El-Hanania v Vella
[2019] FCCA 1555
•9 July 2019
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| EL-HANANIA v VELLA | [2019] FCCA 1555 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Application to correct order or orders under the “slip rule” to include an order under s.41(6A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Act) extending the time for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice – whether in the circumstances of this case the slip rule is available to correct orders in this manner – whether there is power under s.41(6A) of the Act to order an extension of time after the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice, as already extended by an order under s.41(6A) of the Act, has expired – whether in the exercise of its discretion the Court should decline to make an order extending time or to apply the slip rule – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.33(1)(c), 41(6A) Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), reg.39.05 |
| Cases cited: Agrillo v Codisposto [1994] FCA 1561 |
| Applicant: | SABA EL-HANANIA |
| Respondent: | ELON JOSEPH VELLA |
| File Number: | SYG 2258 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Manousaridis |
| Hearing dates: | 9, 31 May 2019, 7 June 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 8 July 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 9 July 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr J T Johnson and Mr Y Chen |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Saba El-Hanania Lawyers |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Mr B Sewell of Sewell & Kettle Lawyers |
ORDERS
The interim application filed by the applicant on 10 April 2019 is dismissed.
The costs of the interim application are reserved.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2258 of 2018
| SABA EL-HANANIA |
Applicant
And
| ELON JOSEPH VELLA |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
Before the Court is an interim application filed by the applicant, Mr El-Hanania, on 10 April 2019 seeking an order that the time for complying with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice served on him be extended. Mr El-Hanania seeks the order under r.39.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR), as “picked up in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia”. In substance, however, Mr El-Hanania seeks an order that a previous order or previous orders made in this proceeding be corrected under the “slip rule” to include an order under s.41(6A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Act) extending the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice that has been served on him.
In addition Mr El-Hanania submits the Court has power to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice because he filed the application for such order before the time for complying with its requirements, as prescribed by the bankruptcy notice itself, had expired.
Background
On 14 August 2018 Mr El-Hanania filed an application in this Court seeking an order to set aside a bankruptcy notice that was served on him on 27 July 2018. On 15 August 2018, 28 August 2018, and 6 November 2018 the matter came before a Registrar of this Court who made orders for the conduct of the application. Included in the orders the Registrar made on each of these days was an order under s.41(6A) of the Act extending the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice up to the day to which the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice had been adjourned.
On 27 November 2018, when the matter next came before the Court, the Registrar made further orders, one of which was that the application be referred to a Judge’s docket to be listed on a date after 17 December 2018 to be advised by the Registry. The orders as entered, however, do not include an order extending the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice.
The matter came before me on 8 February 2019 for directions. Towards the end of the hearing Mr Johnson, who appeared for Mr El-Hanania, applied for an order to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice. I informed Mr Johnson that the orders made on 27 November 2018, as entered, do not record an order extending the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice. Mr Johnson said he thought an extension had been granted, and that it “was certainly intended”. I asked Mr Johnson whether I had power to extend time, given there was no record that such order had been made on 27 November 2018, and that the time for complying with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice had expired. Mr Johnson said there would be power if such order had not been made on 27 November 2018 because it would have been a slip.
I informed the parties that in a different matter that had been before me counsel for both parties accepted the Court had power to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice even after the time for compliance, as extended by an order of this Court, had lapsed; and that I was prepared to make an order in this case to extend time if both parties were to consent. Mr Wallace, who appeared for the respondent, Mr Vella, said he had no instructions to consent. I indicated to Mr Johnson and Mr Wallace that on the next occasion the matter would come before me I would make an order extending time if the parties were to so consent, or I would hear argument about whether I have such power. I adjourned the matter for directions to 9.30 am on 1 March 2019.
On 1 March 2019 the matter came before me. Ms Soon appeared for Mr El-Hanania, and Mr Wallace for Mr Vella. The parties requested I adjourn the matter for four weeks. By consent I adjourned the matter to 29 March 2019. Neither party raised with me the question of making an order extending the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice.
On 28 March 2019 Mr Vella filed a creditor’s petition. The act of bankruptcy on which the petition relied was Mr El-Hanania’s failure to comply with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice by 27 November 2018. That is the date to which the time for complying with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice had been extended by an order made by a Registrar of this Court on 6 November 2018.
