter of the plaintiff to Mr. J. Hayman, Tomasetti & Son Ptye Ltd., concerning

conversation with Mr.

J. Oxley."

18

I can see no basis for any claim

for privilege in

respect of these letters.

The next category of documents is entitled "Copies

of

correspondence enclosed with letter plaintiff

to Haymen". The

letter referred

to appears to be that of

6 February 1979 to which

I have just referred.

No claim for privilege has been

established in respect

of any of the correspondence enclosed with

the letter of

6 February 1979.

My decision in relation to any document which

I have

held not to be privileged is subject to the qualification that any part of any such document which does no more than reproduce

legal advice obtained in relation

to the proceedings need not be

made available for inspection.

I propose to adjourn the matter to a date which

I will

now fix.

I,

0

*$-:.

,/(‘/, i,’

t ,

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA)

I.

/

1

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY)

No. N.S.W. G44 of 1978.

1

DIVISION

GENERaL

1

BETWEEN:

BFLWBLES

HOLDINGS

LIMITED

Applicant

‘ AND:

TRADE

PRaCTICES

COMMISSION

Respondent.

5 June 1981

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Franki J.

In this Notice of Motion

I gave judgment on 21 May 1981

l

which I hoped might substantially resolve the problems which

had arisen with regard to discovery.

I refer to that

judgment when I said:

“I consider that the most practical course

is for me to

rule on such of the documents

referred to by senior counsel €or the applxant as I can without mspection and

to leave the partles to consider my

judgment before proceeding further. It

is possible that any issues remaining

undetermined may be agreed by the parties.“

I laid down certain tests which were summarized on the

latter half of page

11 when I said:

“I am therefore of the oplnlon that in

order to attract legal professional

privilege the document must have been

L .

brought into existence for the sole purpose

of submission to the legal adviser either

for obtaining legal advice or for use in

the litigation. Unless the document was

brought into existence for the purpose

of putting it before the legal adviser

legal professional privilege does not attach

to it. Whilst neither of the cases

I have

mentioned deal specifically with the question

of copies I am satisfied that legal professional

privilege attaches to

a draft or copies of

a

document which is itself entitled to that

privilege, at least if the existence of the

draft or copy represents

a reasonably necessary

stage in the preparation of the document

to

which privilege attaches."

I also added a qualification in the second last

paragraph on page

18 whlch is:

"My decision in relation to any document which

I have held

not to be privileged is subject

to the qualification that any part of any such

document which does no more than reproduce

legal advice obtained in relation to

the

proceedings need not be made available for

inspection."

The effect of my Judgment,

so far as it relates to the

documents under consideration m it, was that documents which did not fall within category (ii) or (iil) set out in the

second affidavit of Miss Hannon and reproduced at page

6 of

my judgment were not privileged.

It had not been necessary

for me to consider documents falling within category

(vi) of

that affldavit but the

applicant does not seek inspection

of any documents falling within that category.

As a result of further argument since my judgment was

delivered it is necessary to deal with the position in

relation to documents about which

L made no speciflc flndings

in that judgment.

3.

The applicant seeks that

I rule on each other document

by doing no more than relying upon the description of that

document in Miss Hannon's second affidavit, together with

any necessary inspection which

I may be requested to make

and which I might feel to be justified.

The respondent argues that the basis of my ruling in

relation to each document in category (ii)

or (iii) of Miss

Hannon's second affidavit requires consideration of the sole purpose for which that document was brought into existence and that neither the description in the affidavit nor any

other description

of it would be sufficient to establzsh that

purpose.

I consider that the only practical way to deal with

this problem is to order that Miss Hannon file and serve

a

further affidavxt on or before 5pm. on

11 June 1981, listing

each document for whxch privilege is still claimed by the respondent and stating withxn which of the categories (ii) or (iii) or (vi) that document is alleged to fall.

The documents which will need to be covered

in th

affidavit are those in the schedule tendered today by senior

counsel for the applicant and marked Exhibit

"A" , and for

which privilege is still claimed by the respondent.

