SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Stockley Furlong (A Firm) v Hyde [2023] QCA 203
PARTIES:
STOCKLEY FURLONG (A FIRM)
(appellant)
v
MARK HYDE
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 780 of 2023
SC No 11837 of 2022DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2022] QSC 285 (Burns J)DELIVERED ON:
20 October 2023
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
23 August 2023
JUDGES:
Mullins P and Flanagan JA and Henry J
ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
CATCHWORDS:
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – GENERAL MATTERS – AMENDMENT OF ORIGINATING PROCESSES AND PLEADINGS OUTSIDE LIMITATION PERIOD – where the respondent was granted leave pursuant to r 376(4) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (“UCPR”) to amend his defence and counterclaim to plead a new action for an account – where the account is pleaded in response to allegations by the appellant that the respondent is indebted to it for the unpaid balance of a running account – where the appellant contends, among other things, that the account sought by the respondent is statute-barred insofar as it relates to payments that were made by the respondent more than six years before the commencement of the proceedings – where a running account gives rise to a single, undivided debt for the amount of the balance due – where the account sought by the respondent is, in substance, a true defence to the appellant’s claim, not an independent cause of action – whether the account sought by the respondent is subject to the limitation period in s 10(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 – whether the respondent requires leave under r 376(4) of the UCPR to amend his defence and counterclaim
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 10(2), s 27(1)(b), s 42
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 376(1), r 376(4)Airservices Australia v Ferrier (1996) 185 CLR 483; [1996] HCA 54, considered
Bayton Cleaning Co Pty Ltd v Woods [2015] NSWSC 369, cited
Feiglin v Ainsworth [2011] VSC 454, cited
Giacci v Giacci Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] WASC 349, cited
Henriksens Rederi A/S v THZ Rolimpex [1974] QB 233, considered
Hewitt v Henderson [2006] WASCA 233, cited
HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v Dierickx (2013) 306 ALR 53; [2013] NSWCA 479, cited
Jane v Bob Jane Corporation Pty Ltd & Anor [2013] VSC 406, considered
McDonnell & East Ltd v McGregor (1936) 56 CLR 50; [1936] HCA 28, cited
Menegazzo v Pricewaterhousecoopers (A Firm) & Ors [2016] QSC 94, cited
Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Owners Strata Plan No 72381 (2015) 105 ACSR 1; [2015] NSWSC 202, considered
O’Neill v Foster (2004) 61 NSWLR 499; [2004] NSWSC 906, cited
Re Convere Pty Ltd [1976] VR 345; [1976] VicRp 30, cited
Re Footman Bower & Co Ltd [1961] Ch 443, distinguished
Sidney Raper Pty Ltd…
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- Case
- [2023] QCA 203
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the respondent's counterclaim for an account, which was filed outside the limitation period, was permissible. The respondent sought to amend his defence and counterclaim to include a new action for an account in response to the appellant's claim for the unpaid balance of a running account. The appellant argued that the account sought by the respondent was statute-barred insofar as it related to payments made more than six years before the commencement of the proceedings. The court had to determine whether the account sought by the respondent was an independent cause of action subject to the limitation period in s 10(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974, or if it was a true defence to the appellant's claim that did not require leave under r 376(4) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 to be amended.
The court found that the account sought by the respondent was not an independent cause of action but was, in substance, a true defence to the appellant’s claim. It concluded that a running account gives rise to a single, undivided debt for the amount of the balance due. Consequently, the account sought by the respondent was not subject to the limitation period in s 10(2). The court determined that the application for leave to amend was unnecessary and dismissed the appeal. The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the account sought by the respondent is subject to the limitation period in s 10(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.
2. Whether the respondent requires leave under r 376(4) of the UCPR to amend his defence and counterclaim to plead a new action for an account.
Held
1. The account sought by the respondent is not subject to the limitation period in s 10(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.
2. The respondent does not require leave under r 376(4) of the UCPR to amend his defence and counterclaim to plead a new action for an account.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the nature of the account sought by the respondent. It noted that both the account sought by the respondent and the appellant’s claim for the debt arose out of the same running account. The court emphasised that a running account gives rise to a single, undivided debt for the amount of the balance due. Consequently, the account sought by the respondent is, in substance, a true defence to the appellant’s claim, not an independent cause of action. This meant that it was not subject to the limitation period in s 10(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.
The court further analysed whether the respondent required leave under r 376(4) of the UCPR to amend his defence and counterclaim. It observed that the respondent brought the application out of an abundance of caution. The court concluded that the application was unnecessary as the account sought by the respondent was properly pleaded as a true defence to the appellant’s claim and was not an independent cause of action.
The court thus dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that an account sought in response to a claim for a running account is a true defence and not subject to the limitation period in s 10(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The court also established that leave under r 376(4) of the UCPR is unnecessary when the account is properly pleaded as a true defence.