The matter came before me again on 29 March 2019. Mr Johnson appeared for Mr El-Hanania, and Mr Wallace appeared for Mr Vella. Mr Johnson informed me he had been provided by email with the creditor’s petition that had not yet been served on Mr El-Hanania, and that the petition was returnable before a Registrar on 9 May 2019. Mr Johnson said he would invite me to order that Mr El-Hanania file an interim application “under the slip rule with any affidavit and an outline of submissions”. I ordered that Mr El-Hanania file and serve an interim application, and affidavits in support and outline submissions, by 29 April 2019, and I ordered Mr Vella file any affidavit or outline in reply. I also ordered that the interim application be made returnable before me at 9.30 am on 9 May 2019, and that the creditor’s petition also be listed before me at that time.
The matter came before me again at 9.30 am on 9 May 2019. By that time Mr El-Hanania had filed an interim application together with an affidavit and outline submissions prepared by Mr Johnson. Mr Chen appeared for Mr El-Hanania, and Mr Sewell appeared for Mr Vella. I received evidence and heard argument on Mr El-Hanania’s interim application. Mr Chen relied on an affidavit made by Mr Johnson. To his affidavit Mr Johnson annexed an email he sent to Mr El-Hanania on 27 November 2018 reporting on the outcome of the hearing before the Registrar. The email sets out the orders the Registrar is said to have made, the last one being to “[e]xtend the time for compliance with the Bankruptcy Notice BN 226177 issued on 26 July 2018 up to and including the date upon which the matter is listed before the Docket Judge”.
In his written submissions Mr Johnson submitted that, on the evidence, an application “was made and sought to have been granted by District Registrar Wall on 27 November 2018 extending the time for compliance” with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice. Mr Johnson relied on the operation “of what is described as the “slip rule””, as considered in the judgment of the Full Federal Court in Flint v Richard Busuttil & Co Pty Ltd.[1] Mr Johnson submitted that, notwithstanding the subsequent presentation of the creditor’s petition, “the Respondent was present and would have known the nature and effect of the orders sought and obtained before District Registrar [Wall] on 27 November 2018”, and “this is an appropriate case in which the court ought to make the orders sought in the Interim Application”.
[1] [2013] FCAFC [13], at [26-33]
At the hearing on 9 May 2019 Mr Chen made oral submissions that followed the substance of Mr Johnson’s written submissions. Mr Sewell, on the other hand, submitted the Court had no power to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice because the power under s.33(1)(c) of the Act to extend time after time had passed did not apply to the time for complying with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice.
At the hearing I asked the parties’ representatives to what order or orders it was submitted the “slip rule” was to be applied. I noted that if the slip rule applied to correct the order made by the Registrar on 27 November 2018, the order would have included an order that the time for complying with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice be extended to the day on which the matter was to come before a Judge of this Court which, in this case, was me on 8 February 2019. On 8 February 2019, however, no order extending time was made. Mr Chen submitted that if I were to find the slip rule applied to the orders made on 27 November 2018, it would be open to me to correct all subsequent orders to include an order extending time. Mr Chen, however, requested an adjournment for the purpose of obtaining the transcript of the hearings before me on 8 February 2019 and 1 March 2019. I adjourned the matter part heard to 9.30 am on 31 May 2019.
Ms El-Hanania filed an affidavit annexing the transcript of the hearing before me on 8 February 2019, and additional submissions prepared by Mr Johnson. The matter came before me again on 31 May 2019. Mr Johnson appeared for Mr E-Hanania, and relied on his written submissions. Mr Sewell repeated his submission that s.33(1)(c) of the Act denied the Court power to make an order extending the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice after the time for complying with it had expired. I reserved judgment and listed the matter for delivery of judgment on 7 June 2019.
As I was considering my judgment, I formed doubts about whether the slip rule was capable of applying to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice. I undertook my own research which led me to my judgment in Lavin v Toppi,[2] where I found an alternative source of power for extending the time for complying with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice; and that is s.41(6A) of the Act itself.
[2] [2014] FCCA 1228
When the matter came before me on 7 June 2019 I decided not to deliver judgment because I had not informed the parties of the potential availability of the reasoning I accepted in Lavin v Toppi as a separate basis for making an order extending the time for complying with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice, and I also raised the question of whether, assuming I had power, I ought to exercise my discretion in favour of extending time. I made directions permitting the parties to file further submissions and affidavits. The parties did so, although Mr El-Hanania filed further submissions on 25 June 2019 instead of 14 June 2019, being the date by which I directed that this be done; and, given Mr El-Hanania’s lateness in filing his submissions, Mr Vella filed written submissions on 8 July 2019 instead of 28 June 2019, being the day by which I directed Mr Vella file submissions and affidavits in response. Mr El-Hanania filed an affidavit on 8 July 2019. I also ordered that unless by 28 June 2019 the parties informed my associate otherwise, I would be at liberty to give judgment on Mr El-Hanania’s interlocutory application to extend time based on the affidavits read and the submissions made at the hearings and on the submissions and affidavits the parties were to file pursuant to the orders I made on 7 June 2019. My associate received no notice from any of the parties that they wanted any further hearing.
