Stirnemann v Kaza Investments Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

STIRNEMANN v KAZA INVESTMENTS PTY LTD

[2011] SASCFC 77

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Vanstone and The Honourable Justice Peek)

29 July 2011

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE - AGREEMENTS CONTEMPLATING EXECUTION OF FORMAL DOCUMENT - WHERE CONCLUDED CONTRACT

Appeal against a decision of a District Court Judge that the parties had entered into a binding contract for the sale and purchase of land – the Judge held that the parties entered into the contract via facsimile transmissions – facsimile referred to “further necessary paperwork to be prepared by a lawyer” – formal Law Society pro forma contract was subsequently drawn up and executed by the appellant but possibly not the respondent.

Whether there was a binding agreement between the parties – whether the words “I will arrange for further necessary paperwork to be prepared by a lawyer” meant that there was more to be done to conclude a binding agreement – whether those words could be equated with the words “subject to contract” – whether the learned trial Judge was permitted to have regard to the formal Law Society contract as extrinsic evidence – whether the Judge erred in awarding the respondent all of its costs of action.

Held: substantive appeal dismissed – the facsimile transmissions between the parties constituted a binding agreement for the sale of the property – the Judge was correct in categorising the case as being within the first of the three categories of cases in Masters v Cameron – the words “further necessary paperwork” indicated no more than the respondent would arrange for a lawyer to provide such documents, if any, as were necessary to effect transfer and the formalities associated with settlement – not necessary to consider whether trial Judge may have used extrinsic evidence of the Law Society contract – appeal as to the costs order allowed to the limited extent of awarding an amount equivalent to the amount of two days’ counsel fee rather than one day’s counsel fee.

Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353, applied.
Pethybridge v Stedikas Holdings Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 154; Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; Howard Smith & Co Ltd v Varawa (1907) 5 CLR 68; Barrier Wharfs Ltd v W Schott Fell & Co Ltd (1908) 5 CLR 647; Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540, considered.

WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED

"subject to contract"

STIRNEMANN v KAZA INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
[2011] SASCFC 77

  1. DOYLE CJ:          I would dismiss the appeal against the order for specific performance made by the District Court on 17 December 2010, but would allow the appeal against the order for costs made by the District Court on 22 December 2010.  As to the costs order, I would order that para 1 of that order be varied to provide that the amount to be…

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Details
Case
[2011] SASCFC 77
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of South Australia, constituted by Doyle CJ, Vanstone and Peek JJ, heard an appeal concerning whether a binding contract for the sale of land had been formed between the parties. The dispute arose from facsimile transmissions exchanged between the appellant and respondent, one of which referred to "further necessary paperwork to be prepared by a lawyer." A formal Law Society pro forma contract was subsequently drafted and executed by the appellant, but its execution by the respondent was uncertain.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the facsimile transmissions constituted a binding agreement, whether the phrase "further necessary paperwork to be prepared by a lawyer" indicated that a binding agreement had not yet been concluded, and if this phrase was equivalent to a "subject to contract" clause. Additionally, the court considered whether the trial judge had erred in admitting the formal Law Society contract as extrinsic evidence to determine the existence of a binding agreement, and whether the judge had made an error in awarding costs.

The Full Court dismissed the substantive appeal, holding that the facsimile transmissions did indeed form a binding agreement for the sale of the property. The court found that the case fell within the first category described in *Masters v Cameron*, where parties intend to be bound immediately but propose to enter into a formal document for convenience or to record the terms. The phrase "further necessary paperwork" was interpreted as merely indicating that a lawyer would be engaged to handle the administrative aspects of the transfer and settlement, not that essential terms were still open for negotiation. The court did not find it necessary to definitively rule on the admissibility of the formal Law Society contract as extrinsic evidence, given its conclusion on the binding nature of the facsimile agreement.

