Straczek and Director-General, National Archives of Australia
[2025] ARTA 1045
•18 July 2025
Straczek and Director-General, National Archives of Australia [2025] ARTA 1045 (18 July 2025)
Applicant:Jozef Straczek
Respondent: Director-General, National Archives of Australia
Tribunal Number: 2022/8314
2023/0985, 2023/2431, 2023/2434, 2023/2436, 2023/2438 2023/2440, 2023/3110, 2023/3111, 2023/3112, 2023/3117 2023/3118, 2023/3119, 2023/3128, 2023/3130, 2023/3132 2023/3133, 2023/4108, 2023/4109, 2023/4110, 2023/4111 2023/4115, 2023/4116, 2023/4117, 2023/4120, 2023/4121
Tribunal:Deputy President P Britten-Jones
Place:Canberra
Date:18 July 2025
Decision:The Tribunal affirms the decisions under review.
...................[SGD].....................................................
Deputy President P Britten-Jones
Catchwords
Archives Act 1983 (Cth) - Request for access to Commonwealth files held by National Archives – whether material is exempt within the meaning of s 33 of the Archives Act - whether Tribunal should exercise discretion in s 44(7) - decisions affirmed
Legislation
Archives Act 1983 (Cth)
Cases
Fewster and National Archives of Australia [2014] AATA 295
Patrick v Director-General, National Archives [2023] AATA 676R v Collaery (No 7) [2020] ACTSC 165
Secondary Materials
John A. Fahey, The Factory: The Official History of the Australian Signals Directorate (Allen & Unwin, vol 1, 2023)
Statement of Reasons
This is a series of applications brought by a historian, Dr Jozef Straczek, who seeks access to Commonwealth files held by the National Archives of Australia. The Director-General of the National Archives of Australia (the Respondent) has allowed access in part and in whole to some of the files requested but there remains a dispute over those parts of the files to which access has been refused. The Tribunal must resolve the 26 access applications that remain. The table at Annexure A of these reasons identifies the access applications and the files which remain in issue.
In all of the decisions under review a delegate of the Respondent decided to release a substantial proportion of the relevant file, but also decided to exempt some material under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 1983 (Cth) (Archives Act). For the file at item 1 in Annexure A, a delegate of the Respondent also decided to exempt information under s 33(1)(d) and relies upon s 33(4A) in relation to non-disclosure of ASIO staff identities.
In making the decisions which are under review, the Respondent relied upon advice received from Australian intelligence agencies and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) as to why parts of the documents sought were sensitive and should not be released.
The Tribunal must now determine:
(a)whether the material in each of the files that has not been made publicly available under the Archives Act is exempt within the meaning of s 33 of the Archives Act; and
(b)if so, whether the Tribunal should exercise the discretion in s 44(7) of the Archives Act to direct that the Respondent gives access to, or to a copy of, part of the exempt records.
The Tribunal heard oral evidence and received affidavits from the following persons called by the Respondent:
(a)Mr Mark Brown, First Assistant Director-General, Integrity, Security and Governance, Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), whose affidavit is dated 28 June 2024;
(b)Mr Jack Lowe (an assumed identity), Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), whose affidavit is dated 25 June 2024;
(c)Ms Brooke Sharpley, Assistant Secretary, Global Security, Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), whose affidavit is dated 1 July 2024;
(d)Ms Monica Carlisle (an assumed identity), Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), whose affidavit is dated 13 June 2024; and
(e)Ms Eleanor Lawson, Deputy Secretary, Strategic Planning and Coordination Group, DFAT, whose affidavit is dated 2 July 2024.
These affidavits deposed to the material of concern for each respective agency which I will refer to as the agency material i.e. the ASD material.
The affidavits and oral evidence of the above deponents were the subject of a certificate[1] dated 8 July 2024 and issued by the Attorney-General under s 36 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) which certified that disclosure of information contained in redacted parts of those affidavits would be contrary to the public interest because disclosure would prejudice the security, defence or international relations of Australia. The redacted affidavits were made available to the Applicant. The Tribunal has had access to the unredacted affidavits.
[1] Exhibit 3.
Dr Straczek gave written and oral evidence and made submissions as to why access should be given. His primary submission was that the information in the documents relate to a period from about 1945 to 1955 and has been publicly disclosed including in the official history of the Australian Signals Directorate, Volume 1, The Factory: The Official History of the Australian Signals Directorate, by Dr John Fahey published in 2023. Dr Straczek argues that if there were any sensitivities in the documents in issue, they exist no longer due to the effluxion of time and public release of related information.
The Legislative Scheme and case law
The objects of the Archives Act include preserving and making publicly available the archival resources of the Commonwealth: s 2A(a)(ii).
Part V, Division 3 of the Archives Act deals with access to ‘Commonwealth records’.
Section 31 of the Archives Act generally operates to require Commonwealth records that are in the ‘open access period’ to be made publicly available, but s 31(1A)(c) provides that the general position in s 31 does not apply to Commonwealth records that are exempt records.
A Commonwealth record is an ‘exempt record’ if it contains information or matter of any one of several specified kinds: s 33(1). Relevantly, this includes:
(a)information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth.
Further, s 33(4A) of the Archives Act provides that a Commonwealth record is an exempt record if it contains identifying information about an ASIO employee or affiliate in certain circumstances.
Section 33(1) and s 33(4A) confer exempt status upon the whole of a record that contains any information or matter of the kind described in that section.
Section 38 of the Archives Act provides:
Where a record that would otherwise be required to be made available for public access under this Part is an exempt record, the Archives may, where it is reasonably practicable to do so, make arrangements for part of, or a copy of part of, that record to which access could be given without disclosing information or matter by reason of which the record is an exempt record to be made available for public access in accordance with this Part.
Further, ss 44(3) and (7) of the Archives Act provide as follows:
(3) Where, in proceedings before the Tribunal in pursuance of an application under section 43, it is established that a record is an exempt record, the Tribunal does not, except as provided by subsection (7), have power to decide that access is to be granted to the record.
(7) On a review in pursuance of an application to the Tribunal under section 43, the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that it would be practicable to give access to, or to a copy of, part of an exempt record in a form that would not disclose information or matter by reason of which the record is an exempt record, direct that access be given accordingly.
