Stork v ABN Group

[2024] FedCFamC2G 186

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

Stork v ABN Group [2024] FedCFamC2G 186

File number:

MLG 1956 of 2023

Judgment of:

JUDGE RILEY

Date of judgment:

1 March 2024

Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Fair Work – application for an extension of time in which to file a general protections claim – application for other relief – applicant failing to appear at a directions hearing.

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977

Fair Work Act 2009, ss.340, 343, 345, 351, 362, 368, 370, 536CA, 536D(2), 550, 557A, 557B

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021, r.13.06(1)(c) and (e)

Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic), ss.78C, 78D, 130

Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013 (Vic), ss.75(1)(a), 92, 93, 103(1), 104(1), 105(1), 107(1), 179, 292, 575, 581(2), 585, 601, 608

Cases cited:

Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298
Meredith v Chad Group Australia Pty Ltd [2021] FCCA 415

Division

Division 2 General Federal Law

Number of paragraphs:

59

Date of last submissions:

2 February 2024

Place:

Melbourne

Advocate for the Applicant:

No appearance

Solicitor for the Applicant:

None

Counsel for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Respondents:

Ingmar Taylor SC

Solicitor for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Respondents:

WA Workplace Law Pty Ltd

Solicitor Advocate for the Tenth Respondent:

Jessica Voglis

Solicitors for the Tenth Respondent

Gallagher Bassett

Counsel for the Eleventh Respondent:

Stephanie Cheligoy

Solicitors for the Eleventh Respondent

Maddocks

Counsel for the Twelfth Respondent:

Siobhan Kelly

Solicitors for the Twelfth Respondent

Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office

Solicitor Advocate for the Thirteenth Respondent:

Matthew Jorgensen

Solicitors for the Thirteenth Respondent

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

MLG 1956 of 2023

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

PERRY STORK

Applicant

AND:

ABN GROUP (VIC) (COMPANY)
(ACN 130 382 188)

First Respondent

AIDEN HOOPER
Second Respondent

DALE ALCOCK
Third Respondent

(and others named in the schedule)

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE RILEY
DATE OF ORDER:	1 MARCH 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to r.13.06(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021, the application filed on 16 November 2023 be dismissed for non-appearance.

Note:   The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note:This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE RILEY:

1. Before the court is an application that is somewhat confusing but seems to be primarily seeking:

   (a)an extension of time under s.370(a)(ii) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (“the FWA”) in which to file an application alleging breaches of the general protections provisions consisting of:

   (i)dismissal in contravention of s.340 of the FWA;

   (ii)misrepresentation in contravention of s.345 of the FWA;

   (iii)coercion in contravention of s.343 of the FWA; and

   (iv)discrimination in contravention of s.351of the FWA; and

   (b)reinstatement of compensation payments; or

   (c)leave to make an application to the Magistrates’ or County Court to reinstate compensation payments.

2. The application was accompanied by a Form 2. In addition to the above, the Form 2 seeks compensation, damages, reinstatement of employment, back pay and pecuniary penalties. It also alleges various breaches of the Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013 (Vic) (“WIRCA”) and the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) (“OHSA”).

3. The applicant, Mr Stork, is not legally represented. He was employed from 11 September 2017 until 9 May 2023 as a construction quality controller by the first respondent, ABN Group (Vic) Pty Ltd (trading as Boutique Homes and Home Buyers Centre) (“ABN”). On 9 May 2023, ABN terminated Mr Stork’s employment. ABN’s stated reason for the termination was Mr Stork’s repeated failures to attend scheduled independent medical evaluations (IMEs) to assess his fitness for work.

4. The second to ninth respondents are various employees of ABN, being the managing director and other managers.

5. The tenth respondent was named in the initial application as Gallagher Bassett Australia (Agent and Management). The correct name of that entity is Gallagher Bassett Services Pty Ltd (“Gallagher”). Gallagher is ABN’s workers’ compensation insurer. Jessica Voglis filed a notice of address for service in her own name, apparently on behalf of Gallagher. Jessica Voglis appears to be Gallagher’s head of legal.

