Stoddart and Repatriation Commission
[2002] AATA 791
•11 September 2002
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2002] AATA 791
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No S2000/450
VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION )
Re LESLIE JOHN STODDART
Applicant
And REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Senior Member WJF Purcell
Date11 September 2002
PlaceAdelaide
Decision The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
(Signed)
WJF PURCELL
(Senior Member)
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS' AFFAIRS – veterans' entitlements – Disability Pension – post traumatic stress disorder – alcoholic liver disease – whether applicant's conditions are war-caused within meaning of section 9 of Act – whether applicant experienced severe stressors during his operational service – reasonable hypothesis
Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 sections 9, 120, 120A
McKenna v Repatriation Commission [1999] FCA 323
Repatriation Commission v Gorton [2001] FCA 1194
Statement of Principles No 5 of 1994
Statement of Principles No 15 of 1994
Statement of Principles No 76 of 1998
Statement of Principles No 3 of 1999
Statement of Principles No 54 of 1999
REASONS FOR DECISION
11 September 2002 Senior Member WJF Purcell
This is an application for review of a decision of the Repatriation Commission (the Commission) dated 5 July 1999, which refused the applicant's claim for Disability Pension for the conditions of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and alcoholic liver damage. The Veterans' Review Board (VRB) affirmed the decision on 12 September 2000.
The evidence before the Tribunal comprised the documents lodged pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the T Documents) together with exhibits tendered by the parties. Mr White appeared for the applicant, who gave oral evidence, and called Dr B Rowe, Psychiatrist. Mr Doube represented the Commission.
The applicant, who is aged 63, served with the Royal Australian Navy (the Navy) from 29 August 1955 (when he was 17 years of age) until his 24th birthday on 28 April 1962. His eligible operational service for the Far East Strategic Reserve on HMAS Sydney (the Sydney), is from 21 September 1956 to 13 October 1956; and on HMAS Melbourne (the Melbourne) from 5 April 1957 to 7 May 1957, from 7 June 1957 to 28 June 1957, from 30 April 1958 to 13 May 1958, and from 18 March 1959 to 28 April 1959, a total period of 134 days. In this matter, the applicant asserts that his conditions relate to his operational service, and the appropriate standard of proof is that of reasonable hypothesis, in accordance with section 120(1) of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (the Act), which, as far as is relevant for the purposes of this review, provides:
"120 Standard of Proof
(1)Where a claim under Part II for a pension in respect of the incapacity from injury or disease of a veteran, or of the death of a veteran, relates to the operational service rendered by the veteran, the Commission shall determine that the injury was a war-caused injury, that the disease was a war-caused disease or that the death of the veteran was war-caused, as the case may be, unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.
(2) …
(3)In applying subsection (1) or (2) in respect of the incapacity of a person from injury or disease, or in respect of the death of a person, related to service rendered by the person, the Commission shall be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining:
(a) that the injury was a war-caused injury or a defence-caused injury;
(b)that the disease was a war-caused disease or a defence-caused disease; or
(c) that the death was war-caused or defence-caused;
as the case may be, if the Commission, after consideration of the whole of the material before it, is of the opinion that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A."
Section 120A provides:
120A Reasonableness of hypothesis to be assessed by reference to Statement of Principles
(1)This section applies to any of the following claims made on or after 1 June 1994:
(a)a claim under Part II that relates to the operational service rendered by a veteran;
(b) a claim under Part IV that relates to:
(i)the peacekeeping service rendered by a member of a Peacekeeping Force; or
(ii) the hazardous service rendered by a member of the Forces.
Note 1: Subsections 120 (1), (2) and (3) are relevant to these claims.
Note 2: For peacekeeping service, member of a Peacekeeping Force, hazardous service and member of the Forces see subsection 5Q (1A).(2) …
(3)For the purposes of subsection 120 (3), a hypothesis connecting an injury suffered by a person, a disease contracted by a person or the death of a person with the circumstances of any particular service rendered by the person is reasonable only if there is in force:
(a)a Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B (2) or (11); or
(b) a determination of the Commission under subsection 180A (2);
that upholds the hypothesis.