The principles to be applied are those set out by Deputy President Constance in Fewster and National Archives of Australia:[2]
[2] [2014] AATA 295 [14].
(a) Once a record falls within the open access period, prima facie an applicant has a right to access it.
(b) The prima facie right to access is subject to the record not being an exempt record within the meaning of section 33 of the Act.
(c) A review by the Tribunal of a decision under the Act is a conventional merits review. This means that the Tribunal is required to make the correct decision on the evidence before it at the time it makes its decision.
(d) In reaching its decision, the Tribunal must exercise its independent judgement; it is not bound to accept the opinion of any witness before it. The Tribunal will treat with respect and carefully consider all of the evidence.
(e) The Act requires that “[b]efore determining that the record is not an exempt record, the Tribunal must request the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security to appear personally and give evidence” on specified matters. The Inspector-General’s evidence is not binding on the Tribunal.
(f) Each record claimed to be exempt is to be considered individually. The quantity of material released as compared to the quantity in dispute is not a relevant consideration.
(g) In interpreting the provisions of subsection 33(1)(a), including the word “security”, the usual rule of statutory interpretation should be applied, namely that the words should have their ordinary English language meaning understood in the context of the statute.
(h) Consistently with the principle stated in the previous sub-paragraph, the words “could reasonably be expected to cause damage” should be given their ordinary meaning. The ordinary meaning of these words does not require a finding that the disclosure of the record in question will in fact cause damage to security, defence and/or international relations.
(i) The meaning of the word “damage” should not be restricted to particular categories of damage. I do not accept the argument put on behalf of Mr Fewster in this regard.
(j) The “references to security, defence or international relations are references to distinctly unique concepts, albeit that inevitably in some instances there may be some overlap as to whether or not a matter that affects the international relations of Australia might also be a matter that affects the security of the country, and that significant damage that is occasioned to international relations may have consequential and predictable effects that flow on to damage security interests.”
(k) The risk of mere embarrassment to, or the risk of exposure to public discussion and/or criticism of, Australia and its agencies are not of themselves sufficient to justify a conclusion that a document is an exempt document.
(l) In making its decision the Tribunal may consider the “mosaic theory” that organisations can obtain valuable information by piecing together a number of small and apparently insignificant pieces of information. The argument is that the Tribunal should consider this possibility when considering the release of small pieces of information which form part of a larger document. Consideration should also be given to the effect of the release of apparently insignificant information from several documents. In my view this is a matter to be considered on the facts of a particular case if the evidence before the Tribunal warrants such consideration. It should not be regarded as a principle of general application.
(Footnotes omitted)
In Patrick v Director-General, National Archives,[3] I considered the meaning of the phrase ‘could reasonably be expected to cause damage’ and said:
[3] [2023] AATA 676.
[24] The phrase ‘could reasonably be expected to’ was considered by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Attorney-General’s Department v Cockcroft [1986] FCA 35; (1986) 10 FCR 180 at 190 where Bowen CJ and Beaumont J said:
In our opinion, in the present context, the words “could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information” were intended to receive their ordinary meaning. That is to say, they require a judgment to be made by the decision-maker as to whether it is reasonable, as distinct from something that is irrational, absurd or ridiculous, to expect that those who would otherwise supply information of the prescribed kind to the Commonwealth or any agency would decline to do so if the document in question were disclosed under the Act. It is undesirable to attempt any paraphrase of these words. In particular, it is undesirable to consider the operation of the provision in terms of probabilities or possibilities or the like. To construe s 43(1)(c)(ii) as depending in its application upon the occurrence of certain events in terms of any specific degree of likelihood or probability is, in our view, to place an unwarranted gloss upon the relatively plain words of the Act. It is preferable to confine the inquiry to whether the expectation claimed was reasonably based: see Kioa v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 62 ALR 321 per Gibbs CJ and Mason J.
[25] Sheppard J agreed with Bowen CJ and Beaumont J in Attorney-General’s Department v Cockcroft but gave separate reasons in which he said at 196:
In my opinion he will not be justified in claiming exemption unless, at the time the decision is made, he has real and substantial grounds for thinking that the production of the document could prejudice that supply. But, stringent though that test may be, it does not go so far as to require the decision-maker to be satisfied upon a balance of probabilities that the production of the document will in fact prejudice the future supply of information.
[26] Wilcox J said in Arnold v Queensland [1987] FCA 148; (1987) 73 ALR 607 at 616 that the words ‘could reasonably be expected’ do not require the demonstration of a probability of damage.
[27] President Kerr in Fernandes v National Archives [2014] AATA 180 was guided by Sheppard J’s reasons in Cockcroft and said that:
the proper point of the spectrum is somewhere between risk and balance of probabilities. But in the end … the real test is not to be found in any gloss of judicial language, but rather in the language of the Archives Act itself understood in the context of the interests it is protecting.
[28] President Davies in Maher and Attorney-General’s Department (1985) 7 ALD 731 said at 742 that a mere possibility of damage would not be sufficient and further:
The phrase "damage to international relations of the Commonwealth" comprehends intangible damage to Australia's reputation though such damage may be difficult to assess. International relations have never been matters easy to define or to quantify. Regard must be had, inter alia, to the relationships between particular persons in one government and persons in another. Damage to personal relationships may cause considerable harm for a time at least.
I accept that it must be shown that the publication of a document claimed to be exempt could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the international relations of the Commonwealth. A mere allegation to that effect is not enough. There must be cause and effect which can reasonably be anticipated. But if it can reasonably be anticipated that disclosure of the document would lessen the confidence which another country would place on the Government of Australia, that is a sufficient ground for a finding that the disclosure of the document could reasonably be expected to damage international relations. Trust and confidence are intangible aspects of international relations.
