Stockley Furlong (A Firm) v Hyde

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Stockley Furlong (A Firm) v Hyde [2023] QCA 203

PARTIES:

STOCKLEY FURLONG (A FIRM)
(appellant)
v
MARK HYDE
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 780 of 2023
SC No 11837 of 2022

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2022] QSC 285 (Burns J)

DELIVERED ON:

20 October 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

23 August 2023

JUDGES:

Mullins P and Flanagan JA and Henry J

ORDERS:

1.   The appeal be dismissed.

2.   The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – GENERAL MATTERS – AMENDMENT OF ORIGINATING PROCESSES AND PLEADINGS OUTSIDE LIMITATION PERIOD – where the respondent was granted leave pursuant to r 376(4) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (“UCPR”) to amend his defence and counterclaim to plead a new action for an account – where the account is pleaded in response to allegations by the appellant that the respondent is indebted to it for the unpaid balance of a running account – where the appellant contends, among other things, that the account sought by the respondent is statute-barred insofar as it relates to payments that were made by the respondent more than six years before the commencement of the proceedings – where a running account gives rise to a single, undivided debt for the amount of the balance due – where the account sought by the respondent is, in substance, a true defence to the appellant’s claim, not an independent cause of action – whether the account sought by the respondent is subject to the limitation period in s 10(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 – whether the respondent requires leave under r 376(4) of the UCPR to amend his defence and counterclaim

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 10(2), s 27(1)(b), s 42
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 376(1), r 376(4)

Airservices Australia v Ferrier (1996) 185 CLR 483; [1996] HCA 54, considered
Bayton Cleaning Co Pty Ltd v Woods [2015] NSWSC 369, cited
Feiglin v Ainsworth [2011] VSC 454, cited
Giacci v Giacci Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] WASC 349, cited
Henriksens Rederi A/S v THZ Rolimpex [1974] QB 233, considered
Hewitt v Henderson [2006] WASCA 233, cited
HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v Dierickx (2013) 306 ALR 53; [2013] NSWCA 479, cited
Jane v Bob Jane Corporation Pty Ltd & Anor [2013] VSC 406, considered
McDonnell & East Ltd v McGregor (1936) 56 CLR 50; [1936] HCA 28, cited
Menegazzo v Pricewaterhousecoopers (A Firm) & Ors [2016] QSC 94, cited
Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Owners Strata Plan No 72381 (2015) 105 ACSR 1; [2015] NSWSC 202, considered
O’Neill v Foster (2004) 61 NSWLR 499; [2004] NSWSC 906, cited
Re Convere Pty Ltd [1976] VR 345; [1976] VicRp 30, cited
Re Footman Bower & Co Ltd [1961] Ch 443, distinguished
Sidney Raper Pty Ltd…

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Details
Case
[2023] QCA 203
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Stockley Furlong (A Firm) v Hyde involves a dispute between a firm of solicitors, Stockley Furlong (the appellant), and a client, Hyde (the respondent). The appellant had acted for the respondent in relation to matrimonial proceedings in the Family Court of Australia and had rendered invoices for services provided. The respondent had made payments towards these invoices over an extended period, but the appellant claimed that the respondent still owed a balance of $12,488.95. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria.

The central legal issue was whether the respondent's counterclaim for an account, which was filed outside the limitation period, was permissible. The respondent sought to amend his defence and counterclaim to include a new action for an account in response to the appellant's claim for the unpaid balance of a running account. The appellant argued that the account sought by the respondent was statute-barred insofar as it related to payments made more than six years before the commencement of the proceedings. The court had to determine whether the account sought by the respondent was an independent cause of action subject to the limitation period in s 10(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974, or if it was a true defence to the appellant's claim that did not require leave under r 376(4) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 to be amended.