I hope that once this affidavxt is filed and served

there may be

no problems of discovery still remaining.

It is

my present intention,

if necessary, to make an order for

inspection of each document for which privilege is claimed

and which the applicant still seeks to inspect and which

1 s

4.

not established to be within category (ii) or (iii) or

(vi) of the categories in the second affidavit

of Miss

Hannon .

It will also be necessary for Miss Hannon to specify

in her affidavit any document for which privilege is claimed

for any part

on the ground that that part does no more than

reproduce legal advice obtained in relation to the proceedings,

and any order of mine would exclude any such part for which

that privilege were established.

I propose to stand the matter over to

9.3Oam on

25 June 1981 and reserve the question of costs. If in

the meantime, apart from the question of costs, the question

of inspection is no longer an issue, the parties might

be

kind enough to send

a letter to the District Registrar to

that effect and there will then be no need

for anybody to

attend on the date fixed. I reserve the question of costs

and give liberty to either party to apply on

3 days notlce

to the other party.

*

3

I certify that this and the 3

precedingpages are

atrue copyofthe

Reasons for JudgmentheremofhisHonour

M r . Justice F R

I\I /<

L

I N THE

FEDERAL

COURT

OF

AUSTRALIA)

1

NEW SOUTH

WALES

DISTRJCT

REGISTRY)

NO. G.44 of 1978

1

GENERAL DIVISION

)

BETWEEN:

BRAMRLFS

HOLDINGS

LIMITED

Applicant

AND:

TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION

Responden t

25 J u n e 1981

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

F R A N K 1

J

T h i s matter has

t a k e n a

rather

u n u s u a l

c o u r s e

b u t ,

a s

I

s a i d before,

I thought it w a s t he post appropriate c o u r s e for it

t o t a k e .

I

gave sone r e a s o n s for judgment

on

21 May 1981 ,

and

on

t h a t

occasion

J

set

o u t c e r t a in

p r i n c i p l e s

t h a t

I

c o n s i d e r were

appl icable

a n d

r u l e d

o n

a

number

of

documen t s .

One

document

I

s a i d I

would

need

t o inspect before I

r u l e d on it, and t h a t is

r e f e r r e d t o o n paoe

14 of

t h e judgment of

21 May

1 9 8 1 , b u t

sen ior

c o u n s e l

for

t h e

a p p l i c a n t

d o e s

no t

press

for

the

i n s p e c t i o n

of

t h a t

document .

T h e

o r d e r s which

1 made

on

5

J u n e 1981 c o n c e r n i n g a

f u r t h e r

a f f i d a v i t

h a v e

b e e n

c o m p l i e d

w i t h ,

a n d

Miss

Wynne

P a t r i c i a

H a n n o n

h a s

f i l e d

a

f u r t h e r

a f f i d a v i t

of

11

J u n e

1 9 8 1 .

I n t h a t

she has

sought

t o c l a s s i fy v a r i o u s

d o c u m e n t s ,

i n

respect

2.

of

which

inspection

i s sought and

i n respec t

o

f

which

pr iv i lege

i s

still

claimed,

f irst i n t o

c a t e g o r y

(ii) of

t he

ca t egor i e s

which

she set o u t i n h e r

a f f i d a v i t o f

8

May

1981,

secondly

i n t o

category

(iii) of

t h a t a f f i d a v i t

and

t h i r d l y

i n t o c a t e g o r y

( v i ) .

There

i s a

fu r the r

ca t egory

be ing

ce r t a in

documents

which

a r e

sail

t o

c o n t a i n

c e r t a i n

l e g a l

a d v i c e

w h i c h

w o u l d

n o t

be

d i scove rab le

pu r suan t

o

my

e a r l i e r

r u l i n g

insofar

as

concerns

t h e v e r y p a r t

of

each document which

records

the

legal advice.