6. The eleventh respondent was named in the initial application as the Workers Injury Commission. On 19 December 2023, a registrar ordered that the name of the eleventh respondent be changed to the Workplace Injury Commission (“WIC”).

7. The twelfth respondent was named in the initial application as the Victorian Workcover Authority T/A Worksafe Victoria and Officers. On 19 December 2023, a registrar ordered that the name of the twelfth respondent be changed to the Victorian Workcover Authority (“VWA”).

8. The thirteenth respondent is the Fair Work Commission and Commissioners (“FWC”).

9. On 19 December 2023, a registrar ordered that:

   (a)Mr Stork file and serve any further submissions and any affidavit evidence relating to the extension of time application by 4pm on 9 January 2023;

   (b)the first to ninth respondents file and serve any submissions and any affidavit evidence relating to the extension of time application by 4pm on 23 January 2023;

   (c)if Gallagher, WIC, VWA, and FWC wished to be heard on the extension of time application, they file and serve any submissions and any affidavit evidence relating to the extension of time application by 4pm on 23 January 2023;

   (d)if any party seeks an oral hearing with the respect to the extension of time application, they notify the court by 4pm on 30 January 2024, failing which, the application for an extension of time be determined on the papers; and

   (e)the application for an extension of time be adjourned for hearing by a judge.

10. Mr Stork did not file any further submissions or affidavit evidence by 4pm on 9 January 2024 or at all. That was not strictly a default, because the order required him to file “any” submissions and affidavits. The order did not absolutely require him to file submissions and affidavits.

11. The first to ninth respondents and the WIC filed written submissions but no affidavits by 4pm on 23 January 2024.

12. The Victorian Workcover Authority lodged a written submission but no affidavits on 29 January 2024, six days late.

13. Gallagher and the FWC did not file any submissions or affidavits.

14. No one advised the court by 4pm on 30 January 2024 that they sought an oral hearing. Consequently, the extension of time application was to be determined on the papers.

15. However, because the VWA’s submissions were late, they required an extension of time to be able to rely on them. The court emailed the parties on 31 January 2024 with a notice of listing for a directions hearing at 10am on 2 February 2024 by Microsoft Teams. The covering email said that the purpose of the directions hearing was to consider whether to give the VWA an extension of time in which to file and serve its submissions.

16. All parties attended the directions hearing except Mr Stork. I am satisfied that the notice of listing was sent to his correct email address as disclosed on his application. He has not filed a notice of address for service changing his contact details since lodging his application. Mr Stork in fact emailed the court in response to the email containing the notice of listing. The court emailed Mr Stork a number of times to seek his participation in the directions hearing, and also telephoned him during the directions hearing, but there was no response.

17. Subrule 13.06(1) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2001 (“the Rules”) provides that:

    If a party to a proceeding is absent from a hearing (including a first court date), the Court or a Registrar may do any of the following:

    …

    (c)if the absent party is an applicant—dismiss the application;

    …

    (e)proceed with the hearing generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceeding.

18. A “hearing” in r.13.06 of the Rules clearly includes a directions hearing, not least because the rule itself expressly includes a first court date, which is typically a directions hearing.

19. Consequently, it was open to the court to dismiss the application filed on 16 November 2023 under r.13.06(1)(c) of the Act. Additionally, it was open to the court to proceed with the directions hearing generally or proceed with determining any claim to relief.

20. On 2 February 2024, I proceeded with the directions hearing in so far as it concerned the extension of time for the VWA to file and serve its submissions. At the directions hearing on 2 February 2024, there was no opposition to the VWA being given an extension of time to file and serve its submissions. The VWA explained that:

    (a)it had not filed and served its submissions by the due date because Mr Stork had not filed any submissions or affidavit evidence;

    (b)however, when the first to ninth respondents and the WIC filed submissions, the VWA reconsidered its position and decided to file and serve submissions as well.