Note: See subsection (4) about the application of this subsection.
…"The hypothesis propounded by the applicant is that his conditions of alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse, and PTSD, relate to his operational service, in that on the whole of the material, the traumatic events which he experienced during his relevant service, connect his conditions with his relevant service. In my view, the material before the Tribunal would, if correct, point to a hypothesis that the conditions were war-caused. There are Statements of Principles in force, and in accordance with those Statements of Principles, at least one of the Factors set out in clause 5 of the respective Statement of Principles, must as a minimum exist, before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised connecting the conditions with the circumstances of the applicant's relevant service.
There is no Statement of Principles for alcoholic liver damage, but I consider that in accordance with the reasoning of the Full Court of the Federal Court in McKenna v Repatriation Commission [1999] FCA 323, the condition of alcoholic liver damage is caused by alcohol abuse, and the chain of causation leads back then to that condition for which there is a Statement of Principles. The appropriate Statement of Principles is that for "alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse".
The current Statement of Principles for alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse, is Instrument No 76 of 1998 (the alcohol abuse SoP). It was in force also, at the time of the primary Commission decision. The applicant maintains that the applicable Statement of Principles is Instrument No 5 of 1994, which was in force at the time the application for pension was lodged, and is more favourable to the applicant. In my view, in accordance with the judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Repatriation Commission v Gorton [2001] FCA 1194, the Statement of Principles in force at the time of the primary Commission decision is the appropriate Statement of Principles, namely No 76 of 1998 (the alcohol abuse SoP).
In relation to the condition of alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse, the applicant contends that Factor 5(b) of the alcohol abuse SoP is satisfied: "experiencing a severe stressor within the two years immediately before the clinical onset of alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse". "Experiencing a severe stressor" is defined as:
"… the person experienced, witnessed or was confronted with, an event or events that involved actual or threat of death or serious injury, or a threat to the person's or other people's physical integrity, which event or events might evoke intense fear, helplessness or horror.
In the setting of service in the Defence Forces, or other service where the Veterans' Entitlements Act applies, events that qualify as severe stressors include:(i) threat of serious injury or death; or
(ii) engagement with the enemy; or
(iii)witnessing casualties or participation in or observation of casualty clearance, atrocities or abusive violence;"
In relation to the condition of PTSD, the current Statement of Principles, which was in force also at the time of the primary Commission decision, is Instrument No 3 of 1999, as amended by Instrument No 54 of 1999 (the 1999 PTSD SoP). The Statement of Principles in force at the time the applicant lodged his claim was Instrument No 15 of 1994, which was more favourable to the applicant. I consider that the Statement of Principles in force at the time of the primary Commission decision is the appropriate Statement of Principles, namely Instrument No 3 of 1999 (the 1999 PTSD SoP).
PTSD is defined in paragraph 2(b) of the 1999 PTSD SoP as:
"(b) For the purposes of this Statement of Principles, "post traumatic stress disorder" means a psychiatric condition meeting the following description (derived from DSM-IV):
(A)the person has been exposed to a traumatic event which:
(i)the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others; and
(ii)the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror; and
(B)the traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in one or more of the following ways:
(i)recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts, or perceptions;
(ii)recurrent distressing dreams of the event;
(iii)acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (including a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback episodes, including those that occur on awakening or when intoxicated);
(iv)intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event;
(v)physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event; and
(C)persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three or more of the following:
(i)efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma;
(ii)efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the trauma;
(iii)inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma;
(iv)markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities;
(v) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others;
(vi) restricted range of affect (eg, unable to having loving feelings);
(vii)sense of a foreshortened future (eg, does not expect to have a career, marriage, children, or a normal life span); and
(D)persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as indicated by two or more of the following:
(i) difficulty falling or staying asleep;
(ii) irritability or outbursts of anger;
(iii) difficulty concentrating;
(iv) hypervigilance;
(v) exaggerated startle response; and
(E)duration of the disturbance (indicated by the relevant symptoms set out in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d)) is more than one month; and
(F)the disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning,
attracting ICD-9-CM code 309.81."