In these reasons for judgment, therefore, I consider whether either or both the slip rule or s.41(6A) of the Act are available to extend the time for complying with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice that was served on Mr El-Hanania; and I will take as read the affidavit Mr El-Hanania made on 8 July 2019.
Is the “slip rule” available?
I examined elsewhere the principles relating to what is often referred to as the “slip rule”, and I do not intend to repeat here what I there said.[3] I have no doubt that the slip rule is capable of applying to correct orders where, through an error or a slip, they do not include an order under s.41(6A) of the Act extending the time for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice. That is so notwithstanding s.33(1)(c) of the Act. The premise on which the slip rule operates is that an order would have been made on a particular occasion but, because of some error or slip, the order was not made. Where on a particular occasion orders were made but, because of some error or slip, an order under s.41(6A) of the Act was not made, and the slip rule applies to permit the correction of those orders to include an order under s.41(6A), the effect of correcting the order to include an order under s.41(6A) is to treat that order as having been made on the occasion on which, but for the error or slip, the order would have been made. In those circumstances, the making of an order under the slip rule is not an order extending time and, for that reason, is not a class of orders that falls within s.33(1)(c) of the Act.
[3] Heywood v Sharpe [2014] FCCA 2999, at [8-23]
I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the slip rule applies to the orders made by the Registrar on 27 November 2018. I am not satisfied, however, that the slip rule would be available to correct the orders the Registrar made on that day to include an order extending the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy beyond the day on which the matter came before me on 8 February 2019. And I am not satisfied the slip rule is capable of applying to the orders I made on 8 February 2019, 1 March 2019, 31 March 2019, 9 May 2019, or 31 May 2019. That is so because although the question of the slip rule was raised on each of these occasions (other than on 1 March 2019), it is difficult to see how my not making an order under s.41(6A) of the Act on any of those days can be said to have been the product of some error or slip by me or by those who appeared before me. In my opinion, there was no error or slip by me or by any person who appeared before me.
Power under s.41(6A) of the Act?
There is an alternative and simpler route to identifying the power for extending the time for complying with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice; and that is s.41(6A) of the Act itself. That route is illustrated in my judgment in Lavin v Toppi.[4] In that case it was submitted the Court had no power under s.41(6A) of the Act to extend the time for complying with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice after the time for complying with its requirements, as already extended by an order that already had been made under s.41(6A) of the Act, had elapsed. I did not accept that submission. Relying on the authority of the Full Federal Court,[5] I found that once one of the preconditions provided for by s.41(6A) of the Act was satisfied for making an order under that subsection, the Court had power to make an order extending time for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice, even if the time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice, as extended by an order already made under s.41(6A) of the Act, had elapsed.
[4] [2014] FCCA 1228
[5] Streimer v Tamas [1981] FCA 123
There is no question that one of the two preconditions provided for by s.41(6A) of the Act, namely, that provided for by s.41(6A)(b) of the Act, has been satisfied in the case before me. Mr El-Hanania applied for an order to set aside the bankruptcy notice before the time for compliance with its requirements had expired. I therefore have power to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice, even if the slip rule cannot apply to the orders the Registrar made on 27 November 2018, or to the orders I subsequently made.
Mr Vella, in his solicitor’s written submissions, submits the Court does not have power to extend the time for complying with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice. Although the submissions refer to Lavin v Toppi, they do not refer to or at least engage with the reasons on which I relied in that case for concluding that the Court has power under s.41(6A) of the Act to extend time for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice after the time for complying has expired provided that, when the application to extend the time for complying with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice has been filed, at least one of the two preconditions provided for by s.41(6A) of the Act have been satisfied. I do not, therefore, accept Mr Vella’s submission that I do not have power to extend the time by which Mr El-Hanania may comply with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice.