With respect to the evidence of the witnesses from DFAT and the Australian intelligence agencies, I would adopt the approach taken in R v Collaery (No 7) by Mossop J who said:[4]
Notwithstanding the submissions of the defendant to the contrary, I do consider that the evidence of witnesses called by the Attorney-General who are currently engaged, or have been very recently engaged in national security and international relations, should be given some additional weight because of the currency and immediacy of their experience. That is not on the basis of any presumption but is instead because I consider that the currency and immediacy of their experience is relevant to the probative value of their evidence. I recognise that there is a risk that witnesses in such a position will "toe the party line" having regard to the position adopted by the government in the proceedings and that their level of anxiety concerning questions of disclosure may be influenced by the immediacy of their responsibilities. I have assessed the evidence of the witnesses called by the Attorney-General with that in mind. Each of them impressed me as fairly and earnestly calibrating their evidence in relation to the value of the NCND principle and the risks of prejudice that would arise from disclosure appropriately in the circumstances.
[4] [2020] ACTSC 165 [68].
Evidence
The witnesses called by the Respondent gave ‘open’ evidence to the Tribunal and were cross examined by Dr Straczek. At times during their cross examination, they indicated that they could not fully answer the question during the open session. To provide procedural fairness to Dr Straczek in the circumstances of the s 36 certificate from the Attorney-General, he provided a series of questions to be put to the Director-General’s witnesses during the closed session. That is what happened and I reminded counsel and the witnesses during the closed session that the purpose of the closed session was to only receive evidence of a nature covered by the s 36 certificate and no more. If there was additional evidence given during the closed session which was not covered by the certificate then I indicated that a further open session would need to be convened, but there was no need to do so. I have taken into account the answers given in the closed session to those questions.
Evidence from Mark Brown of the Australian Signals Directorate
Information relating to the ASD was contained in all 26 files except for one. Mark Brown gave some background evidence about the establishment and history of the ASD and its functions. He also gave evidence, which was partially redacted, about current and anticipated geopolitical and regional challenges.
With respect to the functions of ASD, Mr Brown said:[5]
[40] ASD covertly acquires foreign information not publicly available, through its own collection operations. It also obtains intelligence through its liaison arrangements with other foreign signals intelligence agencies. These include its closest partners: the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA), the United Kingdom’ Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB).
[5] Exhibit 5, affidavit of Mark Raymond Brown affirmed 28 June 2024, 7 [40] (‘Exhibit 5’).
Mr Brown explained that prior to his assessment of the records, a substantial amount of work had been done by ASD’s History and Public Access team.[6] Mr Brown further explained:
[76] During the course of the assessment of these records, ASD has proactively released official historical information about its own history and activities, such as the information in the ASD Official History or on its webpage. ASD has a proactive declassification program that is separate from the review of requests made under the Archives Act 1993 (Archives Act). The voluntary release of Information poses a significantly lesser challenge to ASD than an Archives release. The information is selected either by ASD or a trusted person familiar with ASD such as the author of the ASD official History with a view to minimising risk of damage to security, defence and international relations from the outset. It is then nonetheless assessed in accordance with ASD’s own requirements and standards, without time restriction, to minimise the risk of damage.
[6] Ibid 13-5 [71]-[78].
With respect to his own review of the relevant files, Mr Brown said:[7]
[7] Ibid 15-7 [79] – [92].
[79] I was conscious when I started my own review of the ASD files that:
79.1. a large volume of material had been released for public access from the ASD files; and
79.2. the information that had been exempted had been identified through a great deal of hard work by numerous people over several years.
[80] Nevertheless, I approached my own review of the ASD files on the basis that I needed to test whether each portion of ASD material should be protected from disclosure because there was a real risk that if it were not then its release could or would reasonably damage Australia’s security, defence or international relations. As a result, and as I have already indicated, I identified some information that I did not think needed to remain exempt and I have asked for arrangements to be made for that information to be released.
[81] The remaining ASD material, which I do not think should be released, when read as a whole would provide those interests adverse to Australia with detailed and sensitive information about the workings of ASD in its early years, information about its targets and areas of interest and operations, sources, methods, capabilities and foreign liaison relations. [redacted].
[82] [redacted]
[83] In forming my opinion that the ASD material should not be disclosed, I considered several matters which I explain below.
The age of the Information
[84] Most of ASD files contain information from approximately 70-80 years ago. Some of the information in ASD’s records from that period is no longer sensitive and can be released. This is illustrated by information, a great deal of which was classified TOP SECRET at the time, having been released in response to these archives requests, or proactively declassified in recent years.
[85] However, even the passage of such a long period of time does not diminish the sensitivity of some information. In the context of the current circumstances where, as I have said, Australia faces increased threats to its national interests, ‘historical’ information can remain sensitive and could or would be damaging if released. In my opinion, for reasons I will explain and despite the passage of time, there is still a real risk of damage to Australia’s security, defence or international relations if the ASD material is released.
The audience to whom the information will be published
[86] In assessing the ASD files, and whether ASD material can be released, I have taken into account that information in the ASD files if released will be disclosed to the world at large and not only to the Applicant.
… [paragraphs 87 to 90 redacted]
[91] The Director-General of ASIO’s threat assessment of 2024 indicates that Australia’s defence capabilities are a top intelligence collection priority for Australia’s adversaries, and even for some countries which Australia considers friends. He notes that foreign intelligence services are targeting Australia’s military capabilities with an insatiable appetite to gain insight into Australia’s operational readiness and its tactics, techniques and procedures.
[92] In my opinion, this extends to ASD’s operational capacity, which is an essential element of Australia’s defence preparedness.
As to why the ASD material should not be disclosed, Mr Brown divided his evidence of damage from disclosure into four separate categories as follows:[8]
[108] I address why the ASD material should not be disclosed by reference to the damage that I consider could, or would, be caused to national security, defence or international relations through the following categories:
108.1. Category A: ASD’s foreign liaison relationships;
108.2. Category B: Disclosure of targets;
108.3. Category C: Disclosure of intelligence sources, methods, capabilities and/or operations; and
108.4. Category D: Archival policies of the 1980s.
[8] Ibid 19-20 [108].