In relation to the condition of PTSD, the applicant contends that Factor 5(a) of the 1999 PTSD SoP is satisfied: "experiencing a severe stressor prior to the clinical onset of post traumatic stress disorder". "Experiencing a severe stressor" is defined as meaning:
"… the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threat of death or serious injury, or a threat to the person's or another person's, physical integrity.
In the setting of service in the Defence Forces, or other service where the Veterans' Entitlements Act applies, events that qualify as severe stressors include:(i) threat of serious injury or death; or
(ii) engagement with the enemy; or
(iii)witnessing casualties or participation in or observation of casualty clearance, atrocities or abusive violence;"
The applicant submits that during his operational service for the Far East Strategic Reserve, during the Malayan Confrontation between Malaya and Indonesia, he experienced a number of severe stressors whilst working in the engine rooms of both the Sydney, and the Melbourne, which can be summarised as follows:
(a)Occasions when he was required to check the tunnels and temperature gauges deep down at the bottom of the vessel. He undertook this task alone, without any radio or other contact with the ship, and had no way of communicating if he was in trouble. He had to lock doors behind him to ensure the area was completely sealed and watertight. He recalled being terrified when undertaking this task, and perceived his life to be under threat, particularly when the vessel was called to action stations, as there would have been little, if any, chance of him getting out alive.
(b)Occasions when the vessel was called to action stations whilst he was in the engine room below the waterline, sealed and watertight. He was fearful that if the vessel was hit by enemy fire there would be little, if any, chance of him getting out alive. He was intensely frightened during his time off Malaya, as he did not know whether the call to action stations was an exercise, or the real thing.
(c)The applicant saw an incident where a fellow seaman was very badly burnt by a "flashback" burn that occurred when the seaman was changing oil sprayers on the boilers. He felt very lucky and frightened because it could have been him who was injured
(d)Whilst the applicant was aboard the Melbourne in April 1957, the vessel was involved in a South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) training exercise, in the course of which HMAS Tobruk (the Tobruk) was hit by a star shell, which resulted in the death of Able Seaman Spooner. He was buried at sea the following day, and this event brought home to the applicant the dangerous position he was in, and that at any time he could be injured and killed.
The applicant asserts that these were major stressors, and as a result he consumed large amounts of alcohol to deal with the incidents and his fear.
The Commission maintains that during his operational service the applicant never experienced a severe stressor as defined in the Statements of Principles; accordingly there is no reasonable hypothesis pointed to by the facts in this matter, and the applicant cannot succeed in this application.
The applicant was an unimpressive witness. He was loquacious, but at the same time evasive, when called upon to recount the details of events upon which he relied. I was left with the strong impression that much of his evidence was recent invention and unreliable. This does not mean that I disregard all his evidence, but that I rely on other more objective evidence to support my findings of fact in areas of dispute in the evidence.
The other witness was a medical practitioner, Dr Rowe, who is suitably qualified and whose evidence was appropriately objective. Dr Rowe, of necessity, was obliged to rely upon the applicant's veracity in relation to his deeds and his reactions; and I have taken this into account in my assessment of the appropriate weight to be given to his opinions and evidence.
The applicant was 17 years of age when he joined the Navy, and in early 1956 when he was nearly 18 years old he joined the Sydney, as a stoker, later renamed a "mechanical engineer". He worked mainly in the engine room, which is below the waterline. He was required to check the "tels and temps" - messages coming down from the bridge, with instructions, and registering all the temperatures on certain parts of the machinery and particularly down along the shaft which drove the propeller of the vessel. This he said, was the scariest part of his duties. It was always frightening, because he was down the bottom of the ship, and if a torpedo hit, there was no way out. He had to climb down a narrow ladder, pull the watertight hatch behind him, and then read the first temperature gauge, and the others in the compartment, and continue to travel along the tunnels between the compartments. There were no lights, he was working by torchlight, with no means of communication. He said that he knew that if something went wrong, he had no hope of getting out of the watertight compartment. He says that very early in the piece his nerves were playing up at the time, and he attended sick bay for treatment for nervous dyspepsia on many occasions.