Discretionary considerations
That I have the power to make an order to extend the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice does not, however, mean I must exercise that power. The power conferred by s.41(6A) of the Act is discretionary; and the discretion has been described to be “at large”.[6] Principles relating to the exercise of the discretion under s.41(6A) of the Act were considered by Lehane J in Byron v Southern Star Group Pty Ltd.[7] His Honour noted that although the power to extend time for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy is in aid of the power to set aside the bankruptcy itself,[8] “there is no doubt that it is not only on the hearing of a petition that the Court may “go behind” the judgment giving rise to the judgment debt on which the petitioning creditor relies; the judgment debt can be impeached on a motion to set aside a bankruptcy notice”.[9] His Honour then noted there was some difference of opinion about the principles that should guide a court when exercising its discretion to extend time where an appeal has been brought from the judgment on which the judgment is based. After referring to some authorities, Lehane J said:[10]
In my view the considerations to which Sheppard J refers indicate that the principles to be applied where the question is whether a petition should be adjourned or dismissed are not necessarily those which should guide the exercise of the discretion to set aside, or extend time for compliance with, a bankruptcy notice. The commission of an act of bankruptcy is, undoubtedly, a serious matter; it is, however, of a different order of gravity from the change of status brought about by the making of a sequestration order; and there is also to be taken into account the interest of both the judgment creditor and other creditors of the judgment debtor in ensuring that, if ultimately a sequestration order is made, the relevant act of bankruptcy occurs earlier rather than later.
I think, therefore, that considerable weight should be given to the circumstance that here . . . no stay has been granted (or, apparently, sought) of the judgment supporting the bankruptcy notice. It does not follow that other matters are not to be taken into account . . . For example, the authorities suggest that, reluctant as the Court may in most cases be to enter into the merits of an appeal, the merits may be relevant, at least where the Court is able to regard the prospects of success as “slight” or, possibly, in a case where it is apparent that the prospects of success are unusually strong . . . . It may be that different considerations apply where the proceedings instituted for the purpose of setting aside the judgment are, rather than an appeal, separate proceedings seeking to set the judgment aside particularly where, as in Agrillo, the judgment was entered by consent.
[6] Re Taylor; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner for Taxation (Cth) (1983) 74 FLR 377, at page 379
[7] (1997) 73 FCR 264, at page 268, quoting from Re Sterling; Ex parte Esanda Ltd (1980) 44 FLR 125, at page 130)
[8].(1997) 73 FCR 264, at page 268
[9] (1997) 73 FCR 264, at page 268
[10] (1997) 73 FCR 264, at pages 270-271
Mr Vella submits there are a number of matters the weigh against my exercising the discretion to extend the time for Mr El-Hanania to comply with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice: the grounds on which Mr El-Hanania relies to set aside the judgment on the basis of which the bankruptcy notice has been issued are not reasonably arguable; Mr El-Hanania has not obtained a stay of that judgment; Mr El-Hanania has not been diligent in the prosecution of his challenge to the judgment; and Mr Vella will suffer prejudice if I were to make an order extending time. Mr El-Hanania, on the other hand, submits he will suffer prejudice because he will have committed an act of bankruptcy. Mr El-Hanania submits that he is a legal practitioner and a legal practitioner’s committing an act of bankruptcy is a “show cause event” under the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW), and it will potentially affect his ability to earn an income. Further, he submits that, by opposing Mr El-Hanania’s application to extend time, Mr Vella is taking advantage of Mr El-Hanania’s “difficulties and necessity to obtain copies of transcripts of actual events not only before the Registrar but also before the court on the first return date before the Docket Judge and thereafter has also made submissions as to other occasions where the issue has arisen prior to the filing of the Interim Application in respect of which the present application is based”.[11] Finally, Mr El-Hanania submits that any prejudice Mr Vella will suffer by the creditor’s petition being dismissed if an order extending time is made can be met with an order that Mr El-Hanania pay Mr Vella’s costs.
[11] Further Supplementary Submissions of Applicant, [3(b)]
Apparent merits of challenge to judgment
It is unnecessary that I set out the detail of the judgment on the basis of which the bankruptcy notice has been issued, other than to say that it is judgment for $212,765.37 that was entered in the District Court of New South Wales on 31 May 2018 (Judgment).
On 3 July 2019 the Court of Appeal heard an application by Mr El-Hanania for an order extending the time to 1 April 2019 to file a summons seeking to set aside the Judgment on judicial review grounds. There was also before the Court of Appeal a summons for leave to appeal. The transcript of the oral submissions made to the Court of Appeal is annexed to Mr El-Hanania’s affidavit of 8 July 2019. At the conclusion of the hearing, the transcript records Court of Appeal made the following orders:
In the judicial review proceedings 2019/101284 the orders of the Court are as follows:
1.Subject to the conditions in para 2 below, extend the time for filing of the summons to 1 April 2019.
2.Within 28 days of today the applicant is to:
(a)pay into Court the sum of $212,765.37 to abide the further order of the Court.
(b)provide security for costs in a for satisfactory to the registrar of the Court in an amount of $35,000.
3.Otherwise dismiss the respondent’s amended notice of motion filed 15 April 2015.
In the proceedings commenced by summons seeking leave to appeal filed in proceedings 2019/56754 the orders of the Court are:
1.Summons dismissed.