With respect to ASD’s foreign liaison relationships, Mr Brown gave evidence about the Five Eyes/UKUSA partners, being the signals intelligence agencies of the United States of America (NSA), United Kingdom (GCHQ), Canada (CSE) and New Zealand (GCSB). He said that trust and reciprocity are the foundations of ASD’s most important foreign liaison relationships with its closest Five Eyes partners. Further, he explained that Australia’s collaboration with its closest partners, the US and the UK, is founded in postwar agreements known as the UKUSA partnership, of which ASD has been a full member since 1956. Central to the continued functioning of the UKUSA and Five Eyes partnership is the understanding among participants that information shared by, or related to, one partner will be protected to the level required by the originating partner. This understanding is fundamental to the relationship that Australia has with its closest intelligence partners. To breach this trust in one case will not only compromise information that is sensitive to one of these close allies, but erode the confidence of all the partners in Australia’s ability to protect sensitive information more broadly.
Brown gave evidence which was mostly redacted with respect to communication with Five Eyes partners, namely NSA, GCHQ, GCSB and CSE and other foreign liaison relationships.
With respect to disclosure of intelligence targets, Mr Brown gave his opinion that disclosure of ASD material identifying targets would damage Australia’s national security, defence and international relations.
With respect to archival policies from the 1980s, Mr Brown explained that the majority of the folios to which access was sought has been released, but the release of the remaining segments could or would damage security, defence and international relations.
The reasoning in his affidavit has been largely redacted but it is apparent even from the open material that Mr Brown and other ASD staff have applied significant resources to the applicant’s request for access and that Mr Brown has approached his own review of the documents on the basis that he needed to test whether each portion of the ASD material should be protected from disclosure because of a real risk that its release could or would damage Australia’s security, defence or international relations.
Evidence from Jack Lowe of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service
Mr Lowe gave evidence based on his own significant background and experience and his review of relevant ASIS records and advice provided to him by ASIS staff. He personally reviewed each folio in each record to which he referred in his evidence. In his affidavit, he gave evidence in support of his view that particular portions of the information within several of the ASD records should remain exempt from public release under the Archives Act. He deposed to his approach as follows:[9]
[9] Exhibit 4, affidavit of Jack Lowe affirmed 25 June 2024, 3-4 [16]-[18].
[16] I have closely reviewed the material of concern to ASIS. In doing so, I adopted the approach that I should recommend the release of as much information as possible, until the point that I considered there would be a real risk of damage to Australia’s security, defence or international relations from disclosure.
[17] In forming my opinion, I took into account officially confirmed historical information about ASIS that is already in public domain including:
a. the 3 publications I refer to below at paragraph 29 below and which are annexed to this affidavit, which explain the role of ASIS and provide some insight into its historical development, and
b. the parts of the ASD records I have examined that have been released under the Archives Act.
[18] In examining the relevant ASD records, I have been conscious of the following circumstances:
a. the archives request is directed specifically to the records of an intelligence agency;
b. the records contain different categories of information, some of which is easily identified as highly sensitive, while other information may appear to be less sensitive on its face;
c. some categories of information have required nuanced distinctions to be drawn about what can be released without a real risk of damage to security, defence and international relations; and
d. [redacted]
Mr Lowe deposes to the importance of secrecy for ASIS’s activities and explained about the importance of foreign liaisons to ASIS as follows:[10]
[50] The Five Eyes partnership is an intelligence sharing alliance between Australia and its traditional allies and closest partners, the US, UK, Canada and New Zealand. The Five Eyes partnership is of critical importance to Australia. It provides significant benefits to Australian intelligence agencies. For ASIS, Five Eyes liaison relationships act as a force multiplier for its capabilities and effectiveness.
[51] Currently, ASIS liaises with over 200 different foreign liaison partner agencies around the world that perform a similar function to ASIS, but do so in order to advance their nation’s interests. Liaison relationships, and information received through them, are critical to the work of ASIS.
[52] Without accurate intelligence and advice from ASIS, the Australian Government’s capacity to respond to threats to Australia’s national interests may be significantly reduced. For instance, the Government may not receive timely forewarning of threats to Australia, and its capacity to take appropriate action to deal with them may be diminished.
[53] If ASIS’s ability to perform its functions is degraded, the Australian Government’s ability to protect and promote Australia’s national interests will be compromised. Depending on the significance of the information disclosed, the compromise could be catastrophic.
[10] Ibid 11 [50]-[53].
With respect to unofficial publications, Mr Lowe said:[11]
[66] Unofficial speculation in the media, literature and public domain has a different intelligence value from official confirmation of the correctness or existence (or otherwise) of a particular matter. Whether information is officially confirmed (as opposed to being mere speculation) has consequences for whether the information in the record will be viewed as officially confirmed by other entities, such as foreign intelligence services, and the conclusions that may be reasonably drawn from the record by such agencies and the resources that may be deployed in relation to it.
[67] Where information is released under the Archives Act in response to a request for ASD records, it is made public in a manner that confirms that it is from a government record. The record then becomes a source of officially confirmed information which, if the information relates to ASIS, ASIS’ adversaries, such as a hostile foreign intelligence service, can use to aggregate a picture of ASIS.
[68] FIS [Foreign Intelligence Services] and others with a facility for mosaic analysis may be able to aggregate information which goes much further than what ASIS intended to divulge. The release of what may if viewed in isolation appear to be innocuous information relating to ASIS can greatly assist an adversary to interfere with ASIS or to damage Australia’s national security.
[69] In assessing the records to determine what exemptions to recommend, I have not treated what is said in unofficial publications as publicly acknowledged facts. … [redacted].
[11] Ibid 13-4 [66]-[69].
With respect to the age of the material, Mr Lowe said:[12]
[145] In coming to the conclusions referred to above, I have at all times been very conscious of the age of the information contained in the ASD records. I accept that the sensitivity of certain types of information, and thus the likelihood of damage resulting from its release, declines the further one moves from the time of origin. The decision to release material has been heavily influenced by the effluxion of time, even for records that were extremely sensitive at the time they were created.
[146] However, the opposite is also true, and the sensitivity of some kinds of information does not necessarily diminish sufficiently over time to allow for their release – at least not in the time frame of the records currently under consideration.
[147] The threat environment which faces Australia is now very serious. The level of threat has substantially increased over recent years. Further, the environment continues to evolve. New and dangerous threats emerge periodically, as other threats cease or diminish.