However, the appeal was allowed to a limited extent concerning the costs order. The court varied the costs order to award the appellant an amount equivalent to two days' counsel fee, rather than the one day's fee awarded by the trial judge, to adequately compensate for costs incurred due to an adjournment of the trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I consider that his Honour was plainly correct in his finding. The facsimile “contract” included each of the fundamental elements of a valid contract for the sale of real property: the names of the vendor and purchaser, an adequate description of the land and the consideration. There was nothing in the words of the facsimile to suggest that the parties intended to re-negotiate any of these terms and nothing to suggest that the lawyer(s) drawing up the final contract would have the power to vary those essential terms. In the circumstances, the words “I will arrange for further necessary paperwork to be prepared by a lawyer” meant no more than Dr Fuller would arrange for a lawyer to provide such documents, if any, as were necessary to effect transfer and the formalities associated with settlement.The Law Society contract as extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent? A question arose on the hearing of the appeal as to whether, in support of the respondent’s case that the “facsimile contract” was a binding contract, the trial Judge was permitted to have regard to the fact that a formal Law Society contract was indeed subsequently drawn up and accepted by both parties, thus supporting the proposition that the “facsimile contract” was capable of being carried through to settlement. It appears to be clear that a court may use “post-contractual conduct” as an aid in determining whether a contract has been entered into at all whereas the distinct question of using such conduct as an aid to interpreting the meaning of terms is much more debateable.[8] Thus in Pethybridge v Stedikas Holdings Pty Ltd,[9] Campbell JA (Beazley JA agreeing) stated:[59]… The present state of the law throughout Australia on whether and if so when it is possible to use post-contractual conduct as an aid to construction of the contract is not yet settled: see the authorities cited in Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract, 8th Australian edition, p 392-393; Cross on Evidence, 7th Australian edition, para [39290]; Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council (2002) 186 ALR 289 at 318 [109], per Kirby J. The more restrictive view, favoured in this Court, is that subsequent communications cannot be looked to as an aid to construction of a contract, but can be looked to as an aid to deciding whether a contract has been entered into at all: Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 153 at 163-164, [2001] NSWCA 61 at [25]-[26]; Magill v National Australia Bank Ltd (2001) Aust Contract R 90-131 at 91,609-91,610, [2001] NSWCA 221 at [50]-[53] per Ipp AJA (with whom Meagher and Heydon JJA agreed); Walker v Andrew (2002) 20 ACLC 1476 at 1483-1484, 116 IR 380 at 388, [2002] NSWCA 214 at [39]; Independent Timber Importers v Mercantile Mutual Insurance (2002) 12 ANZ Ins Cas 61-543 at 76,367, [2002] NSWCA 304 at [17]; El-Mir v Risk [2005] NSWCA 215 at [66]. …[8] See Barbara McDonald and Jane Swanton, ‘Subsequent conduct as an aid to interpretation of a contract – “the refuge of the desperate”?’ (1993) 67 Australian Law Journal 864. See also J W Carter, LexisNexis, Carter on Contract (at July 2010) [13-100].[9] [2007] NSWCA 154.

Decision

Reasons for decision

PEEK J
However, there is one matter in relation to which the Court is justified in intervening and this is the decision of the Judge not to award the appellant his costs thrown away as a result of the adjournment of the trial which was scheduled to commence on 19 February 2008, the adjournment resulting from the respondent’s late change of position following the inadvertent disclosure of the 10 January 2003 letter. His Honour awarded the appellant a lump sum equivalent to one day’s counsel fee but that amount included both the appellant’s application for specific directions dated 6 February 2008 (Master Norman) and also the appellant’s oral application made on 19 February 2008 before Chivell DCJ in relation to the adjournment of the trial. It is clear that the award did not include any allowance for the costs thrown away as a result of the adjournment of the trial. In my view, an amount equivalent to the amount of two days’ counsel fee rather than one day’s counsel fee should be awarded in all the circumstances. Conclusion I would allow the appeal to the limited extent of varying the costs order as stated above but would otherwise dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PEEK J