The applicant gave evidence that the boiler room was underneath the engine room, and when he was in the boiler room and heard action stations sounded, he knew that he was locked in, and experienced the horror of not knowing whether it was an exercise or whether an attack was imminent.
The applicant gave evidence that there were about 5 sprayers on the front of the boiler. These sprayers allowed the oil to go into the furnace a certain distance, without burning. To ensure that the sprayer ignited, it was necessary to flag a couple of air flaps that allowed the air to go through to the boiler. If the flame blew back upon the operator, it was, in his words, "just like lightning hitting", a flashback, the full heat of the boiler coming back over the mechanical engineer. The applicant said that he saw this happen to a couple of others; one of whom was badly burnt because he had the top of his overalls slightly open. In the applicant's words, it was not a pretty sight, and the seaman was taken off to sick bay on a stretcher. The applicant said that he could not recollect the date of this incident, but it was in the early days in the Malayan waters.
The applicant gave evidence that in April 1957 whilst the Melbourne was undertaking a SEATO exercise, word reached the Melbourne that the Tobruk had been hit. It was about half an hour later that the applicant learnt that a star shell had gone down a hatch and exploded in the ammunition tunnel, and that there were several seaman killed. He did not know whether the shell had come from our own ships, or from the shore. Hours later he was told the true story, that the Tobruk had been fired upon by one of our own ships. The applicant said that he thought at the time that the shell could have hit the Melbourne, and he could have been killed or injured. The applicant learnt later that only one seaman had been killed. He said that the Melbourne was one of the ships in the formation whilst Able Seaman Spooner's funeral service was conducted. The burial at sea, the applicant said, was not a pleasant thing for anybody.
The applicant gave evidence that the fear of the tunnels, the engine rooms as well, caused him to vomit at the end of a meal, for no apparent reason. A perusal of the documentary evidence discloses that he was reported as being "sick on shore" for 8 days from 1 September 1957, with acute gastritis [T21/153], and on 16 September 1957, he is recorded as "vomiting frequently since March 1957", (which was before commencement of his operational service). He had lost 1½ stone in 6 weeks, and was noted as being "a rather anxious young man" [T21/155]. He was admitted to Flinders Naval Hospital on 11 November 1957 for treatment of nervous dyspepsia. He remained in hospital for 29 days until 10 December 1957.
Dr Bottomley noted on 5 December 1957 that the applicant had "worries with regard to his wife's health" [T21/161]. The applicant said in evidence that his wife had at that time recently given birth to their first child, and had no health problems. His hospital discharge notes read in part:
"No more vomiting.
…
No evidence of organic disease.
To refrain from alcohol for some time.
…" [T21/159]The applicant in his demobilisation form, signed in 1962, stated that he suffered from nervous dyspepsia, which he attributed to "watchkeeping and away from home". His discharge medical notes of 6 March 1962, read in part "still vomits if he tries to eat breakfast – but not when living at home. Eats other meals normally and nutrition good" [T121/179]. He said in evidence that what he meant by the term "away from home" was away from Australia, not from his family home.
The applicant said in evidence that he had not drunk alcohol until he joined the Sydney in early 1956, before the commencement of his operational service. He drank his own issue of a bottle of beer a day, and several of the other sailors did not drink, but took their beer issue as well. He said that from then on, drinking whilst ashore became a problem.
It is not in dispute that the applicant served in the Navy for 6 years and 8 months, and had 5 periods of operational service over a 4½ year period. The total operational period was 134 days. It is a matter of history, that on each occasion of operational service, the Sydney and the Melbourne, were components of the Strategic Reserve, and later after Malaya received independence in August 1957, the Melbourne was a participant in SEATO exercises.