[148] Similarly the capacity and sophistication of ASIS’s adversaries, such as foreign intelligence services, and how they can collect information also evolves across time. In recent years, I am aware that technological developments and artificial intelligence have provided both state and non-state actors with the means and capacity to access information more efficiently and easily. One example is using artificial intelligence and algorithms to search and analyse significant amounts of material to identify specific information, patterns and trends. In light of this, I have taken account the risk that a failure to seek exemption of sensitive information now may prejudice ASIS’s capacity to obtain intelligence required to protect Australia’s national security, defence or international relations against presently unknown but potential threats.
Evidence of Brooke Sharpley of the Defence Intelligence Organisation
[12] Ibid 27-8 [145]-[148].
Ms Sharpley gave evidence about the DIO’s functions, its creation and its international relationships with the UK, USA and the Five Eyes Partnership.
With respect to the records and the exempt material, Ms Sharpley explained as follows:[13]
[13] Exhibit 6, affidavit of Brooke May Sharpley affirmed 1 July 2024, 4-5 [17]-[24].
[17] In my opinion, the release of parts of the records relating to the development of Australia’s post-World War II (WWII) intelligence structure and communications would damage DIO’s relationships with the UK and the United States of America (US).
[18] Of particular concern is certain information about the evolution of the relationships between DIO’s predecessor, the Joint Intelligence Bureau (Melbourne) (JIB(M)), and its counterpart organisations in the UK and in the US. The DIO sensitive material is contained within the following files:
18.1. Records Z1/11 – Joint Intelligence Organisation Report to the Prime Minister on the Joint Intelligence Bureau and the Defence Signals Division (Record Z1/11);
18.2. Record Z29/10 – Visit of General Strong and General Bedell Smith to Australia 1952 (Record Z29/10);
18.3. Record Z29/15 – DSD Relations with the United States (Record Z29/15); and
18.4. Record 2354/9 – Defence Committee Agendum Recent Incidents off Hainan Island (Record 2354/9).
[19] Annexed to my affidavit and marked ‘BMS-2’ is a table that identifies the files and folios where DIO sensitive material appears and summarises DIO’s sensitivities justifying these claims.
[20] I have personally examined each of the records described above and considered the DIO sensitive material. Although many aspects of the early development of Australia’s intelligence structure, roles and foreign liaison relationships have been released publicly, for the reasons I will outline below, it is my opinion that the DIO sensitive material should not be publicly disclosed to prevent damage to Australia’s security, defence or international relations.
[21] In my opinion, there is a real risk that public disclosure of this information could reasonably be expected to damage international intelligence relationships. I deal with this further at paragraphs 37-40 and 58-68 below where I will identify the relationships involved and explain the potential damage that could be caused by disclosure of this information.
[22] The damage to international intelligence relationships remains the case, notwithstanding the age of the records. Age is not the predominant factor in assessing the ongoing sensitivity of intelligence information contained in these records, given their content and nature. Instead the focus of DIO’s examination is on whether the record:
[22.1 – 22.4 redacted]
[23] In some instances, ‘old’ information may have increased in sensitivity over time, rather than diminished. This might occur in cases where, for example:
[23.1 and 23.2 redacted]
[24] Of particular concern in disclosing ‘old’ information is the risk that it could be used by an adversary to piece together a detailed picture of how a particular intelligence agency operates through pattern analysis (also known as ‘mosaic analysis’). If there is a significant disclosure of information and an adversary can collate this information and compare it with other information it has obtained overtly and covertly over time, a detailed picture can be developed on matters such as:
[24.1-24.4 redacted]
With respect to sharing classified information, Ms Sharpley referred to the formal arrangements in place between Australia, the UK and the US and said:[14]
[39] Key to the maintenance of these relationships is the sometimes formal, but more often tacit or implied agreement of the Five Eyes partners that any intelligence data or analysis shared between them is handled in accordance with agreed protocols. Meeting these protocols and protecting the information from unauthorised disclosure is one of the ways that each agency demonstrates, on a daily basis, its commitment to the Five Eyes partnership. For this reason, if a particular partner requests that DIO treat information in a particular way, DIO will adhere to those handling protocols without question or deviation to reinforce the mutual trust and confidence necessary to preserve the partnership.
[40] This is an ongoing task and Australian agencies must consistently demonstrate the value that we place on UK and US intelligence information, and the care with which it will be handled, in order to maintain the goodwill necessary for both the UK and the US to continue releasing timely, relevant and comprehensive intelligence information to Australia.
[14] Ibid 10 [39]-[40].
Ms Sharpley deposed to how a loss of trust between intelligence partners can have catastrophic consequences and that its effects may manifest in different ways. In conclusion, Ms Sharpley said:[15]
[69] For the reasons outlined above, and in light of Australia’s obligations to protect sensitive information shared with us by our intelligence partners, I believe that disclosure of the redacted information in the records and identified in Annexure BMS-2 would damage DIO’s relationships with the UK and the US, impacting adversely on Australian intelligence capabilities and subsequently on Australia’s security, defence and international relations.
Evidence of Monica Carlisle of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
[15] Ibid 17-8 [69].
Ms Carlisle deposes to ASIO’s functions, the need for secrecy and mosaic analysis. She expresses her concern about the release of one of the Commonwealth records entitled “A7452 A459 Protection of sensitive archives documents relating to special UK intelligence”.[16] Part of that record includes transcript from a hearing to which Dr Straczek no longer seeks access.
[16] Exhibit 7, affidavit of Monica Carlisle affirmed 13 June 2024, 2 [10].
With respect to foreign liaison relationships, Ms Carlisle said:[17]
[17] Ibid 6-9 [29]-[39].
[29] Some of the material sought to be exempt from public release would reveal the details of ASIO’s foreign liaison relationships. ASIO works closely with trusted international partners on a broad range of intelligence matters, and relies heavily on relationships with partner agencies and foreign Governments as a way of enhancing capabilities and collecting information relevant to security.
[30] ASIO’s relationships with foreign partners are primarily founded on mutual interest and confidentiality. Based on my direct experience, there is an expectation, both on the part of ASIO and its foreign partners, that the details of any liaison – and sometimes even the fact of the liaison – will be kept confidential. The obligation of confidentiality is ongoing (other than where there is material consent to release it) and is not impacted by the current status of the relationship or the age of any particular information or capability.