21. I considered that it was in the interests of justice for the VWA to have an extension of time in which to file and serve its submissions. Consequently, the court ordered on 2 February 2024 that:

    The time for the twelfth respondent to file and serve written submissions in relation to the applicant’s extension of time application filed on 16 November 2023 be extended to 4pm on 29 January 2024. …

22. In relation to the application filed on 16 November 2023, the first to tenth respondents submitted that it ought to be dismissed under r.13.06(1)(c) of the Rules due to Mr Stork’s non-appearance, particularly as Mr Stork’s application sought an extension of time and was not supported by material.

23. The VWA, on the other hand, submitted that there was some material provided by Mr Stork in support of his application, being the lengthy explanation for his reasons for delay in the application filed on 16 November 2023, as well as an application that Mr Stork had tried to file under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (“the ADJR Act”) regarding the conduct of the registry in connection with his attempts to file the application eventually filed on 16 November 2023. As mentioned at the hearing, to the best of my knowledge, the ADJR Act proceeding had not actually been filed and, in any event, it was not before me so I could not take it into account. Even so, the VWA submitted that the court deal with Mr Stork’s claims for relief in the proceeding under r.13.06(1)(e) of the Rules. The other parties did not make submissions on the point.

24. In my view, the appropriate course is to dismiss the application filed on 16 November 2023 for non-appearance pursuant to r.13.06(1)(c) of the Rules, but to explain some of the numerous deficiencies in the application and Form 2.

25. The relief Mr Stork sought in his application filed on 16 November 2023 was:

    (a)an extension of time, presumably to bring his Form 2 claims, which concerned:

    (i)his termination;

    (ii)alleged contraventions by ABN of the WIRCA and the OHSA;

    (iii)alleged contraventions by ABN of s.345, 343, and 351 of the FWA; and

    (iv)alleged contraventions by Gallagher, the WIC, and the VWA of the OHSA, the WIRCA and the FWA; and

    (b)reinstatement of his compensation payments which Gallagher had stopped paying; or

    (c)leave to make an urgent application to the Magistrates’ Court or County for reinstatement of his compensation payments.

26. In relation to the second to ninth respondents, Mr Stork did not mention them in his application filed on 16 November 2023 or the accompanying Form 2, except in the court heading. In other words, there were no allegations against them and no claims for relief against them. As such, the proceedings against the second to ninth respondents cannot be maintained.

27. Regarding the claim for Mr Stork to be given leave to file an application in the Magistrates’ Court or County Court, it is a matter for those courts to decide whether to grant that leave. It is not a claim that this court has any jurisdiction to deal with.

28. Regarding the claim for the reinstatement of compensation payments by Gallagher, as mentioned above, Gallagher did not file any submissions. Mr Stork did not file any submissions or affidavits explaining why this court should order Gallagher to reinstate compensation payments. Mr Stork’s statements in his Form 2 do not elucidate this issue. It is not appropriate for the court to speculate on how this claim for relief might be put. In the absence of any affidavit or submissions or other explanation, this claim cannot be maintained.

29. Mr Stork’s other claims all seem to be connected with his principal general protections claim under the FWA, which requires an extension of time. The considerations relating to the exercise of court’s discretion to extend time in the present context were explained by Marshall J in Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298 at pages 299 to 300 as follows:

    1.Special circumstances are not necessary but the Court must be positively satisfied that the prescribed period should be extended. The prima facie position is that the time limit should be complied with unless there is an acceptable explanation of the delay which makes it equitable to so extend.

    2.Action taken by the applicant to contest the termination, other than applying under the Act will be relevant. It will show that the decision to terminate is actively contested. It may favour the granting of an extension of time.

    3.Prejudice to the respondent including prejudice caused by delay will go against the granting of an extension of time.

    4.The mere absence of prejudice to the respondent is an insufficient basis to grant an extension of time.

    5.The merits of the substantive application may be taken into account in determining whether to grant an extension of time.