T h i s

a f f i d a v i t

o f

11

J u n e

1981

descr ibes

the

var ious

documents

t h a t it

classif ies i n p r e c i s e l y t h e

same words

a s were

used

t o

c l a s s i f y t h o s e

documents

i n Miss

Hannon ' s a f f idavi t o f

27

January

1981,

and

f o r

t h a t

r e a s o n

I

do

no t

th ink

tha t

it

is

d e s i r a b l e

o r

a p p r o p r i a t e

t o

h a v e

o v e r

much

r e g a r d

t o

t h e

par t icu lar

descr ip t ion

of

the

documents .

A

v a s t

number

of

documents

w e r e descr ibed

i n t h e a f f i d a v i t o f

27

January

1981.

As

I

men t ioned p rev ious ly tha t a f f idav i t

was

of

537

pages.

Now

t h e r e a r e o n e o r

two

documents

as descr lbed

i n

t h a t

a f f i d a v i t o f

27

January

1981

whlch

might

be

thought no t

to

have

been proBuced under

c i rcumstances

tha t

fa l l

wi th in

ca tegory

(ii)

o r (iii)

( i f t h e y b e t h e r e l e v a n t c a t e g o r i e s )

i n

t h e a f f i d a v l t o f

Miss Fannon of 8 Vay 1981. I tske as

examples

a document of 2 8

February 1979 which

i s described a s a f i l e note and

aocument

undated except as

t o May

la80 descrlbed

a s an

i n t e r n a l memorandum

o f

t h e p l a i n t i f f .

E u t

Miss

Fannon

has

sa id

i n paragraph

3

of her

a f f i d a v i t o f

11

J u n e 1981

t h a t :

3 .

"In

t h e

t h r e e

days

preceding

the swearing of

t h i s a f f i d a v i t

I

have

looked

a t each document

l i s t e d

i n

e x h i b i t s

"Y"

and

"2"

t o

t h i s

a f f i d a v i t

h a v e

n d

i n v e s t i g a t e d

the

c i r c u m s t a n c e s

i n

w h i c h

each

document

i s

correctly

placed

i n t h e r ight

f a c t u a l category

of

t h e c a t e g o r i e s

r e f e r r e d

t o

i n t h e p r e c e d i n g

paragraph of

t h i s a f f i d a v i t . "

I s a i d o n 21 May 1981

t h a t I would

no t

permit

cross-

examination of

M r VJalker who

furnished an

ear l ie r a f f i d a v i t and I

cons ide r , b road ly speak ing , t ha t an a f f idav i t

of

discovery should

be

taken

as

be ing

a c c u r a t e

u n l e s s

there i s some

reason for t h e

C o u r t

t o t h i n k t h a t t h a t

i s n o t

so.

Now

I

am

s p e a k i n g

f a i r l y

b r o a d l y

i n

t h e

way

I

have

phrased

tha t .

I

have

been

referred

t o t h e cases of

Birmingham

and Mldland Motor

Omnibus Company Limited v.

London North Western

Railway Company (l?13) 3 K . R . 850, Grant

v .

Downs (1976)

135

C . L . R .

674

and

Vauah v.

Rrit ish

Railways

Board

E 9 8 q

A . C .

521,

b u t

I

do n o t

t h i n k t h e r e

i s anything

in any

of

those cases

which

i s

c o n t r a r y t o

the

view

I have

expressed,

and I do

not

consider

t h a t

h e r e

i s

a n y t h i n g

i n

the

m a t e r i a l

before

me

which

w o u l d

warrant

m y

B e c l i n i n 9

t o

a c c e p t

t h e

s t a t e m e n t

of

V i s s

Irannon

i n

parag-aph

3

of her a f f i d a v i t o f

11 J u n e 1981.

I

th ink , gen t l emen ,

t ha t cove r s

t he

pos i t l on .

I

Associate

Actions
Download as PDF Download as Word Document


Cases Citing This Decision

2

El-Hanania v Vella [2019] FCCA 1555
Cases Cited

0

Statutory Material Cited

0