[31] Since its creation, ASIO has developed liaison relationships that enable the sharing of intelligence and capabilities with many agencies around the world. [redacted]
[32] A significant and well-known group ASIO engages with is the Five Eyes alliance – an intelligence-sharing arrangement between Australia, the United States of America (USA), the UK, Canada and New Zealand. Although the existence of the Five Eyes alliance is not secret and it is widely understood that Australian intelligence agencies have relationships with partner agencies from these countries, the specifics of those relationships are not public knowledge.
[33] The ASIO redactions in the above folios relate to material shared with ASIO or derived from material shared, by:
33.1 The USA; and
33.2 The UK (including the British Secret Service (MI5)).
[34] Disclosing the nature and extent of the information passed between ASIO and these foreign partners would be contrary to the principle that while the fact of the relationship is known, the subject matter and extent of any information exchanged was, and is, regarded as sensitive. This is because it can reveal specific subjects of investigation and areas of interest, intelligence priorities and requirements – all of which agencies seek to protect to ensure that those who seek to undermine them, do not become aware of their interests, capabilities and/or gaps in knowledge. The passage of information between ASIO and these foreign partners is subject to agreed protections and caveats.
[35] For example, the ASIO redactions at [transcript at pages 19 and 20] contain detailed information on the subject of liaison between ASIO and MI5 (and to a lesser extent, the USA). The redactions sought reveal details about both Australia’s and the UK’s subjects of investigation and why they were of interest, the subject matter of the information exchanged (and the frequency), as well as intelligence holdings. [Redacted].
[36] [Redacted]
[37] ASIO has a long history of engagement with these highly capable foreign partners, who provide substantial valuable and credible intelligence reporting. If ASIO is unable to, or even perceived as being unable to, protect intelligence or capabilities shared by these key partners, it would significantly undermine those relationships. Even though the information in the folios is historical, ASIO’s practice of not revealing information of this type – without prior consent – provides these partners confidence that they can continue to trust ASIO with sensitive material and be assured it will remain protected. [Redacted].
[38] Any limitation on ASIO’s engagement with these foreign partners would substantially weaken ASIO’s ability to collect information and provide the most well-informed, comprehensive advice to the Australian government regarding threats to security. [Redacted].
[39] Furthermore, the disclosure of this information could also reasonably be expected to damage ASIO’s relations with foreign intelligence services beyond the USA and the UK. If there were to be a perception within the international intelligence community that ASIO was unable or unwilling to protect confidential communications from partner agencies, other services would be less inclined to share their sensitive security relevant information with ASIO.
With respect to folio 137, Ms Carlisle said:[18]
[42] The ASIO redaction in folio 137 contains the detail – reported by ASIO’s then Deputy Director General in 1995 – of the number of counter-intelligence leads that came from decrypted Soviet Intelligence communications during the period 1941 to 1948 … [redacted].
[18] Ibid 9 [42].
Ms Carlisle also deposes to why access should not be given to ASIO staff information and administrative identifier information.[19]
Evidence of Eleanor Lawson of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
[19] Ibid 10-11.
Ms Lawson gives evidence about Australia’s international relationships and the current strategic environment as follows:[20]
[18] The successful pursuit of Australia’s foreign policy initiatives and its international relationships relies on the careful cultivation and maintenance of relationships of trust and confidence fostered between Australia and foreign governments. Much of the work of diplomatic relations is demonstrating that you can be trusted. In diplomatic relationships trust is often hard won, can easily be lost and, once lost, very difficult to regain.
[19] The consequences of loss of trust in Australia by foreign governments and their populaces are not insignificant – they can derail Australia’s attempts to influence and shape the behaviours of other states in our favour. If other states lose trust in us, we lose our ability to persuade our counterparts, at all levels, and to advance outcomes in Australia’s national interest.
THE CURRENT STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
[20] The current strategic environment in which DFAT operates is quite different to 5 years ago, and very different to 10 years ago. Contemporary international relations are more contested and uncertain than they have been in generations. The risks to Australia’s interests and security are elevated. Australia’s foreign policy settings are continually reassessed based on our strategic circumstances and the value to our overall national interest of strong bilateral partnerships has heightened.
[20] Exhibit 8, affidavit of Eleanor Jane Lawson affirmed 2 July 2024, 2-3 [18]-[20].
Consideration
The files that are the subject of the requests for access relate generally to intelligence and are therefore sensitive given the importance of maintaining secrecy of the operations in this field. Having said that, the files date from the post-World War 2 period from about 1945 to 1955 and relate to information that has been publicly disclosed including in official histories and reports from respected historians. Consequently, a significant part of the files in issue have been released. A general review of the released files show relatively few redacted passages, although there are exceptions.
I was impressed generally with the Respondent’s witnesses from the relevant agencies who would be affected by the release of the redacted information. The witnesses had relevant and significant experience. Their evidence should be given some additional weight because of the currency and immediacy of their experience.
I was also impressed by the approach of the Respondent assisted by the relevant agencies, noting that the process of releasing documents did take some time - the decisions under review from as early as 31 March 2023 were varied by Tribunal orders in 2024 and 2025 so as to allow the release of further information to Dr Straczek. Each of the Respondent’s witnesses adopted an approach by which they reviewed the files on the basis that they needed to test whether each portion of material relevant to their agency should be protected from disclosure because there was a real risk that if it were not then its release could reasonably be expected to damage Australia’s security, defence or international relations. They took into account that information relevant to the access requests had been publicly disclosed and the subject of historical analysis. They tried to disclose as much as possible within the confines of the Archives Act. I have taken the same approach.
I have thoroughly examined all the redacted material and considered carefully the extent of the redactions and the reasons given for them by the Respondent’s witnesses. Those reasons are for the most part contained in ‘closed’ affidavits, but I can confirm that the ‘closed’ evidence was thorough and probative to the issues relevant to s 33 of the Archives Act. I have also considered the publicly available historical information, including in The Factory: The Official History of the Australian Signals Directorate, Volume 1 by John Fahey and published in 2023 (the ASD official history).
