FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Strangio v Westpac Banking Corporation [2008] FCA 1408
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal from judgment and sequestration order of the Federal Magistrates Court – final and interlocutory orders – applications for extension of time – application for leave to appeal – no adequate explanation – no real prospects of success –applications dismissed
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules (Cth) O 52 r 15(1), 52 r 15(2), O 52 r 10
Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137 referred to
Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 followed
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 referred to
Adamopoulos v Olympic Airways SA (1990) 95 ALR 525 cited
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 cited
Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 citedBRUNO STRANGIO v WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION ACN 007 457 141
VID 661 OF 2008
KENNY J
16 SEPTEMBER 2008
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 661 OF 2008
BETWEEN:
BRUNO STRANGIO
ApplicantAND:
WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION ACN 007 457 141
Respondent
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 SEPTEMBER 2008
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time under O 52 r 15(2) of the Federal Court Rules (Cth) and any associated applications be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, such costs, to be taxed in default of agreement, and paid out of the bankrupt estate of the applicant.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 661 OF 2008
BETWEEN:
BRUNO STRANGIO
ApplicantAND:
WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION ACN 007 457 141
Respondent
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE:
16 SEPTEMBER 2008
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
Mr Bruno Strangio has applied for an extension of time in which to file and serve a notice of appeal from a judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court of 28 July 2008 ordering the making of a sequestration order against his estate.
The procedural history of the matter can be briefly summarised as follows.
The respondent, Westpac Banking Corporation (“Westpac”), filed a creditor's petition (“the petition”) in the Federal Magistrates Court against Mr Strangio on 14 December 2007. The petition alleged, and was founded on, a failure on Mr Strangio’s part to comply with a bankruptcy notice served on him on 5 October 2007 (“the bankrupty notice”). The bankruptcy notice was to the effect that Mr Strangio owed Westpac a debt of $36,144.75, being the amount of a taxed order for costs (“the costs orders”) in the County Court of Victoria (“County Court”).
Also in the Federal Magistrates Court, on 25 February 2008, Mr Strangio filed a notice stating grounds of opposition to the petition (“the notice of opposition”). Mr Strangio supported his notice of opposition by an affidavit sworn 25 February 2008. The notice of…
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- Case
- [2008] FCA 1408
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court held that the application for an extension of time under the Federal Court Rules should be dismissed. The Court found that Mr Strangio's application was filed seven days outside the prescribed appeal period and did not meet the criteria for 'special reasons'. The Court also noted that Mr Strangio had not expressly sought leave to appeal the interlocutory decision, but his submissions at the hearing were treated as an application for leave to appeal and an application for an extension of time. The Court concluded that there was insufficient prospect of satisfying the test for leave to appeal and that the application for an extension of time should be dismissed.
The Court further held that the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed as well, as it did not meet the criteria for granting leave to appeal an interlocutory decision. The Court found that there was not sufficient doubt about the Federal Magistrate's decisions to warrant reconsideration and that no substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. Therefore, the application for an extension of time and any associated applications were dismissed, and Mr Strangio was ordered to pay Westpac's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time under O 52 r 15(2) of the Federal Court Rules (Cth) and any associated applications be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, such costs, to be taxed in default of agreement, and paid out of the bankrupt estate of the applicant.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: KENNY J
A proposed notice of appeal was attached to Mr Strangio’s application for an extension of time. The grounds stated were:1.The learned Magistrate erred in law by making a sequestration Order against the appellant in disregard of the principles enunciated by the Federal Court of Australia in Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation(Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137 at 148 (“Ahern”).2.The learned Magistrate erred in law by finding that “no opposition to the granting of the petition was put in submission” made by Counsel for the appellant when, in fact, the appellant’s Counsel had submitted that the petition should be dismissed on the basis of the principles enunciated in Ahern.3.The learned Magistrate denied the appellant natural justice by failing to accede to the appellant’s application to adjourn the hearing of the petition pending the making of an application to stay execution of the judgment debt to the Court of Appeal.CONSIDERATION Under the Federal Court Rules (“the Rules”), the applicant was required to file and serve a notice of appeal against the sequestration order within 21 days from the date of the Federal Magistrates judgment, namely, on or before 18 August 2008: see O 52 r 15(1). Mr Strangio filed his application for an extension of time in which to appeal some 7 days outside the prescribed appeal period. Pursuant to O 52 r 15(2), the time limit in O 52 r 15(1) may be extended at any time for ‘special reasons’. In Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187, a Full Court of this Court said, at 195:“…the expression ‘special reasons’ is intended to distinguish the case from the usual course according to which the time is twenty-one days. But it may be so distinguished (not necessarily will, for the rule gives a discretion) wherever the Court sees a ground which does justify departure from the general rule in the particular case. Such a ground is a special reason because it takes the case out of the ordinary. We do not think the use of the expression ‘for special reasons’ implies something narrower than this.” As counsel for Westpac pointed out, Mr Strangio also requires leave to appeal from her Honour’s refusal of an adjournment since this decision is interlocutory in character: see Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A). Mr Strangio, who as I have said was not represented in this Court, did not expressly seek leave to appeal before or at the hearing. It is plain enough, however, that he challenges her Honour’s refusal of an adjournment. I would treat his submissions at the hearing as in substance an application for leave to appeal against this refusal and an application for an extension of time in which to file and serve an application for leave to appeal: see O 52 r 10. I would dispense with the need for a notice of motion. In determining whether leave to appeal against an interlocutory decision should be granted, the Court must be satisfied that the decision under challenge is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered, and that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision under challenge were wrong: see Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397, at 399-400 per Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ. The question on the extension of time is whether this test has sufficient prospect of being satisfied.