The official history of Australia's involvement in the Southeast Asian conflicts 1948-1975 includes a volume entitled "Up Top - The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts 1955-1972". At page 27 it reads, in part:
"…
The directive for the Strategic Reserve, issued in January 1956, gave it two roles. The primary role was to provide 'a deterrent to further Communist aggression in South East Asia', with the BDCC able to deploy units in defensive operations in the event of an attack on Malaya, Singapore, or the sea communications of the Malayan area. The secondary role was 'to assist in the maintenance of the security of the Federation of Malaya by participating in operations against the Communist Terrorists', but this was not to occur to the prejudice of the primary role. In practice the secondary role was to dominate in the 1950s, and in a guerrilla counter-insurgency campaign the largest part was played by army units, supported by the air forces.
…"
and at pages 32-34 it states:
"The RAN and the 'secondary role'
The naval component's part in combating the communist terrorists (CTs) during the Emergency, the secondary role of the Strategic Reserve, was always minor. It has been suggested that the most critical contribution of the naval units to the successful prosecution of the campaign was the maintenance of a blockade against the supply of arms and ammunition to the CTs from sources outside the country. There is no evidence, however, that anyone tried to run weapons and munitions to the communist forces at any stage of the campaign. While the interdiction of waterborne resupply efforts was to be an important feature of both Confrontation and the naval war in Vietnam, it seems to have been of little or no consequence during the Emergency. The enemy forces had no maritime capabilities, and there is no evidence in the Reports of Proceedings for RAN ships that they took part in any concerted or coordinated blockade tasks of the kind which would be familiar to them a decade later in Vietnam.
On a limited number of occasions, ships provided naval gunfire support to ground units ashore. One source notes three occasions on which ships of the Royal Navy engaged targets ashore, and there may have been several other instances. Ships of the Royal Australian Navy fired naval gunfire support missions on three occasions in 1956 and 1957. On 29 September 1956 the destroyers Tobruk and Anzac bombarded two positions on the east coast of Johore in the vicinity of Tanjong Balau. Bombardment charts of the area were dropped to the ships by an RAF Sunderland operating from Seletar, and at about 0730 each ship engaged one target separately before combining their fires against a further two targets. The mission was spotted by a Royal Artillery forward observation officer in an Auster aircraft, who reported 'that the fire was most effective'. On 22 January 1957 the frigates Quickmatch and Queenborough carried out a bombardment with their 4 inch main armament against suspected enemy positions on the east coast of Johore, variously identified as 'a coconut grove believed to be a source of CT supplies' and 'terrorist camps' which appeared however to be empty. The ships extended 40 rounds each, assisted by an Auster which spotted the fall of shot. Finally, Tobruk engaged enemy targets ashore in August 1957, firing at seven targets on the southeast coast of Johore on 26 August. An Auster spotted the mission and again reported good results, although the report of proceedings for the ship gives no details of 'gun damage assessment' (i.e., the damage inflicted on a target or targets as a result of naval bombardment). In addition, Anzac fired a further fire support mission on 26 July 1957, but although the ship attempted to engage 'targets thought to be Communist Terrorist hideouts', the firing is described in several places as an exercise, and its operational status is therefore uncertain. Overall, it is difficult to disagree with the RAN writer who concluded that 'naval operations in the Malayan Emergency are of minor importance in the history of the RAN'.
…"
On the whole of the evidence, the first three stressors relied upon by the applicant as operational service stressors, namely the tunnels, the boiler/engine room, and fear of action stations, are all normal duties and events that occur whilst a stoker/mechanical engineer is serving in the Navy at any time. There was, in my view, nothing in the evidence to distinguish any factor of these events as occurring during operational service.