The evidence from Australia’s intelligence agencies and DFAT referred generally to:
(a)the importance of foreign liaisons and effective relationships with Australia’s Five Eyes partners and other foreign liaison partner agencies;
(b)the expectation within the Five Eyes partners that any shared intelligence would be kept confidential and not released without authorisation;
(c)the hostile current strategic environment in which they are operating; and
(d)the damage that would be caused to the relationships with partners in the USA and the UK as well as the other Five Eyes partners if the shared material (as redacted) was released.
I accept that much of the redacted material is information which is expected by Australia’s partners to be kept confidential. That applies even though the material is historical and relates to a period soon after World War Two. I accept that its disclosure would damage the relationships with foreign partners, as deposed to by the Respondent’s witnesses, which would have a very real impact on the ability of Australia’s intelligence agencies and DFAT to collect information and to maintain trust and confidence with those partners; and thereby cause damage to the security, defence and international relations of the Commonwealth. Maintenance of those international relationships is critical to the security and defence of the Commonwealth.
The effluxion of time and public disclosure of some information has rendered less sensitive some information that had previously not been released. This was accepted by the agencies and the Respondent as reflected by the significant amount of material released in response to the requests for access made by Dr Straczek. The Respondent’s witnesses explained why the redacted material remained sensitive in particular because of the current hostile strategic environment. The risks to Australia’s interests and security are elevated. The evidence from Mr Brown of the ASD is apposite in this regard:[21]
[85] However, even the passage of such a long period of time does not diminish the sensitivity of some information. In the context of the current circumstances where, as I have said, Australia faces increased threats to its national interests, ‘historical’ information can remain sensitive and could or would be damaging if released. In my opinion, for reasons I will explain and despite the passage of time, there is still a real risk of damage to Australia’s security, defence or international relations if the ASD material is released.
[21] Exhibit 5 (n 5) 16.
Similar evidence to Mr Brown’s was given by the other agencies. I have inspected all of the redacted material and it is my view that none of it is rendered less sensitive due to the effluxion of time or public disclosure of information. Evidence to support my view was given during the closed sessions.
The most significant amount of information in the redacted material related to the ASD. Mr Brown gave evidence that the material, which he considered should not be released, when read as a whole, would provide those interests adverse to Australia with detailed and sensitive information about the workings of ASD in its early years, information about its targets and areas of interest and operations, sources, methods, capabilities and foreign liaison relations. I accept the evidence from Mr Brown that, despite the historical nature of this information, it remains sensitive and is of interest to foreign intelligence services and that the redacted material could be used to determine current operational methods and capacities. With respect to disclosure of international sources, methods and capabilities or operations, I accept the evidence from Mr Brown that information touching on these matters was addressed in the ASD official history, but the examples were carefully selected so as not to damage ASD’s current operational capacity.
I conclude that the release of the ASD material could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth. The ‘closed’ evidence from Mr Brown supports my view.
With respect to ASIS material, Mr Lowe (an assumed identity) identified five categories of ‘exempt material’ and explained in his ‘closed’ evidence the damage he believed could reasonably be expected to be caused if it were released. I have carefully considered his explanation and the redactions containing material relevant to ASIS. I accept his evidence and the extent of the redactions made. To operate effectively, ASIS must largely do its work in secrecy. That secrecy, including historical material, must be maintained. Dr Straczek accepted this and did not press for the release of material relevant only to ASIS.
With respect to DIO material, Ms Sharpley refers to a particular concern about disclosing material relevant to the evolution of the relationships between DIO’s predecessor and its counterpart organisations in the UK and the USA. Having carefully reviewed the redacted material relevant to the DIO, I accept Ms Sharpley’s evidence that the redacted material contains detailed information on the nature and extent of intelligence relationships between international partners which is highly sensitive and confidential to the UK and the USA, even if historical. I also accept that disclosure of this material would damage DIO’s relationship with the UK and the USA which would have an adverse impact on Australian intelligence capabilities and subsequently on Australia’s security, defence and international relations. The ‘closed’ evidence from Ms Sharpley supports my view.
Ms Sharpley has a further concern, which I accept, that the disclosure of ‘old’ information presents a risk that it could be used by an adversary to piece together a detailed picture of how a particular intelligence agency operates through pattern analysis (also known as ‘mosaic analysis’).
Monica Carlisle (an assumed identity,) a senior and experienced officer from ASIO, gave affidavit and oral evidence about information over which ASIO had concerns in 2022/8314 which is item 1 of 26 in Annexure A. Dr Straczek no longer presses for the Tribunal transcript of the ASIO staff information. With respect to the administrative identifier information, I accept the evidence from Ms Carlisle that their release can potentially reveal a significant amount of information by linking otherwise disparate pieces of information. The balance of information in issue is five short passages relating to foreign liaison relationships. These relationships are built on trust and confidence which must be maintained. The redacted information includes confidential information concerning the subject of a relationship with a foreign intelligence partner, the disclosure of which would breach that trust and confidence. With respect to the redaction in folio 137 about the number of counter-intelligence leads, I accept the evidence that this information has not been officially disclosed and that it remains sensitive for reasons in the redacted part of the Carlisle affidavit.
Conclusion
I conclude that the information in the redacted material to which access has not been granted could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth. It follows that the record that contains this information is an exempt record under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act. I am satisfied pursuant to s 44(7) that it is practicable to give access to, or to a copy of, part of an exempt record in a form that would not disclose information or matter by reason of which the record is an exempt record. I direct that access be given accordingly, noting that such access has already been given to Dr Straczek.
The decision of the Tribunal is to affirm the reviewable decisions, as varied, in each of the applications made to the Tribunal.
I certify that the preceding 59 (fifty-nine) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President P Britten-Jones.
...................[sgd].....................................................