2.Costs of the summons to abide the outcome of the proceedings for judicial review 2019/101284.
Back to the proceedings for judicial review, the additional orders are:
4.Reasons reserved.
5.Stand over the proceedings before the registrar for directions on Monday 5 August 2019 . . . .
In his affidavit of 8 July 2019 Mr El-Hanania draws attention to a number of observations made by the judges of appeal during the hearing, the apparent intention being to show there are at the very least arguable grounds on which the Judgment is liable to be set aside. It is not appropriate for me to comment on the passages to which Mr El-Hanania refers because the Court of Appeal reserved its reasons for decision. What Mr El-Hanania does not say in his affidavit, however, is that he will be in a position to meet the terms on which the Court of Appeal granted him leave to extend the time for applying for judicial review of the Judgment, those terms being that he pay the amount of the Judgment into Court by 31 July 2019, and that he provide security for costs by that day in the amount of $35,000. Mr El-Hanania says nothing about whether he has any capacity to satisfy either or both of these conditions. The natural inference to draw from Mr El-Hanania’s silence about these conditions is that he will not be in a position to satisfy them. That weighs heavily against my exercising the discretion to extend the time for Mr El-Hanania complying with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice.
Conduct of Mr Vella
As I have noted, Mr El-Hanania criticises Mr Vella’s opposing the application for an extension of time to comply with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice. There are a number of matters to note.
First, at the hearing of 8 February 2019 I informed the parties’ representatives of the possibility that the Court had power to make an order extending the time for complying with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice even though the time for complying with its requirements had lapsed. There is no evidence about what effort, if any, was made to identify whether the Court did have such power. Secondly, although the absence of an order to extend time was raised by me at the hearing on 8 February 2019, nothing appears to have occurred to address the difficulty I identified until 10 April 2019 when Mr El-Hanania filed the interim application which is the subject of these reasons for judgment. Third, Mr Vella filed the creditor’s petition on 28 March 2019, almost two months after 8 February 2019 when the absence of an order extending time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice was brought to the attention of the parties. There is nothing before me to suggest that anything was communicated to Mr Vella’s representatives that Mr El-Hanania intended to apply for an order to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice and, for that reason, Mr Vella should delay filing a creditor’s petition. There is therefore nothing to suggest that Mr Vella or his legal representatives acted unreasonably in filing the creditor’s petition on the day it was filed.
Other matters
There is no suggestion Mr El-Hanania has filed an application for a stay of the Judgment. There is no material before me, other than the submissions counsel for Mr El-Hanania made to the Court of Appeal, to explain Mr El-Hanania’s delay in taking steps to set aside the Judgement. The material does not permit me to find that Mr El-Hanania has pursued his rights of appeal or to apply for judicial review with diligence.
It may be accepted that committing an act of bankruptcy has potentially adverse consequences for a legal practitioner. Mr El-Hanania says he has informed the relevant authorities that he has committed an act of bankruptcy. There is no evidence, however, that this has affected Mr El-Hanania’s ability to earn an income. In any event, if Mr El-Hanania succeeds in setting aside the bankruptcy notice or in resisting the creditor’s petition, there is no suggestion that any prejudice he may have suffered as a consequence of his having committed an act of bankruptcy will continue.
Finally, the following passage from the judgment of Sackville J in Agrillo v Codisposto can be applied to the circumstances of the case before me, and weighs against my exercising my discretion in favour of making an order extending the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice:[12]
The present application seeks to extend time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice. As Sheppard J observed in Re Geard, It is not the hearing of a bankruptcy petition. The refusal of the application does not affect the debtor's status, but it does mean that the debtor is likely to commit an act of bankruptcy available to petitioning creditors. If the proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales do not result in an order setting aside the consent orders of 14 July 1994, it may well be important to a petitioning creditor to be able to rely on an earlier act of bankruptcy than otherwise would be the case (at 7). This is a factor which, in my opinion, should be taken into account.
[12] [1994] FCA 1561, at [11]
Conclusion and disposition
For these reasons, I am not satisfied it is appropriate that I should make an order under s.41(6A) of the Act to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice that was served on Mr El-Hanania. For the same reasons, I would have exercised my discretion against making an order under the slip rule if I were otherwise satisfied the slip rule was available to correct the orders made on and after 27 November 2018 to include an order that the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice served on Mr El-Hanania be extended.
I propose, therefore, to order that the interim application filed by Mr Hanania on 10 April 2019 be dismissed. I also propose to reserve the question of costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Manousaridis
Associate:
Date: 9 July 2019
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