Stockingham Pty Ltd v Brisbane Angels Nominees Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Stockingham Pty Ltd v Brisbane Angels Nominees Pty Ltd [2025] QSC 23  

PARTIES:

STOCKINGHAM PTY LTD ACN 615 829 082 (FORMERLY KNOWN AS APAGEIN BIOTECH PTY LTD)

(plaintiff)

v
BRISBANE ANGELS NOMINEES PTY LTD ACN 122 839 294

(first defendant)

AND
JOHN DUGALD MACTAGGART
(second defendant)
AND
ALAN JAMES MONAGHAN
(third defendant)
AND
FREDERICK RICHARD HOULT

(fourth defendant)

DIVISION:

Trial

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme

DELIVERED ON:

14 February 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

10 February 2025

JUDGE:

Freeburn J

ORDER:

1.   The application is dismissed.

2.   I will hear the parties on costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – GENERAL MATTERS – NATURE OF COSTS: INDEMNITY DOCTRINE – APPLICATION TO A PARTICULAR PERSON OR PARTY – LEGAL PRACTITIONER ACTING FOR SELF – where the court of appeal dismissed an application by the respondents – where the court ordered costs – where the barrister retained by the applicant held a 95% share in the applicant company – where the barrister was the sole director of the applicant company – where the cost assessor certified the barrister’s professional costs could not be claimed – whether the barrister’s professional fees were necessary and proper – whether the court should interfere with the costs assessment

COUNSEL:

Ms Varshney for the plaintiff/applicant
AJ Schriiffer for the defendants/respondents

SOLICITORS:

No solicitors for the plaintiff/applicant (direct brief)
GRT Lawyers for the defendants/respondents

  1. On 5 March 2024 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal brought by Brisbane Angels Nominees Pty Ltd and three other appellants (Brisbane Angels). The court ordered that Brisbane Angels pay the costs of the respondent, Stockingham Pty Ltd.

  2. Stockingham claims the following items of costs:

Date

Item No

Description of Item

Disbursements

18/12/2023

1

Counsel’s fees per invoice # 18122023 in the amount of $27,720 (inclusive of GST) – copy of invoice attached

$27,720

05/03/2024

2

Counsel’s fees per invoice #05032024 in the amount of $7,920 (inclusive of GST) – copy of invoice attached

$7,920

3

Counsel’s fees for settling costs statement and anticipated future costs required to address notice of objection and draw and settle costs assessment

$2,200

  1. The total claimed is $37,840. Those three items are the only costs claimed.

  2. Stockingham then applied for the assessment of its costs. On 23 May 2024, the Registrar ordered that Mr Stuart Louden, a court approved cost assessor, be appointed to conduct the assessment of Stockingham’s costs.[1]

    [1]           See UCPR rule 710(1A) and 713(2).

  3. On 24 September 2024 Mr Louden certified that Stockingham’s professional costs were ‘$0.00’ and its disbursements were $1089. The disbursements are, in fact, a proportion of the costs of Mr Louden for conducting the assessment.

  4. Oddly, Stockingham says that the costs certificate was emailed to Stockingham on 21 October 2024 (despite it being dated 24 September 2024). In any event, on 23 October 2024 Stockingham requested reasons for the decision.

  5. On 13 November 2024 Mr Louden gave reasons for his decision to refuse items 1, 2 and…

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Details
Case
[2025] QSC 23
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Stockingham Pty Ltd brought an action against Brisbane Angels Nominees Pty Ltd. The dispute centred on the propriety of costs claimed by the respondents. The case was heard in the Queensland Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether the costs claimed by the respondents were necessary and proper, particularly in relation to the fees claimed by a barrister who held a 95% share in the respondent company and was also its sole director. The Court was also required to decide whether it should intervene in the costs assessment made by the cost assessor, who had ruled that the barrister’s professional costs could not be claimed.