    6.Consideration of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a like position are relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion.

30. In the present case, there was no evidence that Mr Stork had taken other steps to contest the impugned conduct. Consideration of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a like position would probably be against the granting of an extension of time in the present case.

31. The more general approach for an extension of time application is to consider:

    (a)the length of the delay;

    (b)the explanation for the delay;

    (c)any prejudice to the respondents; and

    (d)the prospects of success of the underlying application.

32. In the present case, the length of the delay was 57 days. That is because the application to this court, under s.370(a)(ii) of the Act, must be filed within 14 days after the FWC has issued a certificate under s.368(3)(a) of the Act, or such further period as the court allows. In the present case, the FWC issued the certificate on 6 September 2023. Consequently, Mr Stork had until 20 September 2023 to file his application in this court without leave. In fact, he filed the application on 16 November 2023. That was 57 days late.

33. In relation to the explanation for the delay, Mr Stork did not file an affidavit. However, in his application filed on 16 November 2023, Mr Stork said that the delay was caused by technical difficulties and the “unreasonable” and “repeated misleading” conduct of the registry of this court. Mr Stork said that he attempted to file his application on 19 September 2023, the thirteenth day after the FWC had issued his certificate. However, he said that, because he was not registered with the court’s eLodgment portal, he attempted to file via email. Registry replied on the fourteenth day after the certificate was issued with further requirements, which he was unable to fulfil. He said he contacted registry on 22 September 2023, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 30 October 2023, and 1 and 2 November 2023, when his application was finally accepted for filing, on the proviso that he sought an extension of time.

34. Mr Stork did not explain what steps he took between 22 September 2023 and 23 October 2023. Also, Mr Stork did not explain why he did not register with the eLodgment portal. We have an abundance of unrepresented litigants in this court, the vast majority of whom file their documents without incident. It was not appropriate for the registry staff to give evidence in this proceeding about what happened in this case from their point of view, and they did not.

35. However, it appears that Mr Stork probably failed in some way to follow the usual instructions that other unrepresented litigants, including many who are not native speakers of English, manage to follow in this court every day. In other words, I am not satisfied that Mr Stork has a good explanation for his delay in filing. That is particularly so in relation to the delay between 22 September 2023 and 23 October 2023.

36. It was not suggested that the delay in filing caused any relevant prejudice to the respondents.

37. In relation to the prospects of success of Mr Stork’s Form 2 claims, the OHSA claims have no prospect of success. Mr Stork does not have standing to bring prosecutions under the OHSA: s.130 of the OHSA. Moreover, the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria has exclusive jurisdiction to hear civil claims under s.78C of the OHSA pursuant to s.78D of the OHSA. The court would not grant an extension of time to bring proceedings that had no prospect of success.

38. Regarding the WIRCA claims, the court arguably would have an accrued jurisdiction to determine them. However, the court would be most unlikely to exercise its discretion to hear the WIRCA claims in its accrued jurisdiction for the reasons given in Meredith v Chad Group Australia Pty Ltd [2021] FCCA 415, where Judge Burchardt said:

    26First of all, there is a statutory scheme, as explained by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Barwon Spinners, that simply cannot be evaded. It is true, of course, that this court has an accrued jurisdiction which enables it, as a matter of discretion, to entertain claims that form part of the single federal justiciable controversy. Contrary to the submissions of the applicant, however, the WorkCover claim does not form part of a single justiciable controversy. In substance, it forms a completely discrete and totally differentiable claim to straightforward underpayment of wages claims upon which the parts of the statement of claim that are not objected to stands.

    27It is a matter of which I take judicial knowledge that there are courts in Victoria which deal routinely with accident compensation claims of the sort that the applicant apparently desires to bring. There are associated medical panels and medical referees designed to cope with such claims. This court has no expertise in what is well-known to be an extremely complex area of the law. In substance, what the applicant seeks to do is to circumvent the Victorian legislative requirements and, it appears, to bring a common law claim untrammelled by the statutory constraints applicable under Victorian legislation.