The court found that the account sought by the respondent was not an independent cause of action but was, in substance, a true defence to the appellant’s claim. It concluded that a running account gives rise to a single, undivided debt for the amount of the balance due. Consequently, the account sought by the respondent was not subject to the limitation period in s 10(2). The court determined that the application for leave to amend was unnecessary and dismissed the appeal. The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appeal should be dismissed. Both the account sought by the respondent and the appellant’s claim for the debt arise out of the same running account. Properly analysed, the account sought by the respondent is, in substance, a true defence to the appellant’s claim. It is not an independent “cause of action” and therefore is not subject to the limitation period in s 10(2). The respondent brought the application pursuant to r 376(4) out of an abundance of caution. For the following reasons, the application was unnecessary.Background The appellant, which is a firm of solicitors, acted for the respondent in relation to matrimonial proceedings in the Family Court of Australia between 21 September 2005 and 18 August 2014. The parties entered into a client agreement on 27 September 2005 (“the First Client Agreement”). The first invoice rendered by the appellant pursuant to the First Client Agreement was on 17 October 2005. The last invoice was rendered on 3 November 2009. The first payment made by the respondent was on 16 November 2005, with the last payment in relation to the First Client Agreement being made by the respondent on 24 January 2014. In late 2009, the respondent instructed the appellant to institute an appeal against a decision at first instance. A new client agreement was provided to the respondent on 18 December 2009 (“the Second Client Agreement”). Although the Second Client Agreement was never signed, the respondent provided instructions in respect of the appeal on 6 January 2010. Thereafter the appellant issued the respondent with invoices for work it performed. The first invoice was rendered on 18 May 2010, with the last invoice being given to the respondent on 18 August 2014. The first payment made by the respondent was 24 January 2014, with the last payment being made by the respondent on 29 March 2016.The pleadings By a claim and statement of claim filed in the Magistrates Court on 12 October 2016, the appellant claimed as money due and owing by the respondent the amount of $12,488.95. This amount was claimed by reference only to the First Client Agreement. Paragraphs 5 to 7 of the statement of claim allege that the respondent initially offered to pay the invoiced amounts at the rate of $2,000.00 per week and subsequently at the rate of $1,500.00 per week. The first payment of $1,500.00 was made on 21 June 2011 and continued through to 24 March 2016. On 29 March 2016 the respondent paid a further $795.07 and has thereafter refused to make any further payment. The primary judge described the statement of claim as follows:[3]“The statement of claim runs to 30 pages, 28 of which are taken up with a schedule containing ‘details of the invoices rendered, the balance due and payable, the interest accrued and the payments received by the plaintiff’ over an 11 year period from 17 October 2005 to 12 October 2016. Thus, it was quite apparent even at this early stage that the plaintiff alleged that the indebtedness arose from a running account over the period specified resulting in a fluctuating balance depending on the invoices rendered by the plaintiff and the payments made by the defendant. Put another way, the alleged indebtedness arose from an entire account into which all liabilities and payments were carried in order of date resulting in a single balance.”[3]Reasons, [4].

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the account sought by the respondent is subject to the limitation period in s 10(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.
2. Whether the respondent requires leave under r 376(4) of the UCPR to amend his defence and counterclaim to plead a new action for an account.

Held
1. The account sought by the respondent is not subject to the limitation period in s 10(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.
2. The respondent does not require leave under r 376(4) of the UCPR to amend his defence and counterclaim to plead a new action for an account.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by examining the nature of the account sought by the respondent. It noted that both the account sought by the respondent and the appellant’s claim for the debt arose out of the same running account. The court emphasised that a running account gives rise to a single, undivided debt for the amount of the balance due. Consequently, the account sought by the respondent is, in substance, a true defence to the appellant’s claim, not an independent cause of action. This meant that it was not subject to the limitation period in s 10(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.

The court further analysed whether the respondent required leave under r 376(4) of the UCPR to amend his defence and counterclaim. It observed that the respondent brought the application out of an abundance of caution. The court concluded that the application was unnecessary as the account sought by the respondent was properly pleaded as a true defence to the appellant’s claim and was not an independent cause of action.

The court thus dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that an account sought in response to a claim for a running account is a true defence and not subject to the limitation period in s 10(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The court also established that leave under r 376(4) of the UCPR is unnecessary when the account is properly pleaded as a true defence.