Associate
Dated: 18 July 2025
Date(s) of hearing: 10-11 September 2024 and 6-7 February 2025 Applicant’s Representative: Self-represented Respondent’s Counsel: Mr Justin Davidson Respondent’s Representative: Australian Government Solicitor ANNEXURE A
ART Proceeding Title of Record Respondent’s Record Identifiers Decision under review 1. 2022/8314 Protection of sensitive archives documents relating to special UK intelligence Barcode 6930462
Series A7452
Control Symbol A459
NAA app no. RQ22/00005721
3 May 2024 as varied by orders of the Tribunal on 11 September 2024 and 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) and (d) of the Archives Act 1983 (Archives Act) 2. 2023/0985 Joint Intelligence Organisation: Report to PM [Prime Minister] on JIB [Joint Intelligence Bureau], DSD Barcode 667450
Series: A8580
Control symbol Z1/11
2021/00353206
5 April 2024 as varied by order of the Tribunal on 11 September 2024 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 3. 2023/2431 Poulden J E – Appointment of Director DSB Barcode 14401875
Series A8580
Control symbol Z37/24
31 March 2023 as varied by orders of the Tribunal on 11 September 2024 and 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 4. 2023/2434 JIO Early Papers Barcode 14401841
Series A8580
Control symbol Z1/4
31 March 2023 as varied by orders of the Tribunal on 11 September 2024 and 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 5. 2023/2436 Signal intelligence of JIC in Australia Barcode 14401847
Series A8580
Control symbol Z1/24
31 March 2023 as varied by orders of the Tribunal on 11 September 2024 and 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 6. 2023/2438 Organisation of DSD Barcode 14401845
Series A8580
Control symbol Z1/22
31 March 2023 as varied by order of the Tribunal on 11 September 2024 - open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 7. 2023/2440 Relations with Britain – London (S) conference Barcode 14401857
Series A8580
Control symbol Z27/2
31 March 2023 as varied by orders of the Tribunal on 11 September 2024 and 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 8. 2023/3110 DSD Policy on disclosure of information to the public on functions and activities (includes SIGINT activity by Australian armed forced in WWII) Barcode 14401853
Series A8580
Control symbol Z23/6 PART 1
2021/00353224
19 January 2024 as varied by order of the Tribunal on 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 9. 2023/3111 DSD political and media aspects Barcode 14401853
Series A8580
Control symbol Z23/6 PART 2
2021/00353235
3 May 2024 as varied by orders of the Tribunal on 11 September 2024 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 10. 2023/3112 DSD political and media aspects Barcode 14401855
Series A8580
Control symbol Z23/6 PART 3
2021/00353236
19 January 2024 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 11. 2023/3117 Relations with US – visit of General Strong and General Bedell-Smith to Australia 1952 Barcode 14401865
Series A8580
Control symbol Z29/10
2021/00353263
20 May 2024 as varied by orders of the Tribunal on 11 September 2024 and 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 12. 2023/3118 Relations with US – DSD US relationships Barcode 14401867
Series A8580
Control symbol Z29/14
2021/00353269
3 May 2024 as varied by order of the Tribunal on 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 13. 2023/3119 Relations with US – DSD relations with US Barcode 14401869
Series A8580
Control symbol Z29/15
2021/00353269
20 May 2024 as varied by orders of the Tribunal on 11 September 2024 and 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 14. 2023/3128 Relations with New Zealand – NZ contributions to DSD Barcode 14401873
Series A8580
Control symbol Z31/2
2021/00353275
19 January 2024 as varied by orders of the Tribunal on 11 September 2024 and 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 15. 2023/3130 [History compiled by Department of Foreign Affairs:] Post-War Development of Australia’s Intelligence Machinery: A Documentary Survey – Part 2 – Signals Intelligence Barcode 4725484
Series A12392
Control symbol 2
2021/00363563
3 May 2024 as varied by order of the Tribunal on 11 September 2024 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 16. 2023/3132 Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security Draft Sixth Report re DSD Working Papers: Photocopy of SR5/CB 1/14 Box 3 File 7 Visit of US and UK Representatives to DSB November 1952. Tripartite Conference September 1953 Barcode 4727664
Series A12393
Control symbol 6/7
2021/00414043
3 May 2024 as varied by order of the Tribunal on 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 17. 2023/3133 Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security Draft Sixth Report re DSD Working Papers: Photocopy of SR5/CB 1/14 Box 3 File 6 DSB-US Relationships Tripartite Conferences Papers Barcode 4727663
Series A12393
Control symbol 6/6
2021/00363563
3 May 2024 as varied by order of the Tribunal on 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 18. 2023/4108 Attachment of staff of Defence Signals Branch to No 367 Signals Unit, RAF Hong Kong Barcode 463360
Series A5954
Control symbol 2354/11
22 March 2024 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 19. 2023/4109 Prime Minister’s visit to Defence Signals Branch Aug 1995 Barcode 698417
Series A5954
Control symbol 2366/8
2023/00054578
22 March 2024 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 20. 2023/4110 Defence Committee Agendum, Recent incidents off Hainan island [remainder of title exempt] Barcode 463368
Series A5954
Control symbol 2354/9
22 March 2024 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 21. 2023/4111 Use of Service Operators Barcode 463593
Series A5954
Control symbol 2354/8
19 January 2024 as varied by order of the Tribunal on 11 September 2024 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 22. 2023/4115 Visit of US and UK [United States and United Kingdom] representatives to BSD [Defence Signal Branch] Nov 1952 Tripartite Conference Sep. 1953 Barcode 31656237
Series A5954
Control symbol 2355/7
3 May 2024 as varied by order of the Tribunal on 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 23. 2023/4116 DSB [Defence Signal Branch] US [United States] Relationships – Tripartite Conference papers Barcode 31656236
Series A5954
Control symbol 2355/6
3 May 2024 as varied by order of the Tribunal on 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 24. 2023/4117 Joint Intelligence Organisation – Post War. File No. 1 Barcode 681170
Series A5954
Control symbol 2363/1
19 January 2024 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 25. 2023/4120 Defence Signals Branch: Procedures for approval of tasks and their reaction to capacity to fill them Barcode 698408
Series A5954
Control symbol 2365/7
22 March 2024 as varied by order of the Tribunal on 11 September 2024 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 26. 2023/4121 Defence Signals Branch – Review of capacity Barcode 698410
Series A5954
Control symbol 2365/8
22 March 2024 as varied by order of the Tribunal on 6 February 2025 – open with exception under s 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act
References to 11 September 2024 and 6 February 2025 decisions are decisions altered by the Tribunal at the request of the parties.
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