    28In my view, even assuming it were practicable, which I doubt bearing in mind the whole question of serious injury certificates, medical panels (to which this Court has no access), and the like, it is immediately apparent that were it necessary for it to be so this would be one of the unusual exceptions referred to by Brereton J. This is a case in which I would resolutely decline to exercise my discretion to entertain a claim of this sort in the court’s accrued jurisdiction. This court is a completely inappropriate forum for such claims. The Victorian courts are the entirely appropriate place for these claims. Claims of this sort ought not be brought in this court and I hope that this judgment will inform any other party contemplating bringing any such an application in the future.

1. In the present case, the substratum of facts between the WIRCA claim and the general protections claim is also different. The two groups of claims would have very little evidence in common, except for the basic facts of Mr Stork’s employment and such like. A hearing involving the general protections claims and the WIRCA claims would be much longer than a hearing involving the general protections claims alone. This court is not equipped to deal with the WIRCA claim.

2. Consequently, the prospects of the WIRCA claims proceeding in this court are remote. As such, the court would be disinclined to grant an extension of time to enable the WIRCA claims to be brought in this court.

3. Relatedly, Mr Stork alleged in his Form 2 that the WIC breached ss.75(1)(a), 92, 93, 103(1), 104(1), 105(1), 107(1), 179(1) and (2), and 575 of the WIRCA. However, those provisions impose no obligations on the WIC, so they are incapable of breaching them. Additionally, Mr Stork has alleged the WIC criminally breached ss.292, 581(2), and 585(1), (2) and (3), and 601(1) of the WIRCA. However, Mr Stork does not have standing to bring prosecutions under those provisions: s.608 of the WIRCA. As such, the court would not grant an extension of time to bring those prosecutions.

4. Mr Stork also alleged that the WIC breached ss. 340, 345, 343 and 351 of the FWA. However, WIC was not Mr Stork’s employer. In theory, WIC could have been involved within the meaning of s.550 of the FWA in ABN’s alleged breaches of the FWA, but Mr Stork has not explained how such involvement arose. Consequently, the court would not give an extension of time to proceed with those allegations.

5. Mr Stork also alleged that the WIC was involved in breaches of ss.362, 536CA, 536D(2), 557A and 557B of the FWA. However, Mr Stork has not explained how that involvement arose, and it appears unlikely that the court would find that there was any such involvement. For example, s.536D(2) of the FWA concerns influencing a registered organisation. However, Mr Stork did not mention any registered organisations in his Form 2. Consequently, there are poor prospects of success in relation to these alleged breaches.

6. There may be some other allegations against the WIC but they are unclear and are not supported by proper particulars.

7. Moreover, Mr Stork has not actually articulated what relief he wants from the WIC. In the absence of any orders being specifically sought against the WIC, they should not be a party to the proceeding.

8. Mr Stork also alleged that the VWA breached ss.75(1)(a), 92, 93, 103(1), 104(1), 105(1), 107(1), 179(1) and (2), 292, 575, 581(2), 585(1), (2) and (3) and 601 of the WIRCA. Paragraph 75(1)(a), s.93 and s.179(1) and (2) of the WIRCA impose no liability on the VWA that can be enforced by a civil proceeding, such as the proceeding that Mr Stork is presently seeking to bring in this court. Sections 92, 103(1), 104(1), 105(1), 107(1), and 575 impose no obligation on the VWA in relation to Mr Stork. Sections 292, 581(2), 585(1), (2) and (3) and 601 of the WIRCA create criminal offences. This court has no jurisdiction to determine alleged contraventions of those provisions. As such, the prospect of success of Mr Stork’s WIRCA claims against the VWA are non-existent in this court. The court would not grant an extension of time to enable claims with no prospect of success to be brought.

