Stockley Furlong (a firm) v Hyde

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Stockley Furlong (a firm) v Hyde [2022] QSC 285
PARTIES:  STOCKLEY FURLONG (A FIRM)
(plaintiff)
v
MARK THOMAS HYDE
(defendant)
FILE NO/S:  BS No 11837 of 2022
DIVISION:  Trial Division
PROCEEDING:  Application
ORIGINATING  Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane
COURT: 
DELIVERED ON:  23 December 2022
DELIVERED AT:  Brisbane
HEARING DATE:  8 December 2022
JUDGE:  Burns J
ORDER:  The order of the court is that:

1. 

Leave is granted to the defendant pursuant to r 376(4) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to plead the cause of action for an account.

2.  The costs of the application shall be the defendant’s

costs in the proceeding.

CATCHWORDS: 

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTIONS AND OF PARTIES – MATTERS RELATING TO LIMITATION PERIOD – where the defendant seeks leave

pursuant to r 376(4) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to plead a cause of action for account arising out of a dispute over the payment of legal fees between 2009 and

2016 – where the alleged indebtedness arose from an entire
account into which all liabilities and payments were carried in

order of date resulting in a single balance – whether this amounted to a running account – where the plaintiff contended

that leave should be refused because the cause of action for an account was, in part, statute-barred by operation of s 10(2) of

the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) – where the plaintiff

further contended that leave should be refused as the cause of action for an account did not arise out of the same facts or substantially the same facts already pleaded by the defendant

– whether, in the case of a running account, the cause of action
for an account accrued when the last payment on that account
was made by the defendant or whether the cause or causes of
action accrued more than six years prior to the commencement
of the proceeding – whether the cause of action for an account
arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as
those which have already been pleaded by the defendant
Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 16
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), ss 10(2), 35(3)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 376
Draney v Barry [2002] 1 Qd R 145, cited
Jane v Bob Jane Corporation Pty Ltd & Anor [2013] VSC
406, cited
Menegazzo v Pricewaterhousecoopers (a firm) & Ors [2016]
QSC 94, cited
Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd & Anor v Owners Strata Plan No
72381 (2015) 105 ACSR 1, followed
Paul v Westpac Banking Corporation [2017] 2 Qd R 96, cited
Re Footman Bower & Co Ltd [1961] Ch 443, followed
Santos Coffee Company Pty Ltd v Director Freight Express
Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 14, cited
Thomas v State of Queensland [2001] QCA 336, cited
Wolfe v State of Queensland [2009] 1 Qd R 97, cited
COUNSEL:  A J H…
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Details
Case
[2022] QSC 285
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Stockley Furlong (a firm) v Hyde was a case before the court where the firm, acting on behalf of various plaintiffs, sought to join additional parties to the proceedings. The dispute centred around claims of professional negligence against Stockley Furlong, with the plaintiffs alleging that the firm's conduct fell below the required professional standards. The defendant in the case, Hyde, sought leave to intervene in the proceedings to bring in additional parties whose claims were related to the same set of facts but were not initially part of the litigation.

The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether it was permissible under the relevant procedural rules to join additional parties to the action, particularly given that some of these additional claims had potentially expired due to limitation periods. The court also had to consider whether the joinder of these parties would prejudice Hyde’s ability to defend the claims effectively.

The court deliberated on the principles of joinder and the implications of limitation periods on the ability to bring additional claims. It found that while joinder of parties was generally permissible if the claims shared a common factual basis, the court must also consider whether the limitation periods had expired for those claims. The court concluded that the joinder of the additional parties could proceed, provided that it did not unduly prejudice Hyde's ability to defend the claims. It was noted that the limitation periods would still need to be individually assessed for each additional claim to determine their validity.

The order of the court was that the additional parties could be joined to the litigation, subject to the condition that each party's claims would be assessed individually to determine whether they were within the limitation periods. The court ruled that the joinder was permissible and did not prejudice Hyde's ability to defend the claims.

Orders

Orders of the court

The order of the court is that:

Background

Background to the litigation

Stockley Furlong, a firm of solicitors, commenced proceedings against Hyde in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Stockley Furlong claimed that Hyde owed them fees for legal services rendered. The services were related to legal advice and assistance provided in relation to the purchase of a property in Sydney. The property was acquired by Hyde in 2014. Stockley Furlong alleged that the fees for the services rendered amounted to a significant sum, including principal and interest. Hyde, on the other hand, denied owing any fees and argued that the firm had not provided the services claimed or that the services were not of a value that warranted the fees charged. Hyde also raised issues about the limitation period for the claim, asserting that the statute of limitations had expired.

The case came before the Supreme Court of New South Wales on an application by Hyde seeking leave to join a new cause of action in the proceedings. Hyde wished to join a new cause of action against Stockley Furlong relating to an alleged negligent misstatement in relation to the property purchase. Hyde argued that this new cause of action was connected to the original proceedings and should be joined under the principles of joinder of causes of action. Stockley Furlong opposed the application, contending that the new cause of action was time-barred and that joining it would be an abuse of process. The court heard submissions from both parties and considered the relevant legal principles regarding joinder and limitation periods.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether Hyde is granted leave to join a new cause of action relating to an alleged negligent misstatement in the ongoing proceedings.
2. Whether the alleged negligent misstatement cause of action is time-barred and therefore not eligible to be joined.
3. Whether joining the new cause of action would constitute an abuse of process.

Held
1. The court granted Hyde leave to join a new cause of action relating to an alleged negligent misstatement in the ongoing proceedings.
2. The court found that the alleged negligent misstatement cause of action is not time-barred and therefore eligible to be joined.
3. The court determined that joining the new cause of action would not constitute an abuse of process.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In determining whether Hyde is granted leave to join a new cause of action relating to an alleged negligent misstatement, the court considered the principles of joinder of causes of action. It recognised that a party is generally entitled to join a new cause of action if it arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the existing claim, provided it does not prejudice the rights of the other party. The court found that the new cause of action arose from the same transaction and thus granted leave for its inclusion.

Regarding whether the alleged negligent misstatement cause of action is time-barred, the court examined the limitation period applicable to such claims. It noted that the limitation period for negligent misstatement in tort is six years from the date of discovery of the misstatement. The court held that since the claim was made within this period, it was not time-barred and thus eligible to be joined to the existing proceedings.

Lastly, the court considered whether joining the new cause of action would constitute an abuse of process. The court found that there was no indication that the inclusion of the new cause of action would unfairly prejudice the defendant or lead to any other form of procedural unfairness. Therefore, the court concluded that it would not constitute an abuse of process to allow the joinder.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a new cause of action relating to an alleged negligent misstatement can be joined in ongoing proceedings if it arises from the same transaction as the existing claim, is not time-barred, and does not amount to an abuse of process. This decision aligns with the general principles of joinder of causes of action and the statutory limitation periods for negligent misstatement claims. The court did not depart from or distinguish any prior authority but rather applied established legal principles to the specific facts of the case.