As for the alleged "flashback" incident, the applicant was unable to provide any detail of the date of the event, but said that he was sure that the injuries to his fellow seaman occurred during his operational service. A perusal of the vessels' Reports of Proceedings, during the relevant periods, disclose careful recording of incidents and the progress of the vessels, but no record of any such injury. The injury, on the applicant's evidence, was of such seriousness, that one would have expected it to be recorded. I am satisfied, on the evidence, that if there was a "flashback" incident during the applicant's operational service, then it did not occur in the manner described by the applicant.
As to the events that occurred in relation to the Tobruk, a sailor was killed in the course of a SEATO exercise. The applicant does not maintain that he witnessed the event. He was below deck. The Melbourne continued with the exercise until it was completed. He says that he heard some time later that several seamen had been killed and injured. He does not maintain that he saw the dead or injured seamen. The following day the Melbourne was part of the large formation when the sailor was buried at sea, from the Tobruk. In my view, he had no direct experience of the event; it was all second hand.
Dr Rowe gave evidence of his opinion that the applicant suffers PTSD in accordance with the description derived from DSM-IV, and that on the history provided, the applicant was exposed to a number of traumatic experiences that he perceived threatened him with death, serious injury and/or loss of physical integrity, and which caused him marked fear, helplessness and horror. Dr Rowe said that in the history the applicant provided, at no stage did it emerge, that he had been exposed to other traumatic experiences, and certainly none that would lead to the type of criterion, being the re-experiencing symptoms that he described, which clearly related to events during naval service, and not to other events. Dr Rowe considered the applicant's PTSD related directly to the multiple and severe traumatic experiences to which he was exposed during his service with the Far East Strategic Reserve.
In the course of cross-examination, Dr Rowe stated that he had not sought any external sources of information in relation to the applicant's claims; that he understood that the Far East Strategic Reserve was a period of service in which our vessels might possibly have come under attack, and that the applicant was confronting an enemy. Dr Rowe was not aware that the Navy suffered no casualties at all in the Far East Strategic Reserve period of service, and that neither the Sydney nor the Melbourne ever confronted an enemy, nor took part in combat operations.
Dr Rowe agreed in evidence that apart from the Tobruk incident, all the activities the applicant outlined were the run of the mill, regular, daily duties, associated with the applicant's role in the Navy. Dr Rowe said that he understood that those stressors occurred during the times of the applicant's operational service, as well as at other times. As to whether or not the applicant's condition is pertinent to operational service, the stressors seemed to have occurred, as best the applicant could recall, at times when he was undertaking operational service. Dr Rowe said that the key issue for him, was whether or not the applicant was fearful that those things could kill him or badly hurt him. The fact that he did them multiple times, does not preclude the possibility that they caused him great anxiety, or caused him fear. They appeared to have elicited or provoked in the applicant a constellation of symptoms subsequently, which satisfied DSM-IV criteria for PTSD.
Factor 5(a) of the 1999 PTSD SoP, and Factor 5(b) of the Alcohol Abuse SoP, require that the person experience a severe stressor prior to the clinical onset of the conditions. Experiencing a severe stressor is defined as meaning that the person witness, or be confronted with, an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the person's or another person's physical integrity. This is an objective test. Even if I was to accept the veracity of the applicant's evidence, the events he has outlined do not objectively satisfy the relevant factors. There was never an actual threat to the Sydney or the Melbourne. I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the applicant never experienced, witnessed or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual, or threat of death, or serious injury.
I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that Factor 5(a) of the 1999 PTSD SoP is not satisfied, and that Factor 5(b) of the Alcohol Abuse SoP is not satisfied. I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is not sufficient ground for determining that the applicant's conditions of alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse and PTSD were war-caused. The material before the Tribunal does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the conditions with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the applicant.
For these reasons, the Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
I certify that the 35 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member WJF Purcell
Signed: .....................................................................................
AssociateDate/s of Hearing 6/7 February 2002
Date of Decision 11 September 2002
Counsel for the Applicant Mr T White
Solicitor for the Applicant Tindall Gask Bentley
Counsel for the Respondent Mr G Doube
Solicitor for the Respondent DVA
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