9. Mr Stork also alleges that the VWA breached s.340, 345, 343, 351, 362, 536CA, 536D(2), 557A and 557B of the FWA. Sections 340 and 351 can only be breached by a person who is in an employment relationship with another person. The VWA was not in an employment relationship with Mr Stork. Therefore, the VWA cannot have breached those provisions. In theory, the VWA could have been involved within the meaning of s.550 of the FWA in ABN’s alleged breaches of those provisions. However, Mr Stork has not alleged that or provided appropriate particulars of any such allegation and it seems inherently improbable. Consequently, allegations regarding s.340 and s.351 of the FWA and the VWA seem to have very poor prospects of success and the court would probably not give an extension of time to pursue them.

10. Breaches of s.536CA and s.536D(2) of the FWA require actions to influence a registered organisation. Mr Stork has not identified any registered organisations or explained any connection of his claims to a registered organisation. In the absence of such information, the prospects of success of the claims against the VWA under s.536CA and 536D(2) of the FWA seem negligible and the court would not grant an extension of time to pursue them against the VWA.

11. Sections 557A and 557B of the FWA are basically definitional. They are not stand-alone provisions capable of being breached. Therefore, Mr Stork’s claim that the VWA breached them cannot succeed. The court would not give an extension of time to pursue a hopeless claim.

12. Regarding the allegations that the VWA breached s.343, 345 and 362 of the FWA, Mr Stork has not explained how these breaches are alleged to have occurred or otherwise given appropriate particulars of them. In the absence of such information, the court would not give an extension of time for them to proceed.

13. Moreover, Mr Stork has not actually articulated what relief he wants from the VWA. In the absence of any orders being specifically sought against VWA, they should not be a party to the proceeding.

14. As noted above, the FWC did not file any submissions. Mr Stork has not actually articulated what relief he wants from the FWC. In the absence of any orders being specifically sought against the FWC, they should not be a party to the proceeding.

15. Mr Stork also alleged that ABN breached the OHSA and the WIRCA. However, for the reasons mentioned above, those claims are not sustainable.

16. That leaves the primary general protections claims, which are against ABN. The basic scheme of the general protections regime is that:

    (a)people are prohibited from taking certain actions against others for prohibited reasons; and

    (b)the prohibited reasons for the actions will be taken to be the reasons for the actions alleged by the applicant unless the respondent proves otherwise.

17. Mr Stork has not articulated any reasons for ABN’s actions, much less prohibited reasons. In his Form 2, Mr Stork said that ABN terminated his employment while he was suffering a psychological injury sustained in the workplace. However, he does not articulate why ABN terminated his employment or how that reason for termination would be a prohibited reason. The same may be said of the other general protections claims Mr Stork raised against ABN.

18. It is not for the court and the respondents to work out what Mr Stork wants to allege. It is his responsibility to make a discernible claim. In the absence of a discernible claim, the proceeding should not be allowed to continue.

19. More substantively, ABN has given a plausible reason for the termination, being Mr Stork’s repeated failures to attend scheduled independent medical examinations. This also suggests that Mr Stork’s central claim may be without merit.

20. Mr Stork may have made some other claims, but they are not clear. For that reason alone, they should not be allowed to continue.

21. For all of these reasons, as well as Mr Stork’s absence from the directions hearing on 2 February 2024, it is proper that the application filed on 16 November 2023 be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-nine (59) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Riley.

Associate:

Dated:       1 March 2024

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES

Fourth Respondent:	ROB BIRD
Fifth Respondent:	TOM JOHNSON
Sixth Respondent:	VALTER BERGAMIN
Seventh Respondent:	NICK MOSHONAS
Eighth Respondent:	KRYSTAL HALL
Ninth Respondent:	STEPHANIE BAILEY
Tenth Respondent:	GALLAGHER BASSETT AUSTRALIA (ACN 009 778 018)
Eleventh Respondent:	THE WORKPLACE INJURY COMMISSION
Twelfth Respondent:	VICTORIAN WORKCOVER AUTHORITY
Thirteenth Respondent:	FAIR WORK COMMISSION