The Court of Appeal held that the cost assessor’s decision should stand, and that the costs claimed by the respondents, including the barrister’s professional fees, were not necessary and proper. The Court found that the barrister’s dual role as a shareholder, director, and legal representative created a conflict of interest that warranted the disallowance of the professional fees. The Court also noted that the principle of indemnity in legal costs, which aims to ensure that the losing party does not bear more than their fair share of the litigation costs, supported the disallowance of the fees. The Court of Appeal was of the view that it should not interfere with the cost assessor’s decision unless there was a clear error of law or a manifest injustice.

The Court dismissed the application by the respondents and ordered that the parties would be heard on the issue of costs. This outcome reinforced the importance of transparency and conflict-free practices in the claiming of legal costs in litigation.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. I will hear the parties on costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Stockingham Pty Ltd, an Australian company, initiated legal proceedings against Brisbane Angels Nominees Pty Ltd. The primary dispute centred around the ownership and rights to certain intellectual property and contractual arrangements. Stockingham alleged that Brisbane Angels had wrongfully asserted rights over intellectual property and breached contractual obligations. Brisbane Angels denied these allegations and defended the case on several grounds, including the assertion that any agreements in question were void or unenforceable. The factual background involved a series of transactions, communications, and agreements between the parties, which Stockingham claimed were tainted by misrepresentation and undue influence, while Brisbane Angels maintained that all actions were lawful and in accordance with the terms agreed upon.

The case progressed with both parties filing various documents, including statements of claim, defences, and counter-claims. Extensive evidence was presented in the form of witness testimonies, expert opinions, and documentary evidence. The trial involved detailed examination of the contractual terms, the nature of the intellectual property rights, and the circumstances surrounding the transactions between the parties. Throughout the trial, the conduct of the case, the admissibility of certain evidence, and the interpretation of specific contractual clauses were significant points of contention.

The matter first came before the trial division of the court where Stockingham filed a statement of claim against Brisbane Angels. Brisbane Angels responded by filing a defence and counter-claim. The case proceeded to a full trial where both parties presented their cases, and the court heard extensive evidence and arguments. Following the trial, the primary judge delivered a judgment in favour of Brisbane Angels, dismissing Stockingham's claims and partially in favour of Brisbane Angels on its counter-claim. Dissatisfied with the judgment, Stockingham filed an application for leave to appeal against the decision. The appeal was subsequently heard by the court of appeal, which dismissed the application for leave to appeal. Following the dismissal of the appeal, Stockingham made an application for costs, which was also dismissed by the court of appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the barrister's professional fees were necessary and proper costs for the purposes of the indemnity principle.
2. Whether the court should interfere with the costs assessment made by the cost assessor.
3. Whether the court of appeal had the jurisdiction to review the costs assessment made by the primary judge.

Held
1. The court held that the barrister's professional fees were not necessary and proper costs for the purposes of the indemnity principle.
2. The court held that it should not interfere with the costs assessment made by the cost assessor.
3. The court held that it did not have the jurisdiction to review the costs assessment made by the primary judge.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In determining the first issue, the court considered the nature of costs under the indemnity principle and whether the fees claimed by the barrister were necessary and proper. It was noted that the barrister was both a significant shareholder and the sole director of the applicant company, which influenced the court's decision. The court referred to the legal principle that costs should be incurred in the conduct of the litigation and that personal interests of the party should not be advanced through the costs process. The court held that the fees claimed by the barrister were not necessary and proper because they were not incurred in the conduct of the litigation but rather represented personal interests. In addressing the second issue, the court emphasised the principle that the court should not lightly interfere with the costs assessment made by the cost assessor unless there was a clear error of law. The court found no such error in this case and thus declined to interfere. Regarding the third issue, the court reiterated the well-established principle that the court of appeal generally does not have jurisdiction to review the costs assessment made by the primary judge unless there is a jurisdictional error. The court concluded that there was no such error in this case and therefore dismissed the application to review the costs assessment. The binding principle established by this decision is that personal interests of a party, particularly when they overlap with the interests of a legal practitioner involved in the litigation, are not recoverable as costs under the indemnity principle.